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Abstract
Vectorial Realities: Foucault and the Politics of the Literary Address
by
Jiyoung Ryu

Advisor: Ammiel Alcalay

This dissertation articulates the politics of contemporary literature via addressing the theoretical
problem at the heart of Foucault studies. The Kantian problem of articulating the “origin” of
knowledge was also at the core of Foucault’s oeuvre. The dissertation derives a concept, hereelsewhere, from its analysis of The Order of Things to argue that here-elsewhere addresses the
problem at hand via articulating the difference and the sameness that spans the Kantian
continuum of I-Other. It denotes the continuum as a relative spatio-temporality with a vector,
which reflects Foucault’s interest in the modern physics. As a realist and critical concept, hereelsewhere reaches the core of Nietzschean philosophy, addressing the limits in deconstructive
practice by articulating critical practice as vectorial. Foucault, then, aims to transvalue our
nihilistic reality via a confessional discourse along the I-Other continuum. Thus, the politics of
contemporary literature lies in the experience of the Other directly addressing me. In this light,
literature can illuminate the politics of our realities via here-elsewhere, as I demonstrate in my
reading of A Gesture Life. Also, literary experience as articulated by writers such as Orhan
Pamuk suggests possibilities for literary theory to enlighten, and constitute, the theory of the real.
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Introduction

We are familiar with the feeling of knowing exactly what is going in a literary passage. It
is as if the words are there for us, speaking out loud what has been hidden in our minds. Yet the
current literary studies do not theoretically validate the possibility of anyone’s knowing what a
text tells us. The most precious conviction about a protagonist, which functions as the practical
ground for our scholarship about why literature matters, can only be presented as a thesis that, at
the end of the day, remains an opinion. This situation, in fact, applies to the current academic
practice at large; while we continue to produce scholarly results on cultures, societies and
politics of our interest, we cannot claim to know them as realities. If anything, we claim that any
possibility of attaining such a knowledge escapes us; the articulation of reality always gets
ascribed to the ineluctable Other. Thus, however strong a sense of solidarity with Others our
investigations are based on, however crucial stakes our research might have on our shared lives,
the academia cannot counter anyone’s suggestion that he disagrees.
As we all know, the current academia disclaims the existence of any origin of knowledge,
the origin here being the locus where my knowledge of reality overlaps with that of the Other’s.
However, according to Immanuel Kant, whether our thoughts are valid depends on whether it
articulates reality as it is experienced by the Other. The current apprehensions to articulate
knowledge on an Other’s behalf has to do with the realization that concrete violence of
modernity in its diverse manifestations derives from the historical development of the subjects of
knowledge. Thanks to such major studies as Edward Said’s Orientalism, that the academia and
its “rational discourse” have been central in perpetuating the idea of the Orient as the binary
opposition of the West does not surprise anyone anymore. As Said elaborates, the East has been
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a mere foil to the West, illuminating the supposed center of the world; the East had become, all
the more because of the accumulated research that went into establishing it as knowledge, the
muted container of the West’s fantasies. Derrida’s invitation to observe our process of thought,
so that différance can be acknowledged from within the Western scientific discourse, has thus
been central in the ethical deliberations in the scholarly community and set the contour for the
theoretical development of its diverse disciplines. However, while academic language has been
becoming more and more sophisticated and our ethical awareness refined, the question of
whether we will ever be able to present our investigations as pertaining to our shared reality, still
remains in the dark.
Vectorial Realities addresses this question by building up on the outcomes of recent
Foucault studies which, as I will elaborate, has shown that Kant’s critical question was at the
center of Foucault’s work throughout his career. That is, as recent Foucault scholars have it, the
question of how to articulate the origin of our knowledge was Foucault’s lifelong concern, which
he tried to achieve with a theoretical language informed by Kant and other philosophers.
Foucault began his scholarly career by writing one of his two doctoral theses on Kant’s
Anthropology, and even in a very late period of his scholarship was still discussing how the
Kantian question was at the roots of all his work.1 Béatrice Han’s pioneering work, Foucault’s
Critical Project, thus begins with an inquiry of whether Foucault’s oeuvre, in which many see
discontinuities, could be seen as a single, “critical” project. As Han and the many scholars who
pursued her line of investigation let us know, we can regard Foucault’s theoretical work as not
merely engaged in applying theoretical terms to the articulation of reality; his discourse makes
up practices of addressing a theoretical question.

1

Han, Foucault’s Critical Project, 3; Nigro, Introduction to Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 127-130.
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A prominent postmodern thinker, Foucault is fully aware of the subtleties of the
academia’s concerns about knowledge; yet he is also a trenchant critic of the contemporary
capitalistic reality, whose array of terms, such as power, governmentality, and discipline
continue to resonate with the students of the present from diverse intellectual arenas. That is,
Foucault straddles between what could seem two distinct approaches to addressing the real: that
which constantly warns us of deploying signifiers as if transparently, and that which, with equal
urgency, tells us to witness and speak about the present. My take on Foucault begins with this
crucial theoretical positionality that Foucault occupies; I aim to investigate him by addressing the
very philosophical question that is at the center of his scholarship, thereby to see if that will help
me address his discursive politics at large in a different way from before. In other words, I want
to see if we can arrive at a standpoint where we can address the real and be faithful to our ethical
concerns at the same time, through Foucault. Again, that will help me articulate his politics of
discourse anew, which will inform my articulation of the politics of literature.
I believe that it continues to be important for us to address the ground, or the reality, of
our knowledge even in our sophisticated, deconstructive discourse. As a teacher of literature, I
feel the need to teach it as something that articulates the student’s reality in an immediate sense.
In that same setting, I also want to address how the immediacy of literature derives from, and
relies on, its power to critique; critique enables us to maintain a distance from even the most
horrible, tragic, and ironic realities that besiege us, making it possible for us to think them rather
than getting caught up with them in one way or another. Also, I want academic discourse to give
its audience the certainty that it is addressing the aspects of our reality in sharp, focused critical
language, and in that way to continue to stay with its Others. In other words, it is more an issue
of addressing the solidarity with the Other, in addition to, or even rather than, a matter of
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articulating difference from the Other, which is at stake now; granted that there is difference in
between the reality of the Other and the realities that scholars articulate – would not there be
some sameness as well, in whatever theoretical language it could be put?
Bearing this inquiry in mind, Chapter One approaches the Kantian problematic, though
differently from the ways that had been tried either by the Foucault scholars who have been
continuing Han’s inquiry or by those who have used other disciplinary languages for the same
purpose. For I try to adopt, as closely as possible, Foucault’s own language and expository
processes as he discusses the Kantian problem for my articulation of the problem here. Foucault
tries to procure the conceptual validity of the ontological sameness that spans in between where
our experience of reality happens, and where such an experience seems to have arrived from –
the supposed origin where the Other has addressed us – in his articulation of Kant in The Order
of Things. As I will elaborate it, Foucault deploys notions of relativity and vector to capture this
sameness. To theoretically procure this capture, I come up with a term, which I call hereelsewhere, using Foucault’s own language. After establishing the concept in Chapter One, my
dissertation tests it in light of the rest of The Order of Things in Chapter Two, and applies it to
interpreting Foucault’s biopolitical theories in Chapter Three. Chapter three, then, rearticulates
Foucault’s discursive politics via here-elsewhere. In the final chapter, I show how my argument
illuminates the politics of contemporary literature and literary theory.
I carefully introduce and supplement my conceptual argument in Chapter One. After
introducing the reader to the existing scholarship on Foucault and his Kantian problem, I discuss
the unresolved issues in the scholarship for me to take up and build up on them. In the ensuing,
more central part of the chapter, I analyze one of Foucault’s key methodological passages in The
Order of Things, establishing here-elsewhere thereof. To concretize my argument there – which
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sees a notion of space-time in Foucault that is consistent with the insights of modern physics – I
show, in the final section of Chapter One, Foucault’s engagement with his direct and indirect
academic predecessors in the French context of his scholarship, who were striving to incorporate
the implications of modern physics to their epistemological and ontological studies. Specifically,
I analyze Foucault’s “Dream, Imagination and Existence” to show how, working on the
theorization of imagination, Foucault deploys Bachelardian notion and language, fully aware of
Bachelard’s seriousness in his ontological deliberations involving modern physics.
Chapter Two further concretizes the idea of here-elsewhere by demonstrating how it is at
the center of Foucault’s critical presentation of epistemes throughout The Order of Things. For
Foucault, the identification of different historical realities, or epistemes – such as those of the
Renaissance and the Classical – were about recognizing the different vectors along which the
epistemes unfold. The direction along which each reality moves along, is grasped via the
parametric vector, here-elsewhere. Thus, here-elsewhere makes it possible to grasp historical
reality as real, and yet also as différent. This chapter, therefore, challenges some of our notions
that are associated with critique, such as historicity, rationality, and critical distance, since it
maps critique as a spatio-temporal, and in that sense real, experience. To effectively address the
readers in this regard, Chapter Two opens with a discussion of Derrida’s critique of Foucault in
one of their central debates, which bears on the question of the methodological legitimacy of
Foucault’s Madness and Civilization. Throughout the chapter, I continue to refer to the DerridaFoucault debate to punctuate the theoretical implications of my argument.
Chapter Three articulates the political significance of Foucault’s discursive practice by
rearticulating Nietzsche’s critique of nihilism, which is at the roots of Foucault’s biopolitics, in
terms of here-elsewhere. Specifically, it argues that Foucault’s biopolitical discourse enacts
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Nietzsche’s politics, which is the practice of philosophy for the transvaluation of nihilistic
reality. Foucault’s inheriting of Nietzsche is not simply in the way he incorporates genealogy or
in his use of Nietzsche’s insights here and there. Of course, Foucault addresses the problem of
nihilism in his critique of biopolitics, as he understood Nietzsche to have done; more than that,
however, Foucault saw that at the heart of Nietzsche’s politics is the awareness that thought, or
the practice of philosophy, in itself transforms reality. It is in their shared belief in this insight
that we detect here-elsewhere in both of the thinkers. This chapter, then, aims to go beyond
many existing accounts of the relationship between Foucault and Nietzsche by rearticulating
Nietzsche’s philosophy, and especially his ideas regarding nihilism, from the standpoint of hereelsewhere, before I apply it to understanding Foucault’s “political” discourse, by which I largely
refer to discourses on power and biopolitics. So, after the initial section that interprets Nietzsche
through here-elsewhere, I address, in the second section, Foucault’s political discourse through
Nietzsche’s discussions on nihilism. In the final section, I discuss the existing controversies and
issues in the scholarly interpretation of biopolitics, to demonstrate how my own approach to
biopolitics addresses the controversies and sheds new light on what Foucault’s discursive politics
consists of; we can understand it as the “politics of confession.”
In Chapter Four, I show how my theoretical argument bears on literary theorization and
the interpretation of literature. Since deconstructive argument has focused on critiquing the idea
of origin in its evaluation of the Kantian problem without fully reflecting the Nietzschean
concern for transvaluation, deconstruction has sometimes been reduced to a binary discourse,
opposed to certain ideas such as the subject, the interiority, and the objectivity, in practice. The
fact that, at the end of the day, deconstruction does not believe in any stable referent being able
to contain meaning due to the binary structure of the reference system, has often been elided in
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scholarly discourses. This elision, I suggest, sometimes travels back to us, blocking us from
seeing transvaluating qualities in our objects. In this light, I begin Chapter Four with a discussion
of Kōjin Karatani’s Origins of Modern Japanese Literature, to present it as a case where critique
becomes an argument against the idea of subjectivity or interiority, which the author can argue is
embedded in a literary work. Yet I analyze this specific work differently from Karatani, showing
how transvalution is at work even in a literature that the critic sees as “modernist.”
Here-elsewhere can open up new avenues for literary theories and practices of literature.
Moving beyond the largely skeptical light in which realism as a literary tradition has been
viewed recently, we can articulate the way reality is simultaneously experienced and imagined in
and through literary practice. To discuss the possibilities thereof, I introduce Orhan Pamuk’s
theory of the novel, which resonates with my theoretical presentation of here-elsewhere and
offers an array of concepts that work in tandem with and extend it. For instance, I discuss
“landscape” and “center,” to show how they let us build larger concepts for the real beyond hereelsewhere, which we can deploy simultaneously as concepts of reality and as theoretical terms
for literary practice. I consciously apply these terms to my interpretation of Lee’s A Gesture Life,
which consists the final section of the final chapter. The section works in two senses: first, as a
demonstration of my conceptual presentation, it shows how “political life” is articulated by hereelsewhere and vector in the narrative of a fictional character, set in contemporary historical
reality. The protagonist has been living a nihilistic life, which has a direct political significance;
the life is transvalued through the “confessional” discourse that the protagonist enacts throughout
the narrative, which culminates in a triumphal ending where the transvaluation is shown to have
freed, even to a limited extent, the subject from his former realities. I show the political value of
this discourse by pinpointing how my reading responds to, yet overcomes, the current scholarly
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discourses on the political limits of the narrative. Also, the final section also tests here-elsewhere
and the array of related terms, such as the landscape or the center, as concepts of experience and
reality, under the assumption that literature recounts life in a realistic sense. The vectors of life
that the protagonist has been taking and begins to take anew, along with the various spatiotemporal notions that the protagonists articulates as significant in his life, will be re-appraised.
While acknowledging the difference that emerges in every instance of our realization of
knowledge of this world, this dissertation nonetheless argues that, thanks to the reality of vector,
we can also claim sameness between the reality about which we realize something, and that
which we realize as knowledge. Furthermore, the language of vector lets us develop theories
about processes of our reality, which enhances our political discourse on social change and
expands our vocabulary for articulating the significance of art.

8

1. Foucault’s “Thought” as Here-elsewhere

Chapter Intro: Foucault, Kant, and the Problem

Scholarly explorations of Foucault’s interest in philosophical questions have led to a
myriad of insights on how to read and use Foucault’s works as a whole. A focus on the diverse
philosophers on whom Foucault drew in various parts of his career suggests avenues to look for
in the intricacies of Foucault’s oeuvre. While the major point of interest in the earlier period of
the Western humanities’ interest in Foucault was typically his relationship to such figures as
Nietzsche or Deleuze, in more recent years, scholars have also gradually begun to focus on
others, central to which is Kant.2 This shift has come about with the realization that focusing on
the philosophical “problem” in which Foucault was apparently interested, especially during the
early part of his career, helps to add a certain logic to the development of Foucault’s works as a
whole.3 The mass of his works — which are typically subdivided into three distinct periods of
archaeology, genealogy, and the focus on the ethical formation of subjectivity — are understood
to have sprung from the sense of the existence of a problem, which Foucault aimed to approach
throughout his academic life.
Most of the scholars who have developed their distinct Foucault scholarship based on
how Foucault approached his own philosophical problematic agree that Foucault regarded Kant’s
philosophy and the problem of “man” or “anthropology” as central to both modern philosophy
and his own scholarly concerns. As is often noted, it was Béatrice Han’s Foucault’s Critical

2
3

Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 14; Oksala, “Review of Mark Djaballah.”
Han, Foucault’s Critical Project, Into.
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Project that saw Foucault’s oeuvre as an effort to solve the critical question established by Kant
and identified Kant as the starting point of Foucault’s philosophical struggle; Han saw this
influence continue throughout Foucault’s career.4 Foucault’s unusual yet significant interest in
Kant begins with one of his very first academic theses, which he wrote on Kant. His secondary
thesis for the degree of philosophy from the University of Paris was an introduction to Kant’s
Anthropology, a relatively unacknowledged book in Kant’s oeuvre, and yet, one which Foucault
considered to be the cornerstone of Kant’s work as a whole.5 The fact that Kant’s critical project,
which sought to identify universal and a priori conditions of knowledge for the subject of
knowledge, based on the figure of man, makes anthropology a crucial site on which the rest of
his work must be established. This is because man is, itself, the site of emergence of both the
subject and the object of thinking; there must be a clear, distinct existence of both subject and
object for there to be any universal positing of categories of experience. At the same time, man is
also a dangerous site on which the critical work could crumble, since man shows that the subject
and the object of thinking can never be posited in separation from one another. Instead, the two
poles constantly refer back to each other; the subject can never pinpoint where the rest of the
world ends and he as a subject begins, or where his own subjectivity can draw a boundary
dividing himself and the world. Therefore, man remains an unresolved question within the
critical project.6
Critics like Han and Jürgen Habermas argue that Foucault never arrives at any
satisfactory methodology beyond the initial Kantian paradox.7 Indeed, according to Han’s
4

Also, Colin Koopman notes, “Foucault’s inquiries should be understood as investigations of the conditions of the
possibility of the practices whose critique they perform. It is only in terms of Kant’s critical project that the entirety
of Foucault’s work can be brought into focus as a transformative reworking of that project.” Koopman, Genealogy
as Critique, 15.
5
Nigro, Afterword to Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology.
6
Han, “Foucault and Heidegger,” 128; Nigro, Introduction to Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 136-137.
7
Robinson, “An Immanent Transcendental,” 15-18.
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argument, the fact that Foucault constantly finds each of his own approaches unsatisfactory is the
very motive for him to develop a new approach. For example, Foucault’s presentation of the
medical gaze as that which conditions the production of the power exercised in the rationality
and the institution of medicine later leads him to reflect that, there, he had posited “gaze” as that
which exists autonomously and on its own, without the necessary articulation of the conditions
that bring the gaze into existence. 8 Foucault’s succeeding attempt, in which he saw the discursive
function of the “statement” as the autonomous a priori of knowledge — as if turning in a
completely opposite direction from his previous approach — is then also bound to fail, since
there is, again, a lack of articulation of a statement, as such, can contain and sustain the
circularity of the refence between the subject and the object.9 Continued research in this vein, in
which Foucault’s failed critical attempt is again and again revisited and illuminated, certainly
considerably enhances our understanding of Foucault’s works by offering deep analyses of each
of Foucault’s different methods. However, there have been other attempts to differently interpret
Foucault’s relationship to the critical question and his own approaches, in which scholars have
focused more on the areas in which they saw Foucault succeed and arrive at his desired goal.
Oftentimes, it is argued that where Foucault sought to arrive is a form of “historical
transcendental” or “immanent transcendental.”10 While the initial Kantian goal was to show the
form of conditions of experience that remain fixed and unchanged throughout history, the
argument goes, Foucault was interested in finding conditions of experience that undergo
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Han, Foucault’s Critical Project, 50.
Ibid., 63-7.
10
Ibid., 5. Han uses the term, “historical a priori,” which is the same as “historical transcendental” as I explain it here
since both terms refer to the condition of experience; Koopman summarizes the argument of Han, Thompson, and
other scholars who interpret Foucault according in what he sees is a phenomenological light, in order to critique
them. For Koopman, “historical transcendental” is the product of this tendency. Koopman, “Historical Critique or
Transcendental Critique,” 102-105.
9

11

historical changes of their own.11 Han, in her seminal work, practices this stream of arguments.
Power, for example, can be thought of as exemplifying a historical transcendental, since it is a
form through which conditions of the constitution of experience and subjectivity can be observed
and analyzed, and yet are mutable and subject to change according to different historical
circumstances.
Debates on precisely how Kantian Foucault is, how much he derives from Husserl,
whether he is a transcendental thinker or not, etc., all derive from the process of scholars
attempting to point to different sites of Foucault’s development as a thinker or of his
intersections with various of his predecessors as the point at which Foucault began to see how to
resolve the initial problem he set for himself. Colin Koopman, for example, argues that, while
Foucault saw the necessity to articulate the conditions for the constitution of experience in
historical terms from the initial period of archaeology, it is in the succeeding period of genealogy
that Foucault came to practice and expand on his initial problems, establishing genealogy s his
own methodology away from the terms set out by phenomenology and transcendentality.12 In the
process of advancing this argument, Koopman suggests that Foucault’s historical account of the
conditions of experience, rather than deriving from the “transcendental” approach – which is
usually attributed to Kant for its origin and is understood to then have been taken up by
phenomenology – directly continues Kant’s approach, which is interpretable as innately
historical in the sense that Kant’s critical project aims to articulate the conditions of our
historical present.13 Koopman sees “transcendental” approach as characteristic of the subjectcentered approach of Husserl, so he seeks to distance it from both Kant and Foucault. However,
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Han, Foucault’s Critical Project, 4.
Koopman, “Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique in Foucault: Two Kantian Lineages,” 109.
13
Ibid., 115; Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 15.
12
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for other scholars, it is indeed possible to point out that Foucault began to conceive of the
conditions of experience in historical, rather than universal, terms, precisely in the terms of
phenomenology. Thus, Kevin Thompson, for example, in his response to Koopman in the journal
Foucault Studies, notes that we can read Foucault as deriving from the “phenomenology of the
concept,” which is characteristic of Jean Cavailles’s continuation of and interpretation of
Husserl’s original project. This school of phenomenology, which Thompson argues is followed
by George Canguilhem and Foucault, regards thought as a historical experience that needs
transcendental analysis to be illuminated.14 Meanwhile, for such scholars as Johanna Oksala, it is
still important to discuss how deeply Foucault derives from Husserl as well as where and how
Foucault departs from Husserl, because the consideration of Foucault alongside phenomenology
may help us form the ontology of our present essential to feminist politics.15
Scholarly accounts of how Foucault ultimately came to articulate the historical conditions
of the constitution of knowledge or modern subjectivity often begin by aligning him with a
certain philosophical school of thought or a figure from whom he derived his foundational work.
In this process, Foucault is said to have departed from one way of thinking or another. At the
same time, whatever methodology or philosophical thought at which Foucault is argued to have
arrived is presented as the authentic approach to present historical processes that function in the
constitution of both our knowledge and ourselves as subjectivities. When we observe this terrain
of discussions, two questions arise. The first is whether, if ever, Foucault really departed from,
say, Kant’s deliberations or even Husserl’s configurations on transcendentality. This question is
raised despite the truth that, in many different points of his discussions, Foucault mentions being
opposed to, or departing from, a certain school of thought for various reasons. Despites such
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outward statements of oppositions or departures, Foucault himself, as Han initially pointed out in
her book, describes the whole of his work as a critical effort that continues Kant’s work, even as
he explicitly distances himself from deploying “transcendental” approaches in many different
occasions. This demands us to inquire: what do we mean when we say, for example, that
Foucault left a certain school of thinking or methodology? Does it mean that such approaches
harbor some essential core that is opposed to what he turned towards as an alternative? In this
light, Han’s and Habermas’ objections to the scholars who argue that Foucault has, indeed,
arrived at his own conceptualization of the immanent transcendental in distinction from its
Kantian counterpart, reveal their own persuasiveness. When did Foucault ever leave Kant? If he
did not leave Kant at all, what would be wrong in an attempt to continuously gauge Foucault’s
works in Kantian terms, as Han would like to do, even while such terms have been branded
paradoxical by Foucault himself?
Here, a second question arises, which regards the historicity of a certain conceptual
framework or approach: the question of whether a concept can ever be, in and by itself,
historical. If the argument is going to stand that Foucault has, indeed, overcome Kant’s problem
of the dilemma of the establishment of the subject and the object of thinking and arrived at a
historical way to account for the constitution of ourselves, where can such a historicity be located
within the methodology? Such a question cannot but conjure the initial Kantian dilemma into the
midst of the discussion; the question is still one of how we can articulate the way in which
contingent, shifting objects of experience enter what seems to be our stable and unchanging core.
Kant sought to separate the subject of experience from its object so that the subject could stand
in the midst of the transience inherent in the observed world. What Foucault finds problematic in
his introduction to Anthropology is for us to forget this initial Kantian separation. However
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immaculate one would like the boundary between subject and object to be, there is no way for
the subject to tell himself apart from the things that immerse him and even constitute him in the
scene of meditation. At the same time, no part of what the subject would like to identify as
objects of experience can be articulated as distinct or independent from the one who observes
them. It would be possible for us to rely on this or that school of thought to articulate how
Foucault derives from them so that his historiography gives a sufficiently full account of the
process of the historical constitution of knowledge and subjectivity. However, still, is it possible
for us to articulate the way in which they function historically vis-à-vis universally, without
clarifying how they solve the problem of historicity in terms of the initial Kantian problem?
The argument that Foucault has, indeed, achieved his own form of the immanent
transcendental, as opposed to arguments like Han’s or Habermas’, which argue that Foucault has
failed to do so, was put forth by Keith Robinson, who argues for the importance of relying on the
insights of such scholars as Gilles Deleuze.16 As Delueze conceptualizes it, Robinson suggests,
philosophy begins in media res; even while Foucault does not set up any concrete, stable notions
of either the subject or the object of experience as that which grounds our knowledge, his
historical articulations somehow transmit the fact that there are, indeed, grounds of knowledge
that function in a quite consistent manner. Even while the historical nature of such a ground
makes it impossible for us to present it foundationally, it is possible for us to see that Foucault
brings the definite existence and workings of such a ground, which is innate in the way in which
modern subjects are constituted and produce power. As Robinson describes, “behind the curtain
there was nothing to see, but all the more important each time to describe the complex folds of
the curtain.”17 Indeed, many of the scholarly articulations on how Foucault successfully explores
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how the modern subject is constituted through the way in which he experiences his world and
discovers his own truth about it illuminate precisely how Foucault brings out the definite
existence and the dynamic of the “ground,” which somehow interrelate all of these conditions
together, whether the ground is presented as acts of confession, the production of medical
knowledge, or the repeated disciplined movement of one’s body. The significant effectiveness of
such articulations is likely one of the primary reasons for Gary Gutting’s initial objection to
Han’s suggestion to read Foucault in light of Kant’s critical question, since, as he sees it, such
articulations are, themselves, attestations of the direct philosophical effectiveness of Foucault’s
historiography, which annul any need to gauge Foucault against any particular philosophy.
The ironic fact is that, for one to clear such a space so as to proceed freely to discover
newness directly in a discourse without the constraints of the paradoxical Kantian terms, it
becomes necessary for one to provide one’s own normative “ground” to do so. For Robinson, for
a direct description of the “folds of the curtain” to be possible, a definite perspective of doing
philosophy has to be established to validate such an approach. This premises a different “image
of thought” from the version presupposed by, say, scholars like Han or Habermas:
What ultimately divides these readings is, in Deleuze’s idiom, the logic of ‘image of
thought’ upon which their respective interpretations are premised. At stake here, then, are
not only differing understandings of the Kantian legacy and interpretations of the
function and nature of the transcendental, but the commitments one has to the very image
of philosophical and critical thought, of how we should be ‘doing philosophy.’18
It is argued here that, before we can begin to debate on how to interpret Foucault, our different
perspectives on how we view philosophical work should perhaps be admitted and discussed,
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since this is what makes our readings of Kant different. Trenchant as this observation is, it also
simultaneously reveals itself coming a step short of bringing this problem of the difference in
perspectives in dealing with theoretical problems to the terrain of the deliberations on the critical
question that Foucault set for himself. In the above passage, Robinson is really discussing the
different “conditions of knowledge” that were Kant’s and, indeed, Foucault’s problem. If a
certain normativity should be procured for the freedom of thought to proceed, was it also Kant’s
idea, or possibly Foucault’s idea, to arrive at a conception of conditions of knowledge that harbor
openness to historical change?
Deriving from the problems that have been thus far discussed, my particular study seeks
to attempt a conceptual reading of Foucault of a kind that I hope will best address the concerns
that have been presented. First, instead of relying on a frame of argument in which Foucault
began with Kantian problematics and then moved elsewhere to build his own methodology, I
attempt to show how Foucault stayed with Kant in at least one particular site of his intense
sustained conceptual deliberations to develop a conceptual framework to address historical
conditions of thought. That is, I present an analysis of a passage in The Order of Things and
conceptually reformulate the way in which Foucault, after laying out the initial scene of the
problematic in terms of Kant, modifies and builds upon that initial scene using other thinkers,
such as Descartes and himself, rather than leaving the initial scene of the paradox behind. I argue
that, here, Foucault arrives at a definite idea of the ontological formulation of “thought” as a
relative space-time. To present this space-time as a definite conceptual unit, I suggest, in a later
part of the chapter, to formulate such a framework in terms of a relative spatio-temporal
conceptual pair: here-elsewhere.
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Foucault himself never solidifies his own formulation in such terms; after the intense
discussion on the Kantian scene of meditation, Foucault continues to discuss it as a problem and,
as many thinkers have pointed out, continues to address the framework in his own historical
terms. The reason I suggest such a formulation is manifold. First, as I will demonstrate, I see it as
being definitely present in Foucault’s intense methodological deliberations. Thus, after
discussing The Order of Things, I will read some other of Foucault’s works during this period to
show how the conceptual framework innately coheres with the relative space-temporal
framework that modern science encouraged thinkers that were important to Foucault to consider
and accept. As I will show, Foucault was definitely one of the thinkers influenced by the new
framework and, in such writings as “Dream, Imagination and Existence,” sought to apply it to
frameworks for us to think and imagine our reality. Secondly, for me, presenting a consistent
theoretical framework to conceptualize “thought” for Foucault is the best possible way to be both
hermeneutically faithful to Foucault’s philosophical concerns, which remained Kantian
throughout his career, and at the same time creative in my applications of Foucault on the site of
my own reading. For me, what is urgent more than anything in my practice and teaching of
Foucault is to develop a way for the reading to affect the process of constitution of our own
subjectivity. That is, it seems that my own concern to align any particular theoretical framework
to the historical presentation of Foucault is for such a framework to directly organize our
everyday political practice. That is why I want to push theory to a point where it can as closely
adhere to Foucault’s works as possible. Foucault’s works have always seemed to me to have the
potential to affect us directly, such that theory no longer remains detached from our own
contested personal life situations and, instead, offers a way to form ourselves and our lives
towards a direction where they themselves form the most powerful and resistant option possible.

18

His works do not only offer a concerned look at the outside world; to me, they also seem to
address me and my life. If there was ever a conceptual underpinning underlying Foucault’s work,
it would be something open to the one who is reading the text right then. Such an opening, within
the concept itself, is what I seek to address, to the best possible extent.
This, I believe, will become easier if I can interpret the way in which Foucault’s readings
are innately open and malleable to his potential readers. The relative, dynamic spatiality that
spans the here and the elsewhere-than-here of experience, which I argue is Foucault’s own
creative adoption of the initial Kantian dilemma, therefore, stems from my own need to identify
a definite conceptual site and path to experience both Foucault and the contemporary political
reality with which Foucault is fundamentally concerned. The third reason, which concerns the
larger argumentative framework of this dissertation, has to do with my desire to articulate the
political dynamic of language in the contemporary world. Foucault was very attentive to the
centrality of language as a component of our thought. The way in which language arrives to us
from different directions and, thus, becomes different things and functions differently in us, and
along us, will be gradually deliberated on and presented in the context of more coherent
arguments in the chapters beyond this one.

a. “Thought” in The Order of Things

In the passage where Foucault introduces the situation of finitude and continues to
discuss it, he does not “cancel” Kant. Rather, after the initial introduction, he acknowledges the
situation of finitude as having a definite ontological status, as “being” constituted of the stuff or
the “body” of the thinker. That is, Kant’s “confusion” is not just thought of as a mere
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psychological state but rather as coming from the hard-to-believe acknowledgement that, at the
moment when one experiences finitude, one sees that one’s body and the rest of the world is
composed of a continuum. How does this idea appear in Foucault’s actual passages? First, it is
acknowledged that whatever knowledge of finitude arrives from the rest of the world cannot but
arrive through the body. As a gate that opens up to the world and through which any knowledge
about the rest of the world arrives, the “body” is the first term that Foucault uses to reduce
anything that happens in the situation of the finitude into a basic theoretical denominator:
But to man’s experience a body has been given, a body which is his body—a fragment of
ambiguous space, whose peculiar and irreducible spatiality is nevertheless articulated
upon the space of things; to this same experience, desire is given as a primordial appetite
on the basis of which all things assume value, and relative value; to this same experience,
a language is given in the thread of which all the discourses of all times, all successions
and all simultaneities may be given. This is to say that each of these positive forms in
which man can learn that he is finite is given to him only against the background of its
own finitude.19
It is not that man knows anything that lies outside of his own body as a thing, without any
medium, through intuition; rather, whatever value, or knowledge, should first arrive as
something that happens in the very body of finitude that gets to know any event that happens in
the larger world. Desire is given to the body, a finite space in the midst of the larger space, which
becomes the basis upon which anything in the larger space assumes value; language is also given
to the body, and any discourse produced in the larger world is grasped “in the thread of” the
language produced in this finite body.20
19
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Here, it is only hinted that the “space” of the body opens up to the outside space: it is a
“fragment” of the ambiguous space, and its “peculiar and irreducible spatiality” is, despite that
ambiguity, stated as “articulated upon the space of things.”21 However, Foucault’s
conceptualization that, in the mode of the finite knowing of the world, there is indeed an
impossibility of any mentioning of a boundary between the terrain of the body and the space of
the rest of the world, is affirmed in concrete language where the knower finds it impossible not
to ask, in disbelief, how it could be possible that the body of his own being is also the body of
the world that he feels in that body. Here, “be” or “being” becomes the new key word for
abstracting the situation of finitude:
How can man be that life whose web, pulsations, and buried energy constantly exceed the
experience that he is immediately given of them? How can he be that labour whose laws
and demands are imposed upon him like some alien system? How can he be the subject
of a language that for thousands of years has been formed without him, a language whose
organization escapes him, whose meaning sleeps an almost invincible sleep in the words
he momentarily activates by means of discourse, and within which he is obliged, from the
very outset, to lodge his speech and thought, as though they were doing no more than
animate, for a brief period, one segment of that web of innumerable possibilities?22
This passage is significant since, while it communicates the feeling of “confusion” that centrally
marks the passage that bears Kant’s name, it also delineates the type of thinking that exactly
reproduces what Foucault characterizes as the historical episteme of modern thought. That is, it
shows a mode of knowing the world that Foucault presents as definitely distinct from Classical
thought, thus constituting significant material for Foucault’s historical presentation in the book
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as a whole. Before coming back to analyze the passage more closely on the level of its
conceptual abstraction, we should then ask: how are these two epistemes distinguished from each
other for Foucault?
In Classical thought, what is primary is coming to terms with different representations
that characterize anything. If it was a case in natural history and a flower was being analyzed, the
relevant representations would include the shape of its stem, the number of its petals, and the
anatomy of its seeds. The representations of different flowers thus recognized would consist of a
higher level of representation. The very function of thought is to secure the consistency of the
link between what one sees in nature and the tabula of representations that orders nature. Thus,
any hierarchy in the properties of nature can be articulated solely in terms of the relations among
the representations on the tabula. On the other hand, in modern thought, what is prioritized is the
observation of the various functions that maintain a flower’s life, which is essentially not
different from the life of the observer. A perspective is born whereby, rather than distinct
entities, the plant and the observer are all part of the larger mechanism by means of which
diverse functions, such as breathing, reproduction, and circulation, occur in and through such
entities. What should now be thought of as hierarchical is not a series of different visible
characteristics that should be representable but, rather, reside among the diverse mechanisms and
functions occurring in the world at large, which are especially concentrated in the bodies of
certain organisms. The entire priorities of observation change.
The above passage where Foucault describes the incredulous questions that arise as the
thinker perceives the continuum of “being” that links his own body and the body of the rest of
the world, is significant, mainly because of the way it aligns itself with the general tendency of
thinking that characterizes the episteme of modern thought. The thinker and the world are
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thought to be continuous, rather than discrete, by virtue of being the medium through which
essential mechanisms of nature—such as the production of desire or the emergence of language—
are carried out. However, the passage has deeper significance since it shows the way the
continuum of the being of my body and the rest of the world, actually conceived, also enables
fundamental questions about the scheme of Classical knowledge to be raised. Questions such as,
‘how can man be the same as the life that courses through things in the larger world?’ or ‘how
can the language that man produces be the same language that actually existed for thousands of
years before his existence?’ are fundamentally not of a nature that can arise in the scheme of
Classical thought. In Classical thought, anything that is thought automatically arrives as a
representation, which is already defined as something that can never be the same thing as that
which is not it. When one thinks A, it immediately means that it is a thing that is clearly different
from what is not-A. One can think A, B, or C, or A and B at the same time, for example, but can
never think A and not-A in the same category of being, because it is not a representation in the
first place. You can think a flower, and perhaps a flower and the sky beyond it, but never think of
how a flower blends into the sky and call it a representation. Thus, beyond the question of
whether such a scheme of perceiving the world is right or wrong, the situation of finitude makes
it possible for an alternative state of knowing to be conceived at all. The strange being of the
blending of the I into the world, or the melting of flower into the sky, has been, without giving
any room for doubting the possibility of such a being, already perceived. All I can do is to keep
raising incredulous, belated questions about what has been experienced—'how is this even
possible?’; ‘how could I be thinking this?’
The being of thought grasped in the moment of the finitude, then, beyond the question of
how it would be conceptually discussed given the dilemma where no terminology involving
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either the subject or the object of experience is available, is significant for Foucault. This point is
concretized by Foucault when he deploys Descartes to establish the fact that there is definitely a
being of thought involved when one faces himself involved in the situation involving the Kantian
finitude. That is, at this turn of the exposition, Foucault no longer deploys Kant himself in
describing the significance of the situation of finitude; he introduces Descartes to be able to
begin to think such a curious being of thought. Why Descartes? It has to do with the fact that,
when one grasps the being of thought in the mode of finitude, and already finds oneself raising
perplexed questions to oneself about how there could be a being that is, according to the system
of language available to describe ordinary situations, impossible, one is by definition decentered
and confused. Foucault is aware of how, for Descartes, the situation where one gets affected by
the very situation of the meditation, and thereby finds oneself in a state that Foucault calls by the
Latin word stupor, should not be de-legitimated as an object of thinking.23 Rather, in Foucault’s
reading of Descartes’ Mediations, Descartes decides to continue his meditation “validly” even in
a state where he is not even sure of even whether he is awake or sleeping.24 Thus Foucault says
that, with Descartes, “the thought of the ill-thought, of the non-true, of the chimera, of the purely
imaginary . . . emerged as the possible locus and the primary, irrefutable proof of all these
experiences”; Descartes simply showed the impossibility of such states “not being thoughts”.25
Now, then, Foucault is ready to ask a new question: if it is possible for one to grasp the
being of thought even in the disconcerting situation of the finitude, would not there be a way for
one to describe that being? Granted, this stage of deliberation seems the most exasperating, not
only for Foucault who uses many alternate expressions to put into exact words what he seems to
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have an underlying conception of, but also for the Foucault scholars who cannot stop the
discussions on whether Foucault goes beyond the dilemma where, for one to be able to express a
being or an object, one cannot but resort to grammatical language. Many disagreements on the
question of whether Foucault’s archaeology, genealogy, or the ethical approach to subject
formation resolves his initial dilemma involved in the conceptualization of experience, are staked
on precisely this stage of Foucault’s argument. Thus, I want to present the way Foucault goes
even beyond Descartes in his effort at apprehending the situation of finitude as being here. What
happens in his presentation, and can its significance be validated?
It is in comparing what Descartes himself does with the apprehended being of thinking,
and what Foucault himself would rather do with it, that Foucault resorts to using spatial
language. That is, rather than comparing Descartes’ cogito, or the rational “subject” established
on the ground of the validity of the being of thought, with some other linguistic expression or
even a negation of the cogito, Foucault translates Descartes’ cogito and his own alternative
conceptualization of the being of thought, into two different spatial configurations mapping the
event of thought.26 Thus, Foucault shows Descartes freezing the “distance” that comes into
existence between the thinker and the rest of the world when he is imbricated in the situation of
finitude by making it into an absolute, measurable distance. Let’s see again what kind of a
distance is involved here. We have already seen that the experience of finitude involves the
sensation of my own body and the space of the rest of the world blending into one another,
seemingly becoming one. The universe, from which the “speck” of a body seems to have
derived, is also that to which it would ultimately return. I experience the universe, while the
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universe seems to know me as a part of it, and even as something to which it can transmit its
message of how I should live my life. In Foucault’s own exposition, also, finitude involves a
sensation where the language I produce is only a part of the larger existence of language that had
been there before my own existence; at the same time, my production of language itself attests to
the existence of this larger course of production of language. Whatever experience it is—whether
it involves moral intuition, production of language, or a sensation of being in the midst of a
grand dream—there exists a continuum of me and the world. This distance is a crucial clue for
Foucault to conclude that thought is indeed a being even when it cannot be expressed in any
terms based on the opposition between the subject and the object. “Man,” which comes into
existence in the moment of thinking, is this distance, or extension, itself:
Man is a mode of being which accommodates that dimension . . . which extends from a
part of himself not reflected in a cogito to the act of thought by which he apprehends that
part; and which, in the inverse direction, extends from that pure apprehension to the
empirical clutter.27
The distance is that which is established by the “dimension” that links the sheer confused state of
being a part of everything around himself, and thus not even knowing what to call “this state” is,
to that point where this state coheres into a certain experience, whether one calls it a sensation of
“receiving” a moral sensation, a sudden desire to call it and affirm it as the being of thought, or
an acknowledgement that this language I speak is part of the larger linguistic productions that
course through the world. At first, everything one feels—the feeling of blissfulness, fear, peace,
or anything that stirs in the realm of one’s unconscious, together with the temperature, the vibe,
and the outline of the world at large—becomes a large, incontrollable mass; when this “arrives,”
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finally, it gathers into a feeling, giving one the idea that what one has just felt in one’s body has
arrived from the larger world without there being any boundary in between.
Foucault knows that this “distance,” which attests to the connection between the space of
one’s own body and the space of the world at large, cannot be simply affirmed to be a “being” in
the mode of Classical thought. This is not only because Classical scheme of representation is
based on the opposition between the subject and the object of thinking in the first place; the state
of finitude does not last. The sheer surprise that is involved in such modes of expression only
attests to the transgressive character of the extension that bridges me and the rest of the world,
already anticipating how soon the boundary dividing the two would be established again. “Man,”
or the figure of “extension,” which is grasped in finitude, is a paradoxical notion. It both
connects and disconnects; it comes and goes.
This has to do with Foucault’s spatial ordering of the initially Kantian and Cartesian
conceptualization, which we can observe here in more detail. Rather than annulling the distance
as nonexistent, Foucault seeks a way to save its ontological significance by alternatively
spatializing its dimension. Foucault thereby makes a distinction between the way Descartes
conceptualizes cogito, and the way Foucault himself does it, in a way in which he captures, what
is significant for him both in Kant’s finitude and in Descartes’ understanding of finitude. These
two distinct spatialities, by mapping the extension of thought differently, also map our own
selves in relation to the world differently:
Descartes was concerned to reveal thought as the most general form of all those thoughts
we term error or illusion, thereby rendering them harmless, so that he would be free, once
that step had been taken, to return to them, to explain them, and then to provide a method
of guarding against them. In the modern cogito, on the other hand, we are concerned to
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grant the highest value, the greatest dimension, to the distance that both separates and
links thought-conscious-of-itself and whatever, within thought, is rooted in non-thought.
The modern cogito (and this is why it is not so much the discovery of an evident truth as
a ceaseless task constantly to be undertaken afresh) must traverse, duplicate, and
reactivate in an explicit form the articulation of thought on everything within it, around it,
and beneath it which is not thought, yet which is nevertheless not foreign to thought, in
the sense of an irreducible, and insuperable exteriority. In this form, cogito will not
therefore be the sudden and illuminating discovery that all thought is thought, but the
constantly renewed interrogation as to how thought can reside elsewhere than here, and
yet so very close to itself; how can it be in the forms of non-thinking.28
Descartes, by categorizing thought as representation or being in the Classical sense, reestablishes the division between the subject and the object. This conceptual move is that which,
in an “illuminating discovery,” discovers that “all thought is thought”; whatever object I might
be encountering, it would still be an “object.” Thus, whether I might experience A, B, or even F
in the upcoming moment of experience, it would all be categorized into an indefinite X, an object
that is, even before it gets apprehended, decided to be a thing, or that which exists independently
from anything else that is not it. Foucault, in discussing this move, understands Descartes as
being afraid of getting caught up in the situation that he would rather call madness or illusion
again; Descartes puts a “safe” distance that would “guard” himself against such a situation. Here,
thought “renders [the object of thought] harmless” by letting it be possible for the subject to
“return” to where the object is and to explain what it is. The order of the world returns to the
Classical mapping, where the subject safely awaits experiencing an object in safe distance and
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becoming a “rational” subject by being able to offer that the object is “a girl,” “a car,” or “a
letter.”
On the other hand, “modern” cogito values the extension which, as Foucault explicitly
notes it, both links and separates each end of the extension of “man.” This valuing takes place
despite the fact that, for now, there is no language to call what this extension ‘is.’ This has to do
with that, in this situation a dynamic enters into play thanks to the inquisitiveness about the
possibility of ever being able to straddle such an extension again. Such a curiosity, which has
already been discussed as the motive that problematizes the Classical episteme, is shown to
positively trigger a motivation to occupy such an ineluctable space again; it seeks to “duplicate”
and “reactivate” the extension, yet again “traversing” the distance, replicating the way thought
miraculously stretches toward every possible direction — “within it, around it, and beneath it”—
and gathers from there what it perceives. Thought delivers such multi-directionally derived
experience to where it reveals itself as actually felt, bodily experience. It constantly reveals that
the “irreducible exteriority,” which had not seemed to be a part of my own thought, is indeed
part of it, lying simply somewhere “elsewhere than here” whichever direction it might be, which
is then delivered, directly, here. Therefore, exteriority definitely seems to be “close” by.
Triggered by the seeming graspability of such an elsewhere, the search for its location constantly
renews. The renewed search for the tantalizing elsewhere, or a desire to transform that elsewhere
into another occasion of here, is but another name for the constantly renewed activity of thought
or “interrogation.”
Thought, having moved from an obsession to fixate the location of thought in somewhere
safe and absolutely referable and instead remaining interested in how it would be possible to
occupy such an extension and therefore how it would be possible to occupy it for yet another
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time, departs from a preoccupation with fixed space-time. Now the focus is on the everapproaching and receding dynamic of extension straddling the here and the elsewhere-than-here
of experience. We do not know, for the time being, how thought, as it stretches itself again and
again toward where it senses its exteriority to have just arrived from, could be located on the
Cartesian grid of objectivity where everything keeps its positions for the subject. However, the
space of such thought, which emerges literally as the being of the dynamic, has been concretely
posited in the process of Foucault’s series of reflections building up on Kant. Instead of leaving
Kant or taking up a position to articulate his ideas apart from Kant, Foucault has arrived at a
language that, for now, seems inescapably spatial.
That is, Foucault’s deliberation leads him to a specific space-temporal framework since
he seems to be saying positively that there is a dimension of experience that can only be
explained by the way a movement happens from the side of the one who seems to have
experienced his world, toward where his experience as a totality of exteriority seems to have
arrived. This movement “traverses” a definite “extension” that does not have any measurable
value, such as the distance between two distinct points on a Cartesian spatial grid. Rather, this
extension is being itself, which cannot be dissociated from the being of the body of the one who
experiences definite mechanisms of the universe in it. Even while this extension cannot be
“saved” the way a piece of information with its stable numerical values is saved on a computer,
the certainty of the possibility of occupying that extension incites a fundamental
problematization of absolute space-time, creating a desire to occupy such a spatiality yet again.
Foucault definitely points toward the happening or, branching forward, of such extensions, in
ever-recurring desire and “interrogations” regarding the possibility of occupying such a
spatiality. Therefore, in this framework, space and time are not separate; time inheres in the
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rhythmically re-enacted moving-forward of the experiential perspective, which is always
developing toward its elsewhere-than-here, a direction that always has to be actively searched
for and actually arrived at.

b. Foucault’s Theory of Imagination and its Bachelardian Significance

i. Bachelard at the Roots of Foucault’s Philosophical Endeavor
There remains the question to what extent Foucault valued, or retained, the concept of the
relative distance. Also, question would remain as to the reasons for Foucault not to have, then,
adopted a purely speculative approach, taking a historical methodology. Therefore, I would like
to discuss one more of Foucault’s early works that will be useful for thinking about these
questions. That is, I want to consider his introduction to Ludwig Binswanger’s Dream and
Existence, a work of psychoanalysis that, however, Foucault values for his own methodological
concerns.29 In that article, Foucault is interested in articulating how the “anthropology of the
dream” as Binswanger considers it becomes an ontology of the imaginary. At one point in this
articulation, Freud and Husserl are critiqued to better illuminate Binswanger’s contributions. In
discussing this introduction, I will clarify how Foucault’s “ontology of the imaginary” locks into
his interest in, and discussions of, Kant and modern cogito.
For Foucault, psychoanalysis is in a clearly superior position than other approaches to
arrive at a knowledge of human beings, since it values the unconscious as the site from which
human truths can emerge. Moreover, in incorporating actual psychanalytic accounts into public
discourse, psychoanalysis has made it possible for us to think of our dominant unconscious
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memories and narratives in a reflective light. However, in Freudian psychoanalysis the human
unconscious experience often gets reduced to its “symbolic” meanings. That is, regardless of any
significance that should be in the process of forging one’s own psychological truth, a simplified
understanding of such a process reduces the whole of the account into a definite meaning, which
represents the validity of Freud’s set of “interpretations” of fundamental unconscious situations.
For Foucault, this is problematic since it limits psychoanalysis’ capacity to work as a faithful
account of how human experience constitutes its own truth. Since what is valued is whether there
is the expected correspondence between the content of the dream and its significance, the
actively “constituting” essence that is at the heart of the composition of dream accounts becomes
elided.
The subject of the dream, in Freud’s sense, is always a lesser subjectivity, a delegate, so
to speak, projected into an intermediate status, suspended somewhere in the play of the
other, somewhere between the dreamer and what he dreams. . . . However, it is not this
quasi-subject that in fact bears the radical subjectivity of the dream experience. This is
only a constituted subjectivity. The analysis of the dream ought to bring into full light the
constituting feature of dream subjectivity. This is where the Freudian method becomes
inadequate, for the one-dimensional meaning it extracts through the symbolic relation
cannot reach this radical subjectivity.30
For Foucault, the essence of the “radical subjectivity,” or the one that actively forges the truthful
account of his or her own life, cannot be separated from the fact that it constitutes the account.
Freud’s reduction of the subjectivity of psychoanalytic account into a “lesser subjectivity” is
unsatisfactory not solely because it is presented as a medium through which a version of Freud’s
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interpretation of the human unconscious is transmitted. Rather, Freud’s account is deficient in
the sense that it annuls the significance of the constituting act that happens in the production of
meaning. The fact that a certain psychoanalytic case would still be validated even if one
substituted the patient with a different person attests to this inadequacy. For Foucault, therefore,
to be able to account for the element that the patient contributes to the generation of truth
regarding his or her life is a prerequisite for a psychoanalytical theory.
For Foucault, Husserl’s phenomenology provides the “constituting” component of
expression that Freudian psychoanalysis lacks. What Husserl illuminates is that dimension of
expression where any expression, such the most banal indication of what is in front of the
observer, has an aspect of newness, or the implication of being a profoundly new segment of
space-time that constitutes the world. Therefore, illumination of this space-time will be
indispensable for phenomenology to build up on or complement psychoanalysis. As Foucault
cites Husserl:
. . . an act of signification, even the most thwarted, the most elementary, the most boundup in some perceptual content, opens onto a new horizon. Even when I say this spot is
red, or even in the exclamation, “This spot,” even when I lack the words and I point my
finger at something before me, an act of aiming is constituted that breaks with the
immediate horizon of perception and disclose the signifying essence of the lived
perception: the act of meaning this (der Akt des Diesmeinens). 31
Husserl, as cited by Foucault here, thinks that, for us to articulate even the most ordinary
act of giving an account of what one experiences produces fundamental newness, and the way it
“breaks with the immediate horizon of perception and discloses the signifying essence of lived
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perception”—an essence that Freud’s account lacks—involves acknowledging what one
encounters as this. That is, any objective account of the constituting act should account for the
way it “subjectively” encounters what is in front of it and thereby breaks open its own
accustomed “horizon” of perception. Whatever image or language is produced as meaning, there
is a basis or ground that articulates the way expression, by bringing a new spatio-temporal
segment into existence, makes the emergence of such a meaning possible:
. . . something new arises outside us, a little different from what we expected, by virtue of
resistance offered by imaginary material, verbal or symbolic, and also by virtue of the
implications offered by the thing now constituted as significant: by fulfilling itself in the
actuality of the signifying, the intentionally virtual opens upon new virtualities. This
actuality in effect is located in a spatio-temporal context . . . 32
Thus, this spatio-temporal dimension is that paradoxical composite that simultaneously brings
out the most private dimension of experience—what Foucault notes as “the act of meaning
this”—and the universal component in expressive event that is indicated by its spatio-temporal
factor. Foucault seriously accepts the possibility that Husserl’s spatio-temporal model of
“meaning this” can be a new basis upon which the process of production of meaning can be
articulated.
Foucault does not say that phenomenology, on its own, illuminates the “expressive base”
for the articulation of the process of production of meaning, despite suggesting that Husserl
sheds considerable light on the said process. As Foucault has it, Husserl does not go beyond
providing the initial expressive foundation. A meaning is more than what gets acknowledged as a
this; it should also get recognized, interpreted, and understood by others. “[T]hus reinstated in its
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expressive base, however, the act of meaning is cut off from any form of objective indication.”33
Just because the expressive act is situated in the space-temporal framework does not mean that it
acquires objectivity:
The time and space it bears are but a furrow which immediately disappears; and others
are implicated at the horizon of the expressive act only in an ideal manner, with no
possibility of real encounter.34
While Husserl aimed to illuminate that which is “the same everywhere” in any expressive event,
for Foucault, what really matters is more than fleeting space-times; something that mediates the
initiation of the expression, and its fulfillment as a significant meaning, is called for. This is the
context in which Foucault turns yet again to another psychoanalytical model — that which is
provided by Binswanger. Foucault says, phenomenology offers a “different parsing of
psychoanalysis,” or a different light in which psychoanalytical accounts of the dream can work
as the theory of “men.”35
The fact that Foucault sees Binswanger’s work as ideal in this light is stated many times
throughout the article. From the very beginning of the work, he repeatedly states that Binswanger
makes it possible for readers to have a direct access to “Menschsein” or the “concrete content of
existence which ontology analyzes as the transcendental structure of Dasein, as presence-to-theworld.”36 While Foucault uses the term, ontology, here and brings in Heideggerian terminology,
Foucault here is not interested in ontology as distinct from psychology or anthropology. As long
as an inquiry clearly brings forward “human fact”—which is the real “content of an existence
which is living itself and is experiencing itself, which recognizes itself or loses itself in a world
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that is at once the plenitude of its own project and the ‘element’ of its situation”37 — it satisfies
the demands to be a true ontology. Foucault says, at one point, that “we may dispense with an
introduction which summarizes Being and Time in numbered paragraphs, and we are free to
proceed less rigorously.”38 This has to do with his conviction, which is stated repeatedly, that
Binswanger’s work is so manifestly satisfactory in bringing the human existence into light that it
is best approached directly on its own terms. The singular, concrete examples that Binswanger
analyzes are already enough of a demonstration:
In contemporary anthropology, the approach of Binswanger seems to us to take the royal
road. He outflanks the problem of ontology and anthropology by going straight to
concrete existence, to its development and its historical content. . . . nothing could be
more mistaken than to see in Binswanger’s analyses an “application” of the concept and
methods of the philosophy of existence to the “data” of clinical experience. It is a matter,
for him, of bringing to light, by returning to the concrete individual, the place where the
forms and conditions of existence articulate.39
In Binswanger, as Foucault has it, the content of analysis cannot be pulled away from its
methodology. Foucault’s repeated guarantees in this light promise that his discussion of
Binswanger will reveal something about Foucault’s own convictions about methodological
validity.
The question, therefore, remains: are there any theoretical elements that are consistent in
Binswanger’s approach but that are different from either Freud’s or Husserl’s approaches as they
are critiqued by Foucault? Could we isolate or characterize any aspect of Foucault’s discussions
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on Binswanger so that we can see it as complementing, or building further up on, Freud and
phenomenology? Such will be the foci of my observation here. If we could isolate some
theoretical element, and shed light on its justification, we will be able to consider how it factors
in The Order of Things. According to Foucault, a theory of expression is methodologically equal
to a theory of thought. It is that which objectively indicates the essence of man’s production of
whatever that is true about himself and his world.
We can observe those other theoretical components that constitute “Dream, Imagination
and Existence” other than Freudian psychoanalysis and Husserlian phenomenology via
examining the work of Gaston Bachelard. The reason for this, can be thought of both broadly and
narrowly. That is, it can be found in the obvious continuity in the methodological concerns
between Bachelard and Foucault, which has been noted both by Foucault himself and by many
other scholars. A narrower one involves the way Foucault foregrounds his problematics around
certain central themes important to Bachelard, such as imagination, in the article. However, the
question of how to account for imagination, while being a central question taken up in Foucault’s
article in obvious follow-up of Binswanger, would ultimately be subsumed under our lager
discussion of how Foucault aims at articulating modern episteme with as much methodological
precision as possible. In order for me to present as integral reading of the two thinkers as
possible, though, let me note in advance that Foucault refers to Bachelard explicitly to suggest
the validity of his “vectorial” approach in theorizing imagination. The significance of this
referral, though, will be discussed further again.
As I have mentioned above, the methodological continuity between Bachelard and
Foucault has been already well noted. However, as in the case of many works on Foucault, there
are different emphases and perspectives in the way scholars illuminate Bachelard’s significance
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for Foucault. Therefore, for me to be able to address these other perspectives ultimately, and for
the sake of my argument here, I want to introduce one of Foucault’s articles where he discusses
the significance of the school of history of science in France, which he was an integral part of. I
believe this article, “Life: Experience and Science,” would show how he situate the thinkers that
were his obvious precedents in terms of their philosophical significance, especially as a
particular intellectual force intent on solving Kant’s problematics regarding the meaning and
definition of rationality.40 Then, I will discuss how Bachelard responds to this problem on his
own terms, extending the critique of the false binary between the subject and the object of
knowledge into a building of his own unique metaphysical picture, presenting a dialectical or
‘rhythmic’ re-creation of being on the temporal plane of its development. Examining this
innately spatial presentation will then prepare us to zoom in closer to examine more minutely the
arguments in Air and Dreams and Foucault’s “Dream” article together.
“Life: Experience and Science,” which was originally published as Foucault’s
introduction to George Canguilhem’s The Normal and the Pathological, has recently been
brought up anew in Foucault studies thanks to the way it illuminates the place of the Kantian
critical question for Foucault.41 There, the issue is the “historical” meaning of thinking, or
rationality, which Foucault deems to be central as one of the two major trends in the European
theoretical inquiries after the Second World War: “During that era, rational thought was
questioned for the first time not only as to its nature, its basis, its powers and its rights, but as to
its history and its geography, its immediate past and its conditions of exercise, its time, its place,
and its current status.”42 This frames Foucault’s argument on the importance of our re-valuation
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of Canguilhem in this writing. Thus, Thompson has introduced precisely this article to note how,
for Foucault, phenomenology was never simply a school of thought that could be rejected
wholesale since, in this specific article at least, Foucault is defending what Thompson sees as a
“phenomenology of concept,” which is an idea of a concept as already material and historical.43
As Thomptson sees it, Foucault suggests Canguilhem as the medium for us to think the
historicity of rationality. This is certainly a relevant point that should ultimately be considered
for our comprehensive understanding of Foucault’s idea of thought, or rationality. For my
approach here, though, where the primary question is not whether Foucault reached any
conceptual reconciliation between rationality and historicity but how he did it, it is more useful to
deploy Bachelard, who is one of the historians of science Foucault mentions in the above article
as someone who was, along with Canguilhem, involved in the same collective effort, for the
simple reason that Foucault deploys Bachelard in the specific investigative context available for
me. For now, the part of Foucault’s argument that introduces the whole French school of the
history of science is useful for my argument on Bachelard, which is enough for me to establish
an introduction to the significance of Bachelard as it was seen by Foucault.
Indeed, Bachelard was admittedly the most central figure among the founder of the
school of the history of science noted by Foucault in the article. Also, as such works as Cristina
Chimisso’s careful study of the intellectual and institutional history of the said intellectuals
show, Bachelard’s coming into prominence as a major figure in the school of the history of
philosophy definitely marks the “philosophical” turn in the representative value of the school.44
As Chimisso discusses it, there had been various beliefs and approaches to the study of history of
science before the establishment of the Institut d’Histoire des Sciences et Techniques by Abel
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Rey, which was going to be the basis for the power of the scholars who, following Rey, would
pursue historical studies of science for the study of the human mind, or with underlying
philosophical concerns. Before the onset of this definite trend, there had been a spectrum of
interests in the study of history, which included the efforts of Metzger or Koyré, whose aim was
“principally the accurate reconstruction of past theories, practices and ways of thinking.”45
However, the philosophically oriented scholars who succeeded Rey, such as Léon Brunschvigc,
who was the professional predecessor and an academic mentor of Bachelard, believed that it was
basically impossible for a scholar not to bring his own standards to the study of any historical
period. Indeed, Foucault’s argument on Canguilhem also shows the continued valuation of this
school of such ideas as the norm as what observers bring to their study. Also, we have to take
serious consideration of Walter Privitera’s argument that a fuller understanding of Bachelard’s
beliefs on the importance of science for a normative or ethical approach to the history of science
should precede our effort at accounting for Foucault’s purportedly “anti-scientific” attitude:
the conditions should be created thereby for a critique that not only exposes the
untenability of maintaining a critique of reason as a basic attitude but can also discuss the
idea of anti-science, with all of its philosophical and normative implications.46
Foucault was a direct inheritor of the series of predecessors who prepared the ground for his own
historical approach. Therefore, it is worth considering that Bachelard, who was the major
cornerstone of this particular line of intellectual development, was not only doing historical
work, but was endeavoring to develop his own ontological thesis which, according to Bachelard
scholars, is what underlies and coheres his various other projects as a whole.47
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Dialectic of Duration, which is Bachelard’s ontological thesis presented as a critique of
Bergsonian duration, is the most basic text that contains, according to Chimisso, elements that
are complete for his ideal anthropology.48 The reason he builds his thesis, as she argues in her
study of the intellectual history of this time, has to do with the fact that it was necessary for the
school of the history of science based on the Institut d’Histoire des Sciences et Techniques to
engage with Bergson, who was the most influential and major philosopher of their time, to be
able to put forward their own different approach to the debate on science and metaphysics.49
While Bergson had become successful by presenting a concept of philosophy as inherently
opposed to the that of science, since he saw philosophy to be based on intuition and thus able to
grasp truth about humans and the living beings, Brunschvigc, Bachelard, and the scholars who
were doing their own philosophy in the form of the history of science were more interested in
recovering scientific rationalism based on a different concept of science from Bergson’s.50 This
alternative science was to be based on the new and counterintuitive findings of modern physics,
which they saw had the power to challenge what the framework of thinking that Bergson
monolithically called “science” depended on. When we look at The Dialectic of Duration or
Bachelard’s later works such as Air and Dreams, we see that he wanted to effectively transmit
his own metaphysical thesis by building up on the already well-known concepts of Bergsonism.51
Thus, The Dialectic of Duration can also be read as Bachelard’s unique thesis on temporal
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duration, which is modified from Bergson’s own version, based on the grounds of both logical
exposition and the experimental results of modern physics.
Like Bergson, Bachelard posits reality as that which is actually and temporally
experienced by the ones who are undergoing their own life experiences, one instant after another,
rather than something that can be abstractly taken for granted to exist out there. Reality is thus
the terrain of experience that incorporates in its empirical account all the psychological,
emotional, mental, and bodily sensations and perceptions that are experienced by the one who is
trying to give an objective account of them. This means that Bachelard shares the same
presuppositions as not only Bergson but also Foucault, Descartes, and Kant, who have been
discussed here as those who try to come up with theoretical accounts of experience, or what
Foucault calls “thought,” as that which actually arrives at the observer. Bergson had emphasized,
before Bachelard, the importance of accounting for time as that which is actually experienced as
a continuous flow, in and through experience itself. For Bergson, time is the succession of one
frozen instant after another which, cumulatively, creates a cinema-like effect that gives an
impression of seamless movement. It is, then, precisely this idea of continuity that Bachelard
attacks in The Dialectic of Duration where, as the title indicates, duration is considered not an
unconditional, taken-for-granted, and eternal flow of continuity but rather a repeated and everrenewed "dialectical" movement of initiated by the mutual dynamic of the thinker and the world.
In Bergson, Bachelard observes, “the soul is seen to be a thing behind the flux of its phenomena;
it is not really contemporary with its own fluidity.”52 Since experience has to be actively renewed
moment after moment, a dialectic comes into play as the rhythmic movement of time. Bachelard,
in the introduction to the book, says that he is laying the groundwork for what he would want to
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become a “philosophy of repose.”53 Creative moments are not composed of ready-made
continuity; they are constituted by endless alternations between experience and repose,
affirmation and negation, and knowing and aporia.
Already, a parallel with Foucault’s presentation of thought as the constantly renewed
search for, and thus ceaseless moving forward toward, a new potential site of thinking can begin
to emerge. However, the parallel is on a more fundamental level, which has to do with the
consideration of how to account for time as it is experienced. Negation or aporia should be
included in the conceptualization of the “present” of experience, as that which actually unfold for
the perspective undergoing it. As Foucault’s discussion and appropriation of Husserl indicates,
experiential horizon, as it is viewed from the one who is actually experiencing his or her own
present, always opens up to a yet-unknown transcendentality. Transcendentality is not an
immaterial ideal lying outside the boundary of the real. It is part of the real, albeit in a
suspended, potential shape. As will be further described through Foucault’s delineation of the
“landscape” or the “scene” of experience later in the article, the next moment of my experience,
or the future of my movement, is precisely that which, from the side of the horizon of my own
experiential space, draws me toward it; it does not lie anywhere outside this space here. More
precisely, if the aporia, or the flickering negation of not knowing what it is that I must be
experiencing in my body right now— whether it might be a momentary confusion of not knowing
where I am as a result of a shock from my reality, a feeling of getting overwhelmed with
something like gratitude, or total lack of certainty whether I might be able to think clearly amidst
a staggering feeling of inaptitude — was exactly the experiential space that overwhelms me right
now, there would be no possible experiencing of any future moment, for the time being. I might
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have a sense of where I might want to head toward after this moment has passed; but, future
would only arrive with my actually progress towards the elsewhere-than-here, after I go through
the moment of passing. It would need to be earned, as it were, thanks to my own having
experienced my experience. No future as such can be presupposed; it will only emerge at the far
end of this particular extension which I am in the midst of crossing, and in doing so, shaping.
Therefore, dialectic for Bachelard is a matter of logic per se, but more that of temporal
process. There is no future lying separate from the present; the dialectic is the succession of one
present after another, or one present experiential space after another. If there is no experience of
aporia, there is no movement toward a new present. I experience, get immersed in a new
experiential terrain that decenters me with its particular newness. Aiming to understanding this
situation, I move, aiming myself towards where it seems to have arrived from. I walk out into my
usual street in the morning; I notice a man standing in the corner, head slightly bent, dressed in
shabby clothes. A flickering moment of undecidedness about what to “think” of this situation
precedes the moment when I then get endowed with a definite feeling toward this particular
experience, outside my door, on this particular day. I go through the flickering instant of aporia:
what would my own perception of this man be, which should factor in everything else in this
world that I’d be obviously perceiving along with this person, down to the humidity level, the
taste of coffee that remains in my mouth, along with all the unconscious memory of my having
engaged with people in my world up to last evening? What would I decide the meaning of this
man to be—a feeling of sudden dejection about the state of the world; a surprising tenderness
toward an ordinary, fellow human being; or an alarming, cold disinterest? A meaning always
arrives as what was, in the flickering previous moment, going to be my future. The rhythm of the
production of meaning punctuates the endless alternation of my present moments.
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This is why, for Bachelard, the negation in the dialectic is not any negation of an inherent
being or of an internal truth, but the possibility that the potentiality that is there for me will not
be “discovered” by me in the following instant:
Have you discovered a blue dahlia? Do you therefore declare that this flower is despite
this a dahlia? This is an admission that previously you imagined that for this flower such
colouring was impossible. Your judgement of discovery, of surprise and exclamation, is
thus no more immediate and direct than any negative judgement. It was preceded by the
inverse judgement, by the flimsy, irrational inverse belief that there is no such thing as a
blue dahlia . . . 54
Opposition between negation and discovery, in this sense, is to be thought of not in a logical but
in an organic sense. The moment of discovery can be paired with Descartes’ affirmation that the
moment when he has just been undergoing so much confusion, not knowing whether he is
dreaming or not, can be asserted to be “real,” for him, since he is participating in the production
of his own thought then. In such contexts, therefore, the realization of the dialectic is more
important than what to call the state of the reality. As Bachelard says, what has been discovered
cannot be “murmured half-heartedly or caught up in the prattle of reminiscence,” precisely
because what we see there are the “proofs of being”: “it is Being, objective being as well as
subjective being, it is your being as well and your whole reason that you are engaging in this
discussion.”55 This is because, precisely speaking, until the moment you discover, you do not
know if you have existed, since you had not been done with perceiving your world. The
discovery of anything in the world you are immersed in is also the discovery of yourself,
helplessly a part of its being, as Foucault also acknowledges.
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Bachelard thinks that Bergson, instead of being faithful to the feeling of real suspension
included in our every present moment, re-constituted duration from his own experience of
memory, which gives one a feeling of wholeness and plenitude, instead of that of suspension,
undecidedness, and vulnerability. Because the positing of duration guarantees that being would
immediately succeed another being, it cannot ultimately explain the emergence of newness in the
world. Endless supplies of different, pre-existing beings would suffice to make up the flow of
duration. Instead of there being a complete suspension of any meaning for the world that I see in
front of me, there is already a guarantee that, for example, I will see a dahlia, or a sun, a flower,
or a car.
Such a view is falsifying for Bachelard, and it would be so for Foucault, too. This is
because, for them, there is no inherent ontological division between the level of our own
psychological and bodily experience and the level of what is objectively real. What is real is
always real for me, as discovered and re-discovered by me. As Bachelard puts it, “you are
affirming forcefully,” and “expending nervous energy, a little of your living soul and duration,”
and thereby let your reality to be posited.56 As Foucault puts it in “Dream, Imagination and
Existence,” the sens of existence should be understood as double entendre: the “direction” of
existence, that is, existence which always arrives at here, for you; and the “meaning” of
existence which is thereby decided by you.57 As Bachelard sees it, by removing the dialectical
temporality that is true to the description of the present experience of anybody, Bergson reinserts
a metaphysics of substance into his philosophy of duration. Life lived in such a mode, which
believes in the being of whatever would lie beyond the horizon of my own present world now,
would be, for Bachelard, not a life that is true to the “scientific” observation of reality as he
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articulates it. Even the most seemingly objective outlook on the world, for example the belief
that there are objects that can be presupposed apart from the workings of our psychology, was
strange to Bachelard.
Thus, as Chimisso puts it:
Bachelard regarded the view that science is about ‘things’ that exist independently of our
knowledge so bizarre, that, instead of refuting it philosophically, he decided to
psychoanalyze those holding it. He clearly thought that attachment shown by human
beings to the mind-independent reality of objects of their knowledge could only be
explained psychologically. For him realism is an innate, instinctive attitude toward the
world, which had more to do with our desires, and in particular desire of possession, than
with any scientific approach. Realism is for him a psychological complex rather than a
philosophical position. Realists, says Bachelard, suffer from Harpagon complex: they are
misers who want to ‘possess’ the ‘riches of reality.’58
For Bachelard, it is an illusion to believe that there is a plane of observation where we can access
some pure, unmediated things in themselves. Duration pretends to give us a complacent, easy
access to one’s future without the mediation of our thoughts. For Bachelard, there is no
knowledge that is not already mediated, already différant.59 Such différance, however, is not a
termination but rather the beginning of an effort at constructing scientific objectivity. The
dialectic is the first step for us to discuss any causality existing in our world. In Bachelard’s
expositions on the dialectic, there is a peculiar sense of reliance on how things work for us, on
the level of our fluctuating psychological reality. After what seems the most devastating and
irreversibly disastrous experiences, one discovers that the self has miraculously put itself back
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together; sometimes, a blind and sheer will-to-destroy drives us in response to a situation, in a
way that can justify itself the larger course of things. The level of experience that admits
moments of sheer suspension of any certainty regarding the being of such moments, in the end,
demonstrates “psychic causality.”60

ii. Modern Science and its Implications on Bachelard’s Kantian Discourse
Even while such a dynamic, which works on the level of our psychic realities, could be
admitted and agreed upon as generally applying, it remains a question how concrete Bachelard’s
ontological argument, which argues for suspension of any assumptions on the being of the
subject and the object in their opposition, should be. This, in fact, brings us back to the question
of Bachelard’s relevance in considering the philosophical questions that engaged Foucault, both
in such works as The Order of Things and “Dream, Imagination and Existence,” and possibly in
the whole of Foucault’s works. I have already mentioned that, for Foucault, the relevance of
following the works of the historians of science who were working in France in the postwar
period could be found in that they let us approach the significance of rationality as is captured by
Kant. I have also noted, briefly, that this particular school of thinking that has preceded and
prepared for the work of Canguilhem, to whom Foucault pays particular attention in this article,
and Bachelard. As Chimisso notes, the Institute d’Histoire des Sciences et Techniques, from its
early days since its foundation in 1932 by Abel Rey, was an important center where a certain
trend in approaching the history of science was gradually settled throughout the early and midtwentieth century. As she argues in many of her works that follow the trajectory of development
of this trend, there was a definite shift in the focus of the scholars in this period. She explains
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how, up to the point when Bachelard replaced Rey as the successor of the Institut, there had been
an ideal of the “total history” in the study of the history of science. While there was an
underlying aim of observing the “mind” that produced a particular approach to the study of
science — since they believed that there was historical specificity in the working of the scientific
mind — there was still an emphasis on comprehensibility, encouraging “punctilious attention to
sources and an exhaustive account of the wider culture and society in which the sciences under
study had developed.”61 As time passed, however, the relative shift from an “epistemological
history” to a “historical epistemology” became more and more pronounced; indeed “historical
epistemology . . . abandoned” the aspirations of the total history. The historical epistemology, for
instance, of Canguilhem, which studies the function of the discourse of the “norm,” throughout
history, survives this shift. Thus, Bachelard remains Canguilhem’s “recognized point of
reference in this type of enterprise.”62
Chimisso takes interest in Canguilhem precisely for his idea of the “norm,” which can be
found in the study of the history of science. As I have briefly mentioned above, Foucault’s own
interest in Canguilhem also concerns the idea of norm or the normal. He considers such a
concept as inherently variable and as dependent on the articulation of the patients who are treated
by the doctors who give an account of their medical observations. Therefore, comparison
between Foucault’s and Canguilhem’s epistemological concerns remains a productive field of
research, while Chimisso notes that Foucault’s own account of the epistemological concerns of
the historians of science who are his predecessors is simplistic and demands modifications.63
What is of more immediate concern for my own approach here, though, is the fact that
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Bachelard, while being a historian of science, had epistemological interest in his approaches,
which was then transmitted to Foucault, both directly through his studies of him, and through the
institutional and historical air in which he was doing his scholarly work. While, as I have noted,
there have been many works that note Bachelard’s influence for Foucault, they could be
complemented to the extent that the study of Bachelard’s fundamental epistemological and, as I
would show, ontological concerns had been suffering from relative dearth. At the beginning of
his studies on the Bachelardian influence prevalent in Foucault, Privitera notes that, the dominant
focus so far on Bachelard in his relation to Foucault was on seeing how “the father of historical
epistemology was also a proto-structuralist.”64 Privitera notes, however:
Counter to this reading, dominant in the 1970’s, Hyppolite and Vadée have argued,
convincingly to my mind, that without the metaphysical background Bachelard’s thought
loses its coherence.65
Indeed, if one surveys the whole of Bachelard’s work—instead of the ones which had been
translated into English earlier than others—one can see that Bachelard voiced very strong
arguments on the need for modern science to inform ontology. That is, his ontological
convictions were backed up by his interest in modern science, which were then translated into his
epistemological concerns. Thus, Chimisso has also recently begun to inquire how concrete
Bachelard’s ontological concerns were, which came both from the direct influence of his
predecessor and mentor Brunschvigc, and also from his own exposure to the discoveries of
modern physics.66 While her research provides us with much needed information regarding the
history of ideas, what are still needed are the discussions on what modern science actually
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discovered, to be able to consider the concrete ways in which its implications, via Bachelard,
could have influenced Foucault’s conception of rationality.
It took a long time, repeated series of experiments, and collective efforts of theoretical
physicists and mathematicians to gradually come to terms with the implications of the findings of
modern physics. This does not only have to do with the newness of the results; it also has to do
with how they challenged fundamental scientific mindsets and the more or less already firmlyestablished frameworks for studying science. The experiments and the theoretical formulations
directly challenged the notion that there was an objective world out there before the observer or
the scientist approached to study it. The major findings of modern physics that were particularly
challenging, which began with the discovery of the quantum nature of heat, light, or atom,
fundamentally disrupted the idea that we can think of the world around us as occupied by
discrete “things,” or chunks of matter, which successively occupy one absolute space after
another, along the supposedly unidirectional flow of time. In quantum physics, energy seemed to
travel in discrete energy, and in “jumps,” therefore cancelling any assumptions about where the
object should be between the time it initiated the jump and the time when it is observed to have
arrived somewhere after its jump.67 The interrelationships in between the object and other factors
of the experiment, such as the act of measurement itself, began to be considered in trying to
come up with a reliable formulation for their dynamics. Then, such experiments as the doubleslit experiment with light, brought forward the curious hypothesis that the way light manifests
itself as either wave or a group of particles depends on the way the experiment is set up. Real
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evidence of there being a “reaction” on the part of the object observed in response to the
measuring attempt emerged.68
Rather than such a situation somehow getting explained away by Classical physics —
which was again and again attempted, as is seen in Einstein’s famous assertion that God does not
play dice — it promoted other experiments that gradually developed into the idea that, until the
measurement happens, there is only probability, or, what can be only thought of as potential. In
this state, a mathematical formula can predict the range within which a certain object would
materialize for a certain observer when the measurement happens. However, the certainty of
there having been that same object that got observed by the end of the experiment in the midst of
the observational process began to be suspended. Again, such conclusions took a long time and
repeated deliberations to be regarded as plausible. If there were not the interim developments,
which were experimentally validated, conceptually persuasive, and constantly discussed among
the community of the most eminent and proven physicists of our time, such ideas as the “wave of
probability” would never have been accepted by scientists.69 This is because the idea that the
observation itself can not only somehow affect the experimental result but also might be
fundamentally co-creative of the object of experiment profoundly attacks the most sacred belief
of the scientists about their profession — that of scientific objectivity. The history of the
discoveries and the discussions of modern physics is filled with repeated accounts of despair, and
endless attempts by the physicists to fight the most obvious experimental results that they were
themselves making, even while such discoveries would surely be considered first-rate.70
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The attempts to think otherwise of the interrelationships among things, space, and time,
therefore, did not come about in a brisk brushing away of the Classical mapping. Rather,
scientists began to explore philosophical ideas in search of any conceptual framework that would
help the counter-intuitive discoveries and explanations of modern physics get circulated, both for
themselves and for the larger world.71 This is precisely the point of interaction between modern
physics and such scholars as Brunschvigc. He believed that there should be a methodological
approach that should take consideration of the insights of modern physics which, as he saw it, in
its own way attacked such central notions as an absolute subject and an object in their mutual
distinction that had been regarded as established for several centuries by then. He took seriously
the idea that what is observed by us is always a dynamic interaction and transformation of what
could only be tentatively called the subject and the object. It is in this context that he took Kant
seriously for his epistemological concerns; the idea of the mutual transformation of the mind and
the world was central for Kant.
While the notion of such mutual transformation, which he took from Einstein’s theory of
relativity, was central to his scholarship as a whole, Brunschvigc’s actual methodology was a
historical one, based on careful textual investigations of the literature and scientific accounts of
the past. This was certainly based on his belief that the way human beings thought decided and
transformed the things they observed. However, Brunschvigc could not follow Kant further than
the point where Kant articulated the mutual transformative dynamic between the mind and the
world because Brunschvigc did not approve of the way Kant abstracted the terms in which to
generalize and map the experience in the larger world. He believed that Kant’s a-historical
categories of conditions of experience, and his categories of forms of knowledge, only adhered to
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Newtonian mapping of absolute space-time. They are, in other words, not purely derived from
speculative endeavor. “The a prioris of Transcendental aesthetics, that is absolute space and
time, no longer correspond, for Brunschvigc, to the bases of contemporary ‘speculation,’ by
which he meant contemporary physics and geometry.”72 Therefore, while Brunschvigc is
categorized as an idealist and Neo-Kantian, his methodology itself came from his conviction that
a philosophical endeavor that relies on the Classical physical mapping can no longer work as the
objective study of the mind and the world in their mutual, and historical, engagement. In his
time, “objective” could no longer be taken for granted.
The way Bachelard approaches modern physics for his own conceptual needs directly
continues that of Brunschvigc, a fact that is apt for our ongoing consideration of the
philosophical aspect of Foucault. Many scholars have noted that Bachelard should be thought of
as the crucial medium to think of the way Foucault sets up and resolves his own critical
questions. Such arguments assume that Bachelard, like Brunschvigc or Foucault, was also
interested in Kant’s epistemological problems and how they should be addressed through a new
conceptual frame. David Webb addresses precisely this aspect of the question, setting up
Foucault’s question as a critical one, and suggesting that Bachelard offers a way for Foucault to
reconcile the Kantian dilemma.73 Bachelard’s concept of “open rationality,” which is a “field of
relations from which subjectivity and objectivity” themselves “emerge,”— a field where “the ties
between intuition and understanding becomes loosened,” thereby giving more “leeway” for “how
this comes about”—is, methodologically speaking, “just what Foucault needed.”74 This comes
from Webb’s understanding that what Foucault was searching for was “a genuinely distinct
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domain irreducible to [either] positivism or transcendental philosophy.”75 However, Foucault
cannot entirely accept Bachelard because, even while the processes Bachelard describes go
“quite beyond anything that Kant would have recognized,” Bachelard’s concepts are still
couched in Kantian terms, leading to an uneasy mixture of “incompatible elements.”76 For Webb,
Jean Cavaillès becomes an alternative medium for us to think through the way Foucault manages
to present “a more autonomous dimension described in its own terms.” While I am completely in
agreement with the way Webb describes how an autonomous realm functions in Foucault, I want
to add that, rather than leaving Bachelard, it would help us to investigate further how Bachelard
expresses his method in Kantian terms, precisely for the sake of articulating the way Foucault
deploys the Kantian terms for his own autonomous work.
One clue to this question can be located in the fact that Bachelard uses “corpuscles” as,
according to Chimisso, a “generic term” to refer to subatomic particles.77 Strictly speaking, it can
be a controversial choice, since Kant’s neumena is that which is not accessible through sensible
perception. However, subatomic particles, or the electrons, are the main object for the discussion
of quantum mechanics, since the discovery of their quantum nature that explained the way atoms
are constituted. Bachelard’s choice to call that which is mathematically conceivable “neumena”
should have derived from an understanding of the development of modern atomic physics.
There, mathematical formulas were the major media through which the most hard-to-accept
experimental results could be validated as such — as having physically happened in the first
place — thanks to being reliable for their capacity to explain and predict consistently. Therefore,
when Bachelard argues that we can think of something as existing when it is mathematically
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conceivable, he means that we cannot reject what has actually happened, which mathematics
teaches us to have obviously been the case, simply for the sake of a belief in the way “objective”
situations are supposed to happen. That is, we have to take into consideration the significance of
mathematics in the course of the development of quantum mechanics, when it began to be
appreciated in a wholly different context and significance from before, to appreciate Bachelard’s
Kantian terminology. Bachelard must have assumed that, in discussing neumena, Kant was
pointing toward the dynamic between the subject and the object where what already exists as
sub-atomic “reality” comes into existence as an object that is measurable thanks to the
engagement with the subject in the dynamic. If this was an incorrect deployment on Bachelard’s
part, it does not take away the context in which Bachelard was trying to conceptualize a definite
process.
If Bachelard’s relevance can be thus recontextualized, it is again up to us to decide to
what extent Bachelard is appropriate in thinking of Foucault’s approaches. This extent is what I
am interested in trying to explore and capture in my reading of Foucault’s article, “Dream,
Imagination, and Existence,” beyond the point of methodological discussion that has been
already covered above. As I have discussed already, Foucault is interested in conceptualizing a
theory of expression that inherits both from Freud’s psychoanalysis and Husserl’s
phenomenology. Expressions emerging from the unconscious should be counted in thinking of
epistemology; it should also get regarded that such an expression is unique and moves toward its
own transcendence in its movement to produce its own truth. Privitera, who explores the
Bachelardian problematic and theme in Foucault’s oeuvre in Problems of Style: Michel
Foucault’s Epistemology, focuses on this article early on in the book.78 For him, the dream space
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that is described by Foucault there is precisely the primordial space where, beyond any
distinction between the subject and the object, the direct imaginary production of one’s own
psyche constitutes its objective self. He emphasizes how Foucault extends this realm to the
public space where discussions among subjects happen, which he sees is a different move from
Bachelard. Bachelard, Privetara suggests, confines his discussions on psychoanalysis to the
realm of the private psyche. Thus, we have to focus on the way in which, in Foucault, the
romantic theme of the imagination constituting a primordial self is given an objective theoretical
space to articulate itself. This is precisely the thread of the “style” which, as Privitera sees it, is
weaved throughout Foucault’s oeuvre, which merits more fundamental attention than the usual
level discussions of styles reach.
I would suggest that, when we read Bachelard’s Air and Dreams, together with
Foucault’s article, the parallel between the two thinkers will become more pronounced and
Foucault’s theoretical concerns and solutions further illuminated. Certainly, as Privitera sees it,
imagination was central for Foucault’s concerns in this theoretical endeavor, as can be seen in
the fact that the title of the article contains “imagination” in addition to Binswanger’s original
book title, Dream and Existence. This indicates that, in Foucault’s theoretical move to frame
Binswanger’s analysis as an ideal ontology of expression, he wanted to bring out the way in
which Binswanger articulates imagination. However, imagination for Foucault was not simply a
matter of primordial, romantic notion that for that reason can somehow transcend the field of
philosophical discussion—as Privitera himself I think would agree. The question, again, for
Foucault was how to articulate the most private of experiences as the objective moment that can
be theoretically articulated. Bachelard’s “imagination,” I think, should have been useful for
Foucault for such a methodological concern, beyond its significance as a specific act.
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iii. How Foucault Builds up on Air and Dreams

Air and Dreams, like Bachelard’s many other works that explore poetic imagination, is
devoted to exploring specific literary imaginary — that of being able to fly in the air or feeling
lifted up, which one experiences in one’s dream or in valued literary works.79 The book is filled
with literary and psychological accounts that describe the experience of being able to fly, being
rocked to and fro in the movement of the wave, or other such experiences that Bachelard puts
into the category. Profoundly consistent with the dream accounts that Binswanger analyzes that
Foucault discusses in “Dream, Imagination and Existence” — a consistency that would be further
elaborated on in this chapter — the book is about an essential persuasiveness of the aliveness of a
certain imaginary for our psychological experience. That is, Bachelard is suggesting that specific
motifs such as being able to fly in the sky contain so perennial a truth about the mechanism of
human imagination that it is worth being studied in a book wholly devoted to exploring that
theme alone.
However, his exclusive focus on a specific oneiric and imaginary motif does not solely
come from a belief that an understanding of human imagination can be reduced to certain truths
contained in an image. Strongly reminiscent of Foucault’s critique of Freud, he critiques
psychoanalytic approaches that reduce interpretations of dreams to a matter of identifying certain
predetermined symbols as what attests to the perennial existence of certain truths in the
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mechanism of human psyche. One such concern considers the literary value of the motifs —
while it does not remain the only or primary concern, which has more to do with his aims
regarding ontological discussions. Such discussions, however, cannot be separated from his
aesthetic cares, as will be introduced and developed further in my discussion of the book. For
Bachelard, recognizing such motifs as having wings or flying in the sky as the sign of the
dreamer gratifying his desire through the dream is inadequate primarily because it cannot
account for the “aesthetic” essence of going through such an experience, even in a dream – how
could we explain the beauty and the “grace” involved in the dream of flight, he asks, when all
experience of dreaming of flight gets associated with the gratification of desire?80 The
imagination of being lifted up in the air, or a man’s dream of how, in the days of his youth, he
was walking down a slightly downward hill with his beloved, feeling almost buoyed up with
hopes about the future, leaves an arc of flight in the imaginary that is graceful.81 This line, then,
can only be explained by the actual dynamic that attends to our imagination or dream of flying.
Bachelard’s book would be, for many readers, deemed a success that as not only an
exploration of a certain poetic theme but also as a persuasive account of how poetic imagination
relies on the mobility inherent in an imagining psyche. He cites many poems, which have not
been selected based on their imageries such as wings, birds, or feathers, but on the question of
whether they truly incite a feeling of being lifted up in the reader. As he cites Milton: “And from
these corporal nutriments perhaps/ Your bodies may at last turn all to spirit/ Improved by tract of
time, and winged ascend/ Ethereal, as we ...”82 He somehow places himself in a position where it
becomes possible to evaluate different literary works according to their “oneiric sincerity,” or the
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degree of their truth as accounts of imaginative reality.83 This fact can be considered with the
fact that, on this level of his exposition, he has a strong belief in the life of the “image,” such as,
again, that of flying in the air, or, other essential elements such as water or fire, which had been
explored in his previous works. While this approach gives his books their solidity and unique
appeal, it can possibly render one to find his methodology as unsatisfactory. In many places in
Air and Dreams Bachelard does sound like he thinks that image is the last word to explain not
only what initiates, but also explains, the dynamism of psychic reality. As will be discussed later,
Foucault rejects Bachelard for reasons of this kind after having followed him up to a certain
point of his discussion.
What is more fundamental in Air and Dreams, though, is given in concrete sentences
throughout the book which, while it centralizes and builds itself upon a specific literary theme,
aims to bring out a fundamental dynamic. The dynamic, by putting such images in motion,
makes imaginative life possible. In this light, from the beginning of the book, Bachelard aims to
distinguish image from imagination, implying that images themselves are not what he is getting
at on an ultimate level:
… an image that deserts its imaginary principle and becomes fixed in one definite form,
takes on little by little all the characteristics of immediate perception. Soon, instead of
leading us to dream and speak, it causes us to act. We could say that a stable and
completely realized image clips the wings of the imagination. It causes us to fall from the
state of dreaming imagination that is not confined to image, and that we may call
imageless imagination, just as we speak of imageless thought. In its prodigious life, the
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imaginary no doubt leaves behind some images, but it is always more than the sum of its
images, always beyond them.84
The task for Bachelard, therefore, is to abundantly transmit, through actual literary texts, the
essence of this “imageless imagination” or “imageless thought” that makes actual images a mere
supplement to imagination as a phenomenon.
Seen from this methodological perspective, however, it is not difficult to think of the
possible danger or limit of Bachelard’s approach. What is the standard for one to decide on the
absoluteness of a certain image to convey the dynamic which would inherently stir in the
reader’s mind? There is nothing else to rely on than Bachelard’s own conviction about the
aliveness of a certain literary language or a particular dream account. Thus, he uses expressions
which would be hard to accept for thinkers who are used to the notion that there is no universal
language that would appeal to every mind. As I have mentioned above, there is such a thing as
“oneiric sincerity” or the “purity” of a certain image which can be gauged. He suggests that the
images which stir the primordial feeling of being lifted up in the air, sometimes get
“rationalized” or contaminated by the authors who try to make sense of them in their already all
too scientific minds.85 For example, one does not need elaborate details to explain how it
becomes possible for one to fly in his/her dream. But the waking mind, not being confident about
the fidelity of his own account, provide needless, “insincere” details, such as having wings
grown under one’s shoulders or flapping them. While, as I have mentioned, this would be related
to Foucault’s own reasons for not taking up Bachelard’s methodology wholesale, I would
suggest for now that it remains important for us to visit Bachelard’s theoretical accounts
dispersed in different parts of this book to look at the reasons for him to have turned to this
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particular methodology. Then it will be easier for us to understand the way Foucault builds his
theoretical argument partly on Bachelard, inheriting Binswanger for getting “directly” at the
“content” of human existence, partly transforming Bachelard to convey the dynamic of
imagination in a less arbitrary sense.86
Bachelard, at one point, states that it is the consistent purpose of Air and Dreams to
construct a “metaphysics of imagination.”87 How and why this should be so is succinctly put in
one of the short “conclusion” chapters by the end of the book. What he is interested in is the
metaphysics of movement, for which he sees Bergson as an important predecessor.88 However,
for Bachelard, Bergson’s account is not satisfactory. Bachelard is interested in communicating
an idea of movement that is integral to the process of change. This is natural when we recall his
ideas on experience; as a repeated movement toward its own transcendentality, experience is
already a process of change, involving one’s own psychic reality and what arrives toward one
from the realm of potentia surrounding oneself. Thus, Bachelard asserts that, rather than lying
outside the real, imagination is found in the “dynamic,” which is precisely what makes the
continuous transition from the immanence to the transcendental possible. “. . . if we want to
study objects that truly produce motion and that are truly the initial causes of movement, we may
find it useful to replace a philosophy that deals with kinematic description with one that studies
dynamic production.”89 An alchemic change is initiated by the movement of the one undergoing
imagination, which links one’s own immanent world with the transcendental.
This mode of experience, where one definitely faces one’s own transcendental horizon, is
central to Bachelard’s argument. This shows in his critique of the way Bergson conceptualize
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lines of movement. The mechanical picture of the upward and then downward movement of
water at the fountain cannot satisfy us. It does not feel real to us, since it does not give any room
for our own participation in the movement: “It symbolizes motion without destiny.”90 Lines of
motion are that which, as in Foucault’s account of thought moving from here to an ever receding
and re-emerging elsewhere-than-here, develops along the movement of our experience that
follows its own destiny, a specific direction of movement meaningful for the one who
approaches it. Lines of development feels genuine and, indeed, “graceful,” only when described
“as they develop in a certain set of circumstances,” in their actual unfolding.91 In this way,
Bachelard’s critique of Bergson is inherently in line with his critique of Freudian psychoanalysis.
Similar to the way Freud simplifies dream account into explanatory concepts, Bergson reduces
accounts of movement into “visual” or “kinematic” descriptions, that which lacks more
fundamental “dynamic” or “productive” elements of the phenomenon of movement.92
More than anything else, the common denominator between Bachelard and Foucault in
their approach in putting forward a theory of experience is how sometimes, accounts of dream,
imagination, or other cultural indexes become almost indispensable in communicating the
dynamic inherent in the space that maps our experience. For Bachelard, the dream or imagination
of growing light has more to do with the imaginary of eating a “light food,” which can be seen in
the beliefs in certain monks eating the fleshes of birds that fly high during their meditative
retreats, rather than the exhaustive details attached to accounts of dreams of flying, such as
having elaborate wings.93 This is because, for him, imagination has to do with what we feel in
relation to the rest of our immanent world. If you feel light, it means that you feel light in
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relation to the air surrounding you, and this establishes a different relationship between the way
you had experienced it before the imagination and the way you experience it now. In this light,
the cogito is the cogito that weighs.94 As Descartes got into a state of thinking that made the
boundary between himself and the world porous the moment he felt the heat in his hand, for
Bachelard, having the feeling of becoming light in one’s own body initiates a dynamic that is not
just about imagination, but about an account of existence that is more fundamental to the content
of imagination at hand.
By the point when Foucault is ready to begin his own detailed analysis of Binswanger, he
is no longer interested in finding something about dream as such, or, about some truth about
certain psychoanalytic symptoms. Rather, he is suggesting that dreams might be ideal for giving
an account of how human beings experience their world, in that particular mode expressible
through dream accounts. Essentially, he says, an account of the dream is also an account of an
experience. More than any other experience, however, in Foucault’s presentation of the cultural
history of the dream, it is valued as an experience of “knowing,” or knowing the world
surrounding one.95 Thus, he lists some formidable presences in the history of Western thought
chronologically, such as Plato, Aristotle, and such Romantic writers as Novalis, who are
presented not as people who are interested in dreams for their own sake but who focus on dreams
for their inquiries on how knowing the world happens.

94

Ibid., 260. I quote the entire passage here:
We must first ascribe value to our own being before we can judge the value of others. That is why the
image of the weigher is so important in Nietzsche’s philosophy. “Je pense” (I think), therefore “je pèse” (I
weigh): it is not by coincidence that these two terms have a profound etymological link. The cogito that
weighs is the first of the dynamic cogitos. It is to this weighty cogito that all our dynamic values must be
referred. This imagined value judgment on our own being is where the primary images of value are to be
discovered.
95
Foucault, “Dream, Imagination and Existence,” 47.

64

What is this mode of knowing the world? It is where one, through an experience and
sensation of becoming one with the world, gets the truth of his own destiny in this world, and at
the same time, grasps the inherent truths regarding that world. Accounts of the dream, as in the
case of Bachelard’s approach in Air and Dreams, are but a medium through which, thanks to its
expressive persuasiveness, one gives accounts of how such a knowing could have taken place.
Imaginary motifs are thus referred to by Foucault as “philosophic themes,” or, accounts that have
not yet assumed an adequately logical shape for a philosophical discourse.96 Such intermediate
discourses include that of Aristotle, where the soul is compared to water.97 In the state of the
dream, the center of the soul is calm, stable; and yet the periphery of the water, thanks all the
more to the tranquility of the center, plunges itself more violently into the outside world and
sways with its current, an ever more adequate state to feel the course of things. The dream is a
state where, undisturbed by the waking soul, the unconscious is ever more ready to seep into the
rest of the world that surrounds it and grasp its truth. The reason we refer to the state of the
dream, or such imaginary experiences as getting immersed in water or being consumed in fire, is
not because we are interested in such states for their own sake; it is because it is believed that
underlying such states is a deep-seated mode of our knowing the world, which really involves a
kind of our being one with the world, and thereby being able to acquire some fundamental
knowledge about both our destiny and the future of the world. Perhaps it is important to state
here that such a point is repeated over and over by Foucault, with different quotations and
analyses. He tries a re-reading of such passages from Plato, which many say have “pre-Freudian”
undertones98; and he suggests that, in recognizing the significance of the passage, what is at stake
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is not some fundamental unconscious meaning that might be buried under the surface layer of
Plato’s accounts. Rather, in referring to dreams, the accounts bring to light the actual spatial
relations that exist in between the one who experiences the world and the world itself that would
then illuminate what it means to know the way that is valued by such thinkers as Plato.
The indispensability of cultural indexes for the articulation of a theory of knowledge
would then be shown, in his subsequent analysis, in the way he seeks to present Binswanger’s
psychoanalytical accounts whereby they are heavily charged with motifs such as fire, light or
darkness. And yet, through such language, Foucault continues to present some fundamental ideas
about the spatial and mobile mechanism that plays itself out in the scene of knowing.
Particularly—and this is certainly not all of the picture, and would be complemented later on—
Foucault is very specific about the fact that experience of dreaming, or imagining, is about an
objective constituting of oneself as a movement, and a “free” movement, toward one’s own
destiny in his world.99 Innate in this idea is that dream reveals the ultimate paradox that lies in a
mode of existence where, while one proceeds towards his own future out of his sheer free will to
realize himself, a trajectory of life is thereby constituted only under the constraints of the
objective conditions available in the world where he lives. Dream is thus the only, and most
adequate, means to reveal the way how when one feels exactly like the whole world belongs to
him since everything he has ever wanted has become realized or is likely to be realized – that
moment, on its reverse side, points towards his ultimate destiny on this trajectory of his life – his
death. Foucault thus discusses how Calpurnia’s dream about Caesar is both about “the entire
power and freedom of the imperator who shakes the world,” and, at the same time, about “the
risks he runs and his imminent assassination.”100 Dreams of death are the ultimate accounts of
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this limit point in any attempt at understanding dream on the level of content only; they trace out
the trajectory of the movement of life which is an ironic combination of the free movement
towards transcending one’s present self, and the objective necessities with which the world
shapes such a free movement into one’s destiny. A dream of death, therefore, instead of letting
the sleeping man sleep, wakes him up and lets him face his future where his destiny lies.
Foucault cites from Macbeth here: “Banquo and Donalbain! Malcolm! Awake/ Shake off this
downy sleep, death’s counterfeit,/ And look on death itself!”101
This specific mechanism of experience, thanks to its layout, aligns one to the vector in
which his transcendence lies. This direction is that which cannot be dissociated from the
dynamic that the back-and-forward moment of the one going toward his transcendence, in
relation to the world that approaches him, establishes. Within this directed movement, elements
of “objective” necessities, or unchangeable conditions, of experience cannot be precisely told
apart from the elements that depend entirely on the free, desire-filled movement of the one
progressing along life. Transcendence here is that which is always recognized as something that
somehow seems to have been already decided for me, as something that feels strangely natural or
neutral — despite the fact that, in order to find such truths, one has had to step into a journey
which so powerfully and irresistibly has drawn him in. It is inevitable, then, that Foucault values
this element of vector as an integral theoretical element in the concept of experience. It has been
seen that, in The Order of Things, Foucault makes it clear that the momentary distance that
comes into being in between the here and elsewhere of the space of thought is also that which
disconnects the two ends, since there is no way such a distance can make the distance between
the inside and the outside, or, the immanence and the transcendence, of thought, fixed or
101
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decided. The distance is always out of grasp, appearing and then disappearing like a mirage;
momentary “furrows” of space-time which, as soon as coming into existence would then soon be
erased. This is the way Foucault describes, at the end of The Order of Things, how the concept of
man is like a drawing on the sand giving in to the waves and vanishing like a dream.102 However,
Foucault at the same time values the objective nature of these phenomena. The flight toward the
future is not just about one’s own solitary journey, but about, as Foucault puts it in “Dream,
Imagination and Existence,” a “originative responsibility” or “radical responsibility” — it is a
question of how my advance literally makes the world. Thus, the phenomenon of thought is of an
ethical import.103 That is, while there seems to be hardly any room for any subjective element on
the level of our mere observation of the world, the element of transcendentality that is innate in
the objective constituent of space-time of that occasion, constitutes the occasion as something of
our own making.
It is on this level that Bachelard’s suggestions on the ethical dimension of science should
be taken as well. The ethical dimension of Bachelard’s ideas is getting renewed attention; also,
how to understand it and to apply it to Foucault studies remains an unfulfilled task. For
Bachelard, “In the realm of images, there is no way to separate the normative and the
descriptive,” because “the imagination is necessarily valorization.”104 In other words, we cannot
imagine without valorizing:
As long as an image does not reveal its value by beauty, or, to speak more dynamically,
feeling the value of beauty, as long as it does not have a pancalist and pancalizing
function or find a place for one who imagines in a world of beauty, then it is not fulfilling
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its dynamic function. If it does not lift up the psyche, it does not transform it. For this
reason, a philosophy that expresses itself in images must put absolute trust in them, or
else it will lose a part of its force. A doctrine on the psyche that posits it as essentially
expressive, imaginative, and valorizing in nature will always, in any circumstance,
associate image and value.105
For Bachelard, it is possible for us to discuss the “hierarchy” in this valorizing function:
“A doctrine of the imaginary must work on the task of defining this hierarchy.”106 Thus, it is
possible for us to “measure” to amount the resistance created by an upwardly surging
imagination against a matter that heavily weighs down on it.107 It is natural for the philosophers
of life to value that which “proliferates” life, and try to bring, like alchemists, dead matters that
devalue life into a direction that breathes life into them.108 Rather, just as in the case of Foucault
where he chooses to use actual psychoanalytic cases, together with “essential” cultural indexes
such as fire or water, for his theoretical project to be able to discuss a theory of expression on an
ontological plane, Bachelard uses literary motifs for us to gauge the different ways in which we,
in our different space-temporal reality, experience each of our own transcendentals. This seems
to have to do with the irony that, while we might agree that an irreducibly unpredictable newness
is brought into the scene of our observation, what we actually experience is always reckoned as
what ‘I have just recognized,’ as something that was already there before my observation, as part
of my own ordinary world. (What is ‘new’ in the way the sky hovering above the building of my
office feels new to me this morning?) While the feeling includes an element of newness, the
object can always be expressed with a language that is already available for us. In practical
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terms, therefore, transcendental experience cannot be discussed in separation from those things
that enable us to have such experiences; Bachelard can thus discuss the different “infinities” in
which people experience their transcendentals. “Tell me which infinity attracts you, and I will
know the meaning of your world. Is it the infinity of the sea, or the sky, or the depth of the earth,
or the one found in the pyre?”109 Such questions are central to Bachelard’s methodology in the
period when he has, beyond The Dialectic of Duration, has begun using literary language to
directly invite readers for an “imaginary journey,” encouraging them to recognize the dynamic
that attaches them to the images.110 This is because he centers each book on different matters, or
elements, which for him seem to be the most familiar motifs of sublimation in dream accounts
and literary works in the culture that he is embedded in. Therefore, seeing the different books
together gives a feeling that, while each of them is devoted to transmitting the same feelings or
ideas — that of the movement of the imagination — there indeed are different ways in which
readers can feel such dynamics. Such difference is, again, even in figurative terms, expressed in
terms of differences in the “directions” in which the imaginative dynamic moves. There is an
imagination of melting into the rest of the world, for example, while there is also an imagination
of plummeting down to the bottom of the earth.
Such “differentials” in the imaginary of transcendental themes, therefore,
comprehensively work as an argument for the reality of the vectorial “values” in our experience
of the world. This point is precisely what Foucault acknowledges by organizing his own
presentation of Binswanger’s analysis — the most central part of his argument — along the
different vectors in which dream accounts are organized. Having acknowledged, in his previous
section on the cultural history of the dream, the fundamental significance of the motifs of the
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dream as that which directly mediates discourse of the imaginary and epistemological
experiences, Foucault now argues that Binswanger has “empirically” proved the significance of
the working of such fundamentals.111 That is, he is, by way of Binswanger, suggesting that there
are irreducible cultural denominators that map the dynamic space that comes into existence, and
it is just that dream accounts work as such cultural denominators, which is definitely proven by
Binswanger’s anthropological account of the dream analysis. However, Foucault does not
straightforwardly import the way Bachelard marks his different transcendentals with different
images. In the process where Foucault applies Bachelard for his argument there is an interesting
displacement that comes from Foucault’s own concerns about making “image” the last word to
discuss the significance of the dream experience. To what extent Bachelard is important for
Foucault, and how exactly Foucault intends to distance himself from Bachelard and thereby, as I
will show, tries to remain true to the fundamental philosophical implications that Bachelard’s
project points toward, should then be clarified.
After discussing the several significant vectorial modes that experience takes in its dream
mode — which will be discussed in detail later in the chapter — Foucault presents a critique of
the theory of imagination which centralizes the image. Here, the theorist he uses is Sartre, who is
useful for Foucault precisely because of the merits and limitations Sartre presents for the
construction of the theory of imagination. For Sartre, the imaginary act is that which “invokes”
the “perception” of that which is hoped to be there, in a reality marked by the absence of the
object of the imagination.112 While Foucault agrees with this point to the extent that he would not
want the object of the imagination to characterize the imaginative act itself, he is no longer with
Sartre when Sartre, as Foucault sees it, centralizes the “absence” of that which is to be imagined,
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or, along with it, the “irreality” of that which is imagined, as the quintessential characteristics of
the imaginative act113:
I am trying to imagine today what Peter will do when he gets such and such news.
Agreed, Peter’s absence surrounds and circumscribes the movement of my imagination.
But that absence was already there, before I imagined; and not in some implicit way, but
in the keen mode of my regret at not having seen him for a year. That absence was
already present, in the very things, the familiar things which today still bear the mark of
his departure. Absence precedes and colors my imagination, but it is neither the condition
of its possibility nor its eidetic index.114
For Foucault, the fact that something is absent is not in itself essential to the act that attempts at
its imaginative presentation. Sometimes, if someone is absent, it alone would bear too much on
me to be able to imagine him; sometimes, it is possible even to imagine Peter while he is sitting
right in front of me.115
For Foucault, it is impossible to think of the image as that which is irreal or as the
negation of presence because such a conceptualization transmits a wrong idea of the spatial
dynamic that works in our imaginative practice. The opposition between the real and the unreal,
or that between presence and absence, leads to a wrong spatial mapping of the imaginative
situation:
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When in imagination I see him in his room, I do not imagine myself peering at him
through the keyhole, or watching him from the outside. Nor is it quite right to say that I
transport myself magically into his room, where I remain invisible. To imagine is not to
actualize the fable of the little mouse, it is not to transport oneself into the world of
Peter.116
Imagination does not actualize a spatial relation between the one who imagines and the world
which is imagined — a world where Peter is present — in a way which sets up an actual world
where there is no Peter, and then an imaginary one where he is. It is a mode in which every part
of this world is intimately known to me, since whatever arrives at me about this world, I feel as
my own experience, in me. Whatever happens in this world, I know as something which has
happened on the extension of my own becoming, precisely in the sense discussed by Aristotle,
where, in dream, one seeps into the rest of the world, merges with it, and knows it as part of
myself:
To imagine . . . is to become the world where he is: I am the letter he is reading; I
conjure myself from that look of attentive reader; I am the wall of his room that watch
him from all sides and hence do not “see” him. But I am also his gaze and his
attentiveness, his dissatisfaction or his surprise before the letter. I am not only absolute
master of what he is doing, I am what he is doing, I am what he is.117
This is not a world that exists outside oneself; rather, it exists, in a sense, thanks to my coconstitution with it. The world and I exist together or come into existence together. It would not
be there if I did not know it through its every corner, precisely through an experience that cannot
be constituted without me actually feeling it.
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Foucault concretizes such a distinct spatial idea further by putting what he is trying to
express into theoretical terms, which transmits precisely Bachelard’s idea of constitution of
experience as a definite vectorial movement which, in its dialectic, achieves a transition from the
realm of immanence to that of the transcendental.
[the fact that, in imagination, I am precisely everywhere which constitutes my knowledge
of Peter] is why imagination adds nothing new to what I already know. Yet it would be
incorrect to say that it brings nothing and teaches me nothing. The imaginary is not to be
confused with immanence, and is not even exhausted in that formal transcendence of
whatever delineates itself as irreal. The imaginary is transcendent. Not with the
“objective” transcendence (as in W. Szilasi’s sense of the term), since the moment I
imagine Peter, he obeys me; each of his gestures fulfills my expectations, and finally he
even comes to see me because I want him to do so. But the imaginary gives itself as a
transcendence where, without learning anything unknown to me, I can “recognize” my
destiny. Even in imagination, or rather, especially in my imagination, I do not obey
myself, I am not my own master . . . In Peter’s imagined return, I am not there, before
him, because I am everywhere, around him, and in him; I do not talk with him, I hold
forth . . . I ‘stage him.’118
Imagination is distinguished from mere fantasy or the sheer inverse picture of reality because it
actually “obeys” the knowledge I have of things.119 I have definite material, derived from the real
knowledge of the world, and imagination can only be constructed with this given material. To
this extent, imagination stays with immanence. However, there is a certain something that can
only be learned or recognized when I imagine the things that I had not known before this
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imagination. This new thing, the moment it reaches me, already presents itself as something that
is not foreign, as something that is “recognizable.” That is why transcendence can never be
thought of as anything that lies beyond the horizon of the real, but as that which becomes real in
the movement of the imagination.
Imagination, therefore, is something that makes any mechanical dichotomy between the
real and the unreal meaningless. Rather, it should be noted that the vectorial movement that gets
established between immanence and transcendence makes the “becoming” of a “newer” reality
possible, and that should be the definite way in which we theorize the spatial relations that come
into existence when we imagine. The extent to which Foucault values this framework is shown
by the very end of this entire article where he posits imagination not as supplementary to, or
opposite from, reality, but as that which is central to the understanding of what reality means for
us. If imagination can be regarded not as a negation of reality, but precisely as a dynamic which
reconstructs immanence in the plastic movement of thinking, then the working of imagination is
at the heart of our perception of reality in the first place:
. . . it is . . . through the imaginary that the original meaning of reality is disclosed.
Therefore, it cannot exclude reality. At the very heart of perception it can throw into
bright light the secret and hidden power at work in the most manifest forms of
presence.120
Situating imagination “at the very heart of perception,” Foucault is really here overturning the
familiar hierarchy between reality and imagination and setting imagination at the center of the
conceptual framework of our mapping of the real. This parallels his former move of this kind
where, overturning the familiar conception of the dream as a subcategory of imagination, he
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posits it as an indispensable framework to understanding imagination as an experience. If dream
is indispensable for us to understand imagination, and imagination is necessary to understand the
way we experience reality, then, now he can posit dream as the framework to understand the
coming into existence of reality. The “anthropology of the dream,” exemplified in the
Binswanger’s studies, thus assumes ontological significance.
In these displacements, what is again revealed is the importance of the ontological basis
that undergirds Bachelard, which is central in Foucault’s conceptual mapping of the dream
scene. That is, we have to inquire to what extent Foucault tries to preserve the “spatial”
philosophy which is Bachelard’s, which, as has been already noted, fundamentally derives from
the conceptual implications of the theory of relativity, which challenges the Newtonian
framework of absolute space-time. From now on, I will observe how much such an alternative
conceptual mapping of the world is important to Foucault’s theory of the dream. Ultimately, this
will give us an opportunity to see how concrete Foucault’s sense of the conceptual dynamic that
grounds our experience of the world should be.
While dream experience unmistakably involves an experience of becoming one with the
world, of losing oneself in the midst of things which cannot be distinguished from his own body
(which is marked by Kant’s moment of finitude), this does not mean a mere mechanical
continuation of such a state. Since this mode of experience is fundamentally situated on the
trajectory of one’s own life, and happens because of the drive to more concretely approach, and
know, one’s own future, it has definite moments of closure. That is, the state where everything in
the world addresses one and throws one into a sensation of getting lost in the midst of
everything, gears one toward a moment when the world would arrive at one as a definite sense,
or, a meaning. This dimension is that which the kind of psychoanalysis that only regards the
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meaning of the dream on the level of signification cannot reach, which is seen in its incapacity to
interpret the dream of death in its full significance:
It is doubtless no accident that Freud was halted, in his dream interpretation, by the
recounting of dreams of death. They marked, in effect, the absolute limit to the biological
principle of the satisfaction of desire; they showed, Freud sensed only too keenly, the
need for a dialectic.121
What is a “dialectic” here? It is not a “rudimentary opposition” between the “organic in the
inorganic” that death should divide and set up as contradictions. The moments of “closure” that
dream experiences have to constantly achieve have to do with the fact that the closure happens
along the trajectory of one’s life. Life definitely tends toward its future, a point that lies further
along the trajectory. It is facing and moving toward a definite point where what it desires at the
present would be fulfilled and “totalized”:
The imagination does not tend to halt the movement of existence, but to totalize it. One
always imagines the decisive, the definitive, that which is thenceforward going to be
closed. What we imagine is of the order of a solution, not a task. Happiness and
unhappiness are inscribed in the imagination’s register, not duty and virtue. This is why
the major forms of imagination are aligned with suicide. Or rather, suicide appears as the
absolute of imaginary behaviors: every suicidal desire is filled by that world in which I
would no longer be present here, or there, but everywhere, in every sector: a world
transparent to me and signifying its indebtedness to my absolute presence.122
Thanks to the dialectic of the constant moving from a here from which a desire arises and leads
me to an elsewhere-than-here where I move along the trajectory of my life, I constantly fluctuate
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between a state of ‘wanting to arrive at a state where I am in total oneness with the world,’ and a
state where such a desire is totalized, closed, and felt by me. This is why death in a dream “no
longer speaks of life interrupted, but of the fulfillment of existence, showing forth the moment in
which life reaches its fullness in a world about to close in.”123
Foucault makes clear the difference in the levels of the meaning of a dream or that of a
dream of death between that of his own framework and of what Freud offers. The difference
especially appears when Foucault attempts to illuminate the dream of Dora, which Freud had
admitted his own lack of capacity to fully understand. What Freud does not see is that when Dora
gives an account of the dream where she does not feel sad at all at the news of her father and
removes herself from the company of her family and begins to read a big book, she is not only
talking about herself or about the characters of her dream. The dream is also addressed to Freud
himself, where she is stating that she has chosen her own solitary path, having rejected the
psychoanalytic practice itself, which is just another occasion of the grand complicity of men in
an attempt at gratifying their virile desire. Having taken up lesbian sexuality, she is, in giving
account of her dream, stating that “I am abandoning you and continuing my journey alone.”124
Freud, who cannot place himself on the trajectory of Ellen West’s life, cannot reach this kind of
knowledge:
Dora got better, not despite the interruption of the psychoanalysis, but because, by
deciding to break it off, she went the whole distance to that solitude toward which until
then her existence had been only an indecisive movement.125
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Dialectic is that which is graspable only from a point of view that apprehends this trajectory, a
trajectory that is initiated by the movement of the dream itself. The dream subject is “the
coming-to-be and the totality of the existence itself,” instead of anything that is recognizable on
the level of representation in the dream account. Foucault presents Binswanger’s analysis of the
dream of a young woman as an example that brings this significance into light. Unlike in the case
of Freud, Binswanger sees what is essential in the dream account: it is her own act of decisive
facing toward a point in her future, where “the patient will finally deliver to the analyst that
secret which she does not yet know and which is nonetheless the heaviest burden of her
present.” Instead of returning her to a point in her past where she is a “lesser existence,” it
126

“declares … the future,” and “anticipates the moment of [her] liberation” which is of her own
making. It is in this sense that dream is a “prefiguration of history”127:
[the] constituting moment [of the dream subject] can only be that existence which makes
itself through time, that existence in its movement toward the future. The dream is
already this future making itself, the first moment of freedom freeing itself, the still secret
jarring of an existence which is taking hold of itself again in the whole of its becoming.
The dream means repetition only to the extent that the repetition is precisely the
experience of a temporality which opens upon the future and constitutes itself as freedom.
This is the sense in which repetition may be authentic, and not by reason of its exactness.
The historical correctness of a detail in the dream is only the chronicle of its
authenticity.128
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Therefore, the sens of dream, for Foucault, should contain the double meaning it plays in its
original French word—it is both the “meaning” and the “direction” of the dream account129; the
direction in which one definitely travels and moves toward cannot be told apart from the
meaning that one comprehensively derives from any dream account.
Foucault does not refer the dialectic to Bachelard; he explains it with Hegelian language,
elaborating it with the “three-fold” rhythm of movement — moving from the sheer cacophony of
being lost in the midst of everything, getting fixed and frozen in a “dreamlike immobility,” and
then “finally, let loose in joyous freedom,” now allowed to move toward its next destination
again.130 Thus, his effort at dialectical mapping of the repetitive movement of imagination is not
where he directly inherits Bachelard’s language. Actually, this point in his argument is where
Foucault distances himself from Bachelard in terms of using Bachelard’s terms, which, as we
have observed, are built around the centrality of the “image.” Foucault makes it explicit that he
needs an alternative theoretical format:
Gaston Bachelard is absolutely right when he shows the imagination at work in the
intimate recesses of perception, and the secret labor which transforms the object one is
perceiving into an object of contemplation. “One understands forms by their
transformation”; then, beyond the norms of objective truth, “the realism of uncertainty
holds sway.” No one has better understood the dynamic work of the imagination and the
incessantly vectorial nature of its movement. But should we also follow Bachelard when
he shows this movement culminating in the image, and the thrust of the image installing
itself of its own accord within the dynamism of the imagination?131
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This is an explicit acknowledgement of the derivation from Bachelard’s theory of the
“dynamism” of the imagination, which is centered on the studies of the different images. As we
have seen, Foucault, like Bachelard, respects the way concrete images directly work on and
incite imagination, due to the weight of their historical significance, as actual sedimentation of
the imaginative material within the lived cultural lives. I have mentioned in passing above that
Binswanger is significant for Foucault for the reason that he has proved the value of these
cultural indexes. But, as I have also briefly noted above, Foucault modifies the way such cultural
indexes are deployed in his own theory. Foucault focuses on the uses of these motifs as an
indicator of the regularity of the working of the dialectic within the relative spatial mapping
which is the experiential terrain. This is made explicit already in the section where he discusses
the usage of these motifs in the Western philosophical discourse on imagination:
All of these conceptions [such as fire, water, light and dark] constitute a double polarity
in the imaginary philosophy of the dream: the water-fire polarity and the darkness-light
polarity. We will see later that Binswanger discovers them, empirically as it were, in the
dreams of his patients. The analysis of Ellen West transcribes fantasies of soaring toward
the world of light and burrowing into the cold, dark earth.132
Rather than following Bachelard in making the image the last word to map the dynamic reality of
the dream, letting the articulation of its spatial dynamic culminate in the image, Foucault, via
Binswanger, deploys images in pairs, thereby making them conciliatory to the description of the
spatial dynamic of the dream.
Foucault’s discussion of the “scene” or the “landscape” of the dream retains the innately
relative movement of the here-elsewhere alternation which has been mapped in his conceptual
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re-presentation of the Kantian moment of finitude. And it is here, also, where it becomes definite
how much Foucault understands the dynamic of here-elsewhere as having specifically spatial
significance. The conceptualization is spatial in that it is characterized as something which is
distinguishable from other spatial models. As a dialectical space, it is “reciprocally ordered” and
is contrasted from the alternative geometric conceptualization where everything occupies its own
immobile positions regardless of the experience of the one who approaches them in his
observation. It is not a space that is “presented as the geometric structure of simultaneity,” a
space where “natural sciences deploy objective phenomena in their coherence”.133 The geometric
structure of simultaneity is that which “exists only after being analyzed,” through a logical effort
which retrospectively tries to make sense of the lived world. But the lived space shows a peculiar
mutual dynamic between its near-space and far-space:
[the space of scene or landscape] gives itself originally as the distance of colored
plenitudes or of reaches lost in the horizon, enveloped in the gathering distance; or, it is
the space of things there, resistant to my touch; it is to my right or my left, behind me,
opaque or transparent to my gaze. In contrast to the space of geographical reference,
totally elucidated in the form of a general diagram, the scene is paradoxically closed by
the infinite openness of the horizon. Everything that this horizon implies in the way of an
eventual beyond delimits the familiarity of the hither and of all the pathways staked out
by habit. It refers thus to the absolute of a situation which gathers in all the affective
powers of the hearth, the native land, the Heimat. And each of these lines, which vanish
into the horizon, is already like a road of return, a familiar bearing for rediscovering ten
hodou oikade, the homeward road.134
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Foucault’s lived space is different from the kind of space that is understood via its “geographical
reference” that “elucidates” each and every positionality on it, it being a “general diagram.”
Referentiality on such a geometric terrain does not have to refer to the way it is concretely
experienced by me. On the other hand, the lived landscape marks its horizon solely with the loci
that lie at the far end of me. It is elsewhere precisely because it is not within my grasp here: “it is
the space of things there, resistant to my touch (my italics).” It is an area which is defined by
how, whichever way I turn, it escapes the current range of my view: “to my right or my left,
behind me, opaque or transparent to my gaze.”135
The sense of there being such a “there,” however, is important, precisely because it
paradoxically denotes, relatively, the space that is familiar, near, and homely. What is close by is
felt to be so precisely because it is hemmed in by the far-space: “Everything that this horizon
implies in the way of an eventual beyond delimits the familiarity of the hither and of all the
pathways staked out by habit.”136 Whichever way one would turn, the far-side, precisely by its
unreachability, somehow closes up on some “absolute . . . affect” and “power” which conjure up
everything that evokes the everyday, the habituated, and thus the comfortable for me. Such a
spatiality is already dynamic; reaching to the horizon is already taking a “road of return,” a
“homeward road.” The openness on the horizon already “paradoxically” indicates the “closing”
of the space. This dynamic, “reciprocal ordering” of the lived space continues throughout
Foucault’s description of Binswanger’s different dream scenes.137 It is relevant to both an
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articulation of one’s sense of security in inhabiting it and that of the vulnerability and danger that
accompanies it:
The security that space provides, the solid support that it lends to my powers, rests on the
articulation of near space and far space: the latter, by which one withdraws and eludes, or
which one sets out to explore or conquer; the former, that of rest, of familiarity, that
which is right at hand. But this relation is disturbed in some experiences: then, far space
may press upon near space, permeating it on all sides with a massive presence, with a
kind of grip that one cannot loosen. Now the distant may slowly enter into the porous
presence of near space, mingling with it, to the complete elimination of perspective . . .
Now, far space may penetrate the immediate sphere of the subject like a meteor – witness
the patient reported by Binswanger: he is properly oriented in space, but lying in bed he
has the sensation that a piece of the railroad track, over there, below the window,
separates from the horizon, penetrates the bedroom, traverses it, bores through his skull
and lodges in his brain. In all these metatheses of the near and the far, space loses its
secure character, becomes filled with the stifling threats and sudden dangers, is furrowed
by irruptive forces. Space, sign of my weakness.138
Since the dimension of this particular space is solely marked by my own participation in its
dynamic articulation of the near and the far, it both gives me a sense of power, and at the same
time, as its down side, a sense of vulnerability.139 However, the various dynamic of the near and
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the far as the “metatheses” of the spatial articulation of the dream space is secured for Foucault’s
argument here.
The multiplicity of such near-far extensions would, from every possible direction, delimit
the ultimate sphere of my experienced world, like so many radiuses that form a sphere by being
projected from its center. This comparison should be immediately modified since the lived space
would never be as neat or homogeneous as the geometrical space, by definition; it would be felt
irregular and look out of shape, just the way one naturally experiences one’s own world, where,
as Foucault precisely notes, there are always objects that are experienced more intensely than
what vaguely lies in the background. Also, the idea of projecting such multidirectional potential
vectors of experience to conceive of a possible sphere of one’s lived world should be a
questionable idea from the level of consideration here, where the lived world becomes possible
only from a particular and concrete perspective. It comes and goes with experiential occasions,
rather than remaining as anything that can be observed from a neutral distance. It would also
need to be considered that, it would never possible to think of a “radius” of the distance that
spans from the here to the elsewhere-than-here of experience, since transcendentality is
something that leads to “mere” potentiality, or that which does not yet exist properly.
Transcendentality only makes sense when one is facing one’s own horizon, involved in a
movement that always turns out to have already made transcendentality into an actuality.140
It should be rather noted here that, with the fluctuating extension that Foucault regards as
not compatible with Descartes’ conception of it as an abstract distance, Foucault thinks of a
“primordial” world which comes into existence dialectically, rhythmically, and yet concretely. It
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is his conceptual conclusion, at least in this article, that, the world is experienced for us,
“primarily,” not as an abstract three-dimensional geometric reality mapped in stable grids of
space-time; rather, it comes into existence precisely as it arrives at us, moment after moment, in
a mode where we become one with the world. Since such a movement itself constitutes the
space-time of the world, the “displacement” from the near to the far does not simply cross an
already established expansion; “It travels along . . . Its future is not prearranged by the
geography of the setting, but is awaited in its authentic historicity.”141 Space-time is created
along the movement of the life, an argument that is repeated throughout the paper. However, it is
most significant in the part where he elaborates why and how he cannot “follow” Bachelard
when he posits the “image” as the last word of his theory of the imagination.142 This can only be
explained by a conjecture that, for Foucault, the solid world of reality which, albeit momentarily
and relatively, comes into existence in the imaginative experience cannot be left out of a possible
spatial mapping of such a world.
While Bachelard, thanks to his belief in the power of the poetic language to invoke a
dynamic transformation in the being of the readers, argues that image itself was dynamic,
Foucault chooses to focus on the way images alternate in the movement of here-elsewhere in his
deployment of the dream motifs for a construction of the theory of imagination. I have already
presented how, while discussing the relevance of imageries such as water or fire in the Western
tradition for the establishment of the theory of dream, he transposes them as the evidence of the
existence of “polarities” or “pairs” of imagination which has been “empirically” posited by
Binswanger.143 Therefore, while he continues Bachelard’s method on the level of positing the
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actual dream motifs or literary images as the theoretical terminology of the theory of the dream,
he definitely departs from him on the level where, for him, the relative distance between the
immanence and the transcendence, or between the here and the elsewhere-than-here, of
experience has to remain as a concrete theoretical element. Without these polarities, Binswanger
is of no use for him; he would have just gone as far as Bachelard, who would have still remained
unsatisfactory for him. Foucault’s discussion of Binswanger is presented to show the validity of
the “set of oppositions [which] defines the essential dimensions of existence.”144
Such a point becomes particularly manifest when Foucault discusses one specific
“vector” of dream experience as it has been analyzed by Binwanger — the “vertical.” This of
course implies that Foucault conceives of different vectors of experience as a valid analytical
category to think of experience as such; this point will continue to be discussed in the rest of the
chapters of this dissertation. Let me just note here that, as Foucault discusses the different
vectors in “Dream, Imagination, and Existence,” they do not have the same anthropological
significance. For Foucault, the vertical axis is more “fundamental” and “originative” than the
other axes or vectors of existence: thus they “do not have equal universality and the same
anthropological depth.”145 Why does Foucault discuss the vertical dimension as having priority?
Because it works, as it were, as the standard upon which all the other vectors gauge their degree
“authenticity” as experience: “. . . it is along this vertical direction of existence, and according to
the structures of temporality, that the authentic and inauthentic forms of existence can best be
allocated.” 146 The imaginary space of Ellen West, discussed as the abrupt soaring toward the
light and the sudden falling down to the darkness, is significant because it shows how her
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immanent world, the most significant being her body, has been completely negated and
concentrated into the darkness, as something which should not have any “meaning” in her world.
The world of light, which is ethereal, ideal, and haven-like for her, is that which has become only
possible for her by denying her own material, bodily existence. Her psyche, which shuttles back
and forth restlessly in between these two polarities, is exemplary of an extreme existence that
would only be able to find a meaning of existence in suicide.147 Here, again, while Foucault
brings into play all the power of the elemental forces of such images as light and dark, he does
not deploy them in isolation. Light and dark become meaningful as they denote the ends of the
polarity that structures the dream space and mark the inevitable oscillation which happens in
between.
Having seen this spatial significance, it can be said that the reason for Foucault to assert
the significance of the kind of a world which already has to be defined in its alternating polarities
should be the same as that which made him posit a “modern cogito” in The Order of Things. It is
important for him, following Descartes, to affirm the being of the distance that connects my own
being and the being of the world experienced, since he believed in the co-constitution of my own
experience and the experience of the world. However, he has to distance himself from Descartes,
there not being any absolute reference with which to map the distance between I and my world.
At the same time, while he agrees with Bachelard and his ontological ideas which enable one to
conceive of the experience of imagination as already a theory of reality, Foucault cannot follow
him in letting the image alone do the conceptual work for expressing the dynamic inherent in
dream experience — despite the fact that Bachelard discusses poetic images precisely to reject
any of their significance as “allegorical attributes.”148 The reason should be thought of as
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twofold. First, he has to assert the reality of the spatial dimension that maps imagination to renew
our discussion of imaginative acts and the significance of literary images. What makes a
particular imaginary felt alive and real? Why does it make sense for us? Foucault’s discussion of
what happens when I imagine Peter because I miss him, transmits such concerns vividly. It is not
because of his actual absence that my imagination of Peter becomes an imagination; it is
because, just in the way I actually experience the precious friendship Peter lets me experience, I
experience him, with all my existence:
. . . in his presence, too, before that face which today I am reduced to imagining, I can
already summon up Peter in imagination, not as elsewhere or as different, but there,
where he was, just as he was. This Peter who is seated there before me is not imaginary in
that his actuality might have duplicated itself and might have assigned me another, virtual
Peter (the Peter I hypothesize, desire, anticipate), but is imaginary in that, at this
privileged moment, he is, for me, precisely himself, Peter. He it is, toward whom I go,
whose encounter promises me certain satisfactions. His friendship is located there,
somewhere on that trajectory of my existence I am already tracing out. His friendship
marks the moment in which directions will change, or where, perhaps, they will regain
their initial orientation and simply run their course. To imagine Peter when I am
perceiving him thus is . . . to grasp once more that original movement of our existences
whose precocious concurrence can make up a single world more fundamental than that
system of actuality which today defines our common presence in this room. Then my
perception itself, while remaining perception, becomes imaginary by the sole fact that it
finds its coordinates in the directions of existence itself. Imaginary, too, my words and
feelings, this conversation I am now having with Peter, this friendship. Yet not false, for

89

all that, nor illusory. The imaginary is not a mode of unreality, but indeed a mode of
actuality, a way of approaching presence obliquely to bring out its primordial
dimensions.149
By imagining Peter, I know the fundamental meaning of his significance for me, which can only
be articulated on the dimension of reality which develops and changes course along the trajectory
of my life. I “realize” the satisfactions he gives me, the feelings I feel thanks to him, when he is
sitting there in front of my eyes. I do not realize this thanks to an image of him, but because, in
the existential dimension which opens itself up to me in my imaginary act, I know what it means
for me to have encountered him, in the sense of the whole trajectory of our existences have
“concurred” with one another.150
Imagination, therefore, goes beyond itself — and this I see as the second reason for
Foucault to have emphasized the significance of the spatial dimensions involved with it. By
pointing toward a direction leading to the trajectory of my future, it sends me onto a life which is
more “imaginary,” or of a kind that is more likely to bring more friendships or encounters of the
nature that I have experienced thanks to Peter. This would be the case whether my imagination
might simply secure one initial directionality for the lager arc of my existence, in which other
instances of imaginations — with their different vectors — would further modify its course, or it
might powerfully set the whole of the course in one fell swoop.151 It indicates the potential
relationships and mutual transformations which will happen in the worlds of my future. It
encourages me to live a certain kind of a life, sending me off toward a certain trajectory. Thus
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Foucault brings out the ethical dimension of imagination and its possible trajectories of
realization, which functions in a way that makes one happy. In this way Foucault remains true to
Bachelard who, in his book on imagination, keeps on quoting such lines as the following,
precisely from a belief that it works in the readers by literally making them light as a feather. It is
from Rilke:
Where no path has been marked out
we flew.
The arc is still engraven in our minds.152

c. Conclusion: The Necessity of Here-elsewhere

Han and other scholars have tried to gauge Foucault’s different methodologies, such as
archaeology, genealogy, and an examination of the constitution of ethical subjectivity, according
to the a priori standards set up by Kant. This effort stems from the problematic that Foucault
bases his inquiries on Kantian terms. The problem, however, in focusing on whether Foucault
adequately solves Kant’s dilemma involved with the indistinguishability between the realms of
the empirical and the transcendental is that such perspectives does not recognize that Foucault
has not moved beyond Kant’s specific site of problematization. This site, which is also
“finitude,” “man,” or “anthropology,” is precisely the situation of philosophical practice that
makes it impossible to set up any boundary between the empirical and the transcendental. When
we observe The Order of Things and the way in which Foucault attempts to build on the passage
of the finitude, we do not see Foucault addressing the problem by setting up, or relying on, any
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conceptual divisions between the empirical and the transcendental. Rather, he procures the
spatial dynamic that is inherently relative and, thus, capable of articulating the ceaseless, directed
movement of the here, where experience has just arrived, to an elsewhere, where the exteriority
seems to lie:
In the modern cogito, on the other hand, we are concerned to grant the highest value, the
greatest dimension, to the distance that both separates and links thought-conscious-ofitself and whatever, within thought, is rooted in non-thought. The modern cogito (and this
is why it is not so much the discovery of an evident truth as a ceaseless task constantly to
be undertaken afresh) must traverse, duplicate, and reactivate in an explicit form the
articulation of thought on everything within it, around it, and beneath it which is not
thought, yet which is nevertheless not foreign to thought, in the sense of an irreducible,
and insuperable exteriority. In this form, cogito will not therefore be the sudden and
illuminating discovery that all thought is thought, but the constantly renewed
interrogation as to how thought can reside elsewhere than here, and yet so very close to
itself; how can it be in the forms of non-thinking.153
Foucault makes it explicit that the distance spanning the “here” and the “elsewhere than here” of
thought cannot be represented as an absolute distance, as was proposed by Descartes, who, based
on this abstraction, goes on to establish the centrality of the rational subjectivity as opposed to
the observable and measurable world around him. However, at the same time, Foucault, in his
various different sites of theoretical endeavor, which nonetheless exhibit mutual integrity and
coherence, tries to procure the evanescent event of thought as being. For many, such a move is,
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in the first place, an impossible one; they believe that such a move cannot be saved without reimporting the categories that Foucault dismisses in the first place.
Seen from the perspective of the theory of relativity, which offers an alternative spatial
mapping between ourselves and the world to the Newtonian geometric model, I argue that it is
indeed possible for us to save Foucault’s concept of the being of thought without resorting to the
absolute positionality of the subject and the object. In Foucault’s passage above, neither the
“here” of thought as the locus of experience, nor the ‘elsewhere than here’ as the site towards
which thought advances in its search for the locus of exteriority, exists in an absolute geometric
sense. However, they do exist, at least in relation to one another. As in Foucault’s argument on
Binswanger, the near place and the far place mutually exist, in "reciprocal" order, without there
being any way for us to map them in a measurable sense. 154 In “Dream, Imagination, and
Existence,” Foucault strenuously tries to demonstrate how the landscape or the scene of the
dream space comes into existence in the necessarily vectorial movement involved with the
transition of immanence to transcendence, while such a movement does not presuppose any
absolute existence of immanence as opposed to transcendence. Thought is that which enacts
change, but there is no way for us to discuss, in any consistent way, the separate existence of
immanence and transcendence. Rather, what we do know is that thought happens in a way that
definitely links the near space and the far space of the experiential terrain, which spans, as in
Kant’s finitude, through our effort to observe the world.
There is no absolute direction or vector along which the trajectory of experience could
move in the next instant. We cannot discuss it, that is, as the East or the West. However, as my
discussion of Bachelard has demonstrated, there are different potential vectors along which I can
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advance. Thought seems to be a space which, from the direction of exteriority, stretches directly
into the realm of my immanence, in continuation. I do not know where that direction of
exteriority is “within” me, “around” me, or “beneath” me; but, at least I know that it has arrived
from an “elsewhere than here.” Without this recognition, I would not feel that I would be
travelling towards an elsewhere. Furthermore, the vector or direction that Foucault discusses in
“Dream, Imagination and Existence” already assumes a distance that spans between the here and
the elsewhere-than-here of experience. For some thinkers, it is impossible to discuss this
distance as a stable concept; the Kantian finitude is a problem precisely because, there, we
cannot but get caught up in the endless “oscillation” where the subject and the object constantly
refer to one another.155
Foucault, however, conceptualizes here-elsewhere not as an absolute distance. Instead,
here is relatively nearer to the locus of thought than elsewhere-than-here. That is, it denotes the
singular situation of thinking in which thought always happens to someone. That is, the mutual
poles of here and elsewhere-than-here cannot replace one another, and that is why thought
always conceives of its progression towards somewhere. Elsewhere is always further than here,
for me. If we take here-elsewhere out of the picture and make the distance abstract, as something
spanning two absolute points, then the distance will no longer span for anyone for delineating his
life. In the effort to make the distance absolute, subject and object must indeed endlessly
“oscillate.” However, if we maintain here-elsewhere, what we have is no longer oscillation, but a
repetition of the movement of growth. Thought does not come back to the same site of paradox;
as Foucault has it, it has already left where it used to be, facing towards a new horizon of
thinking.
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Foucault did not explicitly formulate thought in terms of such a relative pair. Rather, as
Harvey proposes, Foucault seems, in many sites of his subsequent work, caught up in Kantian
categories of space-time. Harvey argues that many of Foucault’s “arguments, full of initial
spatial insights, collapses into stasis,” since Foucault “imprisons himself in a Kantian panopticon
of his own making.”156 For Harvey, this has to do with the radical implications that Foucault may
have seen in the task before him, which was a more “direct” fulfilment of his promise to take up
the Kantian questions stated in the early phase of his scholarship.157 Harvey thinks that, if
Foucault had followed this early road, he could have possibly attempted a “critique of
geography”— a science that sees space itself as productive of knowledge:
The idea of geography not as a dead science of spatial ordering but as a live science of
historical geography, as a discipline that can openly embrace the dialectic and perform its
radical function alongside anthropology as a ‘condition of possibility’ of all other forms
of knowledge, must have seemed threatening to Foucault.158
I still must question why Foucault did not pursue integrating his conceptual work with a coherent
idea of space-time, which could incorporate both anthropology and, as Harvey suggests,
geography or any other spatial sciences. Part of my idea that has been discussed in this chapter is
that Foucault, having derived his perspective from psychoanalysis, believed in the power and
objectivity of specific languages, which carry cultural weights of usage, and continued to speak
in the language of weighted history.
At any rate, I think that, based on here-elsewhere, Foucault’s project begins to resemble
the science of the dynamics of life. There may be ways in which we can observe different life
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trajectories, based on different vectorial modes of life, in the historical manifestations of our
lives and our societies. Explorations of the ways in which such trajectories develop and possibly
interfere with or block one another can become political inquiries. How do political processes
enter into the process of our formation of ourselves, and what is Foucault’s unique way of
articulating such processes? Would an inquiry of such mechanisms enhance our capacity to live
with our thoughts in our given historical reality? The rest of the chapters of this dissertation
inquires how far Foucault has gone in developing concrete ideas on the processes of our own
political formations in modernity. Harvey’s closing remarks are encouraging, since they
insinuate that Foucault inherits Kant most palpably where Foucault, like Kant, seeks to bring
philosophy closer to a science of life. Harvey’s words sound all the more palpable because he
brings up this idea only the last sentence of his article, as if the point had to be brought up at least
before closing his argument on the relevance of Kant for Foucault: “It remains for us, however,
to realize the powers of both anthropology and geography as ‘conditions of possibility’ not only
for all other forms of knowledge but also, as Kant himself envisaged, as a preparation for living
in more enlightened ways.”159
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2. Vectorial Realities: Epistemes in The Order of Things

Chapter Intro

There are points that should be further clarified. Above all, there is Foucault’s basic
assumption that examination of epistemes — modes of emergence of reality in relation to those
who live in different historical conditions of knowledge — is possible. If thought already takes
the thinker toward an elsewhere-than-here, how could any historical distance be maintained
between the thinker and the objects of his thought (which are, in this case, the epistemes)? How
could any thesis that argues for the existence of epistemes be consistently validated? In response
to such questions, this chapter posits “vector” as the theoretical language that both articulates the
transiency of the epistemes and argues for the tenability of distinct historical theses on different
epistemes. It builds up on what can be called a dual character of vector — that it is always a
contingent and passing event and that it has definiteness of its own thanks to its nature of being
“directed” — to see if it works as a critical lens via which to read the comprehensibility of
Foucault’s The Order of Things.
The Order of Things is a long and dense work, which means that this will be a lengthy
chapter. There are not many scholarly works that have tried to deal with the whole book in its
entirety to this date despite the immense interest in Foucault that the academia has shown in the
recent decades. This must have to do with Foucault’s methodology therein, where he mixes
dense theoretical accounts with one of his most intricate and richly detailed archaeological
accounts of the history of the fields of knowledge, beginning from the Renaissance and ending
with the contemporary era. In my reading of The Order of Things, I will argue that here-
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elsewhere works as a theoretical lens to read the whole of Foucault’s argument there. I will
elaborate on how vector is applicable to the reading of Foucault’s presentation of each field of
knowledge.
Thus, the primary purpose of this chapter is to present a valid reading of The Order of
Things, and thereby showing the applicability of the already established concept — which was
actually based on select passages from the book — to the rest of the book. There is however also
a second goal, which has to do with the notion of historicity that undergirds Foucault’s method. I
will argue that we can see the significance of historicity as not simply confined to Foucault’s
archival work narrowly defined. Rather, historicity as Foucault means it can illuminate what we
refer to as critical practice. That is, there is always “historical” work embedded in our critical
deliberations. Despite the risk of sounding simplistic and perhaps problematic, I would hint here
that, by the later part of this chapter, critical practice will emerge as an activity of “looking back
on my own past.”
I have mentioned above that the viability of vector as the lens for the reading of The
Order of Things has to do with what can roughly be called its “duality” — that it is a definite
concept of space-time, which argues for the innate directionality of experience, and yet it denotes
the relativity, rather than the absoluteness, of such a space-time. This idea will undergird my
reading of the two past epistemes that Foucault deals with in the book— the Renaissance and of
the Classical — which are examined in addition to, and also in relation to, the modern episteme.
Concepts such as “rationality” or “discourse,” which I see as centrally undergirding the notion of
an episteme, or such ideas as the “Table” or “interpretation,” which are central to defining a
specific episteme in distinction from another, will gradually reveal themselves as correlated to
the relative spatio-temporality of here-elsewhere. Thus, in such a process, how each central
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conceptual component defining different epistemes has an innately dual nature the way hereelsewhere does, will be clarified. For example, “rationality” will be, for each different episteme,
demonstrated as operating in an absolute way — as if following the course of nature. However,
the vectorial investigation will reveal such a course as merely relative — that there could always
have been different directions, and thus for a course of life to be forged along.
Before I move on to present my investigation of the epistemes, let me discuss the way the
above-mentioned duality addresses the critical concerns having been expressed towards
Foucault's methodology in general. Specifically, let me discuss points of criticism that came
from Jacques Derrida on Foucault’s approach. Presenting Derrida’s concerns about Foucault’s
rationale for his Madness and Civilization, I will briefly discuss how vectorial presentation of
Foucault’s epistemes will addresses such concerns. This discussion will lead the readers into the
theoretical issues that the rest of this chapter will deal with.

a. Dialogue with Derrida
Derrida sees two interrelated but distinct problems or issues in Madness and
Civilization.160 The first is if Foucault correctly interprets the passages from Descartes’
Meditations on which Foucault builds his rationale for the entirety of the project. The second
involves Foucault’s expression that he aims to write the history of “madness itself.”161 Let us
look at this second issue first together, which will take us to the point where we can discuss the
first also. Derrida discusses the second issue thus:
In writing a history of madness, Foucault has attempted — and this is the greatest merit,
but also the very infeasibility of his book — to write a history of madness itself. Itself. Of
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madness itself. That is, by letting madness speak for itself. Foucault wanted madness to
be the subject of his book in every sense of the word: its theme and its first-person
narrator, its author, madness speaking about itself. Foucault wanted to write a history of
madness itself, that is madness speaking on the basis of its own experience and under its
own authority, and not a history of madness described from within the language of
reason, the language of psychiatry on madness . . . 162
For Derrida, “to attempt to write a history of madness itself,” and to attempt to write “a history of
madness described from within the language of reason,” are distinct. The former,
problematically, tries to establish madness as the “subject” of Foucault’s own articulation. In this
attempt, that is, Foucault himself would want to step into the subject position of the madness and
become its secret articulator, thus dispossessing whoever that is the rightful owner of such an
experience of the right to become the articulator of it.
Here, Derrida can be seen as expressing the ethical concerns of the Western intellectuals.
Many of them acknowledge, as Edward Said does in Orientalism, that the history of the violence
perpetuated by the West in the name of History or Progress — such as capitalism, imperialism or
colonialism — requires, as its prerequisite, the epistemological possession of the Other as the
West’s own object of knowledge. The establishment of the relation between the subject and the
object of knowledge, as Derrida sees it, lays down the ground of historical violence by
“objectifying” the Other. The Other becomes an inert thing, an item that can be neatly arranged
in the system of the subject’s knowledge. The voice of the Other, which can always surprise the
one who hears it with its difference from the preconceived ideas about who this Other is, gets
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rendered irrelevant or practically nonexistent. Gayatri Spivak thus grounds her postcolonial
critique on deconstruction.163
As Derrida sees it, Descartes prepared this path of thinking for the West — a path that, by
the time it has run its the course, never fails to establish the thinker as the rational subject of
knowledge. So that when this subject stands face to face to the rest of the world, the world is
always already his purported object of knowledge. This is why Derrida thinks that it is simply an
oxymoron for Foucault to attempt to hear the voice of “madness” — that which has been already
contained in the order of knowledge owned by the subject. Foucault is simply refusing to admit
his own embeddedness in the mode of thinking that has established him as the Western subject
in the first place. Besides, Foucault uses Descartes as the rationale for his work. Thus, Derrida
would like to make sure that Foucault understands Descartes correctly; he does not believe that
Foucault understands the significance of Descartes’ turn of thinking where — as has also been
articulated in the Chapter One of this dissertation — Descartes tries to establish an absolute,
measurable distance between himself and his own perception so that he can safely possess the
world as his object of knowledge.
In “My Body, This Paper, This Fire,” which was published in response to Derrida’s
critique above, Foucault presents a rigorous analysis of Descartes’ original French text, refuting
Derrida’s suggestion that Foucault might not be getting the text right. However, as many have it,
the problem has not entirely been closed with Foucault’s responses.164 Derrida’s response has
revealed a possible pitfall in his own approach, which Foucault’s articulations have clarified and,
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as it were, have brought out into the open. Foucault obviously senses that Derrida, in his
earnestness, inadvertently put himself into none other than the position of a subject who is
supposed to own the objective meaning of Descartes’ text.165 Foucault accuses Derrida of getting
engaged in his “pedagogy . . . that teaches the pupil there is nothing outside the text, but that in
it, in its gaps . . . there reigns the reserve of the origin”166; Derrida, in other words, claims to
have accessed the origin of Descartes’ text, as if he alone could voice its meaning in Descartes’
stead. As a matter of fact, Foucault’s accusation can be perspicuously supported by passages
from Derrida’s text. This is specifically so when Derrida illustrates “reason” - the inadvertent
way of thinking of the Western subject, and thus his condition of knowledge - as a “space.”
Reason is a kind of a confinement from which escape is inconceivable. “Nothing within [our
European] language, and no one among those who speak it, can escape the historical guilt,” says
Derrida, saying that it is precisely that guilt that Foucault “apparently wishes to put on trial.”167
He dismisses Foucault’s such presumed attempt, saying that there, “Order is . . . denounced
within order.” The moment one tries to put himself outside the order, “one has already passed
over to the side of the enemy, the side of order.”168
The articulation of this space brings in a binary logic into his discourse whereby Derrida
claims to be able to distinguish the inside of rationality from its outside or implies having control
over whether to remain in the inside or not. Saying that the space of knowledge inescapably
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maps and conditions everyone’s locus of knowledge, Derrida evidently puts himself in a position
where he can safely be distanced from such a space – Foucault’s counterargument rings true
indeed. But the real problem at stake, again, is how a different articulation of the conditions of
knowledge can become possible if the vocabulary of space turns out to be so unreliable. For one
thing, there are many expressions that describe epistemes in The Order of Things — historical
conditions of knowledge — as spatial. It is granted that, as many Foucault scholars have noted,
Foucault has been always attentive to and careful about this problem, the problem of articulating
the spatiality of knowledge. Many have elaborated on Foucault’s sophisticated theoretical
concerns thereof. However, there have not been serious investigations on how such a spatial
approach, by its own merit, addresses the issue of its own critical valence. This becomes a more
serious problem if Foucault’s purportedly “historical” approach in The Order of Things were to
be equally applied to the rest of his works. For it is also true that Spivak’s attack on Foucault for
objectifying such terms as “power” would still stand if there was not going to be serious inquiries
on how Foucault’s method fundamentally reflects the political problems inherent in the way
knowledge is articulated.169 That is, the postcolonial import of historiography should be
illuminated.
My work will respond to this concern by presenting the way the different epistemes
emerge in relation to here-elsewhere, the vector of modern thought. That is, whatever realities
that we might observe in our historical investigations already emerge as vectorial realities that
are differently aligned in relation to the parametrical vector here-elsewhere, the condition of
thought for our present reality. As has been noted, along here-elsewhere, we perceive reality as
having been singularly experienced by an Other. This Other is the one that has summoned me,
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residing here, from the side of elsewhere-than-here. Responding to this call, we advance, in
order that we experience a world that should have been experienced by this Other. So Foucault
says that to imagine Peter is not about conjuring his actual presence, but about “staging” Peter
the way Peter would have experienced his world.170 It is because I would be seeing the world
from what should have been Peter’s own point of view that there is no room for me to conceive
of any image of Peter in this mode of experience.
Each of the episteme that Foucault demonstrates presents itself as cohering around a
definite perspective, as if it is being scanned by a traveler who is in the midst of advancing
further into it. There is an active sense of each episteme being in the process of being built up,
since in modern thought, the world is ceaselessly emerging, or arriving, at the here of the
perspective. As has been noted, here-elsewhere denotes the dynamism of the space-time that is
always in the midst of transition. Showing that Foucault’s epistemes are pictures of history that
are always in the midst of unfolding themselves for singular perspectives that are encountering
them at the moment, I will counter Derrida’s point that Foucault is attempting to write a version
of history as it belongs to the Other. As the idea of here-elsewhere has it, while we singularly
experience the reality of the Other in that mode, there is a theoretical understanding that such a
reality is always a relative one, having arrived at my own site of experience — here — already
with its share of difference.
I foreground the enabling aspect of “space” as the language for the presentation of
historical reality via demonstrating the vectorial nature of epistemes. The historical distinctness
of each episteme manifests in its difference in the vector of development in relation to the vector
of modern thought. That is, each episteme presents itself as developing in a direction that is
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different from the vector of here-elsewhere. For example, the Classical world develops
“vertically” or “perpendicularly,” thanks to the fact that it orders experience for the observing
perspective in terms of the intersecting poles of the space dimension and the time dimension
which that meet at the right angle. For an “I” that lives the Classical episteme, it is as if that I
advance into my future by plunging myself straight ahead, encountering the representation of my
world at each passing moment along this linear, straight trajectory. The spatial dimension exists
perpendicularly to the temporal dimension. Since the vectors of these two dimensions are laid
out in these terms, they do not cohere with here-elsewhere. While I will not be further
elaborating on the Classical episteme here, I would like to make the advance point that, there is
an extent to which we can conceive of the tangibility of our historical thesis even while our
historical observation is hopelessly conditioned in terms of the evanescent, fleeting spatiotemporal event of here-elsewhere. The difference in vector of the past epistemes in relation to
that modern framework can be posited as a historical thesis.

b. The Renaissance Episteme

i. Resemblance
The space-time of the Renaissance world emerges thanks to the activity that is called
“writing.” As Foucault has it, if you were living in Renaissance and was facing the world laid out
for you in front of you, you would think that the world that you were encountering each passing
instant was continuously being “written.” I will be elaborating on what I mean here throughout
the rest of this section. Let me just introduce another concept related to what I have just
suggested. It is the idea that, when the world was being written out for you, it had to be written
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according to the rule of “resemblance.” So, the language of resemblance was what was “writing”
the spatiotemporal reality of Renaissance world according to Foucault’s historical presentation of
the Renaissance episteme. Resemblance is the only term via which one can imagine, and know,
the spatio-temporal make-up of the world; it was the basic rationality via which one thought
reality if you were living that time.
Now, Foucault explains the way Renaissance world expressed the constitution of the
world with the “figures” of resemblance. He suggests four of such figures. The first of the
figures, convenientia, contains the most basic idea of resemblance. Foucault suggests that
resemblance is a certain mechanism that is imagined to be mutually present in between
physically adjacent things:
Those things are ‘convenient’ which come sufficiently close to one another to be in
juxtaposition; their edges touch, their fringes intermingle, the extremity of the one also
denotes the beginning of the other. In this way, movement, influences, passions, and
properties too, are communicated. So that in this hinge between two things a resemblance
appears. A resemblance that becomes double as soon as one attempts to unravel it: a
resemblance of the place, the site upon which nature has placed the two things, and thus a
similitude of properties; for in this natural container, the world, adjacency is not an
exterior relation between things, but the sign of a relationship, obscure though it may
be.171
The idea is roughly that, just the way two people who are constantly left with each other
gradually begin to influence, and finally get to become similar to, each other, things that exist in
the Renaissance world are involved in such mutual relationships. Specifically, however, it is not
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simply that there are things, and then these things exchange influences in between them, with
themselves remaining intact as themselves: “adjacency is not an exterior relation between things,
but the sign of a relationship.”172 Resemblance is a universal force that actually shapes and
transforms things, and it is impossible to discuss any single “nature” of a thing in isolation
without mentioning the active force of resemblance in which that thing is involved with —
always with a pair of itself. This is because reality is not defined in terms of a “thing” in
Renaissance; “resemblance” comes before the possibility of ever mentioning “things.” But not
even that: rather than resemblance coming before things, it is the only terms in which existence
is ever discussed. Crude as it might seem, it can be compared to the case where “lovers” need to
be mentioned in order for one to explain what love is. We know that there is love because of the
active engagement and relationship that manifest in between a pair of lovers; however, we are
not interested in these two people as individuals — for example, in their professions or their
genetic make-up — since we want to articulate the principle that works in the “hinge” in between
counterparts, enacting the endless communication and influence that hold things up.173 The
influence itself, or the force itself, which works in between the counterparts are called
resemblance.
Thus, Foucault says that resemblance “becomes double as soon as one attempts to
unravel it.”174 The nature of resemblance as Foucault explains it is closely related to the fact that,
as soon as one tries to recognize resemblance, one cannot but get trapped in the endless backand-forth movement of the mutual influence and communication that form the circle of a
particular resemblance. It is impossible to “define” a particular resemblance, such as “the one

172

Ibid.
Ibid.
174
Ibid.
173

107

that exists between the sun and the sunflower,” for example, as we might say in our ordinary
language: to see what that special influence should be, would be the same thing as participating
in the endless back-and-forth movement that has to keep referring to the other counterpart in
order to know one of the pair. Resemblance as Foucault postulates it has an intimate connection
to one of his expressions that he often uses to describe resemblance – “mirroring.” Resemblance
is not about similarity of outward shapes, nor about commonality of itemizable characteristics. It
is rather about the actual experience of looking into the eyes of the one you are in love with. In
order for me to know what it is that I am going through right now, I would need to refer to this
person who I love, and then, he or she would also need to refer back to me to define his or her
experience in turn. There is an endless back-and-forth movement that strengthens itself and
builds its own momentum in between the counterparts, a movement that is profoundly hermetic.
Since it never escapes the circle in which it endlessly reproduces itself, it cannot be
“represented” as if it could be described apart from the actual undergoing of it. This is what
Foucault means when he says that, while resemblance is a kind of a language we can solely
resort to when describing Renaissance episteme, that episteme does not deploy the language of
“representation,” which is the discourse of the Classical episteme rather than that of the
Renaissance episteme. Here, let me elaborate one more point that, “discourse,” for Foucault, is
the linguistic act that puts together all the spatio-temporal elements in a world in their mutual
coherence. Again, the discourse, in that sense, in the Renaissance world is “writing,” in the sense
that resemblance is something that keeps being written. This will be elaborated further soon.
According to Foucault, the force of one particular resemblance can influence something
that exists immediately adjacent to that first resemblance. This is how an imagination of the
whole of the world comes into being, where it is composed of a long “chain” of resemblances
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where circles of resemblances are imagined to be linked from one end to the other. Foucault
quotes from one of the scholars of that time:
As with respect to its vegetation the plant stands convenient to the brute beast, so through
feeling does the brutish animal to man, who is conformable to the rest of the stars by his
intelligence; these links proceed so strictly that they appear as a rope stretched from the
first cause as far as the lowest and smallest of things, by a reciprocal and continuous
connection; in such wise that the superior virtue, spreading its beams, reaches so far that
if we touch one extremity of that cord it will make tremble and move all the rest.175
The idea is that, a specific kind of resemblance can have similarities with other resemblances.
Some of the “convenience” that exists in between the vegetation and the beast can also be shared
by the convenience that exists between the beast and man. A particular “virtue” that might
emerge in the back-and-forth movement of a particular set of resemblance, might well be present
in the stream of influence that flows in between another resemblance. However, this point should
not be confused with another of Foucault’s point, about resemblance being a peculiar discursive
unit of the Renaissance world; I use the expression, “unit,” in that it is impossible for us to
articulate the principle via which that world is experienced as an orderly whole without referring
to resemblance. This is, again, because resemblance is the minimum unit via which to express
any tangible existence that constitutes the Renaissance world. And yet, it is not possible either to
refer to any one specific resemblance, as if giving it a specific name; if we attempt to isolate one
circle of resemblance, as Foucault notes it, we immediately get caught up in the cycle of endless
“mirroring” that happens in between the pair that is involved in reproducing the circle since it is
impossible to articulate resemblance without referring to that movement.
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In Foucault’s explanation of the four figures of resemblance, it is centralized that
Renaissance world succeeds in imagining itself to be put together via the single term of
resemblance, while resemblance is the most intimate and hermetic affair that remains an affair of
its own. The second figure of resemblance simply expands the first and argues that the “folds” of
space — where each pair of resemblance is facing each other — emerge in larger surroundings,
than the spaces that immediately adjacent pairs occupy. This expansion of the scale of the
mirroring is called “emulation” – the second figure of resemblance. As Foucault has it:
The relation of emulation enables things to imitate one another from one end of the
universe to the other without connection or proximity: by duplicating itself in a mirror the
world abolishes the distance proper to it; in this way it overcomes the place allotted to
each thing.176
The world is imagined to be crisscrossed by multiply directed forces of resemblance, going back
and forth in between partners intensely facing each other and becoming similar to each other
from one end of the world to the other. “The universe was folded in upon itself: the earth echoing
the sky, faces seeing themselves reflected in the stars, and plants holding within their stems the
secrets that were of use to man.”177
Foucault suggests that we can conceive of the “man” of this age as a “privileged point”
where there is a pronounced concentration of multiple lines of resemblances.178 Men perceived
many resemblances in the world, and in this process, also played a part in constituting many
pairs of resemblances, since he discovered many counterparts in the world that he would want to
assimilate himself to:
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. . . he is also the fulcrum upon which all these relations turn, so that we find them again,
their similarity unimpaired, in the analogy of the human animal to the earth it inhabits:
his flesh is a glebe, his bones are rocks, his veins great rivers, his bladder is the sea, and
his seven principal organs are the metals hidden in the shafts of mines. Man’s body is
always the possible half of a universal atlas.179
What Foucault emphasizes here is not that man was a privileged being in the Renaissance world,
a being that could be told apart from all the others in that it worked as an analogy for at least half
of the rest of the existence on the earth. However, “analogy” as it appears in the above passage
does not assume “man” as something that could be conceptualized of itself, or for itself; thinking
of reality in such terms only becomes possible in the Classical episteme. Thus, it is worth noting
that Foucault explicitly differentiates concepts of “man” as it appears in different epistemes.
“Man” as it was thought in Renaissance became only possible in terms of resemblance, rather
than through an imagination of the world in terms of the Classical idea of being or “things.” Thus
Foucault suggests that the many descriptions of the similarities between the bodies of human
beings and those of the birds that are found in the time of Renaissance cannot be seen as an
example of “comparative anatomy.”180 Comparative anatomy, which requires the distinct entities
under comparison to be first conceptualized in themselves, only emerges through the Classical
episteme. While it might be easy for people who are accustomed to thinking in Classical
episteme’s terms to recognize a “comparative anatomy” in the description of the human and
animal bodies in the Renaissance archive, it should be recognized as anachronistic:
So much precision [in the comparative description of the bodies of the human beings and
the birds] is not, however, comparative anatomy except to an eye armed with nineteenth-
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century knowledge. It is merely that the grid through which we permit the figures of
resemblance to enter our knowledge happens to coincide at this point (and at almost no
other) with that which sixteenth-century learning had laid over things.181
On the level of the constitution of knowledge as that which explains the spatio-temporal make-up
of a world, the “analogy” of the Renaissance episteme and that of the Classical episteme are
distinct. To understand this crucially has to do with how resemblance, beyond all, saw existence
as the in-between force that endlessly related counterparts to each other. Convenience is about
the “bonds and joints” that exist in between proximate partners182; emulation, the expansion of
convenience, is “a sort of natural twinship existing in things; it arises from a fold in being, the
two sides of which stand immediately opposite to one another.”183 Thus:
The space occupied by analogies is really a space of radiation. Man is surrounded by it on
every side; but, inversely, he transmits these resemblances back into the world from
which he receives them. He is the great fulcrum of proportions—the center upon which
relations are concentrated and from which they are once again reflected.184
“Analogy” in this sense is the third figure of resemblance. As Foucault has it, through analogy,
certain “reversibility and the polyvalency” in the discussion of convenentia and aemulatio
becomes possible.
Since the constituents of the Renaissance world are endlessly trying to assimilate
themselves to their own counterparts, the world could simply contract to a single point in the
end. A countering force has to offset resemblance, bringing the whole movement of the
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similitude to an equilibrium. This antipodal force, the last “figure” of resemblance that explains
the make-up of the Renaissance world, is called “antipathy”:
The identity of things, the fact that they can resemble others and be drawn to them,
though without being swallowed up or losing their singularity—this is what is assured by
the constant counterbalancing of sympathy and antipathy. It explains how things grow,
develop, intermingle, disappear, die, yet endlessly find themselves again; in short, how
there can be space (which is nevertheless not without landmarks [of] repetitions, not
without havens of similitude) and time (which nevertheless allows the same forms, the
same species, the same elements to reappear indefinitely).185
Since things constantly draw things nearer to themselves and push other things further from
themselves, they are constantly engaged in the working of sympathy and antipathy. The spatiotemporal reality of Renaissance world, according to this account, manifests as the endless
process of the coming-into-being, and the passing away, of things, which obey the rules of
sympathy and antipathy. However, a question remains: if we cannot refer to the language of
“representation” – which makes it possible for us to mention such a thing as a “thing” – how do
we ever use “resemblance” as something like a language with which the world is explained and
rationalized?

ii. Interpretation
It is one thing to understand the constitution of the world through the single figure of
resemblance; it is another thing to “know” it—that is, being able to “articulate” it. For Foucault,
to know something is correlated to being able to put it into language. It is to be able to pin down
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the meaning of a particular experience that I go through, so that it makes sense to me. There is an
inherent generality and order in the way discourse processes my experience and delivers it to me
in a specific order, so that my expression of the world can sound coherent to myself. This order
is, for Foucault, correlated with the way we “rationally” understand the space-time of the world
that we inhabit; we intuitively understand such space-time to be immanent, and therefore to be
related to the experience that I am undergoing in specific ways. There is, therefore, a definite
sense that discourse production is, at the same time, the production of space-time for the person
who, in order to acquire a definite knowledge of an object, has to know how that object relates to
the space and the time that let them emerge for me coherently.
The discourse that produces the space-time of the Renaissance world is specifically
termed as “reading” or “interpretation.” To see what interpretation as a discourse is, we have to
address how it would be possible to refer to resemblance when there is no language to
“represent” it. Representation, if it was to be available, would have immediately given one even
an approximate idea of what one means when he or she said, for example, “the resemblance I am
referring to is that which exists between men’s brain and the walnuts.” When discourse does not
function according to the logic of representation, there is no possibility for us to say, “a walnut,”
for example, and hope that the listener would get an idea of what we mean. This is why I have
suggested that it is not entirely accurate to refer to resemblance as something like a unit. A unit,
by definition, can be conceived of thanks to the idea, or the representation, of itself. Renaissance
episteme uses different means to relate one’s particular recognition of an event— which is
always that of actually “experiencing” a resemblance — with the language that generalizes that
experience, from the language of representation. In order to understand how interpretation works
as Foucault suggests it, we can begin with the idea that resemblances are recognized as “signs”
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that constitute the language of interpretation. Here, of course, “sign” as it is discussed in
Renaissance episteme is not the same thing as what is meant by a “signifier” in a system of
representation. In Renaissance, sign is simply that which enables one to recognize a particular
resemblance. The idea is that resemblances, which had been pre-made by God, are usually
hidden or hard to notice for the human eye.186 But one can read signs of resemblance—and this
act of reading is itself the most basic starting point of interpreting, or discursively articulating,
the world. You read signs of resemblance, as if recognizing someone to be the one you had been
searching for out of a handful of an anonymous mass of human beings. (You are already
involved in the hermetic, “obscure” relationship.)
What does it mean that signs are never more than resemblances recognized? How could a
mere action of recognition constitute “language,” while the action is not conferred to any abstract
symbols or sounds? This becomes possible because, instead of a symbol or a sound, a sign in the
Renaissance episteme can simply be referred to by another sign, precisely thanks to the analogy
that exists in between resemblances. To express a resemblance, that is, one does not have any
other means than to experience another resemblance to arrive at some sense of similitude that
exists in between the two. However, this cannot secure the meaning of even the second
resemblance; for it should be clarified via yet another resemblance. Thus, the attempt at arriving
at the meaning of a particular resemblance leads one to add resemblances, one on top of another,
ultimately arriving at some type of serialization. Such series are in themselves spatiality, or
conceived space, where little circles of resemblance are actually imaginatively linked together
through the rational need to explain the precise way they relate to, or refer to, one another.
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Here, none of the “unit” resemblances within the chain can work as the terminus of the
development of the chain. The whole of resemblances that exist in the world could have been
covered without exception at some point, each having been known via getting referred to another
resemblance, and yet the last necessary link to complete the whole chain of references and stop
the process of endless addition, should be unmistakably missing. Rather, in order for
interpretation to work, the whole journey across the world, relating one resemblance to another,
has to begin yet once more. So Foucault notes the “plethoric yet absolutely poverty-stricken
character” of Renaissance knowledge:
By positing resemblance as the link between signs and what they indicate . . . sixteenthcentury knowledge condemned itself to never knowing anything but the same thing, and
to knowing that thing only at the unattainable end of an endless journey.187
In Renaissance, interpretation is already the “space” of interpretation, having grown out of the
effort to thread circles of experiential spaces together. This is indicated by the title of the section
under discussion, “Prose of the World.” The world of Renaissance is literally a prose; an
interpreted – threaded-out – space.

iii. Rationality
So far, I have explained the discursive production of Renaissance episteme as one whole
process, leading from recognition of a sign and ending (or never ending) in the production of the
prose of the world. However, Foucault also explains this process as two interrelated subprocesses, for the sake of considering the rationality therein. The first is semiology, which is the
recognition of signs, or the act of revealing the existence of a certain resemblance. The second is
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interpretation, which is the art of spatially arranging all the signs that have hitherto been
recognized into a chain that weaves them all together. It is in this latter spatiality that the
interrelations among the resemblances are articulated. Semiology, the first process, and
hermeneutics (or interpretation), the latter process, have a strange relationship, where they are
both continuous and discontinuous. They are continuous because, while we have been twice
removed from the level of actual resemblances that get experienced (or “read”) in the world by
the point when we are engaged in hermeneutics, we have actually never departed from the level
of that down-to-earth spatiality composed of the hermetic circles. As I have discussed, signs do
not deliver us away from the level of immanent spatiality to a separate level of signification; they
are only intermediaries that immediately transfer us to other signs. When we continue to arrive at
ever new resemblances to continue the development of the chain, we are already engaged in
hermeneutics without having departed from semiology. Therefore, semiology and hermeneutics
function on the exact same level of existence. This is what is meant when Foucault discusses
“interpretation” as an actual spatiality produced by the effort at knowing the world. He explains
how it was believed in this time that the study of various languages and the way they spatially
progress teach men something about divine space. It is deemed significant that certain
languages, such as the Hebrews or the Canaans, “all write from right to left, following the course
and daily moment of the first haven, which is most perfect,” while other languages such as
Greeks or the Georgians . . . all write “from left to right, following ‘the course and movement of
the second heaven, home of the seven planets.”188 The shape and the progression of language
“write” the divine space.
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As I have mentioned however, there is a point of discontinuity between semiology and
hermeneutics, and Foucault’s suggestion that discourse rationally orders the spatiality of the
world hinges on this disjuncture. If we stop at the level of semiology, all the resemblances in the
world would have revealed themselves as signs. However, it is when we start to think of how to
articulate the whole of these signs in relation to one another, that is, when we are on the level of
hermeneutics — that it we know that we will never attain a perfect interpretation, or writing-out,
of the world. We can never reach a perfect “text” of God’s intended world however strenuously
we are devoted to the task. Again, this is because the signs keep referring to other signs,
endlessly deferring the moment of their complete articulation:
Every resemblance receives a signature; but this signature is no more than an
intermediate form of the same resemblance. As a result, the totality of these marks,
sliding over the great circle of similitudes, forms a second circle which would be an exact
duplication of the first, point by point, were it not for that tiny degree of displacement
which causes the sign of sympathy to reside in analogy, that of analogy in emulation, that
of emulation in convenience, which in turn requires the mark of sympathy for its
recognition.189
Interpretation always ends up producing a version of knowledge that necessarily misses the one
last puzzle. Semiology tries to attain to the Text of the world; hermeneutics never meets that
expectation. This situation is thus understood as the necessary displacement between the Text
and its interpretation.
However, this does not mean that the chain of interpretation is not a rational articulation
of the world. Foucault has a specific idea of “rationality” as the innate element within the
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discursive production of the world, which is recognizable in his discussion of the Renaissance
episteme. He says that, while the space of interpretation cannot but be incomplete, it is backed by
a theory that completes it from another level. A guarantee is given that while it might forever
remain an unfinished space, the interpreted space already reflects the perfect world that fulfills
divine intention. This guarantee is the theory of the macrocosmos and microcosmos, according to
which this world where one lives and experiences resemblances the microcosmos, or a
duplication, of God’s macrocosmos, or the perfect world. As Foucault has it:
In an episteme in which signs and similitudes were wrapped around one another in an
endless spiral, it was essential that the relation of microcosm to macrocosm should be
conceived as both the guarantee of that knowledge and the limit of its expansion.190
This passage expresses the central idea to the section, “The Limits of the World.” The section
title foregrounds that, as part of the spatial and discursive rationality of the Renaissance world, a
“limit” has been brought in to pre-check the endlessness of the “prose of the world.” Sign, prose,
resemblance, the micro- and macrocosmos, and all the other discursive elements are
indispensable for the Renaissance episteme to become “rational.”
It is important for Foucault to revisit the way we understand the micro- and the macrocosmos theory, which he says takes up a significant part of the accumulated knowledge of the
Renaissance world. Surely, as he puts it, scholars of the Renaissance period already think of the
theory as “important,” the words being one of the “most frequently mentioned terms” of the
time.191 However, Foucault stresses that we should no longer simply deal with the micro- and
macrocosmos theory in a “study of opinions.”192 Rather, it should be seen as an element for us to
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identify and investigate the Renaissance episteme with, because, without such a theory, the space
of the Renaissance world would not have emerged for the one that was part of the episteme in the
first place. To consider this level of the ideas, he says, is the purport of the “archaeological
analysis.”193
In this light, Foucault discusses magic and erudition, which are popular forms of belief of
this period, to suggest that such knowledges are not simply superstitions of the past or the
vestiges of a tradition. Rather, beliefs in the power of magical practices or the importance of
erudition all constitute practices of hermeneutics.194 Thus, such practices are not backward or
less rigorous than the practices of knowledge of more recent times:
. . . it is not from an insufficiency of structure that sixteenth-century knowledge suffers.
On the contrary, we have already seen how meticulous the configurations are that define
its space. It is this very rigor that makes the relation of magic to erudition inevitable –
they are not selected contents but required forms.195
It seems that, Foucault’s epistemic presentations of the past worlds warn us of seeing them as
less “rational” than our own.196

iv. Linearly Progressing Space
We can inquire into how the Renaissance space should have appeared to the Renaissance
viewpoints, since epistemes are realities conceived in terms of the way they are actually
experienced as space-temporality. We can begin by thinking of the conditions involved in the
conceptual shaping of the episteme under discussion. For example, Foucault has suggested the

193

Ibid.
Ibid., 32.
195
Ibid.
196
Ibid., 31.
194

120

idea of resemblance as something like a closed circle of mirroring; also, he has discussed how
and why the larger spatiality should look like a chain. This does not only have to do with that all
resemblances in that world could be lined up back-to-back; since resemblance solely constitutes
that world, and since the only relation that can exist in between resemblances is that of endless
referral, the spatiality of that world should look somewhat like the prolonged series, or chain, of
resemblances. Additionally, there is the idea that the epistemic space of the Renaissance is flat,
or a “surface,” dimension. Since resemblances are weaved into a series, the space consists of a
flat dimension: there is “non-distinction between what is seen and what is read, between
observation and relation, which results in the single, unbroken surface in which observation and
language are interwoven to infinity.”197
Based on my discussion thus far, I think it is significant that Foucault presents the
Renaissance world as being “linear,” a point that has rarely been noted in the critical literature on
The Order of Things. As has been mentioned, he understands the “chain” of resemblances in a
specific way, where it is clear to him that such a chain is never closed, and therefore cannot but
endlessly prolong itself out of the effort to arriving at an ideal form of itself where semiology
and hermeneutics would perfectly cohere. However, makes it is precisely this non-coherence that
delivers us the final form of the Renaissance spatiality. In the passage below, he expresses this
ever-prolonged space as a “thin layer” that gets produced out of an effort to “weave” the layers
of semiology and hermeneutics together. Since interpretation appears out of the effort at
incorporating semiology and hermeneutics together, interpretation is represented as the mid-layer
that appears in between the two initial layers. Thus the middle-layer endlessly progresses out of
the effort to weave the top and the bottom layers together:
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‘Nature’ is trapped in the thin layer that holds semiology and hermeneutics one above the
other; it is neither mysterious nor veiled, it offers itself to our cognition, which it
sometimes leads us astray, only insofar as this superimposition necessarily includes a
slight degree of non-coincidence between the resemblances. As a result . . . its
transparency is clouded over from the very first. A dark space appears which must be
made progressively clear. That space is where ‘nature’ resides, and it is what one must
attempt to know. . . . knowledge and the infinite labor it involves find here the space that
is proper to them: it is their task to weave their way across this distance, pursuing an
endless zigzag course from resemblance to what resembles it.198
The Renaissance world finds “nature” as a space that develops out of the zig-zag weaving of the
space of hermeneutics and the space of interpretation; the in-between space demonstrates the
necessity of the endless referring back to each other of semiology and hermeneutics. While
commentary can never be assured of the possibility to entirely correspond to the Text, it has to be
“directed entirely toward the enigmatic, murmured element of the language being commented
on,” because it is precisely this original text that it aims to restore: “it calls into being, below the
existing discourse, another discourse that is more fundamental and, as it were, ‘more primal,’
which it sets itself the task of restoring.”199 However, of course, commentary cannot exist
without the initial set of signs: “There can be no commentary unless, below the language one is
reading and deciphering, there runs the sovereignty of an original Text.”200
This spatiality would not have been conceivable if the effort at interpreting that world
was not to continue:
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Perhaps for the first time in Western culture, we find revealed the absolutely open
dimension of a language no longer able to halt itself, because, never being enclosed in a
definitive statement, it can express its truth only in some future discourse and is wholly
intent on what it will have said; but even this future discourse itself does not have the
power to halt the progression, and what it says is enclosed within it like a promise, a
bequest to yet another discourse and is wholly intent on what it will have said; but even
this future discourse itself does not have the power to halt the progression, and what it
says is enclosed within it like a promise, a bequest to yet another discourse.201
As if giving a report about something that is developing in front of his eyes, Foucault is giving a
tangible account of the Renaissance spatiality in development. Foucault notes how it is
impossible for any future promise for the completion of the space to “halt its progression”;
newness constantly appears around where the endless linearity of the prose ceaselessly rewrites
itself, revealing itself to be an “absolutely open dimension.”202 At the same time, there is the
sense of witnessing a “trapped” process, a process that seems to be subjected to a mechanism not
of its own design. It is “no longer able to halt itself” because it can only express itself in “some
future discourse,” which, in turn, is entirely dependent on a “promise, a bequest” from an
absolute beyond.203
As has been noted briefly, distinct discursive activities such as writing or speaking have
epistemic significance in The Order of Things. The space-time of the Renaissance world emerges
via reading something that has already been written. The idea is that one reads and only reads, as
if stuck in a cycle of labor that only involves oneself and one’s text. Reading in this sense can
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convey the paradox of the spatiality of the Renaissance; there is the combination of, on the one
hand, a sense of inevitability in being given a linear space as the only possible form of spatiotemporality, and on the other hand, a sense of possibility that this given spatiality nonetheless
produces ever-new meaning, or ever new link of resemblance. Only when one has accepted the
inevitable destiny of in having to read, and read forever, can one enjoy the bliss of recognizing
yet another sign of resemblance or of unravelling yet another hermeneutical mystery throughout
one’s life.
Thus Foucault talks about language, for example, as imposing something like a built-in
passivity for the those involved in discursive activity. It is as if language works automatically, of
its own accord:
Language contains its own inner principle of proliferation. ‘There is more work in
interpreting interpretations than in interpreting things; and more books about books than
on any other subject; we do nothing but write glosses on one another.’ These words are
not a statement of the bankruptcy of a culture buried beneath its own monuments; they
are a definition of the inevitable relation that language maintained with itself in the
sixteenth century.204
No matter what one does with language, there is no changing of the fact that language is the only
medium given to you. When you are engaged in interpreting, you are given a text, not a blank
page, for instance. The picture of the “reader” of the Renaissance world reminds one of the
miniaturists who are portrayed in Orhan Pamuk’s novel, My Name is Red.205 The sole work of
these miniaturists, who are modelled after the actual miniaturists who lived in the late sixteenth
century of the Ottoman Empire, is to try to draw a perfect rendition of any of the episodes
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described in the sacred Koran. Because they draw minute illustrations all their lives, it often
happens that they go blind in their old age. However, it was considered a blessing rather than a
curse, because those who went blind are believed to be able to finally “see” the essence of the
world as it had been ordained by God. The supreme seeing, that is, consists in seeing in their
blindness, in complete disconnection from actually experienced world, solely from the way the
scriptures dictate it.
Such is indeed an impossible spatiality for us, living in our own time, to imagine, since it
is hard to believe that my own experience of the world cannot cause even the slightest degree of
change in the course of things. Even when I do something as slightest as noticing something, it is
normally deemed to cause some difference, in the sense that that act has now caused the result
that I have indeed witnessed something — a fact that is distinct from someone else having
witnessed the exact same event, or me having witnessed something different at that moment. I
glance outside the window and feel ominous about the terrible clouds, which makes me stand up
and walk about; or I gaze at someone, and that someone senses it and notices me. I could also
observe a tree and draw it the way it appears to me. The reality of the Renaissance develops one
tangible bit of itself after another along the course of this person’s interpretation of it. However,
the observer feels that the indubitable fact that he existed in the midst of that world, laughing,
touching, and breaking things, did not cause even the faintest stir in that world, at least in terms
of the way it develops linearly.
How does it feel like being trapped in a language that one nevertheless helps
accumulating? How, indeed, did it feel to live the Renaissance world? Again, one of the theses I
present about The Order of Things is that Foucault’s historical investigation on the epistemes
tries to address such a question. There are obvious theoretical issues that should be addressed in
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order for me to argue this; thus, I will address the implications of the epistemes having been
basically conditioned by the modern episteme. In fact, the Renaissance episteme is the result of
the imaginative attempt of the modern thinker, who is situated at his own here, trying to access
the world the way it would have emerged to his Other, who are imaginatively embedded in the
Renaissance episteme. How does modern thought, then, constitute the Renaissance world? What
do the implications of such a constitution tell us about our imaginative inhabitation of different
historical worlds, whereby we try to articulate how those worlds would have made sense to the
Others who lived them? Such are the questions that I will discuss in a new light, first by
discussing the relationship between the modern and the Renaissance epistemes in the following
section.

v. The Critical Valence of Vector
It is actually easy to dismiss Foucault’s presentation of the epistemes based on Derrida’s
arguments. If the object of our discussion is nothing other than the terrain of reality, so that the
one who encounters it cannot even feel that there should be anything “unnatural” about it, how
could reality ever be made an object of critique? This is a question of whether there can ever be
an “outside” to what Foucault calls an episteme, an idea our ordinary conception of spaces does
not easily accommodate, either. The question is whether Foucault’s vectorial presentation of the
Renaissance episteme accommodates a possible spatiality of critique, whereby things are
simultaneously experienced as lived first-hand and at the same time observed from a critical
distance.
This question, I think, has already been partially addressed by the presentation of the
Renaissance episteme that preceded this discussion. The Renaissance episteme has been
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experienced by Foucault, and by the readers who observe it the way Foucault lays out for them,
first-hand, as it were, along here-elsewhere; the world, as we have conceptually understood it, is
that which unfolds itself bit by bit, along the adding up of one link of the chain of resemblances
after another. However, as we also understand it, the world does not progress unless the vantage
point that experiences it does not stop interpreting the signs that he, or she, keeps recognizing
there. The bottom line of the development of the chain, again, was that, in the first place, signs
are something that can only be known first-hand; and then, for the knower to derive a
significance thereof, he or she should immediately refer that sign to another sign. Thus,
experience after experience of signs should continue, yet in a direction that does not, as in the
modern here-elsewhere, lets the knower to progress further into the trajectory of hereelsewhere’s; since every single signs on the earth should be covered before any complete
interpretation could ever emerge (which never will), the experiences should progress in the same
direction as the surface of the earth, linearly, as if the “prose” of the world should endlessly
struggle to cover the outer skin of the microcosmos.
To the extent where this directionality of the progression of reality only gets
comprehended by the reader’s own participation of the rationality innate in the spatio-temporal
make-up of that world, it is inevitable for us to say that Renaissance world is known via hereelsewhere, via a first-hand experience. Thus, even in a reading experience, spatio-temporality
gets perceived, and the reader gets the sensation of a reality getting unfolded, in the time of his or
her reading. I think that Foucault’s expressions where it sounds like he is describing something
that he is then observing, so that the reader can feel like he is also observing something that is
unfolding at his own now, should be understood in this sense. “Perhaps for the first time in
Western culture, we find revealed the absolutely open dimension of a language no longer able to
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halt itself,”206 Foucault says, for instance; a world is getting revealed to Foucault and to the
readers, and we sense that it can “no longer able to halt itself” – in motion now. I think that this
is what Thomas Flynn gets at, in a passage where he sums up his argument in his Sartre,
Foucault, and Historical Reason, which is one of the central studies on Foucault that explores
Foucault’s “historical reason” in terms of mapping:
I have been arguing throughout this study that Foucault’s recurrent uses of spatial terms,
diagrams, and iconic arguments are likewise chiefly a matter of spatial techniques, not
simply metaphors. They are not just illustrations or mere rhetorical devices, though they
often serve these purposes as well. As with a geometrical demonstration or the model of a
scientific theory or Linnaeus’s drawings, these spatial images are often ingredient in the
very argument itself. And when Foucault speaks of “mapping,” we can see this as an
analogue for the discourse in practice.207
Flynn says that, the spatial presentations, in Foucault, are not mere devices to illustrate his
otherwise strictly “image-free” exposition; it is “ingredient in the very argument itself.” Also,
what I suggest when I point out that Foucault’s spatio-temporal presentation is the unfolding of
the reality for the reader’s outlook in action, is also present in Flynn saying, “when Foucault
speaks of ‘mapping,’ we can see this as an analogue for the discourse in practice.” [my italics]
What does it mean, then, that we can have a critical distance from such a singularly
perceived reality? This question has been addressed a bit already, when I was discussing how the
vector of “linearity” gets perceived as such when we observe the Renaissance episteme. The
“linearity” appears, already, in relation to here-elsewhere; as the directionality that maps the
relationality between the singular I and the singular Other who faces me, here-elsewhere is

206
207

Ibid., 40.
Flynn, Satre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, 127.

128

inevitable when one has to imagine, in the first place, the experience of being in the closed
circuit of resemblance. It is because the Renaissance world does not have the language, or vector,
to refer to that relationship that it has to resort to the linearity. Thus, the particularity of the
Renaissance episteme – that is, the characteristic of itself as different from a parametric
standpoint – would not have been apprehended, if the thinker were not thinking this episteme
already from the vantage point of modern thought.
This means that critical spatiality does not have to be conjured in terms of the
inside/outside binary; it can be envisioned in terms of directionalities. Since here-elsewhere is a
relative vector in the first place, we are not talking of absolute directions, either; while being a
relative vector, here-elsewhere can still be different from another vector that. For instance, we
can recognize the “linearity” of the movement of the Renaissance episteme because such a
linearity is different, at least, from the vector of here-elsewhere; we know that, however long the
chain of resemblance progresses, it will never “overlap” with here-elsewhere coherently.
The idea of vector, which I have foregrounded as central to understanding Foucault’s
modern thought in Chapter One, has not been centralized in the critical literature on Foucault.208
Foucault himself, for that matter, has never systematically presented vector as central to his
methods. However, while he himself did not suggest such an idea, we can piece together his
thoughts, to recover an idea that critical practice can also be thought of as the experience of the
multiplicity of vectors, along which the critic experiences other worlds, and at the same time
critically think of them from his modern vantage point. Let me thus diverge a little bit here to
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examine some passage from Foucault’s preface to The Order of Things, to think of the
implications of his discussion of possible directionalities innate in critical activity there. Foucault
mentions the notion of “heteroclite,” a Latin word translatable as “multiply-tended,” in the
preface. He uses it to denote a “worse kind of disorder” than the disorder that he initially was
discussing at the beginning of The Order of Things.209 At the same time, he suggests the
possibility of detecting this heteroclite as something positive, as that which becomes only
possible when we realize that all our reality is innately ordered in a certain way.
The initial disorder is what Foucault detected in Borges’ writing – this story is famous as
an opener to the Preface. As Foucault has it, in the said passage Borges discusses a specific entry
that he saw in a Chinese encyclopedia. Under the heading of “animal,” Borges finds, are listed
items such as:
(a) belonging to the emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f)
fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j)
innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just
broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies.210
This list is so unlikely that Foucault breaks into laughter, a laughter “out of which . . . this book
first arose”; he realized that the list “shattered” the “thought . . . which characterized our age,”
through which we would “tame” the “profusion of things” that we observe in the world.211 We
realize that there had been operating a “table,” which in other words is:
a tabula, that enables thought to operate upon the entities of our world, to put them in
order, to divide them into classes, to group them according to names that designate their
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similarities and their differences — that table upon which, since the beginning of time,
language has intersected space.212
The uneasiness prompts Foucault to think of certain “impossibility,” an innate impossibility to
“[think] that” in our culture that has to do with the way our thought is ordered.213 Would we ever
be able to articulate that “non-place” of language, now that Borges has done “away with the site,
the mute ground upon which it is possible for entities to be juxtaposed?”214
This deliberation makes Foucault entertain the possibility of a “worse kind of a disorder”:
. . . in which fragments of a large number of possible orders glitter separately in the
dimension, without law or geometry, of the heteroclite . . . in such a state, things are
‘laid,’ ‘placed,’ ‘arranged’ in sites so very different from one another that it is impossible
to find a place of residence for them, to define a common locus beneath them all.215
When the very idea of the table being shattered gives one dizziness, the idea of the co-existence
of multiple possible orders is enough to make one challenged. Foucault does not specifically
build up on the idea of the heteroclite here, but the fact that he values the idea shows when he
begins to set out the basic parameters of his investigations in the book. While, he says, every
culture has its own innate order, it rarely comes face to face with the idea that such an order
exists. It is, however, when that culture finds itself “imperceptibly deviating from that empirical
orders,” especially in such occasions as the reading of Borges’ passage, that “this culture . . .
finds itself faced with the stark fact that there exists, below the level of its spontaneous orders,
things that are in themselves capable of being ordered . . . the fact, in short, order exists.”216
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This “newly perceived order,” or the fact that the order itself was recognized, makes it possible
for one to construct “general theories as to the ordering of things and the interpretation that such
an ordering involves.”217 Foucault argues the said deviation leads to the emergence of the
“middle region” where disparate orders appear “according to the culture and the age in
question.”218 This makes us consider how the production of modern thought with its unique
directionality can become the ground upon which we detect other orders such as the Renaissance
episteme, making it possible for us to conceive of something like the middle-regional palimpsest
or heteroclites.
What stands out from this part of the preface, other than the straightforward fact that
Foucault did have vector in mind as element of critical activity, is that he saw critique as simply
the perception of the “order” that “exists” in the constitution of a culture. That is, it is nothing
other than the recognition that there is a rationality behind the things that I feel as naturally there
– or the perception of the order, that is, the realization that, for the people of Renaissance, the
process of living a life lay in experiencing newness solely in terms of coming up with a new
language for interpreting the already existing Text. The fact that their path of reality lied in the
direction of a surface linearity, that is, might not have bothered them so much; critique is an
activity that perceives the order in which a reality has been laid out in this sense, and not a
“neutral” perspective that is belatedly added from a vacuum, safely from the influence of a
reality that it aims to “only” observe. Rather, as I will elaborate later, “critique” as a practice has
a value of its own, since it is innately a process of creation. Here-elsewhere, again, creates a new
instance of reality with the materials that are currently available. Perceiving the “difference”
from the way things used to be, from the way I could be otherwise, in itself creates a new value.
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Foucault expresses his insight in this light in saying that, “order” is perceived precisely at
the moment when a culture is about to “deviate” from its current direction; it is when the culture
departs from its existing course that it realizes that it has been living in a certain way. The new
value, thus, lies not in judging the past culture as wrong and trying to move away from it; it is in
the degree of divergence that is created in the vector of here-elsewhere along which both the past
and the future realities of the critic is aligned, when critique is practiced. This will be further
discussed.

c. The Classical Episteme

i. Representation
I have suggested how, in Renaissance episteme, resemblance can roughly be thought of
as the unit of discursive production of the world, since there is no sub-unit that could be referred
to in an attempt to rationally put that reality into a discourse. Resemblance is both the principle
whereby the integration of the world is explained, and the rationale that puts that world together,
since any new segment of reality that emerges in the apprehension of that reality coheres with
that rationale. “Realization” achieves its double entendre here; an instance of rational prehension
is also an instance of the materialization of that reality. At any rate, when one discursively
articulates this episteme, he or she first of all has to refer to a “sign” of resemblance, as if
referring to a unit. Representation, the principle of constitution of the Classical episteme, can be
regarded as the equivalent of the resemblance of the Renaissance episteme. Thus, like in the
Renaissance episteme, representation is a particular space-temporality that works as a unit for the
realization of the world, which happens for, and by, the one that encounters that world in each of
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his successive experiential occasions. This is to say that Classical episteme basically unfolds on
the plane of here-elsewhere as it was the case for the Renaissance episteme.
Also, as in the case of the Renaissance episteme, reality presents itself as progressing in a
vector. The only difference is that, in the case of the Classical episteme, this direction is straight
ahead, from the side of here forward, toward where the “Table” lies. This so-called Table has a
large stake in the rational conception of the Classical episteme. It is a flat, surface plane, which
stands face to face with the one for whom the Classical episteme unfolds itself. I will try to
explain how this episteme develops in a perpendicular direction to the Table; the Tables lie at a
right angle to the line of progression of this episteme. Representation has to emerge here (where
I encounter my reality) and proceed toward where this bit of reality would be merged with a
signifier. I use word, merge, for lack of better words, to denote the fact that representation is
nothing other than the total, absolute replacement of reality with a signifier.
In Classical episteme, it is an undoubted belief that what represents something is the
same as that thing. In the actual context of experience, this belief translates into the necessity that
there has to be a total, and immediate, subsumption of actually perceived reality to some sheer
abstraction. Thus, the Classical viewpoint does not believe in the conceivability of any spatiotemporal distance in between here where perception of reality happens, and the location where
the representation of such perception could be found. This other location (which will soon be
elaborated as where the Table is) immediately catches up with the space of here, since the
perceived reality is supposed to be immediately, already, represented. Thus, there should be no
spatial or temporal delay between the moment when I perceive a thing and the moment when that
thing assumes a representation for me. In Renaissance, there was no way to untangle the tightly
knit circle of resemblance. In the same way, there is no way for anyone living the Classical
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episteme to tell reality apart from its representation, or to conceive of any possible spatiotemporal room in between the locus of here and the locus where representation of what has just
been perceived at that here arises. It is in this sense that I refer to the happening of representation
as the minimum unit of constitution of the Classical reality. This also means that — as I will
elaborate on — the purpose of the Classical episteme as a whole can be said to be the total
replacement of actually perceived instants of reality with abstract, universal, and generalizable
signifiers.
Certainly, the process whereby each occasion of actual experience gets immediately
transformed into signifiers is something that does not easily make sense to the modern eye. It
could be granted that such a way of perception still be works on the level of our everyday,
commonsensical reality; if I attend school every day for example, I have a vague knowledge that,
regardless of the ever-mutating nature of reality, there is always a series of things that I safely
assume to be there, thanks to which I recognize “school” as such. Here, I use the word, “things,”
to denote that, by doing so, I am equalizing the singular perception of any random instance of
reality with a definite idea, or an essence, that can function as a safe knowledge of what it is in
distinction from the others. If I go to the library for instance, I would be seeing computers on the
“desks,” which are, in turn, set up in front of the “chairs.” Probably my brain should be, to a
certain extent, immediately processing the things that I witness in front of me into their series of
names, which are clear and distinct. However, that alone cannot annul that, apart from such clear
things, there are daily fluctuations in the world that deliver us adventures, surprises, and
accidents. The kind of things that I easily attribute stable names to could not be so easily thought
of by others. Even the things that strike me as most natural — such as that a particular piece of
worn paper seems to be “garbage,” for instance — would be felt differently by someone else,
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with his or her own particular personal sensibility and knowledge. By the same token, one day I
might suddenly find that, my brain can no longer easily process one of my colleagues as simply a
“colleague”; she could mean much more that suddenly.
What makes such a difference in perception? It seems that there need to be many
conditions for an “episteme” to become possible, such as a basic spatio-temporal unit of an
episteme (such as resemblance or representation), the idea of how or whether that world is
theoretically “closed,” or the discursive rationality of that world (such as interpretation or
naming.) My investigation of the Classical episteme will consistently ask how or if we would be
able to isolate such conditions.

ii. The Intersecting Poles of Space and Time
Let me continue with my discussion of representation. In many of Foucault’s discussions
on the spatial persuasiveness of the Classical episteme, he presents the episteme as built up along
two distinct poles of reality that “perpendicularly” intersect each other — space and time
respectively. One of the foremost spatial constituents of the Classical episteme is the Table, or
the flat, one-dimensional plane where different names or essences of all observable things in that
world are featured. While the Table can be explained in terms of the actual charts or tables that
abounds in the documents from the era, Foucault makes it certain that the Table is an abstract
space, which I would say is comparable rather to something like a digital clock. What features on
the level of the table is only the abstract essences of things, instead of any details that actually
look like or sound like the perceived objects.
Thus, in the field of natural history, there was an effort at coming up with only a handful
of characteristics of the natural phenomena to represent the whole of it. It was believed that, by
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reducing any living object to only a few of its characteristics, it becomes possible for us to
represent every single living being solely out of the combination of a number of elements. All
the rich, ineluctable singular characteristics of an observed reality gets reduced to a few
recognizable characteristics. This mindset undergirds the notion of “vision” in this era; Foucault
discusses how “visual” elements in this sense were the conditions of possibility of the reality of
the Classical era:
The area of visibility in which observation is able to assume its powers is thus only what
is left after these exclusions: a visibility freed from all other sensory burdens and
restricted, moreover, to black and white. This area, much more than the receptivity and
attention at last being granted to things themselves, defines natural history’s condition of
possibility, and the appearance of the screened objects: lines, surfaces, forms, reliefs.219
According to Classical “vision,” natural objects already appear as the black-and-white,
“screened objects.”
The idea is that, at least on the level of knowing something according to the standards of
this era, the actually observed reality is already same as abstract representations. Thus,
observation is only considered to happen on the surface level. Since perceived space has to
immediately overlap, or merge, with the Table, there is no time for the perceiver to reach deeper
into reality than the level that is minimally necessary for a name to be derived for that reality; as
Foucault has it, “natural history is nothing more than the nomination of the visible.”220 As soon
as perception happens — such as the recognition of what vaguely seem like the limbs of a tree
and the striking, dark green shade characteristic of lush tree leaves — the aliveness in such
images is already truncated since the mind immediately knows that what it has just encountered is
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nothing more or less than “a tree.” Paradoxically, while the Table deprives of any actual details
grasped with naked eyes to reduce the object into a representation, there is a collective sense of
eyes finally being opened in this time:
The Classical age gives history a quite different meaning [from that which was given by
the Renaissance age]: that of undertaking a meticulous examination of things themselves
for the first time, and then of transcribing what it has gathered in a smooth, neutralized,
and faithful words. It is understandable that the first form of history constituted in this
period of ‘purification’ should have been the history of nature.221
As we will continue to see, there is a profound belief here that to know nature in the most
immediate sense is to represent it as distinct things. This is why “naming” produces this episteme
discursively.
This episteme had to think that things are already known to be a particular essence even
before any perception has happened. This is the context in which Foucault discusses the
significance of Locke’s theory of “idea” of this time.222 According to this theory, the idea of a
thing is that which the mind perceives as real since it knows that it has just felt it. That is, it
argues that essence as the universal characteristic of a thing is singularly experienced by a
particular mind. This is a radical notion, equivalent to arguing that, for example, there is no
difference whatsoever between my own witnessing of a scenery where dry, empty, and whitish
yellow sand stretches on a vast field, and the capturing of the essence of such perceived reality
with a name, such as “a whitish-yellow desert.” Identification of such a kind, which almost
seems a brutal simplification, is impossible for the vantage point situated in the modern episteme
to believe in. People who observe reality along here-elsewhere would say that there should be
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some displacement between the actually observed reality, and the space entirely identifiable with
names and characteristics. But the Classical episteme overlaps the site where the singular,
individual, psychological perception of reality happens, with the supposed locus of the Table.
The former is a spatiality where the most personal, ineluctable, and emotional dimension of
perception emerges; the latter is product of a conviction or a belief that any perceivable thing in
the world should be universally experienceable.
It follows that, from the theoretical standpoint that makes here-elsewhere conceivable,
Classical episteme needs a spatio-temporal displacement – displacement between the actual,
experienced space (the here of the experience) and the space that emerges by immediately giving
up that actual space for the sake of occupying the plane of the abstraction. Since this
displacement has to happen in no time, the time for representation to take place has to be
theoretically an infinitely small instant. In fact, however slightly I observe a particular scene —
as if skimming on the surface of the scenery — so that I can immediately provide a name for it,
such as, say, “seaside,” it would be impossible for me to say that it took no time for me to come
up with that name. This “theory of no time,” however, is precisely what the Classical episteme
had to actually believe in, thanks to the fact that it believed in the absolute identity of reality and
its essence.
Regardless of if we could actually conceive the duration of an “infinitely small time,”
such a theoretical temporality is a significant element of Foucault’s spatio-temporal
demonstration of the buildup of Classical episteme. The time of one’s life can be regarded as
composed of infinitely small units of time, each unit being theoretically no time. In each of this
“no time,” I would be, according to this episteme, experiencing some thing – anything that can
be reducible as essence or essences. Thus the Classical episteme consists of the intersecting
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dimensions of time and space; at each temporal unit, I would be experiencing something, which
is, according to this episteme, primarily a matter of what I might be “seeing.” For instance, I
could be watching a “sea” at one instant; this essence, in itself, takes up the whole of what my
reality at that moment should be. At the immediately next instant, I could be watching a “wave”
approaching; and then in the next instant I could still be watching a “wave.”
At whichever frozen instant I might be, I would be seeing “something,” a something that
can surely be found on the grid on the Table. Or, what I could be seeing could be reducible to a
combination of a few grids on the Table, but it does not modify the point that, spatially speaking,
my reality can always be indicated as some locus on the Table. This is to say that the Classical
episteme conceives of “reality” in terms of the intersection between the Table and time. To
illustrate, we could think of the Table as something like a very thin sheet of paper where all the
essences of the world are featured as grids; then we could imagine such sheets of paper to be
stacked very thickly, so that the stack can represent the accumulated instants of someone’s
experience in his Classical episteme. The sheets should be very thin to represent the fact that
each experience only lasts for an infinitely small duration of time; the person’s life trajectory, as
it spans through his whole life, would be like “passing” through one Table after another, so that
each Table can indicate which experience this person went through at which moment.
If I was experiencing something like travelling on a long road and finally arriving at the
door of my friend’s house, the Classical episteme would narrate this episode as something like:
“the road, the road, the road, and then the road again, followed by a house, the door of the house,
and then my friend standing in front of the open door.” Such a trajectory, however, is never
conceived of in terms of the Bachelardian “arc,” since each instant of experience is immediately
replaced by another experience, rather than getting arrived at through the experiencer’s passage
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through his here-elsewhere’s. Again, there is theoretically no time taken for the experience of
“the door of the house” to replace the experience of “the road.” Thus, even the comparison to the
sheets of paper is inadequate, since we know that, we take time between looking at a grid on a
sheet of paper and then looking at a grid on another sheet of paper. Since no time is taken for one
to experience one thing after experiencing another in the Classical episteme, one is advancing
perpendicularly in one’s world in relation to the dimension of time. One is going straight
through, since all one has to do in experiencing one’s world is to encounter one essence after
another, without ever having to think of where to arrive next. The next place is automatically on
his face; time is never co-constituted by the participation of the experiencer here. It is prearranged, always arriving immediately, in no time, along with the next share of essence to
experience.

iii. The Critical View of the Classical Episteme
In the section on the Renaissance episteme, I discussed how spatio-temporal
“experiencing” of the rationale of the episteme is integral to Foucault’s presentation of it. This is
because, again, observation of epistemes happens on the condition of here-elsewhere as the
parametric, vectorial setting upon which epistemes singularly unfold, with their share of
difference, which is indicatable with their difference in vector. Thus, epistemes as vectorial
realities convey the sense of critique being a recognition and an acknowledgement of there being
an order in a reality’s make-up. This sense of recognizing the rationale of a reality, as that which
is natural and inevitable for the perspective that should have lived that reality as its own, is
palpable in Foucault’s presentation of the Classical episteme as well. I have already discussed
how the “theory of the no time” would seem unnecessary for a modern perspective; and yet, how
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Classical episteme’s spatio-temporal constitution demands that theoretical temporality. This
point is deliberately and very carefully introduced by Foucault; he emphasizes its strangeness
and rationality.
As Foucault has it, while representation happens on the plane of the Table,
“representativity,” or that which makes representation possible in the first place, has to be
addressed beyond the plane of Table. So Reprsentativity is expressed as that which serially lays
out one Table after another along the dimension perpendicular to the surface dimension of the
Table. This requirement also translates into: without the temporal dimension, the spatial
dimension, which consists of mere frozen snapshots of reality, would not constitute a world as it
would unfold for a singular perspective, even for one instant. So, there needs to be a hidden,
perpendicular dimension of “representativity” for each experienced, or represented, reality. As
Foucault has it, representation has to be “perpendicular to itself”:
An idea can be the sign of another, not only because a bond of representation can be
established between them, but also because this representation can always be represented
within the idea that is representing. Or again, because representation in its peculiar
essence is always perpendicular to itself: it is at the same time indication and
appearance; a relation to an object and a manifestation of itself. From the Classical age,
the sign is the representativity of the representation in so far as it is representable.223
Since essences are expressed on the surface spatiality, that which enables representation to
emerge should progress perpendicularly to the Table. While each version of the Table can tell me
what it is that I have just seen and experienced, the Table itself cannot explain its own
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appearance to me. A second dimension has to be added on to the surface dimension to indicate of
the value of whether a Table is being experienced by me or not.
With this “extra” dimension, the Classical episteme completes its rationale and its
direction. This is the paradoxically “natural” side of an episteme; a “reality” that is, from the
modern vantage point, experienced as such despite its difference. This is why, in this context,
“arbitrariness” cannot simply stand as an antonym of “necessary” or “natural.” While Foucault is
referring to various Classical system of knowledge in one breath in the passage below, his basic
idea is that, what seems as the most arbitrary, unnecessary combination of different dimensions
for the sake of coming up with the experience of reality for the Classical episteme, was actually
the most natural, “primal,” and “transparent” way for it to experience the world:
‘Arbitrary’ stands in opposition to ‘natural’ only if one is attempting to designate the
manner in which signs have been established. But this arbitrariness is also the grid of
analysis and the combinative space through which nature is to posit itself as that which it
is — at the level of primal impressions and in all the possible forms of their combination.
In its perfect state, the system of signs is that simple, absolutely transparent language
which is capable of naming what is elementary; it is also that complex of operations
which defines all possible conjunctions. To our eyes, this search for origins and this
calculus of combinations appear incompatible, and we are only too ready to interpret
them as an ambiguity in seventeenth- and eighteenth- century thought. The same is true
of the interaction between the system and nature. In fact, there is no contradiction at all
for thought at that time. More precisely, there exists a single necessary arrangement
running through the whole of the classical episteme: the association of a universal
calculus and a search for the elementary within a system that is artificial and is, for that
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very reason, able to make nature visible from its primary elements right to the
simultaneity of all their possible combinations.224
Foucault thinks that it is understandable that we raise the question of, how could the Classical
perspective equalize what is natural with what is artificial. The way this was possible has to do
with that “there exists a single necessary arrangement” that put them together; this arrangement
lets the spatiality of that world appear in some kind of a temporal continuity. “A search for the
elementary” in the above passage can be expressed as the desire to overlap what is immediately
captured in one’s impression with some type of a representation; “a universal calculus” is that
which is required to find the most adequate representation for the perception at hand out of an
almost infinite possible combinations of representations, once it is accepted that it is indeed
possible for us to express primal impression in terms of a representation. Such a combination
can, again, parallels the combination between the act of “naming what is elementary” and, the
“operations that define all possible conjunctions.” The idea that two-part segments work in
“single arrangement” is absurd to our eyes: “To our eyes, this search for origins and this calculus
of combinations appear incompatible, and we are only too ready to interpret them as an
ambiguity in seventeenth- and eighteenth- century thought.” However, for the Classical thought,
there is no room for any “ambiguity” in the first place, since all these poles are working already
on the level of the primal impression: “this arbitrariness is also the grid of analysis and the
combinative space through which nature is to posit itself as that which it is — at the level of
primal impressions and in all the possible forms of their combination.” [my italics]
Much of Foucault’s exhaustive demonstration of disparate fields of knowledge from this
era — such as the study of language (which was called “general grammar”), the study of
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economy, or the study of living beings (which was called “natural history”) — is devoted to
demonstrating how this specific spatio-temporal, or “rational” logic, was operating in all of those
sub-fields. That there was such a consistency is a presumed fact by Foucault; according to the
table of contents of The Order of Things, the disparate fields of knowledge are all subsections to
the larger, central chapter that argues for the existence of the Classical episteme as such. It is just
that, the extent to which all of these knowledges demonstrate the way Classical episteme is
produced as a definite spatio-temporal rationality has not been seriously investigated so far in the
critical literature. In Foucault’s presentation, theorization of what language is, for example, or
investigations on what it means for human beings to engage in economic activity, would not
even be conceivable without the rationality that deploys the Table and the linear temporality
together in their specific geometric configuration. I will further illustrate precisely this point. At
the same time, I want to think of some parallels between the Renaissance and the Classical
epistemes to foreground the idea of episteme as such.

iv. Fields of Knowledge in the Classical Episteme
Foucault’s exposition of the theory of language in this time shares the same problematic
as is involved in basic the epistemic construction of this era, which is how a rational mapping of
the world can appear via letting it represented. In his presentation, this rational mapping happens
thanks to the initial, primal impression perceived on the level of our psychology travelling to the
location where it overlaps with a name. For this to happen, first, the primal impression has to
become representable; that is, it has to get to the location where its conceptualization emerges
(which is where the Table lies), so it can be replaced with an abstract character that does not
have any relation of resemblance to that initial primal impression. That is, unlike in the
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Renaissance episteme where there was no escape from the chain of interpretation which was
solely confined to the analogies among the resemblances, the Classical episteme imposes a
complete break in between observed reality and anything that could resemble it. For language to
be produced in this episteme (not via interpretation), observed reality should be directly referred
to an absolute abstraction which does not have any relation to the immanent. So Foucault says
that, while it is true that the grammarians of this period say that sometimes a pictorial shape that
actually looks like a perceived object is used to stand for that object as in the Chinese language
or that sometimes a certain vocabulary that sounds like the perceived object gets used as its sign,
the alphabetical system is ultimately seen as superior because, in it, a particular, singular
impression takes a flight to the dimension of completely arbitrary characters or sounds to get
associated with them. The level on which this purely coincidental match happens, Foucault says,
is the “rhetorical” dimension of language according to the Classical grammarians.225
This does not explain the whole of the process of representation. The rhetorical
dimension has explained only the process whereby any singular experience of reality gets
replaced with an abstract sign; the process whereby a particular name, such as a “cat,” should be
assigned rather than another, remains to be explicated. If a clear differentiation in between names
does not happen, primal impression would continue to alight on random names each time
representation has to occur; then, something that can be seen as a “cat” for us could be referred
to as a “dog” next times we see a similar object. At the same time, a certain degree of
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identification should also be established in between different names, so that objects that are
related to one another would also be related in their names. For example, “snow” has to be
related to “snowman,” and “number” has to be related to “numerous.” For Foucault, the whole
point of the theory of language in this period lies in articulating the process via which the
gridded space of significations, where they are neatly ordered side by side according to relations
of identity and difference, came into being.
In our actual perception, there seems to be a mechanism that links an impression that I
have received just now, and the impression that I am having right now. For example, let us say
that, but a moment ago, I was seeing the sky in which the blazing red of the sunset was
beginning to spread across the surrounding azure; now, a second after that moment, what I see is
a bit of a gold emerging out of the redness, with the red part itself having grown larger. While
representation might be able to give us the exact description of what I see in front of me at each
distinct instant — constituted of such names as sky, red, gold, etc. — it cannot give us any clues
as to how one representational instant (one space-time) connects with the one immediately
following it. While it might be very natural for us to assume something like, “a bit of gold has
developed at the edge of an area that used to be entirely red,” or, “the little patch of coffee stain
has become larger now,” the Classical episteme, precisely speaking, does not offer us any solid
ground for us to establish causality or logical connection in between succeeding events.
For this reason, Foucault says, Classical rationality has to summon resemblance back into
the new episteme to offer it a minimum degree of rationale. This becomes possible since
resemblance or similitude presupposes an instinctual, ineluctable relation between things that
attract one another — they are simply alike. If I see a slightly yellowish red a second after seeing
a complete red, the yellowish red can be imagined to resemble the complete red so that their
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actual continuity can be presupposed. Since the first perception – whereby I have witnessed the
color red – has let me represent that reality via the name, “red,” the second perception, which I
understand to be related to the first one, can now be represented with a name that is located
somewhere near where that initial name “red” is located on the Table. That is, a different grid,
such as the “yellowish red” or the “orange,” can be located somewhere around the initial grid
“red.” The second grid, as Foucault says is, is related to the initial grid in relations of identity and
difference. Resemblance thus explains the way the Table of representation gradually came to
take a stable shape. As Foucault has it:
So that at the base of spoken language, as with writing, what we discover is the rhetorical
dimension of words: that freedom of the sign to alight, according to the analysis of
representation, upon some internal element, upon some adjacent point, upon some
analogous figure. And if language possesses the diversity we observe in them, . . . if they
have all had their own history . . . this is because words have their locus, not in time, but
in a space in which they are able to find their original site, change their positions, turn
back upon themselves, and slowly unfold a whole developing curve: a tropological
space.226
In rhetoric, we witness primal impression “alight” on a sound, as in the case of the impression of
the color red to “alight” on the sound of “r” or “ed” in the word “red.” After this initial moment,
the original word returns to its “original site” when the exact same impression is repeated; a
series of such original words can “change their positions,” as new words begin to get added near
them as new impressions similar to the original ones occur. After a certain number of words have
been positioned in relation to the relations of identity and difference among themselves, they also
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“turn back upon themselves” in a movement that concretizes themselves. The “developing
curve” that language leaves in its trace makes it possible for us to detect its spatio-temporal
trajectory.
With the importation of resemblance in articulating the temporal establishment of the
Table, it gets accepted that there should be an element of order according to which a particular
representation can or cannot immediately follow another one. An idea of an ordered world
becomes possible, where there are certain limited number of things that I can experience in my
whole life — which are all neatly represented in their relations of identity and difference on the
Table — and there are certain rules as to how far I can jump from experiencing one specific set
of grids to experiencing another set of grids within the span of the unit time it takes for one to
experience something new after having just experienced a certain thing. In this light, grammar
lays out representations of my world in an ideal order for myself so that their temporal unfolding
can naturally reveal the way how, in the universe, one thing leads to another, or, how a certain
thing has to be mentioned before something else in order for us to properly reflect their
interrelation. Foucault articulates the central problematic of general grammar when he says: “to
my gaze, ‘the brightness is within the rose’; in my discourse, I cannot avoid it coming either
before or after it.”227 Which should come first in my discourse — a noun or an adjective?
Foucault notes how Adam Smith regards metaphysics as “an essential ingredient . . . even in the
least of adjectives”:
It would be nonsense to see [general grammar] purely and simply as the application of a
logic to the theory of language. But it would be equally nonsensical to attempt to interpret
it as a sort of prefiguration of a linguistics. General grammar is the study of verbal order
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in its relation to the simultaneity that is its task to represent. Its proper object is therefore
neither thought nor any individual language, but discourse, understood as a sequence of
verbal signs.228
The object of general grammar is discourse, the art of setting up an ideal “sequence of verbal
signs” for the observer to put his experience into. While it might seem that the observer, in a
perception that has just happened, feels that “the brightness is within the rose,” the discourse
would immediately adjust that perception so that “I” should precede other potential names in the
sequence. The “rose” can emerge only once “I” has happened; the ideal proposition should be, “I
saw a rose.”
Such a rule would wield immense power; any perception that does not cohere with the
basic way reality should always already present itself for the observer would be dismissed as
nonsensical, which is the same as nonexistent. On the other hand, even a certain version of
reality that had not been experienced would still be considered as plausible in the least, if it could
possibly follow the particular set of representations that I am experiencing or that which I am
likely to be experiencing soon. Thus, even before one hears of any factual account of an incident,
for example, one automatically finds oneself wondering about the subject of the incident in
question. It would be nonsensical, for such a thinker, for reality not to contain a subject as a
factor, which is supposed to be the sole agent for creating such a reality. We can think of a
situation where we can simply say “rainy” to denote that there is the feeling of rain everywhere
around us, compared to the situation where we should say either “It rains,” or “Rain is falling
down on us,” to describe the same situation. In certain languages, it is possible to compose
completely grammatical sentences with something that looks like “rainy,” but not in English.
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Foucault shows that, in the general grammar, the question that applies to the dimension of
emergence or disappearance of a particular representation — which is the question of
“representability”— does not happen in distinction from the problem of which form of
representation should stand for a particular signified. That is to say, the question of if an
intimate, ineluctable emotion could be deemed to be same as a series of particular words, does
not, in our discursive practices, get considered in distinction from the question of which words,
out of many possible ones, should be selected to articulate my particular experience.
Foucault makes this point explicit in his discussion of the “quadrilateral” of language, a diagram
that he devises to visualize the way general grammar operates. In this rectangular-shaped
diagram, four distinct sub-theories of language are presented as four different lines. The model
shows how these four segments work in pairs, where each opposing pair confront each other and
complement each other. For example, the pole of “articulation,” which explains how an actual
thing that gets referred to becomes represented by the linguistic element that stands for it
“confronts,” and simultaneously “opposes,” the pole of “derivation,” which has to do with the
process of expansion of the grid of representation whereby a single positing of a grid lead to the
development of other grids surrounding it. The underlying idea is that, while there should be
such poles, or theories, to explain the overall process of naming, each of these poles cannot be
disengaged from one another. None of the poles, or the sub-theories of language, can stand alone
any more than the relations of identity and difference could be established without considering
the question of how the plane of representation comes in to being with.
The quadrilateral is a strange dimensionality where poles are interdependent on one
another, and at the same time cooperating to achieve a collective effect. Foucault shows how,
combining each other and cancelling each other, these theories achieve “naming,” or the prime
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goal of the discourse of general grammar. Foucault makes it clear that the gist of the Classical
episteme is for reality to get called by a name. The whole process tends to it, so that every
discursive process can be subsumed to that:
One might say that it is the Name that organizes all Classical discourse; to speak or to
write is not to say things or to express oneself, it is not a matter of playing with language,
it is to make one’s way towards the sovereign act of nomination, to move, through
language, towards the place where things and words are conjoined in their common
essence, and which makes it possible to give them a name. But once that name has been
spoken, all the language that has led up to it, or that has been crossed in order to reach it,
is reabsorbed into it and disappears.229
As will be discussed further on, the point that Foucault makes here, with the quadrilateral, can be
applied to all the other fields of knowledge within the Classical episteme. His consistent point is
that, all the intricate, detailed, and immense content of knowledge that this period produced –
and it was an age exceptionally confident about its own rationality — was, when it all came
down to it, the product of the movement of knowledge that essentially wanted to name itself.
While this might seem like an immense simplification, this is what Foucault actually argues; the
implication is also embedded in the statement that there was a “single necessary arrangement
running through the whole of the Classical episteme.”230 To show the consistent working of “an
episteme” here, he again and again falls back to the spatio-temporal language that describes the
organization of knowledge of that time.
That there is parallel production of knowledge in seemingly disparate fields is
emphatically repeated. Look at the way, for example, Foucault explains a particular problematic
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within natural history, where such concepts as “groups” or “species” needed to be established.
For Foucault, this problem is “isomorphic” with that of the establishment of the common nouns
in general grammar:
The problem here is isomorphic with the one we have already met in relation to language:
for a common noun to be possible, there had to be an immediate resemblance between
things that permitted the signifying elements to move along the representations, to slide
across the surface of them, to cling to their similarities and thus, finally, to form
collective designations.231
An “immediate” relation of resemblance makes it possible for “signifying elements” to “move
along representations,” so that a common area among different representations can emerge. As
has been explained, in this way resemblance interludes to the logic of strict identification and
distinction that order the Table. This blurring of the gird is presented to happen on a strictly onedimensional, “surface” plane, whereby the “signifying elements” that derive from resemblance
“move along the representations” and “slide across the surface of them” to “cling to their
similarities.” After this blurring process, a common designation that refers to the supposedly
continuous element in all the distinct objects involved can be arrived at. “Collective
designations” thereby emerge.

v. The Rationality of the Classical Episteme and the Progress of History
One of our questions is if there are conditions that constitute an episteme as such. Thus, I
want to see if Classical episteme, like in the Renaissance case, tries to make itself theoretically
coherent and, closed as it were. For, according to my expositions so far, Classical episteme
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seems to be able to stretch forever. In it, one after another version of representation of the world
continues to arrive at here where we encounter it. An illimitable number of essences could be
experienced within an infinite period of time if nothing limits the number.
As Foucault sees it, the list of essences possible to be encountered for a Classical
perspective is not boundless; there would not be ever new supplies of occasions of reality.
Foucault makes the circumscribed nature of the grid manifest when he compares the Classical
episteme with the Renaissance one. While the search for the analogy in between signatures
should be, by definition, infinite in Renaissance, the primary activity of the rationality of the
Classical time — “analysis” — is “completable,” since it is possible to enumerate the
characteristics to be featured on the Table:
A complete enumeration will now be possible . . . Comparison . . . can attain to perfect
certainty: the old system of similitudes [of the Renaissance episteme], never complete
and always open to fresh possibilities, could, it is true, through successive confirmations,
achieve steadily increasing probability; but it was never certain. Complete enumeration,
and the possibility of assigning at each point the necessary connection with the next,
permit an absolutely certain knowledge of identities and differencies: ‘Eumeration alone,
whatever the question to which we are applying ourselves, will permit us always to
deliver a true and certain judgement upon it.’232
Complete coverage does not only apply to the spatial plane; the temporal plane is also
terminable. Thus, “general grammar” is “achievable,” whereby every possible occasion of
experience would be serially ordered in correlation to the way the reality itself should ideally
develop itself. Also, natural history establishes the order whereby the history of the development
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of nature is impeccably captured, arraying every living being from the most elementary to the
most sophisticated along the stages of evolution. The act of laying out of groups or species on the
Table according to the degree of complexity of different organs — such as those for respiration,
digestion, or mobility — demonstrates “progress.” Even while it would be hard for anyone to
decide whether a particular characterization in an organ is the evidence of it being in a more or
less evolved state than another organ with a different characteristic, the theoretical assumption of
being able to line up every representable character on the Table in the order of their progress,
remains intact. The theory of “continuity,” which was popular in the field of natural history,
presupposes that, while a particular grid of representation, or a series or combination of
representations, have not been actually observed to exist, it is possible for scholars to presume
that they did exist at their time. Grounded on this self-avouched theory, the naturalist Bonnet
could declare that processes of “evolutions were foreseen and inscribed in the germs of animals
upon the very first day of creation.”233
So Classical episteme is theoretically closed though no one could ever tell how the final
version of the represented world would look like, whether we were discussing the development
of language or that of nature. This makes us think of the already-terminated nature of the
Renaissance episteme again. While interpretation always happens in the present, the spatiality of
the prose was already assured of its divine completeness primordially. The theory of micro- and
macro-cosmos was necessary because the real space of that world was a linearity that was
forever elongating itself. Since signs could only be referred to by another sign, the endless
process of adding them up could not end. A separate copy of that spatiality had to be introduced,
so that their hypothetical sameness could pre-gaurantee the linear space’s completion. In
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Classical episteme, however, the world comes into existence through naming — an act of
establishment of the relation of identity between the immediately perceived world and a specific
signification. Thus, even a single instance of representation contains the seed for bringing in a
complete correspondence between the perceived world and its name – an ideal, unearthly version
of that world. This is a different way of expressing that the Table already contains every
conceivable representation of the actually apprehended world. However, the promise of Progress
is still necessary for the whole of the Classical episteme to become integral. Without the
assurance of arriving at an ideal world, the cycle of emergence of one represented world after
another would not have been set off in the first place.
What do we mean by the conditions of an episteme? The perception of a world as rational
seems to include the consideration of the world’s vector, which is also the idea of where my own
experiences are tending to. That is, episteme seems to have to do with the question of, how this
particular experience that I am undergoing is involved with how the larger, persuasively
designed reality is trying to make itself complete, which manifests as a vectorial phenomenon.
The Renaissance world endlessly elongates itself in a direction that does not overlap with hereelsewhere precisely because it believes in the achievability of itself; the Classical episteme
continues to advance in a perpendicular direction to the Table, in a direction that is distinct from
here-elsewhere, because it believes that it will be perfected, fulfilled, by so advancing. Thus – I
risk repeating myself here again – rationality as Foucault presents it is not about being able to
occupy a neutral, vacuumed position, shrouded from every possible influence so that one can
finally begin to objectively consider the object. Rather, rationality is about knowing the world to
be laid out in a certain a way, already, with its own integral design.
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Let’s consider the way Foucault uses specific vectorial denotations to describe his
epistemes. We can try to put ourselves in the vantage point of view embedded in the Classical
episteme, and conclude quite effortlessly that, in where we are, reality approaches us from
straight ahead of us, instead of in a zig-zag road or in an unpredictable direction. In “Dream,
Imagination and Existence,” Foucault describes a case where existence advances in a “vertical”
direction. Later in this chapter, I will demonstrate how this reference to verticality has explicit
connection to the Classical episteme. In the “Dream” article, the link between thinking in terms
of natural history, and existence taking a headlong plunge in the “vertical” direction, is
established. The psychological underpinnings of such a progression are discussed in detail there,
which I suggest deserves our sustained attention. In The Order of Things, however, he does not
use the specific term, “vertical,” although the careful layout of the argument renders an argument
about the “verticality” of the Classical episteme. One of his expressions in The Order of Things
particularly makes us to consider the vector of the Classical episteme; as he has it, by the time
the episteme was being displaced by another episteme, a dimension of “depth” was introduced
into it.

vi. Preliminary Conclusions on the Rationality of Epistemes
Let me deliberate a bit on the implication of the two epistemes being conceptually closed.
It is a known fact that, with all its brilliant successes in science and technology and its attendant
pride in its rationality, what Foucault refers to as the Classical time seems to have resorted to a
specific conception of God in its crucial ontological deliberations. For example, while Descartes
launched one of the bravest philosophical endeavors ever by subjecting the existence of
everything that he observed to doubt, he later on resorted to importing God again as the
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justification of his reasoning whereby existence is assured of.234 He had to do this because, as we
have seen in the first chapter, he tried to save the validity of his own experience by turning to the
notion of substance — which he had not derived from his own philosophical undertaking, but
simply chose to deploy as the need arose. We can recall that Foucault understood this as the
psychological consequence of his fear or his desire to be safe. Complying with this turn, the
Classical era decided to rely on what seemed to be the most manifest, unambiguous, and
effective worldview ever — the Newtonian order of absolute space-time, for its conception of
reality. For this worldview perfectly cohered with Descartes’ rationale, since it presupposes the
enduring existence of “substance” that is itself motivation-less and force-less, which occupy
stable spatio-temporal positionality at any given moment.235 Even while there have been central
philosophical deliberations on the implications of modern physics, which clearly point out the
shortcomings of the Newtonian paradigm, the belief in the existence of absolute grid of spacetime continues to this day, majorly thanks to its sheer practical effectiveness and technological
achievements.236
Foucault had definitely come to a point of his philosophical deliberations where the
Newtonian paradigm could be challenged. It is, in this light, significant that both of the past
epistemes as Foucault presents them in The Order of Things are characterized by having definite
limits, which are related to the idea of a perfect, pre-ordained world to which the currently
emerging bit of reality has to cohere. If this is the case, we can ask if Classical episteme can
indeed be called “secular.” Can they be considered secular simply because they do not ostensibly
need God (as a figure) for the justification of its own existence? For one thing, the prosaic
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Renaissance space had to endlessly advance toward where yet another link in the chain of
interpretation would emerge, thanks to God’s primordial promise that such a process would lead
to the complete overlap of semiology and hermeneutics. In the same way, the limited number of
possible representations on the Table, along with the promise of the completion of Progress,
forms an implicit boundary of the Classical world. Representational occasions ceaselessly
advance and realize themselves as space-time precisely because they aim to realize the predelineated world. The conceptual “closure” of the epistemes, along with the vector in which such
a world develops itself, therefore seems to be a central component in the “rationality” constituent
of Foucault’s epistemes, the past epistemes at least. Whether the notion of the boundary also
applies to the modern episteme, I cannot say for now.
At least, however, I want to argue that there is a deeper consistency between the
Renaissance and the Classical episteme than having been recognized so far. So far, there has
been almost an exclusive focus on the way Classical episteme is recognized, analyzed, and
critiqued in The Order of Things; the study of the Renaissance episteme had been almost treated
as a mere introduction the “real” subject.237 There had not been much attempt at seeing
Foucault’s presentation of the Renaissance episteme as that which reveals the fundamental idea
of an episteme, while “episteme” as denoting historically mutating conditions of knowledge has
been certainly there in the Foucault scholarship.238 A case in point is Gutting’s discussion of the
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book. In his extensive coverage on The Order of Things, which shows a rich understanding of
how Foucault’s archaeological method critiques Western “scientific reason,” there also seems to
be a notion of Classical episteme being the epitome of a “rational” order of knowledge. The
result is the understanding of “rationality” as solely demonstrated by the Classical episteme (and
thus critiqued as the characteristic of such an era), rather than as characterizing “epistemes” in
general:
. . . [with the advent of the Classical episteme] resemblances are no longer regarded as
expressing the true order of reality, an order that is rather to be found in the structure of
the elements into which things and their resemblances can be analyzed. These elements
are related not by vague and ambiguous resemblances but by strict identities and
differences (presence or absence of particular properties).239
The argument is set up around the opposition between, on the one hand, resemblances, which are
“vague” and “ambiguous,” and analysis on the other, which is “strict,” based as it is on
“identities and differences.” While this comparison does not explicitly contradict Foucault’s
discussion on the level of its content, it can distract from the way “rationality” is central to
Foucault’s conception of an episteme. Resemblance is the mythical, foreordained link of the
chain; Renaissance episteme has to articulate the links into its own overall space-time, which is
itself called “interpretation.” On the other hand, the Table of identities and differences is the
spatial condition for representation to happen. Representation is the emergence of reality via the
realization of essence(s) at each instant of time. Classical world articulates occasions of
representation into a larger achievement of History. There is rationality innate in the operation of
epistemes as such.
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For Foucault, Classical episteme is as vague as the Renaissance one, or as mythical, when
it comes to the idea that a germinally perceived instance of reality can immediately be transposed
as an essence, which exists in strict relations of identity and difference with all the other
realizable essences in the world. That is, Foucault is critiquing such “strictness” as, if not as
downright mythical, at least as a problem to be observed and critiqued. The power that
immediately matches this primal instance of reality with a specific grid on a Table is as “vague”
to Foucault as the ineluctable attraction which was believed to exist between the sun and the
sunflower in the Renaissance age, as can be seen in Foucault’s taking it for granted that this
episteme looks “arbitrary” rather than “natural” in our eyes. At the same time, the fundamental
design of the Renaissance world — which sets off the motivation to continue to add up one circle
of resemblance on another, by establishing interpretation as its basic discursive activity and by
offering the guarantee of its success in advance through the theory of the micro- and
macrocosmos — is as precise and unmistakable as the coordination of the Table and the
Progress. The positionality of here, which conditions the emergence of a past episteme, is the
solely makes the present observer to grasp both the complete absurdity, and the impeccable
rationality, of the specific past worlds. It makes it possible to understands that, for those who
were living those worlds, the only option was to know the worlds on the level of their most
instinctive understanding; the path that directed their own singular existence and to the larger,
ever materializing world was manifest.

vii. The Emergence of “Depth” and the Displacement of the Classical Episteme
The vector of the Classical episteme, as I have mentioned above, is a vertical one, which
emerges thanks to the movement of the Classical vantage point that directly faces the Table and
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evenly progresses through the succeeding series of it. That is, the trajectory that is created by the
series of encounters between the singular perspective living its world, and the world itself, makes
a perpendicular angle to the series of Tables that the perspective “passes” through. Now, we can
raise questions regarding the precise relationship between this vertical direction and the vector of
here-elsewhere that grounds it. I have argued for the significance of the flat linearity of the
Renaissance space, which emerges when we consider it in relation to the vector of hereelsewhere. In that case, a particular feeling of experiencing that world emerged at the here of
modern thought, bringing it realizations of the kind such as: “this must be what it should have
felt like to live this world - whatever genuinely matters in this world, seems to happen where I
am shut out of.” I have also argued that such a feeling should neither be a complete rejection nor
an all-out approval of that other world, since it is simply a matter of realizing something.
The significance of the vertical direction in relation to the paradigm of modern thought is
emphasized by Foucault and it is a crucial part of his presentation of the epistemes. Foucault
deliberately “overlaps” the spatio-temporality of the Classical age with that of modern thought in
the chapters that deal with how Classical episteme historically began to be displaced by the
modern one. By this time, as he has it, the new framework overlapped with and coexisted with
the Classical one. In this palimpsest, we do not see the Classical and the modern episteme
developing in different directions. This actually involves some contradiction on Foucault’s part;
since here-elsewhere does not have the same vector as that of the Classical episteme, any time
period where the two epistemes coexisted would have hypothetically accommodated both of the
vectors. Given this, I will be discussing on the purported reasons for Foucault to present the
“overlap” the way he actually does. It has to do with Foucault’s interest in foregrounding what
he saw as the historical significance of modern thought.
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In his chapter on the overlap, Foucault foregrounds a certain dimension of reality that
emerges when the modern episteme is introduced into the midst of the already operational
Classical one. The difference between the old and the new paradigms appear in the extra
dimension of “depth” that pokes out beyond the boundary of the Classical episteme. Thus, the
surface level the Table, from this time on, can no longer function as the sole locus of the
emergence of knowledge.240 The Table becomes displaced and loses its centrality; from now on,
realities are to be found “in a sort of behind-the-scenes world even deeper and more dense than
representation itself.”241 The perceptual vantage points no longer immediately encounter the
Table; while, even at this time of displacement, the Table is still in operation, the one who
experiences the world has to first travel further into depth beyond the surface level, in order to
encounter reality embedded in its own “depth” or “density.” Only then the perspective be able to
“find a way back” to the Table to locate a name for the reality having just been explored:
In order to find a way back to the point where the visible forms of beings are joined —
the structure of living beings, the value of wealth, the syntax of words — we must direct
our search towards that peak, that necessary but always inaccessible point, which drives
down, beyond our gaze, toward the very heart of things. Withdrawn into their own
essence, taking up their place at last within the force that animates them, within the
organic structure that maintains them, within the genesis that has never ceased to produce
them, things, in their fundamental truth, have now escaped from the space of the table;
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instead of being no more than the constancy that distributes their representations always
in accordance with the same forms, they turn in upon themselves, posit their own
volumes, and define for themselves an internal space which, to our representation, is on
the exterior.242
Things no longer exist in terms of “the constancy that distributes their representations always in
accordance with the same forms”; they shroud themselves in a dimension which is their own.
This new dimension of reality makes us detect whatever arrives at us in our perception as
originating from “the heart of things.” Foucault however makes it clear that the supposed origin
of things is always hidden from plain view, unlike in the basic mode of the Classical age where
people believed that the truth of everything was in full display in front of their eyes. Now, things
“turn in upon themselves, posit their own volumes, and define for themselves an internal space
which, to our representation, is on the exterior.”
The depth dimension that emerges in this context is attributed to the emerging new
episteme, modern thought; at the beginning of the next chapter, Foucault summarize his
discussions up to that point, saying that the previous section was about “the chronological edges
of the rift” that “divides in depth the episteme of the Western world” and isolates the beginning
of a certain modern manner of knowing empiricities.”243 Or, as he puts it a few pages before, a
“profound event” happened “towards the end of the eighteenth century” that “detached the
possibility of synthesis from the space of representations.”244 We can therefore gather that
Foucault uses the depth dimension to express the difference between the extension of hereelsewhere, and the non-distance between the perceiving vantage point and where the Table is. To
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be consistent with my discussion so far, here-elsewhere does not displace only the temporal
dimension of the Classical episteme. Whatever arrives along here-elsewhere cannot be assigned
a single essence, since it also spatially disrupts the boundary between a particular being and what
is not that being. (This has been explained as here-elsewhere disrupting the boundary between an
object A and non-A in Chapter One.) However, here Foucault presents the case as if the
difference between the Classical and the modern episteme is only in their temporal planes. The
difference in vector is reduced to the temporal, as if the two epistemes progressed in the same
direction:
The space of Western knowledge is now about to topple: the taxinomia, whose great,
universal expanse extended in correlation with the possibility of a mathesis, and which
constituted the down-beat of knowledge — at once its primary possibility and the end of
its perfection — is now about to order itself according to an obscure verticality: a
verticality that is to define the law of resemblances, prescribe all adjacencies and
discontinuities, provide the foundation for perceptible arrangements, and displace all the
great horizontal deployments of the taxinomia towards the somewhat accessory region of
consequences.245
In the Classical age, the Tables’ “great, universal expanse” was to arrive one after another in the
“down-beat of knowledge,” since such a guaranteed succession maintained that world. However,
the newly emerging dimension of reality, which locates itself according to “an obscure
verticality,” entirely displaces the primacy of the Table. Since reality can only be located through
a deep dive into the beyond of the Table, the Table is now only an “accessory region of
consequences,” a “superficial glitter above an abyss.”246
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Foucault calls this new dimension “historicity.” Again, we can see that Foucault
foregrounds the dimension of time in the critical displacement of the Classical episteme. Thus,
from now on, I want to investigate any possible significance that Foucault attributed to
historicity, to possibly clarify why Foucault presents a simplified picture of the vectorial
difference between the Classical and the modern episteme. To this end, I will briefly turn to a
part of “Dream, Imagination and Existence.” There, Foucault associates “historicity” with the
practice of critical observation of the Classical episteme. Foucault specifically emphasizes in this
article — more so than in The Order of Things — that the Classical episteme cannot emerge
apart from the actual practice of grasping existence constituting itself along here-elsewhere.
What critical practice really does in its revisit to the Classical episteme is to bring specifically
situated, live perspective that lives the Classical world into existence. Therefore, “overcoming”
of the Classical episteme does not happen in terms of remaining either inside or outside of it, but
in terms of making the whole of that world come alive again for a specifically grounded,
vectorial standpoint. The dimension of depth assumes its significance as that which introduces
this standpoint. After discussing “Dream, Imagination and Existence” then, we will be able to
ask: “what would it mean for the Classical episteme to be something that only becomes
meaningful when it gets ‘re-lived’ by the critic?”

viii. “Vertical” as Inauthentic Vector in “Dream, Imagination and Existence”
As has been discussed in Chapter One, Foucault says that the articulation of the dream in
itself puts together a reality for the patient — a reality that spans along her own here-elsewhere
and unfolds in a dialectical movement. After this suggestion, Foucault in fact presents the case
that there are several possible vectors which the reality spanning here-elsewhere can take. He
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discusses the significance of some of the directions, each of which are taken in different principal
modes of human experience, which he categorizes as the “tragedy,” the “epic,” etc. While this
discussion should be a case of interest for its own sake, what concerns us here is that Foucault
has a way of grouping the different vectors into two categories – the “authentic” and the
“inauthentic.” The “authentic” direction includes all the diverse, possible directions that
existence can take to realize itself, which Foucault’s considers as the materials for an
anthropology of the vectors of reality. On the other hand, the inauthentic mode has the same
status as the vector of the Classical episteme, which makes it a case of particular concern for us
here. The connection between the inauthentic mode and the Classical episteme will be
established here, and the significance of such a connection will be discussed.
Foucault uses Ellen West’s case to illustrate the inauthentic realization of existence. Like
in the case of all the other vectors, existence is realized in this mode in a dialectical, back-andforth rhythmic movement. However, it is a specific case and a category of its own, however,
because here, the here-elsewhere develops in a radically “vertical” direction. It spans between
“the underground world of burial, symbolized by the cold dark of the tomb,” and “the world of
light” which can only be reached via “a flight,” or a movement of soaring toward the peak of
heaven.247 This is not about riding on the rhythm of life, a feeling that can be derived from the
description of the mode of life lived on here-elsewhere, as I have discussed it in Chapter One;
instead of taking life as if riding on one wave after another of it, Ellen West becomes trapped in
what seems a fatal, frantic shuttling back-and-forth between the top and the bottom of the world.
The movement of to and fro no longer happens because of the operation of here-elsewhere; the
verticality dictates the two extreme poles:
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For Ellen West, the solid space of real movement, the space where things come to be, has
progressively, bit by bit, disappeared. It has become wholly reabsorbed into limits of its
own, it has become its own suppression, it is exiled into the two contradictories of which
it had been the unifying moment.248
As Foucault expresses it here, the vertical movement is the empty remainder of what used to be a
more substantial — or what he refers to as the “authentic” — movement spanning hereelsewhere. Presumably, here-elsewhere once used to function as the reconciliation and the
“unifying moment” of the relative positionalities of here and its elsewhere; now it has become
defunct with the “disappearance” of the “solid space of real movement.” What solely remains is
the empty contradictories that do not have to do with any substantive reality.
Correlatively, there is no longer the desire that used to pull Ellen West toward the
direction of her “authentic” transcendence. For Foucault, to realize oneself in a “historical” or
authentic fashion is to let myself tend toward the direction that my own desire, which arises in
the midst of my immanent existence, senses as where the rest of the corporeal world has just
arrived from, thereby causing itself to stir towards the world. Thus, the motive that creates the
directional route cannot be detached from the perception which, in one fell swoop, links my own
bodily existence and the rest of the world. However, Ellen West yearns to completely empty out
her body, which would completely block the path of here-elsewhere. She wants to do away with
her body since that is where she senses and locates her own death; she does not sense death
beyond the horizon of her transcendence. Since she already locates death here, she only tries to
flee here:
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The patient does not take on the future as disclosure of a fullness and anticipation of
death. She already experiences death, there, inscribed in her aging body which is more
burdened each day. Death for her is only the actual weight of her flesh, is but one and the
same thing as the presence of her body. During the thirteen years of her illness, Ellen
West lived only to flee the imminence of this death attached to her flesh. She refused to
eat or to give life in any form at all to this body, which would transform into the menace
of death. Whatever gives substance, continuity, and weight to this presence of the body
multiplies the deadly powers that envelop it. She rejects all food, and by the same token
rejects her past.249
The authentic movement of here-elsewhere is motivated by the desire to advance toward where
my next instant of life would be realized, even if the path would ultimately lead to my death.
Death is embraced, since it is an inevitable destination of my potential trajectory of life – the
only possible trajectory in this mode. However, for Ellen West, death is experienced as the
inhabiting of her own flesh. Therefore, it is no longer possible for me to realize my existence in a
way my desires are materialized instant after instant of my advance toward an elsewhere than
here.
Trying to flee death, Ellen West grasps what seems a salvation to her – an existence
above the world, an immaterial form of existence which would be the only alternative to an
embodied life:
She does not take up her past in the authentic form of repetition, but suppresses it by the
myth of a new birth which is to erase everything she had been. … The future into which
existence projects itself is not that of an existence in the world, but that of an existence
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above the world, an overflight, where the limits which enclose its fullness are abolished
in an order to accede to the pure existence of eternity. An empty eternity, to be sure,
without content, a “bad eternity,” as is “bad” the subjective infinity of which Hegel
spoke. . . . This self-transcendence of the existent in its temporal movement, this
transcendence designated by the vertical axis of the imaginary, can be lived as a
wrenching away from the bases of the existence itself. Then we see crystallizing all those
themes of immortality, of survival, of pure love, of unmediated communication between
minds. Or it can be lived, on the contrary as “transcendence,” as an imminent plunge
from the dangerous pinnacle of the present.250
The authentic field of existence is now cleared. A new “future” presents itself “into which
existence projects itself.” This new path opens up a “vertical axis”; the only choice remaining is
to take an “overflight” along that axis even while it would involve a “wrenching away from the
bases of the existence itself.” This kind of a life is described with themes such as “immortality,”
“survival,” “pure love,” or “unmediated communication between minds,” themes that encourage
the mind to invest in the values that denounce life. Or it reveals its sheer terror about death,
where the “imaginary elaborates itself into a fantastic world of disaster. The universe is but the
moment of its own annihilation: this is the constitutive moment of those deliriums of “the end of
the world.”251
Thus, even while the vertical imaginary is one of the numerous possible vectors of
existence, Foucault definitely sets it apart from all the other vectors, which are collectively called
“authentic.” This shows in many other passages, including where Foucault refers to the existence
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lived along the vertical axis as the one without “content.”252 “Content” in “Dream, Imagination
and Existence” cannot be considered away from the connotation of the “existential content” that
Foucault solely attributes to Binswanger’s analysis of the dream, which becomes the theoretical
justification for the introduction. Also, Foucault notes that “freedom,” which characterizes the
formation of reality along here-elsewhere, gets completely drained out in the inauthentic move,
leading to a life of complete, passive determinism:
When lived in the inauthentic mode, [existence] does not become in a historical fashion.
It is absorbed into the inner history of its delirium, or its duration is wholly exhausted in
the becoming of things. It gives itself up entirely to an objective determinism where its
original freedom is completely alienated.253
In the absence of the historical mode of existence, there only remains the “becoming of things,”
or, the world comes into being solely to apprehend each instance of perception as “things.”
While the significance of here-elsewhere lies in the patient’s own recognition of her future and
her destiny in the act of articulating her dream, Ellen West gets reduced to an anonymous patient,
due to her dream getting articulated in the inauthentic mode. The psychiatrist is led to:
. . . see in this state of affairs a verification of his own diagnosis, which justifies him in
considering the illness as an “objective process,” and the patient as an inert thing where
the process is running its course according to an inner determinism.254
There is a profound sense of inevitability in the articulation of this version of reality – things
were always going to turn out that way. The essence of reality that Ellen West would have
perceived about herself and her world would be, “I was always going to die anyway.”
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ix. Classical Episteme, or, the Reading of Existence as Inauthentic
In fact, this dreary worldview has the same status as the Classical episteme presented in
The Order of Things, which is consistent with the Newtonian framework of space-time. The
Newtonian worldview is based on the idea that dead, inert “substances” travel through what
Walter Benjamin has expressed as “empty homogenous time,” occupying one position after
another. The spatial plane is perennially set, the way geometrical references work absolutely and
ahistorically. According to this framework, to exist is to be locatable at a specific space-time;
continuous existence in time is explained as the series of existences at distinct locations at each
succeeding moment. This is why Newtonian framework of absolute space-time goes with
Foucault’s idea of the Table; whatever that is should exist in an absolute, locatable grid, in
whatever instant of time. At any given moment things should exist as distinct, locatable
“things”— they should, at least for that moment, assume some stable, immobile form, which can
be distinguished from other forms of existence occupying other spaces. In this light, this spatial
model is not compatible with the theories and the phenomena of modern physics, where the
discontinuous quantum jumps necessarily involve a state in which the event can neither be
located in terms of absolute geometric spatiality, nor measured in terms of mechanical clock
time.
In Foucault’s description of the “landscape” of the here-elsewhere in his “Dream” article,
he contrasts such a landscape with the kind of spatiality that we can recognize as that of the
Classical episteme. He notes, for example, that “In lived experience, at its original level, space is
not presented as the geometric structure of simultaneity,” which specifically indicates his
understanding of this other framework (Newtonian/ Classical) as based on the “simultaneous,”
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that is, not time-specific, notion of stably referable spatiality.255 We can recall that the
expression, “simultaneity”—which Foucault deploys many times in the same context —is used
when he presents the Table as a “simultaneous” plane.256 In the “Dream” article, Foucault also
notes that the geometric space is where “natural sciences deploy objective phenomena in their
coherence,” again indicating for us that he is thinking of this specifically geometric space in line
with the Classical episteme that is the condition of natural science. 257 Here, we can again think
of how, in Ellen West’s vertically progressing life, both Ellen West herself and the psychiatrist
can only detect an “objective process” running its course. The trajectory of a person’s life gets
completely reduced to the course of the progression of an illness that solely verifies the theorists’
own diagnosis. She cannot make any difference in the “process” that “is running its course
according to an inner determinism”; she remains an “inert thing” upon which the course of
“nature” plays itself out.258 In this oxymoronic “inert” agent, Descartes’ conception of substance,
or being as an inert and fixable spatiality, reveals its ultimate significance.
The case of “manic existence” as Foucault describes it in relation to Ellen West’s case
reads like an extreme version of the Classical episteme where there is not even the minimum
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amount of causality supplied by resemblance or similitude.259 The meaning of “temporality” as
the link between one moment and the immediately following one completely disappears; life is
supposed to be experienced as a series of random shift from the perception of one “thing” after
another. Subjectivity, accordingly, is experienced as a completely void container which should
accommodate each of such mechanical instants. “Temporality’s movement of transcendence can
be . . . covered over and hidden” because “the vertical axis is wholly absorbed into the horizontal
trajectory of existence.”260 As a consequence:
. . . existence tries to “defend itself against the menacings of death by all those
obsessional rites which block the free pathways of the world with magical obstacles. One
could describe a transcendence which acknowledges itself solely in the discontinuity of
the moment and which declares itself only in a rupture of itself with itself: this is the
sense in which Binswanger speaks of “manic existence.”261
Foucault calls this case a “pseudo-transcendence of space”; in its effort to conform to the
determination of “nature,” existence tries to completely override the dimension of time which, as
Foucault sees it, should have been the gate to “free pathways of the world.”

x. Historicity, Difference in Vector, and the Recovery of Existence
A question should be addressed: if Classical episteme confers an inner determinism to the
subject who lives her reality in it, and the subject herself becomes a part of that determinism,
how come Foucault says that this episteme is also a reality lived on the span of here-elsewhere?
That is, where could a “manic” existence be situated in relation to any episteme in the first place,
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including the parametric episteme of here-elsewhere? Asking ourselves such questions would
enable us to clarify what we call “critical practice”; it has to do with Derrida’s critique on
Foucault, where Derrida tries to critique a certain relation that Foucault — as Derrida believes it
— imagined to exist between himself and his text. The fact that Foucault resisted Derrida’s
accusation that Foucault was denying his own “subject” position as the Western intellectual,
means that there could be a way for us to articulate a thinker’s relation to his historical text in a
way that answers both Derrida’s and Foucault’s concerns. That is, Foucault’s method can be seen
as both doing justice to the inevitable difference that comes into existence in between ourselves
and the world that we observe, and at the same time as conceiving of the most singular
experiential truth that we derive when we observe anything. The question of whether a “manic
existence,” or the mode of Classical episteme, could nevertheless be justifiably registered as a
valid observed truth will then begin to address the Derrida-Foucault dispute.
I have suggested that we can never detach ourselves from our object of critique since the
object is already the “reality” that is lived by the vectorial standpoint. Now, I want to move on to
an inquiry on the significance of such a critical practice. What gets achieved here, and why are
we encouraged to understand it in terms of historical practice, at least the way Foucault sees it?
For instance, why would Foucault refer to “historical” practice, rather than centralizing other
notions such as the “subaltern?” What are any possible ethical concerns innate in historical
practice as theorized by him?
For Foucault, the fact that here-elsewhere progresses in a different way from the straight,
unambiguous line of progress of the Newtonian model was a given fact. Here-elsewhere is
expressed as a “landscape” that should be mapped along its own “primitive coordinates.”262
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Therefore, while he might be able to entertain the idea of the “anthropology” of different
vectorial modes of existence, it is impossible for us to draw out a measurable chart of
comparison between any different here-elsewhere’s. However, the vertical mode of reality is
useful for Foucault in that, while it is accessible from the standpoint of modern thought, it
reveals its distinctness from all the other vectors as it emerges in our critical purview. Foucault
says, “Indeed, it is along [the] vertical direction of existence, and according to the structures of
temporality, that the authentic and inauthentic forms of existence can best be allocated.”263 The
authentic form of existence always gets a hold on immanent reality to freely create a direction of
life, a direction that never ends up being a straightforward verticality. When the object of thought
is Classical episteme itself, therefore, the difference in the vector that existence takes suddenly
becomes pronounced, because the difference between the vertical and the here-elsewhere is, at
least, manifest for our perception:
One must therefore grant an absolute privilege, among all the signifying dimensions of
existence, to that of ascent and fall, where alone can be discerned the temporality, the
authenticity, and the historicity of existence. If one remains at the level of the other
existential directions, one can never recover existence in any but its constituted
forms. . . . one must turn to the vertical dimension to grasp existence making itself, turn
to the vertical dimension in that form of absolutely original presence in which Dasein is
defined.264
We already know that, in Classical episteme, existence totally gives itself up to a determinism
that takes it along the vertical direction. Therefore, when we access this episteme along hereelsewhere, there is a striking event of existence “recovering” itself, or recreating itself as an
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authentic self, all the while it recognizes that it there has been an occasion where it created itself
vertically. On the other hand, if we only “[remain] at the other existential directions,” this
“recovery [of] existence” would never happen in a way that reveals such a striking difference.
The recovery conforms to already “constituted forms,” because there is no theoretically
graspable difference between the past vector and the present vector.
The recognition of the difference between “how life had been lived”— that is, vertically
— and how life is to be lived otherwise now, is a crucial question, in order for us to address the
seeming contradiction present in Foucault’s discussion of the Classical episteme. I have asked:
what it would mean for us to refer to any episteme in the first place, if epistemes were already to
be accessed according to here-elsewhere, in the event of free thought? We can consider this as
pertinent here: it would be difficult to say that there was a complete lack of freedom in the life of
Ellen West. It seems that the element of “freedom” within Foucault’s Classical episteme is that
which enables a thinker to “see” the episteme — with all its layout — as that which had been
lived by the thinker in his past, while the seeing is happening in the present, along hereelsewhere. That is, within the modern view where the Classical episteme is an object, there
emerges a momentary overlap of the two different vectors, where the vertical one strikes the
thinker as the vector that used to be realized by his own existence in the past. Such an overlap
could not but happen instantaneously, in the singular moment when modern thought emerges or
happens. For Foucault, however, such an overlap should be a significant historical incident
worthy of recognition in itself. This should be the reason why he elaborates on the extra
dimension of depth in The Order of Things.
Since here-elsewhere is always a singular event, it would be an oxymoron to say that
there should be an “overlap” of two vectors spanning in front of oneself. When we think about
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Foucault’s discussion of the emergence of the “depth” dimension, however, it becomes clear for
us that this new dimension is primarily, or only, significant as an indicator to the “limit” of the
Classical world. Living in it, along with it, people had believed that their own world was so
absolute that there was not even the need for articulating it. However, with the emergence of the
new dimension, people began to think about the way their reality had been implicitly
conditioned. Now reality officially becomes a “problem” to think of:
To ask ourselves questions about what signification is presupposes that it is a determinate
form in our consciousness. But if phenomena are posited only in a representation that, in
itself and because of its own representability, is wholly a sign, then signification cannot
constitute a problem. . . . Moreover, it is not even visible. All representations are
interconnected as signs; all together, they form, as it were, an immense network; each one
posits itself in its transparency as the sign of what it represents.265
While being embedded in the Classical episteme, that is, it is completely natural to direct my
own existence perpendicularly, to the extent that there was no question about the possibility of
advancing in different directions. However, the very fact that an extra dimension of depth is
newly recognized, means that it is now somehow possible for the perspective to see that he, or
she, had been living in a way where such a depth dimension should have been ignored or
rendered nonexistent. “For Ellen West, the solid space of real movement . . . has . . .
disappeared. . . . it has become its own suppression.”266
The “overlap” has complex theoretical implications, since it presupposes the existence of
a perspective, or vantage point, that undergoes both of these distinct vectorial modes of existence
at the same time. That is, while there is only one here of experience where the depth dimension
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arrives in a definite vector, it is also recognized, at that instant, that there had been another vector
along which reality had been presupposed to be experienced by that very perspective, up to that
point. True, on the level of our common sense, the psychoanalyst is emphatically not Ellen West
herself. However, when the vertical existence is acknowledged, the psychoanalyst has entered
into a mode of existence where the vertical existence is grasped as having been lived by himself.
It is an inevitable consequence of here-elsewhere being what it is, as has been established in
Chapter One. Think of the occasion where I enter an imaginary perspective where I “stage”
Peter’s life. What is validated is the experience (occasion of reality) that I am going through as
Peter – the possibility of a neutral or absolute existence of any such individuals as “I” or “Peter”
has already been crossed out here. Therefore, when I experience Ellen West’s life — that life
where the only remainder of what used to be an authentic, rhythmic life is the sheer fluctuation
between deathly ideals — it is simply experienced as the path that had been being followed by
me, which has landed me here just now. A continuum gets established between the life that had
been happening in the vertical direction and the life that now spans in front of me. This is an
imagination where, as it were, lives are inter-lived.
I suggest that Foucault was aware of this implication. A case in point is him saying: “If
one remains at the level of the other existential directions [than the vertical], one can never
recover existence in any but its constituted forms.” In the original French text, Foucault uses
“ressaisir,” a word that translates as “recover.” This expression bespeaks Foucault’s assumption
that, when the psychoanalyst listens to his patient, he is engaged in nothing other than a
repetition of his own past experience, an experience that he has in store. Incidentally, the phrase
under discussion had been translated however as, “one can never grasp existence in any but its
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constituted forms,” in the English version of Dream and Existence.267 The translator had
extracted the verb, “grasp,” from the French “ssaisir”— which does have the meaning of “to
grasp” when used without the “re-”— and dropped the connotation of “repetition” in the prefix
“re-.” The translation thus removes the specific implication of the psychoanalyst “recovering”
his own existence. One could conjecture that there could have been concerns about presupposing
a direct, personal accessibility to what should have been uniquely Ellen West’s experience. Such
concerns assume inaccessibility to the perspective of the Other. Any desire regarding the Other
should be carefully delimited as the thinkers’ own issues. The underlying assumption is the
ontological distinctness of the listener from those who he listens to. Ethics grounded on this level
of thinking does not go beyond the version of ontology that knows objects in terms of things –
the Classical episteme.
When the psychoanalyst attends to Ellen West’s articulation of her dream, and as
Foucault says, “bring[s] into full light the constituting feature of dream subjectivity,”268 there is
no longer any difference between the practitioner saying, “this must have been the way she was
living her life at that time,” and him saying, “this must have been the way I should have been
living my life so far.” For this is what it means for reality to be created along the imaginative
trajectory of here-elsewhere. No simple, substance-based idea of an “I,” or a “she,” etc., is even
relevant in articulating the ontological validity of such an instant. We do not know whose
experience I am feeling right now at the instant of my intent, fully emerged listening; we do not
know where my life should tend to thanks to the fact that I have now experienced this. However,
Foucault’s theories fully indicate that such is the moment when anthropological reflections
transform into an ontological movement:
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. . . the transition [gets] effected from anthropology to ontology, confirming that this is
not an a priori division, but a concrete movement of reflection. It is existence itself
indicating, in the fundamental direction of the imagination, its own ontological
foundation.269
Or we could say that this moment of transition is when ontology assumes its anthropological
significance. According to Derrida’s critique of Foucault for his attempt at writing the history of
madness, it is better not to assume that the reader has any access to the experience of the Other.
However, for Foucault, hermeneutical work would not be feasible in the first place without
staking himself as the one who recognizes a distinct voice. How much “objectivity” could be
salvaged for the Western intellectuals, or hermeneuticists, without having implicit or explicit
connection established with the Other, or a definite direction towards which the scholar himself
tends? This is the postcolonial question that Foucault would return to Derrida.
Based on my reasoning so far, critical practice is always a historical practice, an
acknowledgement of existence as it has been lived. Ellen West’s life becomes a (past) instance
of existence that had its own vector and motivation precisely at the moment when that
experience is (again) put into the context of my own here-elsewhere. It always has to be re-lived,
that is — the life that seemed not to have any other option, trapped as it seemed to be in the
absolute track of determinism. Thus, if there was to be a content to our critical account of the
Classical episteme, it would neither be that the episteme is to be denounced because it is wrong,
or that it is to be avoided because it is invincible or dangerous. Rather, it would simply be an
account of my own recognition of the Table, as the one-time matrix of my own reality. As
Foucault notes in the Preface, “deviation” from the existing order, or from the culture that I
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belong to, is the same thing as getting “faced with the stark fact . . . that order exists.”270 A life
caught in the net of determinism is that which cannot see itself as headed toward somewhere —
that that is what existence is about. Correlated to this blinded way of seeing life is the theoretical
approach such as Freud’s — or the version of the Freudian reading of the dreams that gets
critiqued in “Dream, Imagination and Existence.” According to Foucault’s critique, Freud cannot
reach the “radical subjectivity” that is Ellen West’s271; his approach does not reach the
“constituting” essence of the dream subject since it regards the subject as having been constituted
by the “objective” process of illness272:
The psychiatrist forgets that it is existence itself which constitutes the natural history of
the illness as an inauthentic form of its historicity, and that what he characterizes as the
reality in itself of the illness is but an instantaneous snapshot of that movement of
existence which grounds its historicity at the same moment in which it temporalizes
itself.273
What matters is not whether Ellen West’s course of life has run along the projected path for the
advance of “natural history” as assigned by its own “inner determinism.” Rather, what matters is
not to “forget” that it was, as we see it now, always Ellen West’s own existence that constituted
its own mode of formation. That at the heart of Foucault’s notion of critical practice lies the
sense of “not forgetting what I had known in my own past” — is a point that I would again
centralize in our deliberations on Foucault’s historical, critical practice. It should be in line with
this idea that Foucault refers to the dimension of depth as that of “historicity,” since existence
recognizes itself as such when it puts itself along the trajectory of time again.
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xi. Human Nature
Again, Foucault diagrams the displacement of the Classical episteme as the development
of a “depth” dimension. This actually means that, while describing the Classical episteme, he has
always been — from the very beginning of his description — looking at it from a position where
the surface dimension of the Table can be relativized thanks to his own standpoint where a depth
dimension has been procured. This depth, which is diagrammed to solely exist along the
temporal dimension, is what contains the paradox — for lack of words — of the Classical
episteme as a rational, coherent spatio-temporality. This should explain why Foucault needed to
insist on recognizing this dimension; he saw the critical value of such a spatial description. This
can be seen in Foucault’s explanation of how we can detect “human nature” as a constituent of
the episteme.274 I have already discussed how, since there is no given logical necessity for one
representative instant to be directly followed by another one, the Classical rationality had to
import resemblance back again from the Renaissance episteme, so that there could be minimum
causality between one representation after another. This means that the perspective that is
supposed to encounter reality in one distinct representational moment after another, should
believe in the seamless causal, or necessary, connection between one experienced moment and
the one immediately following it. The interstices in between the Tables, therefore, become the
“rational” necessity for the point of view that believes in the necessity of the Classical episteme
itself; at the same time, for the perspective that regards the episteme from the “depth” dimension,
the interstices are there only because they are believed to be necessary.
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What does it mean that one had to believe in a certain spatio-temporality for him to make
his world realized? It means that such a spatio-temporality could be referred to, as Foucault notes
it, as “human nature”:
… if we follow the archaeological network that provides Classical thought with its laws,
we see quite clearly that human nature resides in that narrow overlap of representation
that permits it to represent itself to itself (all human nature is there: just enough outside
representation for it to present itself again, in the blank space that separates the presence
of representation and the “re-“ of its repetition); and that nature is nothing but the
impalpable confusion within representation that makes the resemblance there perceptible
before the order of the identities is yet visible.275
In this passage, there is a palpable sense of the Classical episteme getting described from a
perspective that exists and witnesses it now: “. . . if we follow the archaeological network that
provides Classical thought its laws, we see quite clearly that . . .” As in the case of his discussion
of the Renaissance episteme, Foucault is directing the readers’ attention to what he himself is
also witnessing as it were: “we see quite clearly that human nature resides in that narrow overlap
of representation . . .” The sense of having to experience one represented picture of the world
after another in clock-like order — in what Foucault has also called the “down-beat of
knowledge” — is palpable.276 The space that makes the reappearance of representation possible
has to be presupposed outside the version of the Table that is presently being experienced. The
world that I am supposed to be experiencing now should be transcended, since the Classical
episteme teaches the one embedded in it that the experienced world exactly overlaps with a
particular combination of grids of representations. That is, the world has to be entirely

275
276

Ibid.
Ibid., 251.

184

experienced anew for me to be able to explain any change in my perception over time, so there
has to be a paradoxical moment when the world no longer gets represented at all until the next
version of the Table arrives. “Human nature,” as Foucault suggests it, is something that makes
such an outside experienced “before the order of the identities is yet visible [my italics].” This
account, therefore, could not have become possible without the positionality of here-elsewhere,
which presents the world getting experienced as being built up for it, approaching it and passing
it along the trajectory of lived experience. The Classical episteme had to provide, literally, the
ontological element with which one could fill up the continuum of one’s life; “human nature” is
nothing other than that which provides such an element, a hinge for a rational world. It has to be
noticed again and again, since the recognition solely relies on our own present act of
remembering “how it should have been like for me” to live out such a world; this is how the
constant re-opening of the epistemes operates as a critique in practice for Foucault.
There is a paradox in calling the interstitial spatiality “human nature”; for the episteme to
stand, human nature itself had to accommodate such a spatiality as part of its natural existential
dimension. The hinge, in other words, should be “filled up” with human existence. I, living out
this particular episteme, should make it happen that I am such and such an existence, thanks to
the fact that that is the only way I see myself being able to exist. The world has to be literally
embodied in the Classical episteme. This is apparent in Foucault’s description of Don Quixote as
the exemplary hero of the Classical world.277 While heroes of stories prove a particular lesson or
moral of life to be true, Don Quixote simply proves already written stories to be true. That is, he
is significant not because he is like real people in the world, but because he is the true likelihood
of the already existing texts. In this sense, he is the manifestation of the way the Classical world
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develops. Precisely the way people of Classical world had to prove their world to be true by
witnessing the world in terms of “things,” Don Quixote has to prove the “text on the life of Don
Quixote” to be true, by epitomizing that book:
The book is not so much his existence as his duty. He is constantly obliged to consult it in
order to know what to do or say, and what signs he should give himself and others in
order to show that he really is of the same nature as the text from which he springs. . . .
every episode, every decision, every exploit will be yet another sign that Don Quixote is
a true likeness of all the signs that he has traced from his book. It is incumbent upon him
to fulfil the promise of the book. . . . Don Quixote . . . must endow with reality the signswithout-content of the narrative. . . . [he] reads the world in order to prove the book.278
Here, the book stands for the plane of the Table — a plane where everything that one could
possibly experience is already recounted. It might seem a comfortable world; all that one should
do to prove his own existence is to show that there is absolutely no difference he could add to the
already existing list of the things in the world. Just like Ellen West who wanted to deny her own
immanence to live an absolutely predetermined version of a life, Don Quixote’s life gets reduced
to the ceaseless attempt to prove that he really is of the same nature as the text from which he
springs.
Since Don Quixote finds it “incumbent upon him to fulfil the promise of the books,” he
cannot at all build up his existence along the dimension of here-elsewhere. 279 He chooses to
remain on the surface dimension of the text, as if to take a free ride on what has already been
decided for him: “He travels endlessly over the plain, without ever crossing the clearly defined
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frontiers of difference, or reaching the heart of identity.”280 As if trying to embody the “shortest
possible time” that should theoretically be there between his arrival at one instance of
represented world and the next, Don Quixote completely flattens himself, overlapping himself
with the text:
. . . he is himself like a sign, a long, thin graphism, a letter that has just escaped from the
open pages of a book. His whole being is nothing but language, text, printed pages,
stories that have already been written down.281
The one who has to live out the Classical episteme would have to embody the paradoxical
temporality that should be simultaneously null and substantial. He would both make himself
insubstantial — flat — and yet not be able to stop the frantic back-and-forth movement in
between the vertical polarities. He has to be both the frozen moment of representation and the
linkage between one representational instant after another. This dual maneuver fills up and helps
put together the “reality” of the Classical world as a whole.

xii. Classical Knowledge in the Time of its Displacement
The majority of the chapters on the epistemic shift to the modern episteme consists in
Foucault’s articulations on how fields of knowledge were reconstituted and transformed at this
time. Foucault attempts to let his argument emerge through his series of narratives on the actual
epistemic shift in the study of grammar, nature, or the economy. On this part of the book,
Malignier aptly notes that “there is no room . . . to give any sense of both the subtlety and the
compelling power of [Foucault’s] analysis.”282 Thanks to the intricacy and depth of the
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presentations, however, it has not been easy to comprehensively articulate their theoretical
significance within The Order of Things. The main idea, of course, is that the new episteme —
modern thought — began to operate in all of these newly constituted domains of knowledge.
However, consideration of the significance of these accounts beyond the level of recognition of
this major idea has not been rare. Words that are casually and freely used by Foucault — such as
his discussion of the scholars’ effort to investigate the “origin” of economy around this time —
have not been considered in light of their possible theoretical implications.
I want to note in my brief reading of some of Foucault’s accounts here that Foucault is
discussing the shift in knowledge production in the context of all the theoretical significance of
the epistemic displacement. This means that, with his presentation of how knowledge production
changed around this time, Foucault poses us many questions on the way we produce knowledge
in various areas. When we have read Foucault’s argument on the epistemic shift that appears in
practically all fields of knowledge, questions would arise as to how we could address such
historical concerns in our present and future effort at investigating the world around us. To begin
to address the weight of such a question, I allocate some space to discussing Foucault’s account
of economy, including the part where he expresses his misgivings on Marx, in my elaborations
here.
What marks the historic division between the Classical and the modern episteme in
natural science is the recognition that “knowing” the beings in nature does not entirely have to
consist in apprehending their names or characters. The effort at grasping distinct characters of
the objects being observed still continues; that is, the Table still functions. However, it began to
be recognized around this time that there are functions, needs, and priorities that lead to the
emergence of such characters in the first place. Thus, objects such as plants or animals begin to
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be considered in the context of their lived lives. There emerge such deliberations as: “which
functions are more primary for the survival of the plants, the respiratory function, or the
reproductive function?” The situations in which the plants or the animals themselves were to find
themselves in begin to be contemplated, to respond to such questions as: for what kind of
climatic reasons did living beings begin to require the capacity to move around, when they had
been sedentary for a long time?
Just such considerations have also arisen in the economics. Up to the time of Adam
Smith, the primary concerns in the field were the establishment of a field of identities and
differences, which would establish the “values” of all exchangeable commodities on an equal
scale. It was important to allot all commodities a grid on the Table so that they are situated
within a homogenous relationship of commerce. However, at that time, no one asked if there
could be a fundamental basis for the establishment of such a homogeneity in the values of things.
In fact, there was an assumption that, if there should be any “common” source of value applying
to all the commodities on the Table, then it should be nothing other than labor, since it inevitably
takes labor to produce any commodity. However, “labor” in this sense is only something that
emerges retrospectively in response to provide some content to fill up the question mark. It was
brought in for the sake of being the common unit, not because labor in itself signified anything in
itself for considering economic processes as an object of concern. In order to arrive at some
numerically expressed value for a certain product, the cost of labor was calculated. However,
such a calculation was done in a somewhat superficial manner, by adding up the cost of all the
commodities that should be theoretically required to maintain labor force, rather than in a way
that takes consideration of the real situations laborers find themselves in and are compelled to
deal with in order to maintain their power to produce. People would add, for example, the value
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of the food that the laborers should consume, the value of the house that a laborer should need
for the protection of his body, and so on.
However, with Smith and then, with Ricardo, the question of what constitutes the value
of labor comes to the fore — not in the sense of having to retrospectively provide the content of
the values of the commodities on the Table, but in the sense of thinking of the phenomenon of
labor in and for itself. Labor gets considered as the fundamental human need, a real need that
arises for specific individuals who find themselves situated in circumstances where food is dire,
mouths need to be fed, and tools or housings should be made. That is, the significance of
economic activity begins to be deliberated on in terms of the human need to produce anything in
the first place. There is a veritable shift in the priority of consideration: “after Ricardo, the
possibility of exchange is based upon labor; and henceforth the theory of production must always
precede that of circulation”283:
If things are worth as much as the labor devoted to them, or if their value is at least
proportionate to that labor, it is not that labor is a fixed and constant value exchangeable
as such in all places and all times, it is because any value, whatever it may be, has its
origin in labor.284
From now on, value no longer works as a mere nominal unit for the process of exchange.
Analyses such as Ricardo’s “[explode] that notion, and [single] out in a radical fashion, for the
first time, the worker’s energy, toil, and the time that are bought and sold, and the activity that is
at the origin of value of things.”285
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It is essential to consider expressions such as the “origin” of labor or the “origin” of
value, which appear in the above quoted passage, along with the theoretical underpinnings of the
epistemic shift under discussion. If we simply read them as part of historical narratives, it would
be easy to assume that Foucault philosophically believes in the “original” or “natural” existence,
as it was with the Classical episteme. Don Quixote, for example, had to believe that things
“naturally” existed as smoothly and as effortlessly as characters existed on the pages of a text.
The historical change Foucault describes in his discussion of economics here, however, has all
the significance of questioning the possibility of such a “reality.” Looking at the world afresh
from the dimension of depth, one notes that, instead of things existing naturally, there is only
repeated attempts to reproduce such a world, by the frantic movement of the perceiver to
“flatten” himself, or to take a perpendicular plunge to originate an ideal life.
Such a realization, as we have seen it, does not come about without the actualization of
the dimension of here-elsewhere. This why, in many occasions in Foucault’s presentation of the
new perspective that emerged in economics, we see the description of a world that stretches
ahead for a certain perspective facing it:
Homo oeconomicus is not the human being who represents his own needs to himself, and
the objects capable of satisfying them; he is the human being who spends, wears out, and
wastes his life in evading the immanence of death.286
Homo oeconomicus is not simply a figure that supplies the reason for the existence of the Table
of commodities. He is someone who faces the stark fate of death emerging on the horizon of his
life; and he is someone who, in responding to such a fate, “spends, wears out, and wastes his
life.” His own activities, which have arisen from within himself, lead to a series of new
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immanent encounters with the rest of the world, composed of his own “spending, wearing out,
and wasting” of his life. It is a stark picture, plainly contrasted from the mirror-like presence that
was only a purported actor of economic activities. Such a contrast cannot merely be read as the
description of different persona. The entrance of the “real” activities, and the proactive
acknowledgement of human finitude, are not presented as a one-time incident; it is the correlated
result of a shift in the mode of knowing the world.
Foucault continues to remain ambivalent about the whole shift that he so confidently
proclaims the arrival of. He also maintains an uncertain attitude toward such concepts as “man,”
“finitude,” and “anthropology,” concepts which are correlated to the modern episteme. While
Foucault’s minute and devoted tracing of the shift in the scholarly fields under discussion
remains valuable, he seems to abruptly leave it in midair, denouncing the modern episteme as
dubious and limited. This is especially interesting when we consider that Foucault’s ultimate
methodology is history. Foucault himself gets engaged in some historical reasoning when he
presents the new mode of thought operating in the relevant fields, as in when he discusses the
emergence of labor as a new concept. However, Foucault seems to abandon his attempt at
practicing this new mode of thought when he has to encounter some ultimate “historical”
conclusions about how things are going to turn out based on the way how things are now.
The shift in the episteme does not only change the way labor is considered as the source
of value; a certain historical rationality becomes possible, a rationality that can explain the
fundamental causality lying behind the continuity and the development of men’s economic
activity in the course of time. This becomes manifest in nowhere else than in Foucault’s
discussion of “scarcity,” a term that undergoes change of meaning around this time, which
complements his larger discussion of “labor.” The history of human beings’ economic activity
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can no longer be accounted for solely in terms of its value as that which explains and justifies the
emergence of commodities. Two different versions of historical account, both of which consider
finitude as residing at the origin of men’s economic activity, arise. The first version takes into
consideration all possible real elements that enter the fraught game for survival that greets each
human being in their history — such as the desire for the species to thrive, reproduce, and
expand; the limited amount of rich, fertile land and the progressive deterioration of the quality of
lands that should be tilled after the initial share of good lands has been used; the physical
limitation in the span of life and labor; and the human beings’ ability to domesticate animals, use
tools, etc. The scholars conclude that all of these elements would ultimately find a point of
mutual adjustment. As a result, there would be specific consequences; for example, a certain part
of the population would be found to be following a certain mode of life, such as agriculture,
while others would be living differently. Or, there should be a point where the overall human
population would reach a stasis, a point where there should be no more land to be tilled with the
amount of labor presently available, etc. The second narrative on scarcity is Marx’s. He suggests
that the capitalist development has its own logic and speed, based entirely on the suppression and
ignorance of the finite need of the workers actually engaged in the production of values. As
history accumulates, therefore, there will inevitably be a time when the striking inability for the
capitalist process to address such needs – the “real” needs – becomes too palpable to be ignored.
Laborers themselves come face to face with the stark fact of their finitude:
What others attribute to nature or to the spontaneous order of things, these men are able
to recognize as the result of a history and the alienation of a finitude that does not have
this [capitalistic] form. For this reason they are able — they alone are able — to reapprehend this truth of the human essence and so restore it. But this can be achieved only
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by the suppression, or at least the reversal, of History as it has developed up to the
present: then alone will a time begin which will have neither the same form, nor the same
laws, nor the same more of passing.287
A completely different kind of historicity from the Classical version is getting acknowledged
here. In the new episteme that arose around this time, history is what Foucault calls the
“anthropological hollow,” a potential void that man finds again and again for himself to fill up,
out of his sheer desire to do so.288 Marx argues that the laborers can recognize that the history
that drives the capitalistic process operates solely by alienating the “void” of men’s finitude,
which should in the first place have been constantly created and re-created along the span of
here-elsewhere that each man faces as his own.289
The first version of the account of scarcity seems to present a bleak picture of a future
where the course of things solely dictates the course of things — where the element of human
desire and agency is simply counted as one of the “natural” factors that play themselves out in
the game of production. This bleakness, however, does not seem to be the reason for Foucault’s
ostensible rejection of anthropology as an alternative mode of thought for any of the past
epistemes. After introducing the second type of the historical narratives — that of Marx’s —
Foucault says that the downside of this version is that, while it presents itself as an opponent to
the bourgeois economy of its time, it fundamentally shares with it the same condition of
knowledge. There is an aspect to Foucault’s argument whereby a certain mode of thought cannot
fundamentally transcend the reality of its time if it is based on the same historical condition of
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knowledge that shapes that reality. In his famous denouncement of Marx’s thinking by the end of
his discussion of scarcity, Foucault says:
At the deepest level of Western knowledge, Marxism introduced no real discontinuity; it
founds its pace without difficulty, as a full, quiet, comfortable and, goodness knows,
satisfying form for a time (its own), within an epistemological arrangement that
welcomed it gladly (since it was this arrangement that was in fact making room for it)
and that it, in return, had no intention of disturbing and, above all, no power to modify,
even one jot, since it rested entirely upon it. Marxism exists in nineteenth-century thought
like a fish in water: that is, it is unable to breathe anywhere else.290
Foucault indeed sounds determinate here in his judgement on Marxism’s position in the history
of epistemes. What really defines its limit is the fact that it has never brought in any real
discontinuity in between epistemes; definitely, here, we see Foucault assuming that revolutionary
change has to involve shifts of the epistemes (along with their vectors) if my argument so far
stands.
As I have discussed above, one of Foucault’s central concerns in writing a history of
epistemes was in articulating the principles of the epistemic shifts. I have suggested, moreover,
that precisely this concern has got Foucault concerned with the spatial construction of epistemes.
My attempt in this chapter has been to illuminate how one aspect of this spatial element — the
uniquely relative vector of modern thought, here-elsewhere — works as the critical medium
through which “past” epistemes are accessed, reclaimed, and “re-lived.” Therefore, my argument
in the rest of the chapters would not simply accept Foucault’s explicit statements that modern
thought as an episteme is sloppy. I will, rather, present the ways in which Foucault seems to have
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detected something that points toward a “future” episteme from within the modern episteme
itself. I would suggest that, according to my own argument on Foucault’s position of modern
thought, Foucault would not be able to find himself able to reject Marx in as ultimate a manner
as that which he shows above. There are indications in The Order of Things that what matters is
not to absolutely accept or reject modern thought, but perhaps to admit the fact that sorting out
which part of a historical account to take, and which part to reject, has become an all the more
intricate and difficult task. When are we ever to agree that we are finally recognizing the true
“origin” of human labor, for instance?
Since here-elsewhere always involves the definite positionality of here — which is
contingent by definition — we seem to be in a position where it has become almost impossible to
agree on the truth of historical realities. However, as my argument in the following chapters will
suggest, this situation does not simply mean that we are left with the stark binary of taking the
most contingent, singular, and “unprovable” as the truth of a certain reality, or to give up on any
claim to know anything. This has to do with that modern thought as such does not even allow
any “disinterested” gauging of how things are. I will argue, in my discussion in the next chapter,
that Foucault’s choice of genealogy as the theoretical undergird for his historical studies cannot
be separated from his interest in Nietzsche’s political ideas. When Foucault thinks with
Nietzsche, he is already engaged in moving towards his own elsewhere-than-here, or that which
would decide the way in which he would be “realized” in the next instant of his life. Genealogy
is, to borrow Foucault’s expression, already a transition from epistemology to ontology, and I
will be suggesting that that already challenges Foucault’s own professed misgivings on modern
thought as a whole. Foucault, that is, would not have rejected Marx in such a wholesale fashion
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if, as David Harvey suggests, he had engaged with his own ideas on the spatiality of epistemes
on a deeper level.
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3. Biopolitics and Foucault’s Discursive Politics of Confession

Chapter Intro: Issues in Biopolitics

It is not an easy task to discuss biopolitics. This is because the instant one begins to
address it, one also reveals her own theoretical interpretation of what the term means, and why
and how the term can be put into the context of her discussion in that specific way. One risks
suggesting ideas without valid support. And yet, I need to address “biopolitics” to get my bearing
into the forthcoming discussion in the first place; perhaps because the term is so theoretically
charged, it has entered into current theoretical discourse without having been accorded even the
most basic denominator of just what people mean by it. Thus, I will try to give a brief
introduction to biopolitics first. The account that I will be giving there would be insufficient to
convey the multifaceted ways biopolitics is getting discussed and researched on. And yet, as I
later elaborate on the theoretical issues and argue my position, my own suggested initiation into
the discussion will hopefully be justified.
Despite the prevalent connotation of the term as the political problem of the current phase
of capitalism, it is not easy to think of biopolitics as something that we can evaluate, criticize, or
decide to embrace or reject. As a matter of fact, Foucault explains biopolitics as a phenomenon
of our reality, the way we are living our lives now; thus, in raising biopolitics as a problem, the
question of whether it is possible for us to cut off or reject part of what we are living as our own
daily reality, emerges. Anyhow, by way of definition, biopolitics is nothing other than the kind
of politics that involves human life in a biological sense. For instance, when Foucault argues that
we should reflect on state politics in terms of governmentality, he means that we can regard
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political process as the comprehensive mechanism whereby the population is governed so that it
continues to survive and maintain itself as a productive labor force. Simply put, the social body
as a whole is then seen as a kind of an organism. Governmentality is the rationality that operates
throughout such a social realm, calculating the optimal state for the maintenance of the
population in terms of birth rate, climate conditions, food supply, mental health, etc. Such an
approach gives fresh insight into the politics of the modern states, whereby what often gets
ultimately prioritized is the rationality that maintains the overall health of the social body,
compared to, say, the type of rationality that we usually attribute to individuals. This latter type
of rationality is thought of as the constituent of the rationality of the citizenry that gets
represented in the public sphere. So, for instance, when the former kind of rationality gets
practiced, one would be thinking: what should I say here so that my survival will be procured?
Think of this situation in opposition to the situation where one is supposed to practice the latter
kind of rationality, where one thinks: what should I say to make sure that a fair president can be
elected for all of us, regardless of my survival?
Foucault’s biopolitical thesis challenges some deep seated assumptions and beliefs
embedded in Western political philosophy. In his introduction to Homo Sacer, Giorgio Agamben
notes that, while Aristotle, the father of the political theory of the West, always presented human
beings as biological beings with political capacities that exist in addition to their biological
characteristics, biopolitics implicates men’s biological or physiological processes in political
process, in an insidious way that he calls “inclusive exclusion.”291 In Aristotle’s picture, human
beings are assumed to be the sovereign governors of themselves: they own their own actions and
words in the sense that they are free to decide whether to produce such actions or words and are
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able to take responsibility for them once they are produced. Their rationality is a capacity that
functions fairly, in a way that does not have to do with their existence as biological beings. In
biopolitics, politics is expressed according to the way humans, as a collective social body,
exercise and prioritize certain of their bodily instincts, such as those regarding their survival,
reproduction or the enjoyment of their pleasure. As Foucault has it in The History of Sexuality,
human beings make themselves into subjects by electing to take pleasure; the pleasure that arises
in confessing to the authority of knowledge.292 Through such practices, they participate in, and
contribute to, the processes of rationality that constitutes population as the pleasure-seeking
biological organism. This overall organism, then, determines the nature and the shape of the state
that they occupy.293
Biopolitical rationality, which could at first glance look like nothing other than the benign
care for, and the attention paid to, the biological keeping of the citizenry, betrays its disturbing
hidden side in certain of Foucault’s discussions and in the scholars’ discussion of biopolitics in
addressing current social problems. On many different occasions Foucault presents a picture of
reality where what Agamben presents as bare life becomes its veritable element, even though it
should be immediately added here that the notion of bare life itself is subject to debate. For
Agamben, bare life refers to the life that has been deprived of the sense of there being an agent
for governing or producing that life. In other words, bare life has the connotation of human lives
having been rendered an object, in the sense that this object can be freely known to be such with
no regards to the human agency that should supposedly own its own live body. Once having
been objectified in this regard, the live human body, in that live state, gets conceived as
possessible or consumable, precisely the way in which, for instance, a freely roaming chicken
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could be, for a certain person, his food. So if the chicken would be vigorously moving around, it
would indicate, for this person, the freshness of his meat, rather than the fact that the chicken is
enjoying its life because it is moving the way it wants to move, for instance. It is in this context
that Rosi Braidotti aptly argues how pornography is not an abnormality of the otherwise moral
society, but a necessary offshoot of the system of knowledge that organizes modern society as
Foucault presents it.294 Human life in its objectified state is regarded as possessible in little bits
and pieces, as if in pornographic images there is no need for the depiction of the feelings of the
one whose body gets to be spectatorially consumed. Thus, it could be said that, in conveying this
strangely prevalent conception of life as object, bare life is an apt term. Though in a different
context, Agamben suggests that “brain-dead” human bodies attests to how the definition of life
and death is not simply biological, but political; in that case, life has been already reduced to
mere biological operations that maintain the aliveness of each organ, without there being an
agent for the whole of the body, whether the patient is still “alive” gets subjected to legal
disputes and state interventions.295 Again, as I will elaborate further, the very fact that bare life
gets conceptualized has problematic implications. Nonetheless, many scholars have been
deploying the term in effectively analyzing such diverse contemporary problems as human
trafficking, sexual harassment, slavery, and the downright degradation of life.
As I have discussed earlier, there is ongoing controversy on how to adopt biopolitics as a
political term to address our reality. In this final section, I aim to discuss how here-elsewhere
theoretically rearticulates Foucault’s biopolitical discourse in a way that addresses key stakes in
the current controversy surrounding the subject. Thus, I first recapture the said controversy,
using Agamben’s terms as reference points; then, I re-articulate Foucault’s biopolitical thesis in
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light of here-elsewhere, trying to make clear in this process how my approach addresses the
controversy while suggesting new insights about Foucault’s discursive politics on biopower.
Specifically, I argue that, when Foucault presents his biopolitical thesis to his audience, he is
inviting the audience to participate in the politics of confession, based on the theoretical
presupposition that to critically reflect on biopolitics is to transvalue it. After elaborating on this
point, then, I will revisit the theoretical controversy to show how my intervention responds to
and negotiates the diverse perspectives.
It will not be wrong to say that Agamben’s thesis became famous because he
problematized Nazism as the central question that political philosophy needs to address. For him,
the camp, where human beings were kept alive while completely being deprived of any rights
that they are ordinarily accorded with, is the metaphor of the state of exception, a central spatial
term that he explains Western politics in terms of. Specifically, he suggests that spaces of
exception are potentially everywhere in the Western political sphere, permeating it through and
through as it were. This is because what we deem as the normal political realm, where we are
each deemed as legal subjects with inalienable rights, is actually a provisionary space in light of
the original founding of this normative ground. In order for this normative ground to be secured,
a violent, arbitrary, and completely inexplicable sovereign founding act is necessary.296 Thus, the
sovereign can always suspend normativity in the state of exception, when he deems that the
existence of the ground of the normativity is at stake. This is why the state of exception can
always intervene into and permeate the normative political sphere; Agamben posits that, in the
end, the state of exception should be regarded not as an exception but as the necessary condition
for our normative reality. This is why he says that, at the foundation of Western politics is the
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presence of bare life – the life that has been abandoned by the sovereign, the life that is alive but
has been deprived of any right, or the life that can, as he has it, be killed but not sacrificed. So
Homo sacer is the necessary ground for the foundation of Western politics; Nazism, which
brought forth a phenomenal state of exception where human lives could be killed like “lice,” is
not an abhorrent breach of the foundational human rights, but an anticipatable culmination of the
course of politics that had been established, in the first place, on the basis of homo sacer.297
By suggesting that the problem of the original violence of the state is not only a subject
for sober theoretical reflection but something that can actively intervene into our seemingly
mundane life space without warning, Agamben conveys the palpability of biopolitics in our
midst. For he is practically saying that we could get rendered bare lives any time, regardless of
our rights. This is, however, precisely the point that worries scholars. By undermining the
political authority of the sovereign by defining it as an arbitrary power that only heeds its own
whims, the political terrain gets cleared of any legitimacy. There is no longer any secure place
for the kind of politics that the West always believed in – the exercise of the collective will of
human beings who are sovereign owners of their rational opinions.
It can be said that, from Agamben onward, any discussion on biopower addresses the
question that he has thus raised, either implicitly or explicitly, though it can also be said that
Agamben's take upon biopolitics foregrounds the problem that always inhered in the discursive
practices on Foucault's thesis. On the one hand, on a less problematic note, there is the
interesting insight that the way we function as biological beings, i.e. animals, might supersede
the way we practice so-called rational capacities. There is an overturning of priority in political
analysis in the nascent trend of biopolitical research, which delves into the minute physical
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details of social interactions and bodily practices to find the way power materializes and
circulates in the nooks and crannies of the social sphere. All the while, apprehensive voices warn
of our lack of resources in engaging with political problems thus newly defined. For these
concerned scholars, the idea of resistance or change should matter in our understanding of
Foucault as much as the theses on power, governmentality, or discipline monolithically defined.
So, in tandem with the ever growing biopolitical research, theoretical investigations on the
Foucauldian notion of change, resistance, or intervention, prosper. Indeed, Foucault has
presented his view on these topics in many instances, albeit in often perplexing terms.
Thus, at this point, a rethinking of biopolitics becomes all the direr. Is there a way for us to
negotiate the seemingly two distinct necessities – the necessity to address the grim reality of the
biopolitical phenomena, and the necessity to politically intervene into or respond to such
phenomena? New questions have been raised in relation to this issue. What does it mean, for
instance, for Foucault to have presented biopolitical phenomena as part of his genealogies? To
what extent is biopolitics predicated on Foucault's ontology, which is analyzable in line with the
thoughts of Deleuze, Spinoza, or Heidegger? How do we unravel the precise implications of
Foucault's various historical tenets, such as that while politics used to operate according to the
logic of sovereignty, now politics operates according to biopower? For scholars such as Mika
Ojakangas, it is imperative not to present biopower in the context of traditional politics, given
that Foucault often explains biopolitics in oppositional terms from what he calls the sovereign
type of politics.298 Oftentimes Foucault associates the emergence of biopower with a new
historical phase, where politics functions as part of the immanent process of reality formation.
Since this process is articulated in terms of Spinozan potentiality, "where reality is about
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difference of degree and intensity" rather than about enduring substances, it is impossible for us
to assume bare life as stable, passive, and non-changing objects.299 Thus Ojakangas suggests that
Agamben is trying to have an “Impossible Dialogue on Biopower” with Foucault by suggesting
the notion of bare life; for Ojakangas bare life does not fit into Foucault’s careful and emphatic
theorization of power, where power appears never to stay the same or to stop moving from one
place to another.
Yet, such a critique does not remove the theoretical problem of articulating that which
exercises power, or that which produces biopolitics. In articulating biopolitics in terms of bare
life, Agamben relegates the exercise of power to the exceptional sovereignty. While many
scholars continue to critique Agamben, the question of how to articulate that which operates
biopower, remains a problem. Sergei Prozorov, for instance, critiques Agamben, arguing that
central to Foucault’s theses on power is the idea that power is always actively produced and
circulated, while such production or circulation can never get attributed to any specific human
subject.300 Such has always been the weird side of power, a source of fascination and puzzlement
for the students of Foucault; power is, as Foucault has it, “intentional yet nonsubjective.”301 As
puzzling as this idea still can be, at least it seems to never allow scholars to get away with an
idea that, “We are all merely cogs in the machine; the machine, the system, is to blame, and there
is no room for us to do anything about political process.” Power would not be there if it is not
actively enacted or exercised; as Prozorov demonstrates it, Foucault presents an "imagery of
power" where there are "myriad agencies of power," which appear to be:
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. . . busily (re)forming their objects so that nothing in principle should remain untouched
by the mechanisms of power. Quarantine operations during epidemics, the complication
of dossiers on delinquents, campaigns against children’s masturbation, etc. – Foucault’s
writings create an impression of an endless vertigo of governmental activity of doctors,
teachers, wardens, judges, social workers that might make one wish for Agamben’s
abandonment. The objects of a Foucauldian power are never abandoned but rather
permanently abducted by myriad governmental agencies, simultaneously confined in the
restricted domains of power and rendered productive in accordance with their
rationalities. This form of power that Foucault has famously termed ‘biopolitics’ does not
oscillate between killing and abandoning to a permanently insecure life; instead, in a
formula that we find no less disconcerting, it makes live. The crucial point here is that,
contrary to some overly enthusiastic readings, biopolitical power does not foster,
augment, extend and nurture ‘life-as-such’ (which, in its very ‘as-suchness’ should be
able to do perfectly well without biopower) but only the forms of life that are in
accordance with its specific rationality.302
Prozorov is intervening into Agamben's thesis by suggesting that, what Agamben terms bare life
is nowhere to be found in the scenes of power production as Foucault presents them. As
Prozorov sees it, the irony of bare life is that, while it has been reduced to the status of an object,
it still is alive in a definite sense. Since it is still alive while objectified, it moves, eats, answers
questions, etc., thus serving as the medium of the production and circulation of power.
It is not difficult to see why Prosorov’s should get “disconcerted” about the aspects of
power that “make live.” As he has it, it is already disconcerting to consider bare life as a feasible
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notion; but the idea of people who are merely alive to function as the medium of power is indeed
troubling. This would be a life where the aspect of owning one's life thanks to being able to
occupy one's here-elsewhere would have been nullified. Were I to provide an illustration, I could
discuss the life of someone like Ellen West as Foucault analyzes her case in "Dream,
Imagination and Existence," a life where every living moment is given over to realizing herself
as an ideal, since immanent life is "in vain" anyway. Biding time until her death arrives, she
could dedicate herself to realizing the ideal of the womanhood that her society requires of her,
for instance, however oppressive or inconsiderate of her feelings and needs such a process
should be. In Chapter Four, I analyze Chang-rae Lee's A Gesture Life as the depiction of a
minority subject as one such case; the subject says “yes” to every denunciating and humiliating
remark or practice imposed on him for the sake of becoming a dutiful citizen; yet in fact, he is
actually succumbing to the innate fear that otherwise he would perish, and to the pleasure that he
derives from succumbing to authorities.
Prozorov's point is that, one of the obvious points Foucault makes in his biopolitical
discourse is that people do not unilaterally get rendered bare lives by an outside authority, and
the way power is positively practiced through the very life processes that people conduct for
their survival should be given due attention in accounting for power. This is why he emphasizes
that in biopower, life has been "permanently abducted" rather than getting lived or enjoyed as
"life-as-such."303 I would say the benefit of his perspective is in its transmission of the poignant
fact that some of us sometimes live our lives as abducted lives, as if they do not belong to us.
Yet, as a theoretical critique of Agamben, Prozorov's leaves problems unaddressed, since
his own articulation repeats the same theoretical framework that he begins his project by

303

Ibid.

207

critiquing. For him, it does not do justice to Foucault's theory to present bare life as an
objectified notion of life and the sovereign as that which transcends it; power, that is, should be
understood as an autonomous process in which there has simply been an abduction. And yet,
when he articulates resistance, it is difficult for him to avoid using the language of
transcendence. For him, the hope for change lies in human capacity for freedom, or human
beings’ surprising ability to break out of the abducted life process. As Sébastien Malette has it in
his review of Prozorov's book, Prozorov suggests that freedom’s “irreducible presence reveals
itself through acts and moments of transgression which generate an irruption of transcendence
within the immanence of the diagrammic plane.”304 But what is the relationship between the
mechanism of an abducted life process and the mechanism that leads to the "irruption" of
transcendence of that process? What is the significance of any of Foucault's turns to an
"immanent" portrayal of processes of power when its overcoming should resort to the
"irreducibility" of freedom defined as that which is exceptional, in the sense that it manages not
to get caught up in the abducted life process while still being in it?
These are central issues since, as I will be elaborating further, Foucault's effort is not only
in the imagistic portrayal of the way in which people are being oppressed, disciplined, and
trained to become certain types of personalities in the modern society; more centrally, his is a
theoretical effort, an attempt at re-conceiving the notions that are central to articulating political
process in general. Each attempt at clarifying and intervening into existent scholarly theses on
Foucault and biopolitics brings new insights and complements our previous understandings, yet
there is a sense in which certain central problems which have been acknowledged as crucial for
Foucault's theorization continue to slip through our fingers. I would generalize this situation as
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“the return of the sovereign,” to the extent that sovereignty can be understood as something that
allows exceptionality in our conception of politics. As has been already noted, the idea of the
sovereignty was central to the traditional political formulation, since an original contract among
free men should be presupposed for the law to continue to operate in the normal social sphere.
Something that exceeds everything else, so that this everything else can be guaranteed of its right
to exist, should be presupposed. What I am trying to convey is that sovereignty as the structure
that defines political activity in the first place or as the very language in which we express our
harrowed notions of freedom, resistance, or right, continues to return in our interpretations of
Foucault, while Foucault’s central methodological goal that spanned throughout his career was to
revise that very language.
My take on Foucault is that he has arrived at a concept of thought that allows him to
critically address reality without having to resort to any binary between reality and what
transcends that reality. When Foucault addresses sovereignty, he only does so to critique it, not
to deploy it as a way of mapping political reality. I argue this despite the various instances where
Foucault uses the word "sovereignty" with varying connotations. The premise of this dissertation
is that Foucault was always engaging with the Kantian problem of the theoretical articulation of
thought; I posit here-elsewhere as a consistent concept in Foucault. Therefore, in this part of the
dissertation, I offer here-elsewhere as a terminology to articulate his political discourse, by
which I mean his discourses on power and biopolitics broadly conceived. Let me articulate my
approach more specifically; I suggest that Foucault’s aim in his discursive presentation of
biopolitics lies in transvaluing the Classical episteme, the specific episteme that enables us to
map reality in terms of sovereignty. As has been noted, the Classical episteme is the one that lets
one conceive of reality in binary terms.
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To think politics as a representational effort, as an effort to reflect the collective
rationality of the people on the plane of its representation, is the mode of thinking that the
Classical episteme encourages. And the Classical episteme is an object of critique in Foucault's
theoretical project, as I will further specify in my discussion of Nietzsche. This could sound like
me critiquing representational democracy as a political system. When Hardt and Negri, in
Empire, propose multitude as the alternative to global capitalism, they are doing precisely that: to
criticize representational democracy and neoliberal capitalism in the same breath. I suggest,
however, that Foucault is not arguing either for or against such a political system, but suggesting
an alternative way of thinking political process altogether. His work addresses a specific domain,
our life, and what it can turn out to be, as the locus and the material of politics; to do this, it has
first of all to critique the way we conceive of reality. Thus, Foucault's politics cannot enact itself
without critiquing sovereignty.
I believe that here-elsewhere offers a standpoint that clarifies the points that I am making.
Essentially, the stake here is the same as the one that was at the center of the Foucault-Derrida
debate: whether it is possible or desirable for us to refer to an outside to the object of critique.
Foucault's ontological theses regarding power have made him repeatedly emphasize the
importance of us moving beyond the framework of reality or politics that presupposes things;
this very ontology, however, makes it difficult for scholars to comfortably take an outside to the
observed reality, since in the picture of reality where Foucault's power exists and operates, there
is nothing that is stably separated from its Others. This is the ground on which Ojakangas
critiques Agamben; Foucault's picture of the world, Ojakangas says, does not accommodate bare
life. And yet, Ojakangas' picture, in turn, does not accommodate the picture of an intellectual
who invites his readers to reflect on their shared reality from a distance; that is, the immanent
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ontology as it is articulated in the scholarship on Foucault’s biopower largely does not justify a
picture where Foucault is supposedly standing at a historical distance from his genealogically
presented reality. Moreover, it is hard for scholars to acknowledge the political value of a
completely immanent presentation of reality, since there, reality is supposed to materialize and
change autonomously; from where can intervention be initiated, if reality is all about the flow
and mutability of power that seems to follow its own volition?
Addressing this shared problematic between here-elsewhere and the theoretical
articulation of biopower, I will articulate Foucault's critique of the Classical episteme as
theoretically equal to his discursive presentation of biopower. That is, again, I suggest that the
aim of Foucault's biopolitical discourse is in the transvaluation of the Classical episteme, the
episteme that has made a nihilistic, or biopolitical, reality out of our lives. In inviting us readers
to look into our shared past, Foucault is encouraging us to transvalue our past, which will be our
political action. I believe my intervention is necessary since, despite Foucault's acknowledged
contributions for political theory in his discussions on biopolitics, there are scholars who see his
work as apolitical and possibly irresponsible. To make a claim on the onset of a completely
different form of politics from the one that supports the history of Western politics as a whole,
and not to clarify the implications of his thesis regarding political intervention, makes scholars
think of Foucault as a mere pontificator and not a genuine engager of political reality. My
interest, however, is not really in defending Foucault as a person, but to point out a way of
reading his work that validates what I see as his consistent political approach. By doing so, I
hope to be able to offer a way to negotiate, and put into dialogue, the diverse approaches and
points of interest that scholars bring to their arguments on biopolitics and in that process resolve
some of the confusions.
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We can read biopolitical discourse as critique of the Classical episteme because
Foucault's project on power derives from, and is grounded upon, the Nietzschean critique of
knowledge. Foucault was one of those French intellectuals who turned to Nietzsche because of
their disillusionment with the discourse of the Left in the 60's. As Alan D. Schrift captures it in
his book on the Nietzschean legacy for poststructural intellectuals:
As Paul Bove has noted, "Foucault argues that many of the 'oppositional' rhetorics are in
complicity with the hegemony of power." The state, Foucault claimed in a 1976
interview, "consists in the codification of a whole number of power relations which
render its functioning possible." Revolutions, he continued, involve "subversive
recodifications of power relations" which, however, tend to leave untouched the very
relations of power that make possible the functioning of the state apparatus. As the
twentieth century progresses toward its conclusion, it has become increasingly difficult to
ignore the historical tendency of revolutions of the Left evolving into regimes of the
Right.305
Nietzsche, as Schrift has it, appealed to Foucault because of the way his philosophical position
critiques and observes the "power-knowledge-truth" nexus that constitutes the power relations
that sustain a state, rather than the truth claims that are propagated by different parties such as the
Left or the Right in their debates.
Foucault and Deleuze are, as Schrift has it, the most Nietzschean of scholars among the
poststructural thinkers who took up Nietzsche as their master at this time. Deleuze, for instance,
wrote Nietzsche and Philosophy at this time, which became a phenomenal bestseller for a book
on political theory. Deleuze, as he demonstrates it in his book, believed that Nietzsche had
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arrived at a way to take account of the processes via which subjects are formed, whereby they are
led to live nihilistic lives.306 Why and how one’s way of conceiving of reality actually leads to
the materialization of such a reality, is what Nietzsche’s genealogy aims to articulate. In short,
Deleuze’s account of Nietzsche ultimately shows us why and how reality is perspectivally
created by those who live these realities, as Foucault’s epistemic studies teach us. Genealogy
aims to revisit moments of subject formation, or moments of the formation of the subjects’
knowledge, so that such realities are rearticulated from the perspective of one who were actually
living the subject’s past at that time. Later on, I will elaborate how Nietzsche’s perspectivism is
articulated by here-elsewhere; I find the reason Foucault took up Nietzsche in the fact that
Nietzsche’s genealogy can be articulated via here-elsewhere.
Foucault not only shared the same problematics with Nietzsche – power relations and the
emergence of subjects of knowledge as articulating the violence of modern society – but he also
agreed with the way Nietzsche approached the problems – a genealogical articulation of the
origins of nihilistic reality. Nietzsche’s arguments are rearticulated by Foucault with his own
theoretical terms, such as “power,” “biopolitics,” or “governmentality,” which foreground the
explicitly political nature of the phenomena in question, in that they are a direct comment on the
problem of the states or the contemporary form of capitalism. So Foucault foregrounds the
political implications of Nietzschean discourse on nihilism in his own discursive context.
However, Nietzsche’s original concerns regarding the significance of human psychology in
shaping the world continues in Foucault’s seemingly austere political accounts. In the following
sections I articulate the theoretical continuity between Nietzsche and Foucault; I will first discuss
the continuity between Nietzsche’s philosophy and Foucault’s here-elsewhere, then discuss
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Nietzsche’s nihilism as the problem that derives from the way we formulate knowledge of our
reality. This will prepare me to discuss the significance of Foucault’s biopolitical discourse as
another version of Nietzsche’s transvaluation.

a. Nietzsche and Here-elsewhere
To argue that here-elsewhere addresses and articulates Nietzsche’s philosophy, it would
be productive to begin by observing how his own philosophical project grows out of Kant’s
critical problem. As Deleuze discusses it, it was the “genius” of Kant to posit the question of
whether one could conceptualize critique immanently.307 Kant argued that while people once
required immaterial authorities such as God to explain how we can observe ourselves as if from a
distance, we must establish our own reason as that which observes us, within the very realm of
immanence, in order for us to achieve philosophical modernity. As Deleuze puts it, Nietzsche
thought that while Kant was correct in formulating the task, he failed to achieve a corresponding
result; there exists an “opposition between project and results (moreover between the general
project and the particular intentions).”308 This is because Kant did not realize that what needed to
be questioned was not whether we operate according to “true” morality, “true” religion, or “true”
reason; it was whether such things as “morality” or “truth” exist in the first place.309 Deleuze
attributes Kant’s failure to Kant’s belief in the existence of a “domain” that guarantees the
existence of his ideals. For Deleuze and Nietzsche, as long as the imaginary domain, along with
the ideals such as truth and morality that are presumed to exist on it and thanks to it, stands
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unchallenged, the work of conceptualizing immanent critique is bound to fail. As Deleuze
explains Nietzsche’s critique of Kant:
Critique is nothing and says nothing insofar as it is content to say that true morality
makes fun of morality. Critique has done nothing insofar as it has not been brought to
bear on truth itself, on true knowledge, on true morality, on true religion. . . .
“Zarathustra leaves no doubt at this point: he says that it was insight precisely into the
good, the ‘best,’ that made him shudder at man in general; that it was from this aversion
that he grew wings.” However much we criticize false morality or false religion we
remain poor critics, “her majesty’s opposition,” sad apologists. It is a “justice of the
peace’s” critique. We may criticize pretenders, we may condemn those who trespass on
domains, but we regard the domains themselves as sacred.310
Deleuze thinks that Nietzsche’s genealogy addresses and overcomes Kant’s limitation.
Genealogy believes in being able to trace the origin of substantive, essentialistic thinking.
Critique constantly rearticulates the original moment when thinkers such as Kant actually aimed
to reproduce essentialistic thought. Thus genealogy reveals that what was really at stake for Kant
– the establishment of the ideals for the sake of procuring the permanence of his identity:
For Kant, what legislates (in a domain) is always one of our faculties: understanding,
reason. We are legislators only insofar as we submit to one of our faculties, as [if] it were
the whole of ourselves. But to what do we submit in such a faculty, to what forces? . . .
Reason represents our slavery and our subjection as something superior which make us
reasonable beings. . . . what is concealed in the famous Kantian unity of legislator and
subject? Nothing but a renovated theology, theology with a protestant flavor: we are
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burdened with the double task of priest and believer, legislator and subject. Kant’s dream
was not to abolish the distinction between two worlds (sensible and super-sensible) but to
secure the unity of the personal in the two worlds. The same person as legislator and
subject, as subject and object, as noumenon and phenomenon, as priest and believer.311
How does it become possible for genealogy to recuperate the origin of the sameness – that which
Kant aims to procure? Nietzsche believes in perspectivism, which is the idea that, without the
definite, singular perspective that observes reality, the object of such observation does not come
into existence as such. With the act of observation, a definite sense of the observed reality
emerges, for the one who singularly perceives it:
. . . it is impossible for us to understand and arrive at the meaning of what we see unless
we account for the value of the perspective that in the most singular way understands the
phenomenon. This is interrelated to the ontology that there is no “essence” of a thing;
there are only multiple potential senses of a thing.312
Perspectivism presupposes pluralism, since the event of my observation realizes a potential
meaning for whatever object that registers itself as such for me. In this light, observation is a
process of selection. With observation, a multitude of potentiality passes to the state of actuality,
coalescing into a single selected value:
Nietzsche thinks that the question, "what is...?" is merely a badly posed question which
really should ask, "which one," because, "which one" already presupposes that essence is
nothing other than the sense and value of the thing. . . . We are led to essence only by the
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question: which one? . . . Essence, being, is a perspectival reality and presupposes a
plurality. Fundamentally it is always the question "What is it for me?"313
Since, up to the very moment a meaning gets derived from the observed reality, there is only a
multiplicity of potentiality, the realization of the meaning of the reality has quantitative value,
the kind of value that takes consideration of numeric possibility. However, this value
immediately gets translated as the sense of what the realized difference is for the observer; what
am I learning anew about the object that seems to be the same, yet is different each time I
observe it? 314 How does such difference communicate the sense in which I am a different person
from the person who would have derived a different meaning out of a seemingly same object?
This is why Deleuze argues that there is an aspect of quality that is part of quantity and yet is not
separable from it. “Quality is distinct from quantity but only because it is that aspect of quantity
that cannot be equalized, that cannot be equalized out in the difference between quantities.”315
In the process of the emergence of my reality, there is the repeated cycle of the
presentation of potentialities – the presentation of quantity on the perspectival horizon for the
observer, and the subsequent coalescence of such quantity for the production of quality. With
each passing cycle, I gradually realize force, the accumulation of the realities that that I have so
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far realized. As Deleuze puts it, the event of critique happens when multiple forces are brought
together. This is simply another way of saying that, whenever I observe anything, I am visiting,
or re-visiting, the origin of what I perceive as the reality that has already happened in my own
past. That is, that I observe my reality is simply another way of saying that I am re-creating an
instance of reality that had been an occasion, or a nod, of the force that I had already been a part
of. Yet, Deleuze says that the forces have to be brought together for this combining occasion to
happen, in order to denote the element of difference, or otherness, that emerges in my so-called
recreation of my own reality; it would not be wrong to say, that is, that different forces, or life
trajectories, have been brought together, in the occasion of my critique. When forces have been
brought near one another, or, when I face potentialities on the horizon of my experience, my own
will to power, or the desire for me to contribute to the emergence of difference between myself
and the world that I encounter, realizes a new occasion of observation. As Deleuze explains it,
for this to happen, there has to be both chance and will to power working together:
Chance is the bringing of forces into relation, the will to power is the determining
principle of this relation. The will to power is a necessary addition to force but can only
be added to forces brought into relation by chance. The will to power has chance at its
heart for only the will to power is capable of affirming all chance.316
Will to power is the determining principle of the relation among the multiplicities. It is a
necessary power, yet it is itself an affirmation of sheer chance – a paradox that Deleuze keeps
coming back to in Nietzsche and Philosophy. As I will elaborate further, this combination of
sheer chance and unpredictability on the one hand, and the complete necessity that is conveyed
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by the necessity of will to power – the same necessity for life to go on – on the other, is also
what here-elsewhere articulates, which derives from the insight of the quantum jump.
Nietzsche suggests will to power to avoid articulating the agency of the realization of
difference in humanistic terms. That “will” and “force” connote the emergence of sense and
value does not derive from neutral standards or practices of consciousness, but rather from life as
an absolute impetus. Meaning, or interpretation, occurs not because I can choose whether to
interpret the situations of my life or not; it already connotes a desire that carries me towards the
spatio-temporality where I occupy a certain perspective, where I am forced to interpret the
meaning of my own situation. Hence Nietzsche’s amor fati: my desire makes me love my own
fate as fate. This desire makes me live by making me embrace the here-elsewhere that I occupy
at this moment. Thus, will to power is associated with Dionysian innocence, an attitude of joyful
affirmation of what I am given as my life. Innocence cannot but wholly embrace one’s fate, and
love it, because it is impossible to situate oneself above or outside of it. Nietzsche denounces the
morality that assumes the existence of an outside to immanence, calling it “slave morality.”
Thus, while plurality involves the notion of there being multiple potential senses for an entity,
the selection of a singular sense out of the pool does not depend on any conscious calculations on
the possible gains or losses. The determination of my reality has happened innocently: my reality
might not be an easy or painless one, but I do not assign any responsibility to any specific being
for giving me this lot. This is what Nietzsche means by will to power not associated with, or
attributed to, any subjectivity.317
Nietzsche’s idea of “eternal return” helps us parallel here-elsewhere and the Nietzschean
concept of life. Reality keeps encountering me; it returns to me over and over again, each time
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realizing itself as difference for me.318 Each occasion of reality — the determined sense and
value of the observed world — perishes, as no part of that decisive event endures. Reality is but a
ceaseless series of events whereby multiplicity — that which is only potentially real —
encounters me, produces sense and value for me, and then disappears out of my purview.
It will be helpful to summarize the reasoning that supports my argument that here-elsewhere can
articulate Nietzsche’s scheme of reality. First, there is the fact that Nietzsche presents a notion of
critique that assumes the possibility of occupying the perspectival origin of the mode of thought
that is the object of critique. The motive for the occupation of such perspectives is will to power,
or the innocent embrace of one’s fate. Additionally, there is the fact that this philosophy
recognizes difference, by which the element of newness arises in the spatio-temporal reality of
thought. Nietzsche conceives of the event of thought as returning to the thinker’s perspective
again and again, and he considers this recurrence to be the repetition of dialectical movement –
the fluctuation between the bringing of multiplicity into one’s view and the definite instance of
selection made possible by one’s will to power.

b. Nihilism
For Deleuze, Nietzsche’s philosophy is not only interesting because it builds on the
project that Kant initiated; Nietzsche saw through the violence that the kind of philosophical
system that Kant wanted to challenge but ended up reproducing exerted on human subjects and
their realities. That is, Nietzsche observed and analyzed the particular type of violence or pain
that the substantive thinking, which is what Foucault calls the Classical episteme, propagates.
Thus, to understand nihilism is to understand the mechanism via which a particular type of
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thinking about oneself and one’s reality leads to the production and propagation of pain.
Nihilism has many associated terms with it, such as “reesentiment,” “bad conscience,” and
“slave morality,” which I will try to explain in the following account.
Nihilism is the attribution of the value of nil to my own interpretation of life or what
difference, or here-elsewhere, tells me about my reality. It denunciates any singularly derived
interpretations on life on the ground that it does not come up to the standards of perfect morality.
The problem of perfect morality here is that it is defined as the absolute rejection of any
suffering or pain in life, whereby it becomes impossible for one to go on living his immanent
reality. Rather than via realizing here-elsewhere’s, the nihilistic perspective believes that we can
achieve morality by flipping the value of life, as it were, depreciating the whole of the immanent
life sphere where there seems to be only suffering, pain, and uncomfortable experiences. So, one
chooses to achieve himself not by undergoing the trajectory of here-elsewhere’s, but by realizing
oneself as an “identity,” the identity of a perfectly moral subject for instance.
Thus nihilism is precisely what Kant achieves, as Nietzsche sees it, when Kant decides to
establish essentialistic ideals for him to realize, such as justice, morality, and religious values in
order for him to matter. When it comes to achieving these ideals, it is deemed irrelevant to take
consideration of the feelings that one singularly feels where he is immanently situated, the kind
that obliges one to do something, to say something, or to follow a certain course of action for the
sake of doing what he feels is the right thing to do at that moment. To achieve the kind of
morality that Kant seeks to achieve, one should negate any such personally felt injunctions in the
first place. As Nietzsche puts it, Christianity is the apotheosis of this negation; there, there is no
distinction between the process of living a life and the process of committing a sin. Thus, there
has to be a total negation of any value in human life as a whole. Once this negation is complete,
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an alternative notion of life, or life that is just bearable, is introduced. This other kind of life is
the one in which you live with your bad conscience; you live with your guilt since you are sorry
that you have been born into the immanent world, and you are sorry because Christ had to
sacrifice himself for you. You humbly bide time until the life that really matters for you begins;
the moment of your biological death and of your passage into the world beyond.
The question of how the feeling of pain is addressed in nihilism is central to Nietzsche’s
discussion of it. In the tragic mode of life, which Nietzsche theoretically opposes to the nihilistic
mode of life, human experience of pain leads the one who goes through it to arrive at his own
interpretation of it. Following his own here-elsewhere, he realizes what this pain has taught him,
and where it has landed him; thus, the experience of pain constitutes the bridge that guides him
to his next phase of life and the compass that tells him where he should be headed from now on.
In nihilism, the value of this bridge or the compass gets nullified, because it teaches that
suffering, or pain, is wrong; no one was supposed to experience any pain in the first place.
Nihilism tries to remove pain by attributing it to a source. I have mentioned that Christianity
attributes pain to life itself; but basically, nihilism operates by attributing pain to any locatable or
identifiable thing in line with the way rationality operates in the Classical episteme. Since
realization of any kind is conceived in terms of the materialization of any thing that is
representable there, pain or suffering is attributed to an object – an individual, a system, or any
such thing. The reason that I have had an accident this morning, for instance, is because of the
weather that was making me feel bad and has caused me to feel somehow irritated; the reason I
got into an argument this morning is because the person who was supposed to assist me was not
doing his job properly. This is related to that the episteme’s discursive function is naming; to
come up with a rationale that explains any event in that reality equals naming the thing that came
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into existence in the specific spatio-time in which that thing was supposed to have emerged or
mattered.
This is why the episteme considers that as long as we know the subject of the sentence
that explains a whole event we are done with explaining that event as a whole; it is enough that
we have come up with a satisfactory rationale that tells us what, or who, has done anything.
This provides a seemingly convenient picture. Whenever pain or suffering happens, it becomes
someone’s fault, or the fault that made some specific object to be there. Such a rationale releases
me from any possible blame that this bad experience that I am undergoing is of my own making;
at the same time, it gives me an idea that the cause of the wrong is under my rational control; it
seems that I can now be freed from exerting, or receiving, any pain, as long as I choose to do
nothing to cause any pain on, or disturb, others, and vice versa. Thus, being moral, or to realize
oneself as subject, is conceived in negative terms, in terms of not doing anything that could
disturb others. The ultimate morality here lies in the belief that, we become moral by succeeding
in representing ourselves as moral citizens in the eyes of others like us. Let’s say that there are a
series of conditions that make up the image of a moral citizen; this citizen does not kill anyone,
steal other people’s property, or tell horrible lies. Such sub-conditions are all representable in the
sense that they are all recognizable as the sub-categories that make up the larger image of a
“moral citizen.” Thus, the achievement of morality happens in precisely the same way a certain
flower is defined as such in the Classical botany, which happens thanks to the scholar’s
observation that it is composed of the series of sub-parts that are supposed to make up that
flower as a whole.
Nietzsche says that, these moralists, who are always struggling to meet the external
criteria for becoming a moral being in the eyes of their society, are resentful of those who breach
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the codes of such morality for the sake of acting on their own accord. The moralists have a very
different notion of what to act is from how genealogists conceive of it; while, in the modern
episteme or in genealogy, the realization of reality cannot occur in the first place if acting, or
moving, along here-elsewhere does not happen, the ones who live the Classical episteme regard
action as depending on the choice of the subject of the action, since in that episteme the subject
is the cause and the source of his reality. The subject exists regardless of the action that he or she
chooses to enact; action is a mere byproduct of that original existence, something that cannot
acquire an ontological value of its own. Nietzsche expresses this situation as the “force [getting]
separated from what it can do.”319 He discusses an example of a bird that hunts for its prey;
moralists blame this bird for harming the prey, for causing it pain and for depriving it of life
since, in their worldview, the bird of prey can exist with or without having hunted the prey.
However, as Nietzsche says it, the existence of the bird as that bird can only be secured by its
acting on its own accord, by going with its own desire to hunt. Only by doing so does the
potentiality of its existence pass into actuality; it is the only way that it can become itself.320
In Nietzsche’s account of it, those who choose to live a moral life as I have discussed above,
those who, as Nietzsche calls them, are slavish, harbor cruelty towards those who choose to live
their lives by following and realizing their own here-elsewhere’s. These latter types, on the other
hand, are the Nietzschean aristocrats. The slaves, having chosen a passive life where the only
way they can matter is to be delivered from life, deem themselves good because they are being
passive, because they do not harm anyone, and because they meekly await their own deliverance
by those they have delegated the authority to do so. And yet, because the sole way they can love
their own lives is to love it only when it has been deprived of what that make it free, theirs is a
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perverse love. Those who practice this distorted “love” of life get embarrassed at the sight of a
truly tragic life; they are ashamed to see those who dare to confront and fight the things that
make them feel indignant or angry rather than pretending that nothing is happening. Since
experiences of pain are not supposed to be genuinely felt and interpreted in nihilism, whenever
pain seems to be occurring, it is passed by, ignored, deemed not to matter in the first place. Thus,
nihilistic life is a life that continues to make people bleed inwardly. And yet, one cannot stop
“loving” Christ, or loving the nihilistic negation of this life, since one knows no other way to
bear with life.
To not renounce the love of Christ, one blames oneself for having been born so that
Christ had to suffer for him. Deleuze says that, while ressentiment is the blaming of any object
for the pain one suffers, bad conscience is the turning inward of ressentiment; in believing in
Christ, one no longer blames others, he blames himself. Thus, the perverse love of life, whereby
one can only love it when one inflicts cruelty and pain on it, multiplies and propagates. One
suffers thanks to nihilism, and to get delivered from it he all the more fiercely yearns for the love
that comes from beyond. The priest, in Nietzsche’s terminology, is the one who understands this
process very well. He exercises subtle maneuvers to steer his believers into the endless cycle of
the propagation of nihilism:
It is in bad conscience that ressentiment comes into its own and reaches the summit of its
contagious power: by changing direction. It cries “It is my fault, it is my fault” until the
whole world takes up this dreary refrain, until everything active in life develops this same
feeling of guilt. And these are the only preconditions for the priest’s power: by nature the
priest is the one who makes himself master of those who suffer.321
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What does the priest derive from this process? The priest loves for confessions to
continue, since they secure his position in the hierarchy, the hierarchy that continues to make
him priest in relation to his lamb-like believers. He derives perverse pleasure from the
confessions, the pleasure that comes from acknowledging the willing sacrifices of those who
vow to continue to give him credit by ever more concretizing their beliefs in the afterworld. All
the while, their very lives are sacrificed to give him the assurance that they will never do
anything to disturb his position. How could the priest, then, not love the lambs?
Even when Christianity sings the praises of love and life what curses there are in these
songs, what hatred beneath this love? It loves life like the bird of prey loves the lamb;
tender, mutilated and dying.322
Thus, while one believes that one is being the perfect image of the true believer, the truly moral
personage, or the apotheosis of benevolence, one progressively loses oneself by getting drained
of his very life and positively contributing to the process that multiplicates his own, and the
others’, pain.
Throughout his oeuvre, Nietzsche sought to address the problem of knowledge that he
saw was lying at the bottom of the pain that “men,” as he generalized the people of Europe, were
suffering from and propagating on an unprecedented level. Yet the cycle of the reproduction and
multiplication of nihilism seemed too effective, and the working of the priests so efficient, for
men to try out a different way of living life or to experiment with an alternative interpretation of
their existence. As Deleuze puts it, citing Nietzsche:
Our situation in relation to existence is such that we have not even recognized the will
which is capable of evaluating the Earth (of “weighing” it), nor the force capable of
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interpreting existence. Then we deny existence itself, we replace interpretation by
depreciation, we invent depreciation as a way of interpreting and evaluating. “One
interpretation among others was shipwrecked, but as it passed for the only possible
interpretation it seems that existence no longer has meaning, that everything is in vain.”
Alas, we are bad players. Innocence is the game of existence, of force and of will.
Existence affirmed and appreciated, force not separated, the will not divided into two –
this is the first approximation to innocence.323
Yet, even while we hear Nietzsche positively lamenting this situation throughout his various
works, he did not stop working to counter the tendency of the world turning nihilistic. His
discussions on nihilism, ressentiment, slave and aristocratic morality, or force – were all products
of his communicative attempt at conveying what he sees is at the heart of the issue, the issue that
he variously identified, sometimes as a matter of our physiological or psychological wellbeing
and sometimes as a matter of the survival of the Western civilization as a whole.
Foucault did not adopt such vocabularies – that the problem is physiological, or the
problem is about different “types” of people, wherein we are either slaves or aristocrats. Instead,
he opted to talk about power, about governmentality. And yet, there is no doubt that Foucault
was continuing Nietzsche’s own problematic and was working to respond to the gravity of the
issue as Nietzsche diagnosed it. One of the dangers that Foucault evidently attended to was the
danger of the massive, willing “sacrifice” of humanity, a danger that Nietzsche forewarned of. In
one of his central methodological expositions, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault
concludes his discussion on Nietzsche by listing three different “uses of history” that we can
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derive from him. The final of these is the “sacrifice of the subjects of knowledge,” which he
discusses thus:
Knowledge does not slowly detach itself from its empirical roots, the initial needs from
which it arose, to become pure speculation subject only to the demands of reason; its
development is not tied to the constitution and affirmation of a free subject; rather, it
creates a progressive enslavement to its instinctive violence. Where religions once
demanded the sacrifice of bodies, knowledge now calls for experimentation on ourselves,
calls us to the sacrifice of the subject of knowledge. “The desire for knowledge has been
transformed among us into a passion which fears no sacrifice, which fears nothing but its
own extinction. It may well be that mankind will eventually perish from this passion for
knowledge. If not through passion, then through weakness.”324
Foucault owes to Nietzsche the insight that even what seems an overwhelmingly large-scale
human “sacrifice” originates from the way we get to “know” our reality and ourselves through
the language of ideals. The other side of the perfection of knowledge is the sadistic continuation
of cruelty upon lives. Foucault wanted to address this very issue, but on his own terms.

c. Biopolitical Discourse as Transvaluation
I began this chapter discussing some of the theoretical difficulties that the theoreticians of
biopolitics have got themselves into. I have summarized the issue thus far as the same as what
Foucault’s epistemic studies, and the concept of here-elsewhere, addresses. The problem has two
components: the first is whether it is possible to conceptualize reality in a completely immanent
and non-subjective way, because it seems to be the way reality appears to be according to the
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observation of the ontological theorists, such as Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze. The second
component of the issue involves how we justify the scientific validity of such a description if
there is no subject who can safely be set apart from the object of his description. If there is no
subject, and if the very body of the observer is irrevocably enmeshed with the reality that he aims
to describe unbiasedly, how can we justify the methodology of historical investigations in the
first place? Correlatively, if the investigator cannot be safely set apart from the observed
realities, how do we conceptualize political intervention in the first place, since it would be
difficult to conceive of a fair or unbiased, intervention into historical reality in the first place?
Regardless of the question of if our very idealistically conceptualized notion of politics –
which assume the mutual existence of the subject and the object – should fit into the new scheme
of reality as Nietzsche conceptualizes it, Nietzsche did come up with a new scheme of reality
that evaluates processes of thinking according to the standards of what such a thinking process
does to the physical existence of human beings. He found out that people who forge themselves
into subjects of knowledge despise the way humans could be developed otherwise. He has also
found out that people who thus give up on letting their own interpretations of their lives lead
their way, actually hate those who do not, and try to blame them so that they too, out of guilt,
will give up on following the trajectory of their here-elsewhere’s.
While Nietzsche’s argument had implications on a scale that addresses the significance of
Western civilization as a whole, and while Nietzsche, in his various works, tries to address the
significance of his argument in sweeping, prophesy-like warnings and injunctions, it was
Foucault who came up front with the explicitly political implications of Nietzsche’s arguments,
recognizing the origins of mass killings and other modern atrocities in the process of subject
formation. This is why Foucault’s effort is largely in trying to revise and update political
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vocabulary and grammar, which had hitherto been exclusively relying on the way things were
thought to consist in things. In this process, however, Foucault came to utilizes terms of his own,
which partly contributed to complicating the central issue in our discourse, since the very terms
that Foucault came up with to revise former notions for referring to political processes ended up
getting recycled to support the very structure of thinking that Foucault wanted to address and
critique.
One of the especially knotty issues regards the articulation of “sovereignty” in Foucault’s
theoretical vocabulary. Foucault used this term many times, and in different contexts, and the
ways different scholars of biopolitics propose different understandings of the term have
centralized the controversial nature of the discussion of biopolitics. Adding to my theoretical
argument, which argues for the validity of here-elsewhere to interpreting biopolitics based on the
philosophical continuity between Nietzsche and Foucault, I propose to present a reading of
Foucault’s idea of the sovereign to argue that here-elsewhere does address, and offers a way to
negotiate, the thorny theoretical controversies on biopower.
Sovereignty is a central term in addressing the political significance of biopolitical
discourse. What Foucault means by biopolitics is actually nothing other than the way our society
operates itself; in referring to “governmentality,” for instance, Foucault foregrounds the
operation of the rationality, throughout the social body, that prioritizes meeting the needs of
human beings as biological organisms, so that the citizenry as a physical collectivity can be
maintained as a healthy productive force that reproduces itself. Thus, again, the rationality that
plays itself out when human beings calculate the priorities of their survival, such as that they
should continue to have supplies of food, stable shelter, and the resources to satisfy their various
instinctual needs, are foregrounded as the actual driving force of the biopolitical society. Thus, it
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is easy for us to get confused about, in the first place, what to critique, and where to begin to
question things, precisely because biopolitics sometimes actually seems to address the basic
necessities of our biological lives.
Johanna Oksala says that it is hard to critique biopolitics since it seems too natural or
neutral to critique. This seeming neutrality, however, should to be the most threatening side of
biopower, since it escapes traditional political logic:
Political power in biopolitical societies has evaporated and has been replaced by purely
administrative and economic power. Complex biopolitical techniques aim at making our
life as long and happy as possible with the most scientifically advanced means available.
There are no political decisions or debates left when the aims of biopower are unanimous
and its means scientific.325
As Oksala has it, biopower turned into a completely neutralized form of power because of its
scientific nature. It is hard, in our normal life circumstances, to detect the political nature of this
power. Thus, she argues, it becomes all the more important for us to “explicitly politicize” our
seemingly neutral biological life, since only that will reveal “[our biological lives’] historically
specific connections with the biopolitical regime of power/ knowledge.”326
Why is it necessary, according to Oksala, for us to perpetually remind ourselves of the
political nature of the biological? Because the seemingly neutral biological life sphere contains
hidden sites of danger, from which violence can always erupt and render us into what Agamben
says homo sacer, the biological life that can be killed but not sacrificed. For Oksala, the
sovereign is that which enacts this sudden transformation of normally neutral biopolitical power
into the biopower that can kill us. As Oksala diagnoses the situation:
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. . . the fact that techniques of biopower often fall outside, or through the grid of
politically accountable sovereign power, implies that they can, for this very reason, easily
revert to exceptional sovereign power in the Schmittian sense: biopower can become
sovereign power in a state of exception uncontrolled and unregulated by any law. The
biopolitical practices of violence are often hidden within various institutions in which
petty sovereign can reign, uncontrolled by parliamentary or judicial restrictions.327
As Oksala understands it, biopolitics is a devious form of politics, which slips into the sphere of
our lives immanently precisely because it can mask itself as benign, scientific care for our
wellbeing; however, because it can thus make itself omnipresent, it can become formidable once
it holds sway over our lives. When sovereign power intervenes and combines itself into the
already present biopower, it can swiftly create states of exception in the midst of our domain of
life.
Oksala’s account is disturbing precisely because of the way it conveys our fear about
contemporary forms of political violence, where prevention of violence in terms of juridical or
police measures seems far from enough. Oksala’s account renders palpable the situations where
any live human being can be reduced to bare life, the state of being alive without having any
agency over how or whether to sustain our lives. Oksala challenges the way political measures
continue to be devised only in juridical terms; for her, what is most important is to account for
the way human beings can always be reduced to mere biological animals, so that, as easy as it
became for science and technology to control and improve our living conditions, it has become
that much easy for any arbitrary authority to dispose of our lives as if killing “ants.”328
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Many scholars regard the word “sovereign” as a critical term to explain the explicitly
political violence of biopolitics, precisely the way Oksala attributes the transformation of
seemingly neutral biological life sphere into states of exception to the working of the “petty
sovereigns.” Sovereign is a term that is both crucial in Foucault’s theoretical presentation of
biopower and central to his account of racism and fascism as biopolitical violence. For one thing,
Foucault, on more than one occasion, argues that “biopower” emerged in modern Western
society from around the eighteenth century.329 It is a historically different form of power from
the one that governed Western society beforehand, which Foucault calls “sovereign power.”
Sovereign power and biopower work differently in relation to human lives. While sovereign
power is exercised by killing those who betrays their allegiance to the sovereign, biopower
exercises itself by nurturing, growing, multiplying, and reproducing the lives of those that it
governs. That is, biopower is immanent to life process.
In a different register, Foucault also notes that sovereign power, the historically extinct
form of power, can make a return into the midst of the sphere of biopolitics. When this happens,
we witness mass killings, since while human lives had already succumbed to the processes of
biopolitical control, the sovereign is something that allows itself to kill those whose allegiance
does not align with itself. Foucault explains fascism or state racism as the situation where
massive lives can get killed simply for being not what the sovereign needs them to be. People no
longer get killed, that is, because they did something to betray the sovereign will; they are
eliminated simply because they do not fit into the biological requirement for being the right
subject for the state sovereignty. Foucault expresses this phenomenon as the “intersecting” of the
bio- and sovereign powers:
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We have, then, in Nazi society something that is really quite extraordinary: this is a
society which has generalized biopower in an absolute sense, but which has also
generalized the sovereign right to kill. The two mechanisms – the classic, archaic
mechanism that gave the State the right of life and the death over its citizens, and the new
mechanism organized around discipline and regulation, or in other words, the new
mechanism of biopower – coincide exactly. The Nazi State makes the field of the life it
manages, protects, guarantees, and cultivates in biological terms absolutely coextensive
with the sovereign right to kill anyone, meaning not only other people, but also its own
people.330
Indeed, sovereign power does not simply work as the theoretical backdrop for Foucault to
introduce biopower, as the bygone historical form of power that biopower differentiates itself
from. Sovereign power here features as an active factor in the formation of state racism.
It becomes important for Foucault scholars, then, to illuminate the way sovereign power
functions, alone or in relation to biopower. Here, I would like us to consider a study by Chloë
Taylor, where she examines the way Foucault relates the power of psychiatry to define “normal”
and “abnormal” individuals to the emergence of Nazism.331 Taylor focuses on the centrality of
the problem of race in Foucault’s studies, saying that, even though there are only a few occasions
where Foucault directly mentions “race” within his biopolitical discussions, a careful contextual
reading of the works reveals that race is their hidden core. She notes about the The Abnormal and
The History of Sexuality, the two works that she examines in her thesis, that while “Race is . . .
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not an abiding theme of either work,” it “nevertheless seems significant to each of them in so far
as it is what Foucault concludes with, or is the endpoint toward which the study tends.”332
Her study is interesting in that it shows the gradual processes via which biopower, as it
has been discussed in my work so far, evolves into “internal racism,” or the kind of racism that
the Nazis practiced, which subjects certain groups of people within one’s own society to racism.
For example, The Abnormal shows how the discourse of psychiatry gradually gained the
authority to decide who fits to be defined as normal based on hereditary and genetic factors. As
in the case of The History of Sexuality, humans are encouraged to “know” themselves in
fundamentally essentializing and deterministic terms. Through psychiatry, people learn to think
of themselves in terms of whether they are normal and thus fit to remain as part of their society,
or are abnormal, and so are better to be disposed of. As Taylor sees it, Foucault concludes his
discussion by stating how the evolvement of the psychiatric discourse that he has been observing
is related to the internal racism that the Nazis practiced, the kind of racism that targets the
abnormal members of one’s society. As Taylor quotes Foucault:
The new racism specific to the twentieth century, this neoracism as the internal means of
defense of a society against its abnormal individuals, is the child of psychiatry, and
Nazism did no more than graft this new racism onto the ethnic racism that was endemic
in the nineteenth century. . . . I think, then, that these new forms of racism, which took
hold in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth
century, should be linked historically to psychiatry.333
In Foucault’s discussion, racism does not simply happen when a group of people come to harbor
prejudice about and hatred toward another group of people. It emerges only when such endemic
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prejudices are “grafted” onto what is supposed to be objective, authoritative, and scientific
knowledge about the different “species” of people, whereby, because of biological reasons,
certain species of people are better equipped to continue the genetic heredity of the human race
than others.
What Foucault refers to as ethic racism was already functioning in the era of sovereign
power. The sovereign ruled by “taking life or let live,” since all he had to do to ensure his
subjects’ continued loyalty to him was to punish those who went against his will.334 Think of the
old family feuds; you can always mar the honor of your family by, for example, falling in love
with the daughter of an enemy family, and thus betray the legacy of your ancestors. Then, you
are subject to getting killed by the head of the family. This “sovereign” practice is different
however from the power of the sovereign power that had been “grafted” onto biopolitics. In
sovereign power, it is precisely because the sovereign knows that you have a choice to either
obey or betray the will of the sovereign that it wields its power over you. You are deemed to
have your own choice as a person; whether you choose to be branded with the name of your own
family, or you choose to discard that name because your personal desire forbids you to do so,
remains your choice.
As has been already noted, biopower rules by “making live and let die.” It is a power that
propagates as the nihilistic life that people are led to live, because they are led to believe that
there is no other way for them to realize themselves other than by being the “thing” that
scientific discourse tells them they are. The more passionately they confess that there is
absolutely nothing they can do to add any value to their own lives, the more emptied out their
life becomes of any significance that derives from their own interpretations of their lives, the
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better they would be realizing themselves as what are supposed to matter scientifically. Thus, in
biopower, there is no worry that people would rebel against having been “represented” as
anything. The fact that someone has lived a biopolitical life is already a testament that this
person had been striving to realize himself so he could be “known” scientifically. He might have
been seeing himself as a normal person in sexual terms, a psychologically sound person, or as
genetically superior; whatever category of a human being this person might have been striving to
be, he had been struggling to actively negate his own here-elsewhere’s. This means that there is
no worry that he would turn into someone like Romeo, who had to reject his given name to
realize his desires. In other words, political authority does not have to be exercised by killing
those who deviate from the sovereign will; biopolitics operates via the very process their lives
are lived nihilistically.
This is why state racism as Foucault articulates it is qualitatively different from the ethnic
racism that is part and parcel of the sovereign power, the power that Foucault argues historically
precedes biopower. Also, this qualitative difference, the difference that derives from the fact that
biopower operates on the level of life itself, should also articulate the difference in Foucault’s
own political approach from the approach that sovereign power would wield. In other words, we
can reconsider the political significance of Foucault’s genealogical presentation of the rise of
biopower. If Foucault is indeed practicing Nietzschean transvaluation, he would be enacting
political intervention through the very act of presenting genealogies of biopower, rather than by
offering any knowledge about specific topics.
I am raising this question since, in the analysis of Foucault’s biopolitical discourse, there
are various different emphases on different terminologies, such as the “sovereign” as I have been
articulating it, in addition to more popularized terms such as power, discipline, and
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governmentality. This sometimes tends to present the political problems that Foucault discusses
as centered on, or deriving from, such terms. Foucault at one time expressed a desire to address
this tendency as a problem. Ben Golder notes how Foucault’s turn to governmentality originated
from his sense that his readers had seemed to be too focused on certain terminologies, such as
power or discipline, in receiving his theses, whereas what he really wanted to foreground was the
immanent processes of power.335 Thus, we can observe Foucault’s theses focusing on the way his
discursive practice in and by itself enacts transvaluation – which solely derives from the fact that
they are genealogies – rather than searching for the way theoretical elements such as
“sovereignty” are articulated as a factor in the historical emergence of Nazism or fascism.
In other words, I am suggesting that there should be a way for us to articulate the ways in
which here-elsewhere is not only theoretically articulated, but also ontologically practiced, in
Foucault’s discourse. By definition, here-elsewhere is always enacted relatively, via the process
where the thinker realizes sameness with his Other in that he succeeds in occupying the Other’s
positionality in their shared immanent reality. This precise dynamic, then, should be present in
Foucault’s biopoltical discourse as its organizing principle since the discourse would not have
arisen without Foucault having articulated it from his own here, in relation to his elsewherethan-here, which is the positionlity of the Other into whose perspective Foucault should have
been inserting himself via practicing the discourse. Moreover, if here-elsewhere thus lays the
“perspectival” ground of the discourse as a whole, it would continue to invite readers to think,
and form their own lives, along their own here-elsewhere’s that they discover in the discourse,
since the relative dynamic of the discourse will continue to invite the readers to do so.
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It is manifest in many parts of Foucault’s biopolitical discourse that he is enacting hereelsewhere via producing it. That is, in his discourses on power, Foucault practices transvaluation
by genealogically tracing the origin of the emergence of nihilistic lives, himself assuming the
positionality of this origin, since in genealogy lives are transvaluated only via the thinker
occupying the perspective of the Others who have lived those lives. In other words, I am
suggesting that in no part of Foucault’s discourse on power is he not imaginatively occupying the
positionality of those who have been living nihilistic lives. In Foucault’s descriptions, power
always appears as something that is actively enacted, practiced, felt, and expressed by some
agent or another; in this process, it becomes evident that the one who describes power is aware of
what it feels like to produce power:
The power which thus took charge of sexuality set about contacting bodies, caressing
them with its eyes, intensifying areas, electrifying surfaces, dramatizing trouble moments.
It wrapped the sexual body in its embrace. There was undoubtedly an increase in
effectiveness and an extension of the domain controlled; but also a sensualization of
power and a gain of pleasure.336
Here, the description is as it were of how it feels to exercise power – what it feels like for one to
contact bodies, to caress them, and to intensify the pleasure that the bodies feel in specific areas.
Comprehensively, Foucault is saying that, we have known the pleasure that the exercise
or production of power gives us in terms of our tangible bodily feelings. In many passages in his
account of power Foucault says makes this point clear:
We have . . . invented a different kind of pleasure: pleasure in the truth of pleasure, the
pleasure of knowing that truth, of discovering and exposing it, the fascination of seeing it
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and telling it, of captivating and capturing others by it, of confiding it in secret, of luring
it out in the open – the specific pleasure of the true discourse on pleasure.337
The pleasure one feels in the production of power is not necessarily the pleasure that one derives
from reading or articulating sexual accounts as it might seem at first to the readers of The History
of Sexuality; it is a pleasure that derives from the production of knowledge. That is, Foucault is
suggesting that, in the genealogies that he presents, we have been deriving pleasure that
originates from realizing ourselves as subjects of knowledge.
Foucault makes this clear in his presentation of the Christian practice of confession as the
analogy of the production of power. In this analogy, which many have noted as clearly
Nietzschean, power is described as emerging via the confessor’s own willing production of the
truth about who he is in a way that satisfies the need of his priest-like counterpart. However,
what has less been noted is that, in this genealogical presentation, power is described to emerge
in the relative dynamic between the confessor and the listener, whereby the confessor agrees to
experience the pleasure that his counterpart induces him to experience. Power is experienced as
pleasure because it is fed by the relative dynamic whereby what one experiences becomes
multiplied and intensified precisely because it is what he understands as what his counterpart
should also be experiencing, or what this counterpart also knows:
This produced a twofold effect: an impetus was given to power through its very exercise;
an emotion rewarded the overseeing control and carried it further; the intensity of the
confession renewed the questioner’s curiosity; the pleasure discovered fed back to the
power that encircled it.338
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It is via this mutual back-and-forth inducement and intensification that power produces and
reproduces itself. But whether it is expressed as the “curiosity” of the questioner, or the
“emotion” that the confessor receives as the reward of his divulging, Foucault comprehensively
describes the experiences that both confessors and listeners were feeling as “pleasure,” the
“pleasure of . . . confiding it in the secret” and “luring it out into the open.” This concretizes my
interpretation of Foucault’s presentation of power as coded in here-elsewhere; the confessor has,
in fact, elected to take pleasure because his Other had induced him to do so. At the moment when
the pleasure is being taken or produced, the confessor is actually taking himself to the position of
his Other. A sameness along here-elsewhere gets materialized, where the same experience, or
what Foucault collectively calls pleasure, is shared within the mutuality.
This is what Foucault means by suggesting that, rather than operating as a mechanism of
repression, power is exercised or produced positively. It is not that subjects are formed because
some unknown authority takes away, from them, certain capacities or properties; it is not even
that their desires have been repressed by an overwhelming force. Rather, subjects have been
formed because they have been moving in the direction where their own desire had been hailing
them from. It might seem like the confessor and the listener are two different parties where one is
situated in a higher position in relation to the other. This will be actually true if one were to take
account of the situation in terms of the Classical episteme, where it is possible to identify two
different people when one examines the dialogue between the patient and the doctor, for
instance. However, when it comes to the mode of reality wherein Foucault’s presentation of
power becomes possible – the immanent reality the formation and transformation of which
happens in terms of here-elsewhere – instances of reality, or difference, can only emerge when
sameness along appears.
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That the confessor had actually moved according to his own volition towards where his
pleasure is expected to be – this is the implication of Deleuze’s articulation of Nietzsche in the
language of pluralism. The immanent picture of reality that Deleuze argues Nietzsche presents
always describes reality as the process of the fulfillment and the realization of potentialities by
the one who makes it happen via proceeding towards his destiny, always facing it willingly,
perspectivally. This picture cannot but explain reality as something that had been deliberately
chosen, since every single materialization of reality involves selection out of a multiplicity of
potentialities. This is why Foucault cannot but explain power positively, as something that has
been continuing to be produced because agents have been electing to experience the precise
feeling that their choice would offer them.
This completely rewrites the situation the subjects should have been considering it to be.
The subjects of knowledge usually think that, in having formed themselves as subjects, they did
not have any choice. They think that, for them to be something in the reality they are situated in,
there is no other way than to be an identity, a thing, or an object of scientific inquiry, the way the
seeming authority of such knowledge – the priest figure – suggests. This authority, this priestfigure, is usually the one that the confessor cannot but regard as authoritative, since it is
personified as the parent, the psychologist, or anyone who seems to know how reality is like so
much better than the confessor. Thus it is easy for the confessor to succumb to this authority, and
say that, “Yes, I am indeed the being that you tell me to be.” Yet, the way this situation is
described in genealogy suggests that, actually, there had been a selection on the part of the child,
the patient or the citizen; they might seem to have been forced into it, and maybe that is true in a
sense, but it does not nonetheless remove the fact that, in electing to embody the truth that the
authority was telling him to embody, the confessor was choosing to experience the discreet
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pleasure accompanied in the process. It is in this sense that we can understand Foucault’s remark
that the production of power is played out in “the games of truth in the relationship of self with
self, and the forming of oneself as a subject.”
This is the sense in which Foucault’s biopolitical discourse is a transvaluation of reality.
As in his discussion of Binswanger’s critique of Freud, wherein Foucault argues that what he
calls the “constituting act” of the patient is rendered moot, the subjects of knowledge had been
neglecting to articulate the element that they themselves have constituted in their own lived
reality. Even while it might be a seemingly disgraceful, perverse pleasure, clarifying this emotion
constitutes what Nietzsche calls “interpretation”; in giving a name to the emotion that the subject
himself was going through at a definite past period of his life, he is realizing sameness with this
past self – his Other – and is thereby letting difference emerge. Thus, life is no longer lived
perpendicularly, as a headlong plunge into the future because life is in vain to begin with; life is
put on a different track, on the vectorial path of here-elsewhere. This should explain why
Foucault presents something that looks like a network of multiplicity of instances of power,
where agents are everywhere but no subject is to be found that is accountable for the production
of those instances. Power looks like it is always growing out from one point to another, since by
definition here-elsewhere always develops anew from a newly defined here: power gets
“produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point
to another.”339
It is hard for me to give a precise articulation of why or how it is possible for the
genealogist to locate a multiplicity of power relations all at the same time. My theory explains
that the vector under discussion is not about absolute directionality; yet, it might even be the case
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that the vectorial reality that arrives from elsewhere-than-here could not be unidirectional, so
that the directionality can convey the multiplicity of different directionalities all at the same time
as the origin from which the present occasion of reality has arrived. That is, while it is
theoretically asserted that the experience is vectorial in the sense that reality arrives from
exteriority towards here, the way such a direction gets experienced could convey the multiplicity
of different origins where the exteriority lies, rather than a single direction. This would mean
that, when one tries to genealogically articulate the origin of my current experience, I could
locate a multiplicity of different origins rather than a single locus. I think, if we develop our
speculation in this way, it could be possible for us to explain why Foucault says that “power gets
produced . . . at every point,” instead of saying that power gets produced from one point to
another, the way we usually conceive of a single trajectory of life.
What we can at least confirm here is that, via his immanent description of power,
Foucault achieves to present certain established paths or “channels” of power, where specific
vectorial paths appear predominant. “[Sexuality] appear[s] as an especially dense transfer point
for relations of power: between men and women, young people and old people, parents and
offspring”340; there emerge “privileged objects of knowledge, which were also targets and
anchorage points for the ventures of knowledge,”341 which Foucault calls “institutional
crystallization.”342 Additionally, as power can reach a new area only through a series of hereelsewhere’s, the already developed paths of power serve as a “support” for the “encroachment”
of power in new locales.343 What Foucault calls “areas of extreme sexual saturation” emerge344:
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. . . my main concern will be to locate the forms of power, the channels it takes, and the
discourses it permeates in order to reach the most tenuous and individual modes of
behavior, the paths that give it access to the rare or scarcely perceivable forms of desire,
how it penetrates and controls everyday pleasure.345
In Foucault’s accounts, therefore, one no longer needs the language of representation to explain
the production and multiplication of power; the objects to which effects of power are usually
attributed, merely appear to be the “area” where there is an especially “dense” saturation of the
occasions of here-elsewhere’s.
I have somewhat been digressing from my previous point, which is how Foucault’s
discourse of biopolitics articulates here-elsewhere as its underlying principle of constitution. In
relation to those scholars who assume that the immanently described phenomenon of power
needs an additional, outside standpoint of historical reflection or political intervention that can be
captured in the language of sovereignty, I am suggesting that such a reflective or interventional
standpoint is immanently achieved, or is to be potentially achieved, in the innately relative
constitution of Foucault’s discourse. On the one hand, the articulation of power shows traces of
its own composition, where Foucault himself appears as its own articulator, whereby he is
realizing his own here-elsewhere in relation to his own Other whom he identifies as his own past
self. This past self, as Foucault reflects it in his genealogies, was living life nihilistically at
specific points in his personal history – while we are theoretically agreed that this Other and
Foucault himself are different, to the extent that there always emerges difference in genealogical
articulations. Of course, at the same time, there is no “Foucault himself” that we can get an
absolutely objective access to, either.
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And yet, we have the traces of this person, who is articulating reality as he inserts himself
into the positionality of those who were producing power at the specific historical point about
which he is arguing – the way I was trying to show, earlier in this discussion, how power is
always described in terms that address the specific ways it is actually experienced. My point is
further concretized, I believe, by the way Foucault often uses we as the subject of the experience
of, or the production of, power. “We have produced a different kind of pleasure,” I have quoted
above as how Foucault puts it; this we is used numerous times on different occasions in
Foucault’s discussion of power or biopower, indicating that Foucault, when addressing the agent
of power production, includes at least himself who is giving an account of it at that moment, his
own past self who he admits was producing power at different points in his past, and the
audience that should be listening to his discourse. While this could seem as a mere rhetorical
strategy, I argue that it derives from the genealogical nature of his presentation, where the way
reality is articulated therein is conditioned by here-elsewhere’s. It is not only that Foucault
cannot articulate reality without identifying with his Other; in articulating this reality to his
audience, he has to anticipate the fact that the audience will be seeing himself as their own Other,
into whose position they should insert themselves in order to see, and realize, the reality that
Foucault presents for them. And in realizing themselves in this way, they would also become
part of the whole network of reality that Foucault presents as part of his own trajectory of life.
Thus we should conclude that a discursive politics of confession operates through the
dynamic of here-elsewhere that relatively establishes itself between the discourse and its
audience. The audience, that is, is always personally addressed by the Other that invites the
audience to occupy its own position, thus realizing the audience’s own desire to occupy their
own here-elsewhere’s, letting an interpretation of their own lives emerge. A we emerges via this
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confessing practice, which sums up all the network of here-elsewhere’s that are acknowledged to
have constituted the shared lives, in our own past instants. This we, this multitude, exists as such
thanks to their own acknowledgement of their reality as constituted in the network of hereelsewhere’s, whereby there is no boundary between I and Other.
I think we have arrived at a point where many controversies and confusions about distinct
terms that Foucault deploys in his analyses can be clarified. Thus, biopolitics as Foucault
presents it is never an objective reality that can be addressed, or intervened into, from a point of
view that articulates politics in terms of sovereignty. Oksala’s suggestion is that, since we are
living in a time when “petty sovereigns” who take biopolitical reality into their own hands can
render us into bare life at any given moment, we cannot but resort to “popular sovereignty” to
fight the intervention of the petty sovereigns. If this was in line with Foucault’s argument,
however, Foucault would not have commented, in presenting his methodology, that “in political
thought and analysis, we have still not cut off the head of the king.”346 As I have been arguing,
therefore, we can rather assume that there is no biopolitics in Foucault’s discussion that is not
already getting transvalued, in other words politically addressed or intervened into. The politics
that we are expected to enact in relation to the biopolitical discourse is to respond to the call of
the Other that invites us to realize our here-elsewhere’s in engaging with the historical
presentations. Thus, in listing some of the methodological proposals at the beginning of the
lecture series Security, Territory, Population, Foucault presents, as one of such proposals, a
“conditional imperative.”347 He calls it so since, in suggesting an imperative, he does not want it
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to be conveyed as a pedagogical injunction where he is presenting a model of practice that those
whom he is addressing should adhere to. Rather, he hopes that his analysis can be a kind of a
“pointer” that can direct his audience towards the site of their own struggles within the field of
power:
I would like the [imperative] underpinning the theoretical analysis we are attempting to
be quite simply a conditional imperative of the kind: If you want to struggle, here are
some key points, here are some constrictions and blockages. In other words, I would like
these imperatives to be no more than tactical pointers. Of course, it’s up to me, and those
who are working in the same direction, to know on what fields of real forces we need to
get our bearings in order to make a tactically effective analysis.348
Here, Foucault is suggesting that we embed ourselves into the immanent reality of power that
Foucault helps us conceive of; the relationship being articulated is no longer a “textual
engagement” as such; it is about here-elsewhere, the ontological sameness/difference that
connects us to our reality of here-elsewhere’s. This is, I argue, the way in which we can
understand another of Foucault’s famous statement on resistance: “where there is power, there is
resistance.”349 When you are acknowledging power within the network of here-elsewhere’s, you
are already headed to your elsewhere-than-here, the place where you are no longer a subject of
power but an agent creating difference.
I think, in suggesting that fascism emerged when biopower and sovereign power
intersected, Foucault was nicely complementing Nietzsche’s thesis on nihilism. While Nietzsche
had already prophesied that maybe the end of the will to knowledge will be an inevitable
sacrifice of human beings for the sake of knowledge, he did not the specify the mode in which
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human beings can go to the extent where they are willing to sacrifice lives for the apotheosis of
what they believe is the scientific knowledge about human race, such as that the white race is the
superior race, or that certain genes are superior to others. Nazism, as Foucault discusses it,
showed what exactly can happen when nihilistic lives were given a chance to cohere themselves
around a representation that they believe signifies who they are. As Taylor’s presentation of the
genealogy of psychiatry up to the time when it developed into state racism has it, the
development of nihilism, or the propagation of power, only awaits the moment when lives can be
deployed to realize knowledge. This is exactly the same process whereby patients like Ellen
West only endure their life to realize the ideal that human lives can achieve precisely by their
negation. It is just that, for Ellen West, the ideal was not articulated in relation to the idea of a
race; when race becomes the key term in relation to which the realization of “objective”
knowledge can be attained by deploying human lives as the means, the nihilistic lives are then
motivated to kill other races, or even to kill themselves.
The reason Oksala says that, while we do not have Nazism in our day, we still have
“petty sovereigns” in our midst, is because the term, “race,” has been, and can been, replaced by
any other language. Already Foucault discussed the significance of the language of the normal or
the abnormal as that which can cohere biopolitical lives into units of species, so that such
languages can work as the signpost for knowing which species deserve to survive, and which
species should be killed. He in fact explains this mechanism as what made the “internal racism”
of Nazism possible. The logic herein is very clear, as it is put by Foucault:
“The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the
fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I – as species
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rather than individual – can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will
be able to proliferate.”350
This is the “rational” language articulated by those who live nihilistic lives, according to the
Classical episteme, where they believe that scientific objectivity should be the ultimate authority
to make important decisions about our existence.
That this perspective is neither rational or even scientific is articulated by the
philosophical effort to articulate “thought” that this dissertation traced in Chapter One.
According to here-elsewhere and the way it articulates reality, there are no superior or inferior
things, or beings, whether it concerns race, gender, individuals, or humans and animals. Our lives
do not have to be dedicated to achieving some absolute scientific standards, which only work as
an excuse for us to live nihilistic lives, where we delegate our rights to derive meaning from our
lives to a transcendent authority. In this light, Foucault’s approach is not something that
addresses the problem of biopolitics on the level of the representations of who we are. It is not a
matter of deconstructing, that is, the way we are called a man, a woman, or a black person, that is
at the heart of the politics that Foucault practices in his biopolitical discourses. Rather, by letting
us engage ourselves, and establish sameness, with our Others who we find at the origin of our
nihilistic lives, Foucault calls for a transvaluation, at that origin.
Thus, as much as Foucault explains state racism as the “intersection” of biopower and
sovereign power, it is not possible for us to understand him as thereby suggesting that we
intervene into the problem by addressing the sovereign power only. That is, we cannot intervene
into biopolitics without transvaluing the way lives are lived nihilistically and opting, instead, to
rely on sovereign power and its promises of justice. This is why we can critique the way, for
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instance, “sovereign power” as Foucault discusses is understood and articulated by Oksala. I
agree with her diagnosis of the current political situation, where, as she puts it, “petty
sovereigns” in our midst can always rise and wield their reign on the biopolitical lives that they
govern. By this idea, she is suggesting that small-scale fascisms can always have a hold on
biopolitical lives, since, once we begin to live nihilistic lives, no matter “what” we choose to call
ourselves, we can always make ourselves into small-scale species that claim their right to survive
at the expense of the lives of others. However, as a way to address this situation, she suggests
that we can invigorate “popular sovereignty” in opposition to the exceptional, petty sovereigns,
thereby annulling Foucault’s own politics of discursive transvaluation of biopower:
Biopower is opposed to sovereign power not only in terms of its productive aims and
rationality, but also in the sense that it is essentially not the power of a democratically
elected sovereign body. It is typically the power of experts: managers and administrators
of life. This opposition is important in terms of imagining possible forms of resistance
against biopolitical violence. Rather than attempting to eradicate sovereignty, we are left
with the option of trying to break apart bio-sovereignty – a form of sovereignty in which
biopower and sovereign power coincide seamlessly – and strengthening the power of
popular sovereignty. His analysis thus leaves open the possibility that a viable way to
resist biopolitical violence would be to reinstall legal protections and democratic
mechanisms of accountability rather than launch a wholesale critique of sovereignty
aiming at its eradication.351
For Oksala, there are different “kinds” of sovereignty, as can be seen in her distinction between
biosoverienty and popular sovereignty. This notion centrally derives from her interpretation of
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Foucault whereby Foucault did not argue for the historical passage of “sovereign power” as it
was replaced by biopower at the onset of modernity. She argues, instead, that sovereignty as
Foucault argues it went through “historical transformations,” which can be seen in Foucault’s
argument that sovereign power, while it has been replaced by biopower, makes a return into the
midst of biopolitics and lets fascisms emerge.
As I have been demonstrating, however, Foucault does not argue for the deployment of
sovereignty in response to biopolitics, as much as he does not argue that sovereignty still
operates as the mode of the operation of power currently. Sovereignty, which is the way political
sphere is conceptualized, was operating alongside, and thanks to, the Classical episteme; and in
Foucault’s biopolitical discourse, the sovereign in this sense does not exist apart from the way it
gets reflectively critiqued and transvalued by the we who collectively looks back to our past thus.
I think the way this point escapes Oksala has to do with the way she regards biopolitics as that
which already has a grip on our lives, regardless of the context of Foucault’s genealogical
presentation of it. The seeming neutrality of biopolitics, precisely because its authority is based
on the discourse of science and the knowledge of the experts, is what makes it all the more
powerful and hard to recognize as political:
Political power in biopolitical societies has evaporated and has been replaced by purely
administrative and economic power. Complex biopolitical techniques aim at making our
life as long and happy as possible with the most scientifically advanced means available.
There are no political decisions or debates left when the aims of biopower are unanimous
and its means scientific.352
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She regards biopolitics as having replaced other forms of political power; thus, the recognition
of biopolitics happens without us bringing in, in the first place, a genealogical or critical outlook
upon the current situation. This is related to her saying that sometimes it does seem like
biopolitics is aiding us to enjoy a “long and happy” life with its technological might; biopolitics,
again, is being recognized with no regard to the origin of the emergence of nihilistic lives that
are, when genealogically reflected on, always what have been producing biopower.
In Oksala’s argument, two different notions of political intervention coexist. First, she
suggests that we need popular sovereignty; then, at the very end of the article, following the
passage that I have just cited, she argues that the deceptively neutral biopolitics should always be
critically and historically reflected on to reveal, for each time, the political underpinnings of
power-knowledge that support the biopolitical discourse. “Biopolitical life,” she says, “must be
explicitly politicized by dispelling its naturalness and revealing its historically specific
connections with the biopolitical regime of power/knowledge.”353 Critical or genealogical tracing
of the origin of biopolitics, that is, is supposed to continue, while we cannot let go of the
framework of sovereignty to oppose the bio-sovereign that holds us in its grip. Maybe this
reliance on the sovereign, I conjecture, has to do with the sense of inevitability that we have to
have some form of political control that we, as citizens, can rely on collectively. As much as this
is also a dire issue, I want to point out that we cannot see it as Foucault’s politics in his
theoretical intervention. Legal interventions, and interventions that are executed in the name of
justice, would be necessary in the world we are living in. But then, Foucault’s politics I think is
something that gets to the bottom of the politics that always relies on the framework of the
division between us and them, where someone is considered justified to punish and even kill
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others in the name of justice. While it might be true that we need to “protect” those who do not
harm others and abide by the rules of normal lives from those who are more likely to harm
others, it is also true that Foucault, who was a lifelong activist in questioning the penal system,
was seeking a way to critique its underlying rationality in his theoretical interventions. Needless
to say – as I will elaborate further in Chapter Four – this should be the reason why Foucault’s
politics is deployed to critique the specific violence innate in liberal democracy that has been
globally propagating through the intervention of the police nations such as the United States into
the domestic policies of other countries in the name of protecting universal rights, based on the
presupposition that we are better than them, and thus we can take their matters into our hands. As
we all know, the most violent of colonialist and imperialist crimes have been perpetuated in the
name of civilization that one group of people were better equipped to teach another group of
people who were supposed to be less enlightened. Foucault’s discourse, that is, again, based on
the discursive politics that is meant to directly address each of its listeners and readers, questions
the logic whereby one can believe that he is living the life of a moral citizen as long as one
passively follows the rationality of his society:
Of all the civilizations the Christian West has undoubtedly been, at the same time, the
most creative, the most conquering, the most arrogant, and doubtless the most bloody. At
any rate, it has certainly been one of the civilizations that has deployed the greatest
violence. But, at the same time, and this is the paradox I would like to stress, over
millennia Western man has learned to see himself as a sheep in a flock, something that
assuredly no Greek would have been prepared to accept.354
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In this remark, where Foucault speaks in a language with a distinctively Nietzschean streak with
its clear opposition between the Christian and the Greek cultures, Foucault is raising the
fundamental question of why Western man has come to see himself as a sheep in a flock. Here,
the rise of biopower is not attributed to the exercise of the technological experts or the
advancement in medical sciences. Biopower does not emerge and render ourselves into bare
lives, that is, apart from the way we have been living our lives, according to the way we have
been letting ourselves see ourselves and our reality.
When Foucault says that fascism was the product of the intersecting of biopower and
sovereign power, thus, Foucault was not suggesting that the problem was how the sovereign
power was added into the biopolitical reality, the reality that was already there as such, thanks to
the way technologies and science had been organizing and maintaining human biological lives.
The sovereign, that is, is not the real issue in either the past of fascism or in the current problems
with “petty sovereigns”; we cannot address the situation by intervening at the level of the
“sovereign,” which only addresses the problem on the level of legal culpability. In the process of
fighting for justice, it should be almost indispensable to rely on the law; I think that Foucault
will, in line with his overall logic in his argument on power, wholeheartedly support the effort of
those who find their strategies in tactical legal fights. Nonetheless, again, this does not mean that
this level of political action addresses biopolitics at its core, which is Foucault’s concern in his
books on biopower.
If it is indeed the case that, as Foucault diagnoses it, biopower is at the heart of the large
and small-scale fascisms that we find ourselves and our friends fall victim to, and perhaps
practice unawares, in our daily lives, then it is indispensable for us to practice genealogical
transvaluation of ourselves. It is, that is, not enough for us to address the problem on the level of
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representation only. While Derrida’s deconstruction has played an immense role in making us
reflect on the way we reduce ourselves and our identity to representations, I think it comes short
of bringing us to the site of the origin of where our nihilistic lives emerged, precisely because
deconstruction is so apprehensive of discussing any such thing as an origin. This apprehension, I
think, can be found in Gayatri Spivak’s introduction to Derrida’s Grammatology among others.
There, Spivak links deconstruction to Nietzschean philosophy, arguing that deconstruction warns
us of what Nietzsche, for the first time in Western philosophy, recognized as the violence of
human beings’ “figurative drive,” or their instinct to project ideals of themselves into the chaotic
world outside and pretend that the world is identical to such ideals.355 Then, she argues that the
value of deconstruction lies in that it encourages us to “actively forget” the path of figurative
drive356; That is, deconstruction makes us simultaneously aware of, and yet refuse to follow,
such a drive.
Yet, as Foucault captures it, Nietzschean genealogy is not about any refusal to follow a
conceptual path, but an active effort at occupying the locus of the origin of my own nihilistic
reality. That the politics can be articulated in terms of vector in my own thesis is a testament to
the fact that, in transvaluing nihilism, what Nietzsche and Foucault urge is for us to follow our
own desire to be Other, and achieve sameness in that process. When we claim, as Foucault does,
the experience of having felt pleasure in living moments or phases in our lives nihilistically, our
lives at last begin to follow a different direction. That this kind of politics is not satisfactorily
addressed in Foucault studies, I think, is reflected in the way Oksala understands biopolitics as
something that we are now already living with, because it is what helps us live “long and happy
lives.” When nihilistic lives are transvalued, however, it would be impossible for us to feel that,
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when we were living our nihilistic moments, we were being happy. Nihilism is, by definition, a
mode of life where you have delegated your right to feel happy, and triumphant, in your life, to a
transcendent authority, since you were led to believe that life is meaningless. Whatever you were
giving up your own right to follow your here-elsewhere for – your security, your honor, your
fear of getting blamed – you could not have been happy then, since you were sacrificing your
life.
Any public intellectual would find it hard to let go of the idea that we need sovereignty.
However, to articulate politics in terms of Foucaultian transvaluation of biopolitics is an urgent
issue. The Kantian problem, as Foucault acknowledged it, was a dire political issue after all. In
the past, before the onset of modernity, people could address God, their dead ancestors, or
Nature, to critique, and think, themselves. While religion and other dogmas of the past that Kant
critiqued certainly made people slaves of false idols, it was also true that, when people sincerely
or genuinely prayed, they could sometimes hear their own voices addressing themselves, in the
guise of their God’s voice or their dead ancestor’s voices. Today, we have only deconstruction,
which warns us of truly believing in any one’s voice; voice is seen as the origin of evil, the roots
of essentialistic thinking.357 Thus, while scientific rationality and its brilliant success continues to
lure populations to form themselves into subjects of knowledge, there is no “origin” to which we
can return, to forge solidarity with our Others and indeed with our own.
This does not mean that we do not have any means with which to continue to tranvalue
ourselves; now, I want to discuss the politics of transvaluation that contemporary fictions engage
its readers to practice. However, I think it is crucial for us, critics and literary scholars, to be
critically aware of the politics of transvaluation that we practice in our everyday lives. We as
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human beings have a desire to continue to occupy ever new origins, where we will find ourselves
anew, and where we find our reality transformed. I think it is time for us to say it is okay to do
that.
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4. Literature as the Landscape of Transvaluations

Chapter Intro
“Nothing is invented, since it is already written in nature.”
- Antoni Gaudi

We are back in the terrain of the literary. This chapter argues that thinking of hereelsewhere and the literary together leads us to productive potential venues for research and
pedagogy. It shows how a serious consideration of the “literality” of literary language leads us to
a renewed appreciation of realism; realism articulates the political function of literature as
transvaluation. Countering the prevalent Derridean skepticism regarding the capacity of language
to convey the real of the last few decades, this study argues that we should take the
transformative, and thus realist, function of literary language seriously, so that we can move on
to investigating paths for practicing “strategic” literary politics.358 Once we accept that there are
moments when literary language becomes literal to us in addressing our reality – regardless of
the question of if we want to establish any specific linguistic “sign” as communicating the real,
an act which is, as deconstruction teaches us, a fraudulent and violent attempt – we can see that
philosophical and literary texts engage with the how of the process of political transformation.
To address this how, or the strategic aspect, of the function of literature, I suggest that first-hand
accounts on the craft of literary writing, such as Orhan Pamuk’s articulations of the function of
the novel, offers us useful theoretical notions, including “landscape.”
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With the advent of environmental studies, there is an inundation of discussions on how to
articulate our relations to the physical and cultural world that we live in. As Ulf Strohmayer has
it, “culture” has become a keyword for the investigation of possible alternative forms of
knowledge to the those offered by “science” and “modernity,” with the understanding of the
diverging theoretical schools devoted to the task that we are investigating “local,” tacitly
understood and “practiced” knowledge; cultural knowledge is a spatialized knowledge in that
sense.359 But despite the productiveness of this field of inquiry, we still do not have a theoretical
framework to articulate our connection to our surroundings. Antonio Gaudi, the renounced
Spanish architect, has designed a park named Güell Park. In this park, which was built on a
sloping high hill which is not accommodating to building parks, Gaudi constructed what seems
like a caved path, supported by columns that look like the tree trunks. Rather than trying to make
the hillside even so that it can take vertical, imposing columns, Gaudi chose to subtly adjust the
lengths and the leaning degrees of these columns, so that they naturally fit into their surroundings
as well as form strong arches optimal for supporting the weight of the archway. This shows the
architect’s intelligence in imagining human spaces in close attunement to nature. Yet, despite the
obvious ways human beings interact with our surroundings, being able to imagine ways for us to
blend into its nooks and accommodate to its existing possibilities, theoretical studies of
landscapes and spaces had so far been hesitant to assert that our perception of a distinct physical
nature is real in the sense that we can know certain things about our environment by feeling it
directly.
This is no less true in literary studies. Despite the largely historical tending of the current
research in the discipline, any advocating of the notion that history directly conveys the truth of
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our reality, is either carefully avoided or vehemently protested. The basic precondition that
certain archival or textual detail hails the critic’s attention, appealing to his sense of what
deserves further inquiries, or that the overall layout of such details creates a moderate sense of an
integral culture, society, or a world, does not get delved into much deeply. That is, the
relationships among the critics’ perception, its critical and cultural relevance, and the object of
the critic’s research which oftentimes emerges in the shape of cultural “landscapes,” have room
to be studied in a way that pushes the current frameworks. To develop this point in a way we can
reflect on the relevance, limits, and possibilities of literary criticism, I begin my discussion in
this chapter discussing a notable example of literary and historical criticism, Kōjin Karatani’s
Origins of Modern Japanese Literature. I go over the theoretical presuppositions underlying his
work, which critiques modernity via a historical retracing of the history of the concept “Japanese
literature,” the monolithic nature of which, as Karatani sees it, aligns with the formation of the
imperialistic and nationalistic Japanese subjectivity.
Karatani revisits the historical moment when such a subjectivity emerged, locating it in
the publication of a specific literary work which, as he sees it, aligns with the process of the
formation of the modern subjects’ “interiority.” The concept of “interiority” had been critically
articulated in the philosophical and theoretical studies of modernity in such central studies as
Susan Langer’s.360 I read the literary text where Karatani locates the origin of the modern
Japanese subjectivity differently, to demonstrate that the text embodies an instant of
transvaluation. This problematizes Karatani’s thesis, since transvaluation goes against the very
trend that Karatani attempts to critique – the trend of the formation of a “landscape” as fixed
order of being, which is the equivalent of Foucault’s Classical episteme. While the theoretical
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understandings that propel and frame Karatani’s larger project are cogent, the distinctive
suppression of what a “literature” can do in its capacity to transvalue for the sake of the rationale
of the project deserves to be addressed. I suggest that Oto’s Unforgettable People, which is the
text that Karatani critiques as accommodating the origin of modern Japanese subjectivity, is
valuable not because it believes in “landscape” as Classical episteme, but because it suggests an
alternative landscape based on the ontological sameness present in here-elsewhere. In so doing, I
prepare my next stage of argument, where I will discuss the possibility of this new concept of
literary landscape. This is based on the continuity between my reading of Oto and Orhan
Pamuk’s intuitions about how we come to inhabit the “landscape” of the novel as we progress
deeper and deeper into its narratological world.
To elaborate, I juxtapose, in the course of my argument, Karatani’s skepticism towards
“realism” as a critical school, and Pamuk’s celebration of the very same trend. I try to show how
my discussion of the two said texts encourages a reappraisal of the relevance of realism in
discussing literature. If we can have a consensus that we more or less hear the “voice” of the
protagonist directly communicating the “real” as it had struck him when we quietly agree to his
admissions couched in fictional narratives, the question of whether or not we freeze such
moments into a signifier and parade it as the perennial “truth” deriving from the original nature
of the Universe, would be less an object of an obsessive critique that sometimes becomes
counterproductive. Theoretically adopting, and learning from, literary accounts of how creative
process works for such authors as Pamuk, leads us to a productive, and I would say an urgent,
new paths of critical investigation, which regard the how, or the strategical, side of our everyday
practices of transvaluation.
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It is in this spirit that I, in the final section of this chapter, turn to A Gesture Life, a fiction
written by the celebrated contemporary fiction writer, Chang-rae Lee. In the critical literature of
this book, a large segment of which is part of the Asian American discourse, there is a general
consensus that the major function of the reflective narrative of the senior Korean-American
protagonist is to admit, without judgement, his own complicity with the larger societal wrongs.
Yet, when it comes to the question of how to articulate the political significance of such
admissions, the opinions begin to diverge. Given the pronounced political streak of the Asian
Americanist discourse that takes the problem of minorities, and the related issues of nationalism
and globalization, seriously, the debate concerning the articulation of the political significance of
the novel became an especially contested one. Many are skeptical of what, for them, seem to be
merely “private” confessions of Hata, the protagonist who has reached seniority as a successful
Japanese-Korean-American citizen, who is the denizen of a prestigious suburb in the U.S. in the
period immediately following the end of the Second World War.
Retaining such political concerns, and deploying and building up on the hermeneutical
insights about the fiction that have so far been produced, I try to redirect the critical interest in
the fiction so that we can appreciate the process of transvaluation that happens through Hata’s
narrative. I expand on and elaborate on the insights of such critics as Kandice Chuh, who
foregrounds how the literature speaks to “us,” an aspect of appreciation of this fiction that had
been assuredly present in various critical instances, and yet had been barely clarified in a
theoretical language. I discuss the various aspects in which the novel can be read as the process
of redirecting a life towards the vector of here-elsewhere. I argue that the most fundamental
motif of the narrative, as Lee makes it clear, is the transvaluation of a nihilistic subject, who had
been forming detrimental, necropolitical relationship with the series of societies that he had been
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struggling to belong to, such as Japan and the U.S. His reflections, and the resulting selftransformation, I suggest, cannot be simply “private”; the way the act of narration itself is real is
manifest in the way his articulation shifts to reflect directional language, which gradually
presents him to be able to participate in the Nietzschean cycle of endless returns, yet never
landing him at an immobile, fixed destination.
The way the length, or duration, of the narrative seems to matter in transforming a subject
who is, at the beginning point of the narrative, nearly perfectly nihilistic – who, at this point,
rather chooses to burn his reality down rather than venturing to take a newly emergent, vectorial
path of life – encourage us to engage with a series of inquiries. How do we, for instance,
strategically build our here-elsewhere’s, delimited as we are by the conditions that define us as
physical, biological beings? If the shaping of our lives is political action in itself, how do we
organize our lives and adjust our imaginations in the face of the dejecting reality that, according
to the realistic articulations of historical change that have been articulated in this dissertation, a
world where everyone is happy is hard to even conceive of yet? How do we not give into the
seduction of giving up, losing ourselves to the automatic grinding on of the processes of
modernity, when achieving instances of transvaluation hardly seems to be a feat? Expanding our
horizon of research to the genre of first-hand accounts of literary compositions, and applying the
framework of reality that Foucault teaches us to our reading of contemporary literature, let us
gain practical knowledge as to how to hold on and live our today without losing our morale in
the seeming hopelessness of the situation or getting mired in the guilt that we are only
parasitizing on the existing evil. The courage of someone like Hata, who seems to have merely
things to feel guilty about and pain over in his past and yet holds onto the path of his hereelsewhere’s that makes him revisit and transvalue his past, helps us to become brave, placing our
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faith in the political possibilities of confession that binds the reader and the writer together in our
mutual complicity in secretly breaching the code of the morality of our society. The newly found
possibility of confession – a completely different connotation of confession from that which
Foucault had been critical of through much of his career – is the final fruit that this dissertation
gleans.

a. Undervaluing the Real: Kojin Karatani on Unforgettable People

As Frederic Jameson, in his preface to the book, argues that Karatani’s Origins of
Modern Japanese Literature deserves to be celebrated as an exemplary critique of modernity;
while the work is a solidly historical tracing of the modernist concept, “Japanese literature,” it
also demonstrates, as Jameson notes, the essence of “modernity” in a compressed form to the
Western eye, as if offering its mirrored reflection.361 Theoretically, the work is based on
Karatani’s adept deployment of the Foucaultian notion of episteme, which he seamlessly weaves
into his basically deconstructive argument. Karatani argues that there have been “inversions” in
Japanese history; inversion, which is roughly equivalent to the shift of epistemes in Foucault,
show that what Karatani calls “epistemological constellations,” or the equivalent of epistemes,
are finite. The result is the combination of the minute, detail-oriented tracing of the historical
process whereby a modernist worldview came to existence as a “constellation” or nexus of
knowledges and beliefs in Japan, and the critical discussion of how such an origin, though
seemingly concrete, is illusory. The belief in the “objective” observation of one’s world, which
co-constituted the Japanese modern subjectivity and his “landscape,” can never be seen as
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absolute or transhistorically positable. The emergence of such a constellation is in fact a
psychological event whereby one establishes an affective attachment to the idea of a such an
order in the first place.
Karatani’s discussion resonates with Derrida’s critique of Rousseau, where Derrida
shows the belief in scientific objectivity to be undergirded by the subject’s romantic
identification with his surroundings.362 Karatani denotes the emotional underpinnings of the
relationship between the observer and his observed world in his discussion of inversion, using
the emotivity to undermine the idea of objectivity. The result is the critique of the modern
Japanese subjectivity that became the backbone of the nation’s capitalistic and imperialistic
ventures. Thus, for Karatani, critiquing literary terms, such as “Japanese literature” as a modern
concept, is a political work. His critiques make him inquire whether the notion of an
“intellectual,” and the conceptual relation that an intellectual establishes with Other, is not the
replication of the deceptive modern worldview or what he abbreviates as a “landscape.”
This chapter does not attempt to address the overall setup or the rationale that sets off and
maintains the critical motion of Karatani’s project as a whole. Rather, it tries to recuperate a
certain perspective in reading a literary work which, in the compendious momentum of
Karatani’s critical move, becomes downplayed or suppressed. In other words, I want to question
the way in which, in Karatani’s project, what I see as a profoundly “literary” work of art – a term
that I hope to try to deliberate in due depth in the ensuing argument – gets transfixed as the
epitome of the modernist mode of thinking, and as inaugurating, with its sole power, the
Japanese modernity. The work that Karatani defines as the first embodied articulation of a
modernist mode of thought in Japan is Kunikida Doppo’s Unforgettable People, a fictional
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account of the people that the protagonist has found it impossible to forget. The analysis of the
book happens hand in hand with the discussion of the emergence of landscape, constituting the
linchpin of Karatani’s argument:
What I am referring to as “landscape” is an epistemological constellation, the origins of
which were suppressed as soon as it was produced. It is a constellation which appeared in
nascent form in the literary trend of realism in the 1890s. Yet the decisive inversion has
not yet occurred. The realistic style of this time was basically an extension of Edo
literature. It was Kunikida Doppo’s works – The Musashi Plain (Musashino) and
Unforgettable People (Wasureenuhitobito), published in 1898 – which embodied a
fundamental break with the past. Unforgettable People, in particular, offers convincing
evidence that “landscape” was an inversion of consciousness before it became a
representational convention.363
Here, that Unforgettable People is an account of the people that the narrator has not been able to
forget is seen as the support for the argument that the modern subject and his objective landscape
are psychologically related.
As Karatani sees it, the landscape under discussion is one that is ironically deprived of
the humanity of the people encountered there. While the whole of the island is gradually taken in
from the perspective of the narrator as he was standing on the ship that was slowly approaching
it, the figure of the small man slowly blends into the overall view, comprising a part of the
landscape. The way the whole of the picture is solely centered on, and colored by, the narrator’s
perspective and emotion, and the way the man seems part of that picture, builds up to Karatani’s
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idea that “landscape” dehumanizes. Indeed, the patently emotive undertone of the narrator’s
presentation of the landscape is manifest in the Oto text quoted in Karatani:
Because of my state of health, I must surely have been depressed. I remember, at least,
that I daydreamed about the future while I roamed the deck, and thought of the fate of
men in this life. I suppose this is the sort of thing all young men do at such times. I heard
the pleasant sound of the ship’s hull cutting through the water, and watched the soft glow
of the spring day melt into the sea’s oil-smooth, unrippled surface. As the ship advanced,
one small island after another would rise out of the mist on either side of us, then
disappear. The islands, each draped in a thick brocade of yellow flowers and green barley
leaves, seemed to be floating deep within the surrounding mist. Before long the ship
passed not fifteen hundred yards from the beach of a small island off to the right and I
stepped to the rail, gazing absentmindedly at the island. There seemed to be no fields or
houses, only groves of small, low pine scattered over the hillside. It was low tide. The
damp surface of the hushed and deserted beach glistened in the sun, and now and then a
long streak – perhaps the playing of little wavers at the water’s edge – shone like a naked
sword, then dissolved. From the faint call of a lark high in the air over the hill, one could
tell that the island was inhabited. I remembered my father’s poem, “The soaring lark
betrays a farm behind the island’s face,” and I thought there must certainly be houses on
the other side. And as I watched I caught sight of a lone figure on a sunlit beach. I could
tell it was a man, not a woman or a child. He seemed to be picking things up repeatedly
and putting them into a basket or pail. He would take two or three steps squat down, and
pick something up. I watched carefully as he wandered along the deserted little beach
beneath the hill. As the ship drew further away, the man’s form became a black dot, and
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soon the beach, the hills, and the island all faded into the mist. Almost ten years have
passed, and I have thought many times of this man at the edge of the island, the man
whose face I never saw. He is one of those I cannot forget.364
Interpreting the above passage, Karatani suggests that “the man on Doppo’s island is not so
much a ‘person’ as a ‘landscape.’”365 This also applies to everyone that Doppo writes about in
Unforgettable People where, as Karatani continues to discuss it, “the narrator says, ‘At such
times, it is these people who flood my mind. No, it is these people standing in the midst of scenes
in which I discovered them.’”366 It might not seem odd for a person to notice people as “peopleas-landscapes,” Karatani concedes; the real “eccentricity” of the narrator nonetheless shows in
that he is so haunted by the memories of these people that they crowd his memories and dreams.
Moreover, while the narrator is professedly haunted by memories of “people,” the circumstances
of his remembering, and giving accounts of, those remembered people only show how solitary
the narrator actually is, removed from the outside world in the solitariness of his meditation.367
Karatani quotes a long passage from the text again in this vein; near the conclusion of the novel,
the narrator sits “along at his desk, lost in thought,” with his manuscript of “Unforgettable
People” sitting on his desk in front of him. We read the quiescent account of the narrator, this
time addressing the readers directly instead of the innkeeper. The profusely emotional
connotations of the narrator’s reminiscence become more foregrounded, as the narrator selfconsciously deliberates on the affective power such memories exert on him. In other words, the
memories become more an issue of him as a person, rather than that of the people who dwell
them:
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I am not a happy man. Always I am tortured by life’s great questions and by my own
overwhelming ambitions. In the deepening hours of a night such as this, alone, staring
into the lamp, I experience unbearable sorrow. At these times my inflexible egoism
seems to shatter, and the thought of others touches me deeply. I think of my friends and
of days long past. But more than anything else, images of these people I have described
to you come streaming into my mind. No, I see not the people themselves. I see the
figures in the background of a much larger scene. They are part of their surroundings,
part of a moment. I remember these people and from deep within me the thought wells
up: How am I different from anyone else? Part of the life we share is from heaven, and
part of it is from earth. All of us are returning, hand in hand, along the same eternal track,
to that infinite heaven. And when this realization comes to me, I find myself in tears, for
there is then in truth no Self, no Others. I am touched by memories of each and every
one. Only at these times do I feel such peace, such liberation, such sympathy towards all
things. Only then do worldly thoughts of fame and the struggle for fortune disappear so
utterly.368
Depicting an inherently private moment, when one is indulging in the emotions that he claims to
have been forced upon him by the others’ presence, this scene unambiguously epitomizes
inversion for Karatani: “This passage clearly reveals the link between landscape and an
introverted, solitary situation.”369 The obviousness of such a conclusion gets repeatedly noted, as
Karatani has also noted immediately after presenting the quotation about the narrator’s encounter
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with the old man on the island, that the reason that he has cited the long passage is because it
clarifies that the lone man is a part of the landscape.370
In marking the above passage as the quintessential moment of inversion, Karatani relies
on the theories of modernity in suggesting that, the modern distinction of the “private” and the
“public” secures the possibility of an objective world for the subject. As Karatani points out,
however, Freud, Nietzsche, and others pointed out that such a division was nothing other than a
historical and psychological event whereby the direction of the libido gets introverted.371 Thus, it
is not that the emotive base of perception disappears; the libido has simply changed its target,
having been invested in the belief in an objective persona. Karatani deploys Langer’s Philosophy
in a New Key, discussing how the emergence of an “interiority” taints all subsequent efforts at
coming up with a “realistic” landscape or a completely measurable, quantifiable world that was
the dream of Descartes.372 Yet Doppo’s passage does not necessarily implies that he is trying to
proclaim himself as a completely objective and neutral presenter of his world. Rather, it seems
that he is presenting his narrative in a deliberately dialogical setting, where he tells his tales to an
innkeeper first, and then later, directly to the readers. That is, the narrator in the novel seems
being freely emotional, rather than pretending to be neutral.
Karatani’s argument could be read as suggesting that this primal moment reveals the
emotionality that henceforth only gets suppressed in the ensuing manifestations of the modern
subjectivity. If this was the case, it is questionable how Karatani could read the passage along the
clear conceptual distinction between interiority vis-à-vis exteriority. Such a question, however, is
a difficult one to pose for Karatani, since his presupposition is that the epistemological
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constellation of modernity has a grip on all of us, and as such, is inescapable. In a noticeably
deconstructive vein, Karatani asserts that:
Yet neither Kobayashi nor the painters he discussed in his book were able to escape from
that “landscape” which conditioned the painter’s very discovery of Japanese woodblock
prints and African primitive art. Kobayashi describes no one as having transcended the
confines of landscape. I myself, in writing this essay, do not seek to break away from this
“sphere.” I seek simply to shed light on its historicity.373
As in Derrida’s critique of Foucault’s “Cogito and the History of Madness,” Karatani proclaims
an impossibility of ever occupying an outside of the object of his historical analysis without
pursuing the problematic of how one could occupy a critical position in relation to the historical
system that he himself occupies. At the same time, while he seems to regard libido as an element
of reality – quoting Freud who argues that the formation of interiority results from a redirection
of libido – he does not inquire about the role of desire in historical processes, including those of
the inversion of “epistemological constellations.” Karatani ends up reducing the people who are
recounted in Doppo’s narrative as mere auxiliary to landscape, which practically results in a
concretization of the notion of “interiority.” At the same time, the psychological investment to
the people and the scene thus remembered are ridden of their critical significance, getting
reduced to mere suppressed emotional undergird for an ostensibly emotionless overview of a
subject.
Such problems lead to a circular argument, where no one can ever profess to having a
real connection to his surroundings. What was originally to be a critical overview of the history
of modernity of a nation, leads to the development of an idea that “realism” is ungrounded and
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thus a fantasy. Karatani critiques Viktor Shklovsky, the central figure of the Russian formalist
school and the proponent of the theory of “defamiliarization” in this light:
Shklovsky proposed the view that defamiliarization was the essence of realism. Realism
should make us see that which, through force of habit, we have been unable to see. Thus
realism has no specific method. It is a relentless defamiliarization of the familiar. In
Shklovsky’s view, even supposedly antirealist words like those by Kafka can be termed
“realist.” This type of realism does not describe landscape but always creates it. It brings
into existence landscapes which, although they had always been there, had never been
seen. Shklovsky’s realist had always to be an “interior person.”374
The presupposition that there should be an interiority for the landscape to emerge has becomes
important for Karatani. The kind of landscape presented in Doppo’s passage, which reveals
something new about an observed world, is always subsumed to the realm of the private
interiority, even while the reality of such an interiority gets denied. Why critique something that
is not even real? We are left to ask.
Karatani overlooks the possibility that a landscape, or a particular view of the world, can
emerge without a subject. In here-elsewhere, the process of an imaginative staging of the Other’s
world constitutes reality. There is no presupposition of the existence of any subject in this since
there is no division in “I-Other,” which emerges as the unit of spatio-temporality. In hereelsewhere, I am trying to understand something that I must have been feeling at a certain point in
my past; whomever that I am trying to put myself into the shoes of, can already never be
distinguished from myself. Therefore, it is impossible for us to conceive of reality in modern
thought without realizing a “landscape” in an alternative sense to Karatani’s. As I have discussed
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in Chapter One, Foucault, in his adaptation of Sartre’s idea of imagination, makes it explicit that
the essence of an imagination of another person, say that of Peter, does not derive from either the
actual absence of Peter or the possibility that I can conjure up a world where there is Peter as a
subject or as a representation. Rather, it inheres in the possibility whereby I can imaginatively
stage the world which includes Peter, in the sense that I embody the reality where Peter’s body is
ensconced in. As Foucault had it, “I am the letter that he is reading . . . I am the wall that
watches him from all sides.” Imagining Peter is to occupy the perspective of a here where Peter’s
experience of his would arrives at; it is to occupy the multiplicity of possible positions so that it
is as though “I am the wall that watches him from all sides and hence do not ‘see’ him.”375
If we recall that Foucault grounds his theory of thought upon Bachelardian theory of
vector that regards “imagination” as the conceptual equivalent of rationality, it becomes
noticeable that Doppo’s narrator is experiencing what Foucault calls thought. From the initial
lead-in to the general setting, to the later account where his encounter with the old man happens
in the memory of the island, and further to the articulation of the numerous memories of people
that come “streaming into [the narrator’s] mind,” there is an explicit account of inhabiting the
same reality as an Other. The Others are inhabiting realities of their own and yet simultaneously
share the same reality as the narrator in that all the I-Other’s are facing the same direction,
pursuing the life paths along here-elsewhere’s: “All of us are returning, hand in hand, along the
same eternal track, to that infinite heaven.” It is in this sense that the narrator realizes that he and
the people that he remembers share the common fate – indeed, the narrator notes that, before he
witnessed the old man and his island, he was “daydreaming . . . about [his] future . . . and
thought of the fate of men in this life.” The landscape of the lone man emerges out of thick mist,
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remains in the narrator’s perspective for a while, and then disappears back into the mist, the
whole movement of appearance and disappearance overlapping with, and foreshadowing, the
narrator’s later epiphany, or “the thought of others, “which touches [the narrator] deeply” while
his “inflexible egoism seem[s] to shatter.” These thoughts regard the ones he saw against the
backdrop “of a much larger scene.” Inextricable from their landscapes, their presence is also his
own presence, because the life that is common to them all derives from heaven and returns to
heaven, according to the rhythm that shapes the movement of life as alternation between
appearance and disappearance. The feeling of this insight in itself constitutes the sameness of IOther, positioning the narrator in tune with the others’ movement of life.
The movement of the lone man himself seems to embody the rhythmic repetition of hereelsewhere’s: “He seemed to be picking things up repeatedly and putting them into a basket or
pail. He would take two or three steps squat down, and pick something up.” Consistent with my
account of the Foucault’s adaptation of Sartre, the man’s face is explicitly not recognized as a
marker of his identity: “I have thought many times of this man at the edge of the island, the man
whose face I never saw.” This un-recognition does not have to connote the deprivation of
humanity; for Doppo, the presence of this man, shrouded in his world and living his everyday
fate, comprises part of the landscape that is real – real to the extent that it tells him certain truths
about his reality, and letting him feel it.
When Foucault cites Sartre, he is saying that to imagine Other is to be able to feel the
way this Other inhabits his own world. This is what is commonly meant when we say we feel our
“common” humanity with someone undergoing more difficult situations than us. Vectorial
Realities have been trying to argue that, while it is impossible to do away with the difference that
exist in between the realities that are acknowledged to share commonness in the event of
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thought, such a fact does not cancel the reality of inhabiting the Other’s world which is, as all of
ours are, advancing in the direction of his ultimate destiny, his death. Foucault and Bachelard are
aware that thought, practiced in this sense, could never be emotion-free. Descartes, when he was
meditating upon the significance of him feeling his own world at that moment, became deluged
with emotion, which propels him to say that he is undergoing stupor. Foucault appreciates
Descartes for this very admission; Foucault suggests that, because you feel you are being
overwhelmed or not fit to “objectively” meditate, you are being sane. Continuing to build upon
the Kantian motif of finitude, and appreciating Descartes for extending the definition of
“thought” beyond Kant – since Kant immediately undid the connection that he found between his
own body and the rest of the universe – Foucault recuperated the affective basis of rationality
that was originally in Kant.
In response to Karatani we can ask, if modernity professes to be emotion-free, then would
not the operation of emotion potentially unseat such pretensions? As Karatani notes it, Doppo
freely and repeatedly admits to feeling a powerful emotional connection with the memories of
his “unforgettable people,” which makes him revisit them. Rather than suppressing or repressing
the memories Doppo problematizes them, noting that it seems unnatural for him to find these
memories so powerful, since one should ideally find unforgettable the memories of those he
owes moral or filial obligations to. Doppo decides to recall, deliberate on, and explore such
memories – which makes them free and autonomous acts rather than compromising gestures.
Jameson suggests that the “Nietzsche/Foucault lesson of genealogy” has no place in
Karatani’s thesis since Karatani entirely focuses on repeatedly going back to, and recognizing,
the illusion of reality, which does not allow seeing any depth of the past in it.376 However, the

376

Jameson, Foreword to Origins of Modern Japanese Literature, xi.

276

passages of Doppo connotes genealogy, or the recurrent movement of revisiting one’s previous
worlds. Doppo reflects upon his witnessing the lone man on the island, recounting the minutest
details involved in the encounter; he revisits the resurfacing memories, each time finding himself
pondering upon the reasons for their haunting him. The flagrantly emotional consequences of
these attempts are openly acknowledged and recalled as if in an observational report. It is the
same as in Descartes’ meditation, where the very fact that Descartes is affected by his own
meditational practice is acknowledged, leading him to conclude that such an acknowledgement
should not hinder him from continuing to meditate. The feelings that affect Doppo reach him in
the sense of the event of reality arriving at the here of experience: he feels the weight of his own
“unbearable sorrow,” and “the thought of others touches [him] deeply.” We see recurring
expressions involving how a thought arrives with its own tactility: “images of these people . . .
come streaming into my mind . . . I am touched by memories of each and everyone.”
Let me suggest that, at certain moments, literary language can be taken in a literal sense,
suspending our theoretical skepticism about the transparency of language. In suggesting this, I
am not implying that any of the actual languages that we feel as literal in such occasions should
assume a representational status. While difference emerges in here-elsewhere, making it
impossible for us to posit set languages as the harbinger of the real, it should still be granted that
there is sameness between what arrives at me, and what the Other has supposedly sent or
addressed to me. As I would elaborate in my later reading of A Gesture Life, contemporary
literature calls for our own responses to its literal addresses regarding our shared biopolitical
reality.

b. The Landscape of Transvaluations: Pamuk on the Experience of the Novel
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According to Pamuk, the core of the experience of the reading and the writing of the
novel consists in our sharing everyday experience. “Sensory experience” allows us to do this:
When we open a window, take a sip of coffee, climb a flight of stairs, immerse ourselves
in a crowd, get stuck in a traffic jam, pinch our finger in a door, lose our glasses, shiver in
the cold, climb a hill, go swimming on the first day of summer . . . the uniqueness of each
of these sensations, and the way they overlap with the experience of other people, form
the basis of our understanding and enjoying of a novel.377
The experiences that Pamuk lists in the above are likely to have been experienced by many of us.
He does not assume that they are exactly the same, though; each experience is admittedly
“unique.”378 Still, for any reader, they are recognized as what they themselves have undergone
some time in their past. That is, the described experiences are understood to be the same as their
own past experiences; here, they are experiencing reality in the mode of here-elsewhere. Pamuk
makes his presuppositions clear in many parts of his essay, which further concretizes my
suggestion that his idea of the experience of the novel is equal to here-elsewhere. For instance,
while describing the way Tolstoy presents the sensory details that Anna of the Anna Karenina
undergoes, Pamuk notes, “Reading the description of Anna Karenina trying to read in the
compartment of a night train during a snowstorm, we remember that we have had similar sensory
experiences.”379
The reader’s recognition of the experiences of the protagonist as the reader’s own, is the
“naïve” side of our appreciation of the novel, according to Pamuk. Throughout the essays,

377

Pamuk, The Naïve and the Sentimental Novelist, 45.
Ibid.
379
Ibid.
378

278

Pamuk establishes a distinction between “naïve” and “sentimental” as the cornerstone of his
expositions. As Pamuk puts it, “naïve” writers do not doubt that they are a part of the nature that
they describe. They do not get tortured with the worry that they might be wrong in describing
their subjects. Sentimental writers, on the contrary, are those who are “exceedingly aware” of the
mechanism of their trade, precisely because their state of mind has “strayed from nature’s
simplicity and power and has becomes too caught up in its own emotions and thoughts,” a
connotation that is more apparent in the original German word sentimentalisch, as Schiller used
it in the essay from which Pamuk derives his terms.380 Sentimental writers never assume that
their writings would transparently mirror nature. They are also acutely aware of the ethical
implications of their work, unlike the naïve writers who are “in fact . . . like nature – calm, cruel,
and wise.”381 Pamuk dexterously juggles the opposite terms to convey the delicate art of the
novel; the overarching idea of the The Naïve and the Sentimental Novelist is that the novel
deliberately – or “sentimentally” – makes it possible for the readers to “naively” put themselves
into the position of the characters. The sophisticated mechanisms that enhance the readers’
immersion into the narrative are not meant to trick the them into thinking that what they are
reading is factual, such as that someone called Anna Karenina actually existed. The reader
juggles both the fictionality and the reality offered by the novel, being both naïve and
sentimental at the same time, to maximize their own enjoyment of the art.
For Pamuk, the idea of the fictionality of the novel is the basic denominator upon which
we can build our experience of its reality; it is the component of the theory of the novel that has
already been very much established, upon which writers depend sometimes, as in the case of the
writers who are working in repressive states, who need the excuse of fictionality to be able to
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write novels that reflect on their society.382 Pamuk jokingly says how it frustrates him when the
readers ask him if he is “Kemal,” the protagonist of his Museum of Innocence. Yet he says that
there is a more profound, or significant, aspect to this matter which is usually not acknowledged,
which is that, actually, Pamuk is Kemal. Moreover, when he was writing the story, he wanted his
readers to think that he was Kemal, in the sense that he inserted his own sensory details, the
faithful record of his physical experiences of the world, into the narrative. In the same vein,
while many writers claim that their novels are only products of their imagination, it is well
known that those writers, like Pamuk, also want their readers to see their own reality reflected in
their novels.383
Thus, it can be said that the “naïve” side of the reader’s experience of the novel, rather
than the sentimental side, consists the core of Pamuk’s argument. Despite the difference that
exists in the I-Other continuum, we recognize the Other’s world as our own in each moment of
identification, the accumulation of such moments comprising the overall experience of the novel.
This underlying assumption explains Pamuk’s suggestion that we feel as though we are entering
a landscape when we read a novel. For Pamuk, novels are experienced the way a landscape
painting is experienced, where a viewer’s own intense visualization of the details of the painting
gives him the sensation of entering the world presented in front of him, for him:
Most novelists sense that reading the opening pages of a novel is akin to entering a
landscape painting. Let us remember how Stendhal begins The Red and The Black. We
first see from afar the town of Verrière, the hill it is situated on, the white houses with
their peaked red-tile roofs, the clumps of flourishing chestnut trees, and the ruins of the
town’s fortifications. Then we notice the sawmills and the factory that produces toiles
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peintes, colorful printed textiles. . . . Only a page later we have already met the mayor,
one of the central characters, and have identified his case of mind. The real pleasure of
reading a novel starts with the ability to see the world not from the outside but through
the eyes of the protagonists living in that world. When we read a novel, we oscillate
between the long view and fleeting moments, general thoughts and specific events, at a
speed which no other literary genre can offer. As we gaze at a landscape painting from
afar, we suddenly find ourselves among the thoughts of the individual in the landscape
and the nuances of the person’s mood. This is similar to the way we view a small human
figure depicted against crags, rivers, and myriad-leaved trees in Chinese landscape
paintings: we focus on him, and then try to imagine the surrounding landscape through
his eyes. (Chinese paintings are designed to be read in this manner). Then we realize that
the landscape has been composed to reflect the thoughts, emotions, and perceptions of the
figure within it. Likewise, as we sense that the landscape within the novel is an extension
of, a part of, the mental state of the novel’s protagonists, we realize that we identify with
these protagonists via a seamless transition.384
Pamuk’s is an elaborate account of how the reader experiences the novel as a series of sensory
details, or here-elsewhere’s. Landscape emerges precisely because the reader, having been
observing the details for some time – “first . . . see[ing]” certain parts of the portrayed setting,
“notic[ing]” landmarks here and there such as “the sawmills and the factory,” realizes later on
that the details are an integral part of the “thoughts, emotions, and perceptions of the figure
within it.” There is a definite connotation of recognizing, on the part of the reader, that a factory
was there or some houses were topped with red roofs because the protagonist had experienced
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his world in that way. Thus, the reading process presupposes “the ability to see the world not
from the outside but through the eyes of the protagonists living in that world.” The reader
experiences sameness between themselves and the Other whose world the reader stages in his
realization of reading experience as here-elsewhere; the landscape strikes us as the “extension”
and a “part” of the “mental states” of the protagonists, with which we “identify” with “seamless
transition.”
The discontinuity that exists in each instance of here-elsewhere is granted. The general
landscape does not precede the reader’s re-membering of it, who retrospectively experiences and
feels the world from his own vantage point and thereby reconstitutes the given details into the
contour of a world. “We migrate from one figure’s perspective to another to comprehend the
general landscape as a feeling experienced from within.” Even while the “general landscape”
assumes a certain integrity, each of the instances has been put together by the reader, who
“oscillat[es]” between the long views and the close-up psychological pictures of the characters.
This reminds us of how here-elsewhere’s materializes reality discontinuously, following the
rhythm of quantum jumps. Since landscape has to be thus created by the reader, at a “speed that
no other literary genres can offer,” the emergence of a landscape is the unique feature of the
experience of a novel, along with its constitution out of sensory details.385
Innate in Pamuk’s articulation of the experience of the novel is idea that the landscape of
the novel becomes actual for the reader because the reader knows it to be real. In other words, the
reader gets so involved in the construction of the landscape that he comes to be certain that he
knows “how the universe within the tale appears to the [protagonists].”386 It is a corollary to how
here-elsewhere gives the one that lives it conviction about the Other’s reality despite the
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difference. Pamuk’s discussion suggests that to construct such certainties, or knowledges, can be
a joyous, enjoyable venture. This is interesting, since it implies that here-elsewhere can lead us
beyond the initial fear that leads Descartes to run away from his own experience. By the time we
have developed a secure sense of the landscape that we are in, we experience a “sweet illusion”
that the novel was written solely for us:
The intimacy and confidence that develop between the writer and ourselves help us to
evade, and to avoid worrying too much about, the parts of the book we cannot
understand, or things we oppose or find unacceptable.387
A reader meanders through the ever developing and concretizing landscape via going
through each instance of sensory detail. For Pamuk, such instances are comparable to Aristotle’s
“atom” in Physics, in the sense that each of such moment is indivisible and is always “present.”
Pamuk says that his idea of a plot is corresponds to Aristotle’s notion of time, which is a line that
links all the indivisible moments of “present” sensory experience of my world. It is in this line of
thoughts that Pamuk, as he suggests it, feels “affinity for the narrative theories” of such
formalists as Shklovsky, suggesting that “What we call ‘plot,’ the sequence of events in the
story, is nothing but a line that connects the points we want to relate and pass through.”388 In
Narrative Theory: A Critical Introduction, Kent Puckett discusses a passage from Shklovsky’s
Knights Move, where the Russian critic discusses the image of a knight “making its crooked,
meandering way across a chessboard.”389 Shklovsky says that the strangeness of the knight’s
trajectory reflects the “conventionality of art” which is “forbidden to take the straight road.”390
For Puckett, this passage conveys the essence of both Shklovksy’s work and narrative theory
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since the core of narrative theory consists in communicating “what makes life meaningful in the
first place . . . from the hidden perspective of a methodological analysis.” It stays hidden so that
it can still convey the truth to the few who understands it while not disturbing the many people
who need to believe in social conventions.391 In the same way, Shklovky’s techniques
defamiliarize the crooked paths that people are forced to trace in their lives without offering
judgements about conventions. As Puckett discusses it:
[Shklovsky’s] interest in the knight’s path as passing over something other than a
“straight road” anticipates his influential account of plot as a middle space of Shandean
digressions, missteps, and hesitations; as he writes in a related context, “A crooked road,
a road in which the foot feels acutely the stones beneath it, a road that turns back on itself
– this is the road of art.”392
This passage communicates an idea of formalism that is interestingly devoid of any notion of
“form” as a set model. Defamiliarization presupposes that something about art, or about the way
we experience our life, would be “naturally” revealed simply via shedding light on our ordinary
footsteps on the trajectory of life, which oftentimes take us along crooked, detouring turns. The
innate capacity of humans to experience the real as it actually feels to them, needs to be admitted
and explored, if it is part of such a reality that art tries to convey. As long as we experience our
living moments as actually felt by us – as in our experience of the acute sense of the coarseness
of the stones beneath our feet – they are real for us, if known to us only, even only for while they
last.
The way here-elsewhere weaves into Pamuk’s discussion makes us see further avenues of
theoretical inquiry in Pamuk’s argument. For one thing, through his discussion of the process of
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our novel-reading, we can develop more ideas of “experience” beyond the existing theoretical
discussions. Pamuk suggests that his discussions on the plot should have implications on our idea
of time, yet they also pertain to ideas of space. We can think of, for example, ideas of
“subjective” space. Pamuk’s landscape, as I have been discussing it, is a space that emerges
solely through the effort of the reader, who realizes the given details into the contours of a space,
the center of which is occupied by the reader, (being the protagonist at the moment). Thus,
despite the discontinuity that exists in between each instance of realized sensory details, the
whole of what Pamuk calls the “constellation” of the sensory details constitutes what roughly
feels like a continuum, or a single, unified world of a protagonist or a series of protagonists. For
Pamuk, the composition of a landscape is always a process, something that happens gradually
and through time, which is conveyed with one of his major terms – the “center.”
In one of the central definitions of the term Pamuk explains the center as “everything that
makes a novel,” meaning that we put together sensory details and arrive at a sense of occupying
a landscape to be able to arrive at the center of a novel.393 More importantly, though, center
connotes potentiality, something that we “optimistically” believe to exist in a novel, or
something that makes us go on reading a novel because we do believe in being able to arrive at a
center.394 It is a locus that is better attained when an author has completed a series of novels,
since in that process he has put himself into the positionalities of several different protagonists,
having experienced several possible different realities. Pamuk uses the analogy of the Chinese
landscape paintings to explicate:
. . . to go beyond the limits of ourselves, to perceive everyone and everything as a great
whole, to identify with as many people as possible, to see as much as possible: in this

393
394

Pamuk, The Naïve and the Sentimental Novelist, 24.
Ibid., 25.

285

way, the novelist comes to resemble those ancient Chinese painters who climbed
mountain peaks in order to capture the poetry of vast landscapes. Scholars of Chinese
landscape painting, such as James Cahill, like to remind naïve enthusiasts that the
viewpoint which encompasses everything from high above in a single glance and makes
these paintings possible is actually imaginary, and that no painter really creates his
artworks on a mountaintop. Likewise, the composition of a novel entails the search for an
imaginary point from which one can see the whole. This imaginary vantage point is also
the spot from which one can most clearly perceive the novel’s center.395
The center is a curious idea, since the attainment of this place solely depends on the reader’s
experience of, and therefore attainment of, landscapes. It does not exist as a lack, something that
one recognizes as not being where he or she already is; the hope that the center will be graspable
sometime in the future arises because the reader has already attained a certainty that it is possible
for one to stand at a certain vantage point. As such, the “center” is not categorizable as a referent
on a measurable spatiality, the way destinations are usually conceived of. It is a new concept of a
space, based entirely on someone’s constitution of reality in terms of here-elsewhere. Pamuk
suggests that the certainty that there should be a center and the desire to advance further in the
direction where the center is likely to be, propel the reader to go on developing the novel’s
landscape further and further. “What sets novels apart from other literary narratives is that they
have a secret center. Or, more precisely, they rely on our conviction that there is a center we
should search for as we read.”396
Thinking of center, one gets to wonder to what extent “reality” is by definition an
“imaginable” space. The notion of center complements our discussion of here-elsewhere in that,
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while we have conceived of elsewhere-than-here as the vectorially defined destination, we have
not been able to specify the sense of such a destination. Pamuk makes us think of the way hereelsewhere’s could possibly accumulate – a likely notion, since every arrival at an elsewherethan-here is the result of something having happened at here (which means that elsewhere-thanhere always retains something of here). Experiencing cycle after cycle of here-elsewhere’s, we
could be approaching what feels more and more like a center. In this sense, “center” is an
encouraging notion of a political end, since it is something that propels us to go on, and to
persist, without any ideal of a utopia.
How this willingness, or will, to live, which progresses in a direction that renews the
value of one’s life, actually unfolds, is the subject of my inquiry in the following section. To
enact transvaluation of the readers’ lives via specifically demonstrating the way a life gets
transvalued through instants of thought – this is what A Gesture Life does as I see it.

c. Transvaluing a Life: Chang-rae Lee’s A Gesture Life

i. The Value of Failed Representation?
Franklin Hata, the protagonist and the narrator of A Gesture Life, is a seemingly
uninteresting individual, in the sense that he does not seem to lack anything, leading a
prosperous yet monotonous upper middle-class life. In the onset of the narrative we see Hata
having perfectly integrated himself into his neighborhood, an affluent suburban city in the postwar U.S. He does not seem to doubt the superiority of his neighborhood, the prestige of the life
that he has built there as a successful owner of a medical supply store, and the regard that his
neighbors pay him as a decent citizen. As Liv Crawford, the saavy real-estate agent who is
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enamored of the neighborhood, has it, Hata’s reputation in Bedley Run is such that he has
become a near stand-in for its value: living “in a gorgeous house in the most prestigious
neighborhood, . . . enjoying the high golden hour of a well-deserved retirement, for having been
a business and civic elder and leader,” Hata “is Bedley Run.”397 Yet Lee succeeds in pulling the
readers into the midst of Hata’s life, mainly via the sole power of his reflective voice, which
delves into his own past and present life, which reveals surprising facts about his personal
history. What engages me, however, is not simply the book’s stylistic achievement, but its
political value, which has been subject to much critical discussions.
Specifically, I think the novel is an apt instance of how here-elsewhere functions as
political discourse via literary narratives. So far, no critical perspective has examined how the
book engages in the politics of transvaluation via engaging the readers to acknowledge different
past lives as their own. The life that the book invites us to transvalue is the nihilistic life that the
protagonist used to live and yet has not henceforth had a chance to recall and claim as his own.
Applying my theoretical conclusions as to the politics of discourse in the time of biopower that I
presented in Chapter Three, I want to illuminate Lee’s narrative as a discursive politics. A reader,
that is, will have a chance to see an instance the politics of here-elsewhere in the example of a
life. The biopolitical connotations of our reality, and the way we react to such realities in
different ways – first futilely succumbing to or trying to run away from them, then later, for
specific reasons, deciding to transvalue them – will be articulated in terms of Hata’s life. Also, I
will deploy terms such as landscape or center, which connote the strategic aspect of the politics
of literature, in engaging in the interpretative work.
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Bedley Run is a metaphor of the American “way of life” that the nation began to promote
with the waning of the Cold War era.398 As Seonna Kim aptly puts it, that is, Bedley Run
represents the utopia that the U.S., which was aspiring to rise to the position of the sole global
superpower, was promoting itself to be the seat of. With the passing of the World Wars, and with
its seeming “victory” over state socialism, the U.S. began to jealously promote its “way of life”
based on liberal democracy as the new order for the globe. This barely hides that such a venture
was a mere excuse for the nation to intervene into, and pursue its imperialistic missions in, other
countries, under the pretext that it is only acting as the police nation that guards our good world
from their evil attempts. It began to be argued that we are living in a “post-political” world, a
world where the “end of history” has arrived; we no longer have to question whether liberal
democracy, of which the U.S. is acting as the global guardian in our world, is the optimal system
to organize our lives.
Slavoj Žižek thus argues that, the political problem of today is in the universalization of
capitalist order, which has subsumed difference in the form of multiculturalism. Difference is
accepted only in the gesture of someone ordering an ethnic dish; in this new era, people can
simply maintain “individual” distance to disengage themselves from Others and their
concerns.399 At the same time, they continue to abide by purely capitalistic mode of life that
continues to deploy the law that safeguards and grows the riches of those who are already rich.
Thus, it can be said that, inequality, prejudice, and racial abjection continue as an everyday,
normalized practice. Significantly, Hata’s Bedley Run is almost a microcosm of such a reality.
Hata congratulates himself for being smart in having integrated himself into the society of his
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neighbors when he first moved there, which he attributes to the respect that he paid to the
distance that the neighbors kept in between themselves:
. . . as it mostly is in towns like Bedley Run, and particularly on streets like ours, being
neighbors means sharing the most limited kinds of intimacies, such as sewer lines and
property boundaries and annual property tax valuations. Anything that falls into a more
personal realm is only tentatively welcomed. I know certain families have enjoyed
relationships because of their children, had carpools and holiday barbecues, and perhaps a
shared weekend at a country house upstate or on the Long Island shore, but on the whole
an unwritten covenant of conduct governs us, a signet of cordiality and decorum, in
whose ethic, if it can be called such a thing, the worst wrong is to be drawn forth and
disturbed.
From the time I moved here, I was very fortunate to understand the nature of these
relations. Even when I received welcome cards and sweets baskets from my immediate
neighbors, I judged the exact scale of what an appropriate response should be, that to
reply with anything but the quiet simplicity of a gracious note would be to ruin the
delicate and fragile balance. And so this is exactly what I did, in the form of expensive,
heavy-stock cards, each of which I took great care to write in my best hand. Each brief
thank-you was different, though saying the same thing, and I know that this helped me
gain quick acceptance from my Mountview neighbors, especially given my being a
foreigner and a Japanese. And as I’ve already intimated, they all seemed particularly
surprised and pleased that I hadn’t run over to their houses with wrapped presents and
invitations and hopeful, clinging embraces; in fact, I must have given them the reassuring
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thought of how safe they actually were, how shielded, that an interloper might
immediately recognize and so heed the rules of their houses.400
Hata could integrate himself into the neighborhood exactly because his addition to the
neighborhood did not “disturb” any part of the “unwritten covenant of its conduct.” The fact that,
if Hata should have tried to breach the delicate boundary that delineates the safe distance in
between houses, his acceptance could have been jeopardized, denotes the situation where, as
Žižek has it, the new, subtle version of racism is practiced on the level of maintaining distances
in between individuals. Hata notes how the neighbors were “particularly surprised and pleased”
that he did not act in the way they expected a Japanese to act. The very fact that even a
“Japanese,” who is an “interloper,” recognizes and respects their rules, means that their standard
is unbreachable.
Hata is insouciant towards himself being perceived in this way, embracing the prejudice
of others seeing him as an “Oriental,” accepting the designation without the slightest tinge of
irony. When a neighbor recommends that Hata “return” to Japan now that he is retired, where
Hata should be shrouded in a “silken robe” and surrounded by “knowing maidens,” Hata does
not express feeling any sense of indignation.401 Thus, the situation is where the perception of him
as an “interloper” or someone who is different from the rest of the community persists, while
Hata solely takes the burden of the caution and vigilance perpetually aimed at him. Hata proudly
reflects on the various large and small scale activities and chores that he took upon himself as his
personal task to become, as he admits to his adopted daughter Sunny, “amenable and liked.”402
Yet Sunny, expressing her frustration coming from knowing that Hata devotes all his energy to
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become the “number one citizen” of Bedley Run, throws in his face that people simply find it
“convenient” to have such a “good Charlie” organize the garbage and etc., which she overheard
them saying.403
It is troubling at best that a minority subject should invest his entire life, and all his
emotions and feelings, to perpetuate the system that continues to see him as an Other who is
always a potential threat and an enemy. Indeed, the life-long problem that he had with those who
could have been his families and lovers was that his life was made up of nothing more than
“gestures” that are aimed at pleasing others. Trying to live up to the mores of the communities,
which were successively colonial Japan and the post-war U.S., Hata, who was a minority in both
societies, got exactly re-produced as an oppressive subject, fit to survive in both. Indeed, he
resorts to the patriarchal ideology of domesticity when he faces an opportunity to build a
meaningful relationship with a Korean female, K, which leads to devastating consequences for
K, given that she was already being victimized in many aspects, being a colonized female subject
who had been deceived into becoming a “comfort woman,” or forced sexual slave for the
Japanese soldiers. Thus, some critical perspectives have located the guilt in Hata as a subject,
finding the significance of the novel in articulating that culpability on behalf of the victimized. In
“Traumatic Patriarchy: Reading Gendered Nationalisms in Chang-rae Lee’s A Gesture Life,
Hamilton Carroll critiques the way Hata perpetuates patriarchal nationalism throughout his life.
His behavior is aligned with the way male subjects within a minority community – such as the
Asian Americans – sometimes get blinded to the issue of gender. Invigorated by the “cause” of
fighting minority abjection, male subjects within the oppressed group try to enfranchise
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themselves by replicating the oppressive logic of the larger society, victimizing women or other
members within the community.
Actually, it seems to be the case that the consistency of Hata’s patriarchal and nationcentered way of life throughout his life creates a sense of homogeneity and unity among the
different nations and communities to which Hata is a subject – the colonized Korea, the imperial
Japan, and the suburban city of U.S. Searching for a language to define the common evil that
presides in these various modern societies, critics have suggested that the overall narrative forges
solidarity among the most victimized of the minority groups, such as the women who become
victimized because of Hata, against the common “evil” that Hata represents – for Caroll, it is the
gendered nationalism. For Kim, this common evil is the new global order sustained by the U.S.,
the “biopolitics” of the neoliberal capitalism that operates in the seemingly post-ideological
world. Such critical light, then, creates a picture of opposition between those subjects who betray
the cause of the solidarity of minorities such as Hata, and the victimized, oppressed subjects,
such as K, the comfort woman.
This overall critical landscape is limiting if not problematic on the other hand,
considering the narrative structure of the novel. As is prevalently noted in the critical literature
on the book, Hata’s narrative does not claim to report an “objective” reality but presents every
recollected episode of Hata’s life as part of his narrative, a narrative based on his memory. The
narrative does not follow chronological order, but revisits and recreates this or that aspect of
Hata’s life following his lead. This forces the critics to recognize a certain critical distance
between the present Hata and the younger, recollected Hata. Since the older Hata is looking back
upon his life, sometimes admitting to his failures and ignorance, the structure of the novel makes
it hard for critics to draw a transparent line of opposition between an assimilated subject and his
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victimized Others. Many critics within the Asian American community voiced reservations about
the initial critical fervor about the book that celebrated the possible solidarity between comfort
women and the Asian American minorities based on their shared oppression posed against their
shared “enemy” such as Hata. Thus, a definite critical tendency began to emerge, which warned
against any hope for finding a transparent representation of a subject, or an Other, in the subtle
textuality carefully laid out by Lee. Kandice Chuh, in her “Discomforting Knowledge,” the front
article of the issue of the Asian American Studies that was centered around the comfort women
issue, A Gesture Life “discomforts” our easy assumptions about knowing the Other. The book,
she argues, rather makes us critically reflect back upon the discursive context of Asian American
studies as a discipline.
Such a new critical insight is closely associated with the literary ambiguities of the
fiction. Centrally, as I have noted, the narrative progresses according to the unconscious, or
psychic, needs of the protagonist who somehow finds it essential to reflect on his life in a late
point of his life. It is made evident that Hata is looking back upon his former behaviors and
assumptions; in a passage that is often cited in the critical literature on the book, Hata says that,
he can see only now that he himself, his fellow soldiers, and the comfort girls, were all feeding
into the machine of war, comprising its parts. Kim thus defines the novel as Hata’s “reeducation” narrative, framed as a Bildungsroman. Belinda Kong notes that the fiction makes us
refocus on Hannah Arendt’s thesis on the “banality of evil” since it makes us see how the evil is
innate in seemingly “ordinary” lives such as that of Hata. Kim concurs with Chuh that the fiction
is about the “failure” to represent Other according to my own self-centered knowledge. Such a
critique warns ourselves against pretending to know, and identify with, the Other, seeing that
such an identification can be harnessed for forging excuses for the U.S.’s imperialistic
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interventions overseas. Critics, that is, have found a way to rediscover Spivak’s teachings about
the impossibility of an unequivocal recuperation of the Other’s voice in A Gesture Life.404
And yet, critical discourse that acknowledges the pitfalls of representation has not yet
been able to articulate the literatures’ possible solidarity with the Other. It is true that critics have
defended the victim at the expense of the protagonist; Hamilton argues that, in A Gesture Life,
the body of the traumatized Other returns to the heart of the psyche of the oppressor to disrupt
his easy political assumptions. Hata’s narrative indeed testifies to the necessity for Hata to return
and revisit the sites of his trauma in order for him to move on living the rest of his life in peace.
In the later part of the novel, Hata has conversations with the ghost of K, where it gets revealed
that, throughout Hata’s seemingly ordinary life, K has always been haunting him. While this way
of reading the fiction might lack the critical vigilance regarding the dangers of easy identification
with the Other, at least it makes it possible for the readers to recognize the victim and hear her
voice. The question is: if we are denied hearing K’s voice, for example, or the assurance of at
least knowing the historical circumstances that resulted in real victimization or suffering, what
would be the significance of a book that deals with historical tragedy?
While the deconstruction of the strong conviction about who we are as subjects would
have political significance, based on the insights that subjects of knowledge have been the
perpetuators of historical wrongs, the question of how or whether such soul-searching initiates
political transformation in the conditions of victims still needs to be articulated. Indeed, the
Korean comfort women are still struggling to acquire formal apology from the Japanese
government, which continues to refuse to acknowledge any state-level involvement with the
crime, sometimes claiming that the victims were voluntary prostitutes.405 Thus, there is no doubt
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that publicities about the realities of these victims on the international terrain are still direly
necessary. In what ways does the deconstruction of discourse go hand in hand with the political
work of building solidarities with those who are living and breathing human beings? I feel that
such a concern is also present in Kong’s expressed skepticism about Hata’s narrative, where she
questions the political significance of a “private” psyche gaining new insights about his life
through solitary reflections.
Many critique Hata, arguing that his private self-education has been well-meaning yet
definitely limited. It is as if “Hata,” or what he stands for, has to be critiqued, since he represents
the evil side of who we are as subjects who consist mainstream U.S. society. Yet what these
approaches do not articulate is what political consequences and material changes are generated
via critiquing ourselves via Hata. That is, if the way Hata perceives of his reality is recognized as
problematic and get critiqued, the kinds of things that emerge out of such recognition – the kinds
of things that change in that process – are hardly articulated. There is a scene in the novel where
Hata gets surprised at K telling him that she had been deceived into getting conscripted as
comfort women – she and her sister were told that they would be shipped to a part of Japan to
work in a factory but ended up getting transported to where his camp was. Hata tells the reader
that, while it would be foolish to actually assume that any girl would willingly consign herself to
the fate of comfort women’s, he had somehow been believing that the girls had “volunteered,” as
the name, “voluntary women’s corp,” suggested it. Describing the way the presuppositions of a
dutiful soldier of the imperial army get shaken, this account not only challenge the logic of
representation – the assumption that “volunteers” have indeed volunteered – but also encourages
one to regard Other in a new light. Yet, the existing critical literature on A Gesture Life barely
has any room to positively value the way Hata, unlike all the other soldiers of his base, tried to

296

build a relationship with K, or the way he ended up challenging his “common sense” in this
process, however tragic and violent an end such attempts brought about.
What are the ways in which we could not be forced to choose between solely criticizing
Hata or applauding his innocent attempts and assumptions? I suggest that A Gesture Life can be
read as the fledging attempt of a senior citizen to begin to build meaningful relationship with the
Other and himself through his recollection of his former days; there is a way for us to read it as
meaningful precisely because it is the story of the attempts of a seemingly hopelessly
nationalistic, patriarchic subject. I want to suggest that this new direction of reading has critical
merit since it makes us articulate instances of transvaluation that happen to the subject of Hata.
As critics note, even after Hata finishes articulating his long narrative, he largely remains the
same person. Yet, focusing on the processes of transvaluation in Hata’s narrative makes us see
potentialities that continue to remain, and as such, can be assumed to change Hata’s life further.
This new focus does not attribute the narrative to the unitary subjectivity; nor does it attribute the
recounted life to a past Hata that remains unchanging and constant. Rather, it searches for the
instants when sameness becomes established between the present perspective looking back upon
his own lived life, and the perspective that is engaged in living such a life at that recalled
moment. Hata had been living his life without ever being genuinely experiencing it, in the sense
of feeling his moments as here-elsewhere’s. At many points in the senior Hata’s narrative, we
see him being engaged in recounting the way his younger self should have been feeling,
thinking, and sensing each of the revisited moment. At such points, there is no other event
happening than the acknowledgement of a reality; a certain way of thinking, feeling, or believing
was what was practiced by the younger Hata at a certain point of his life, as the older Hata looks
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back and recounts it. This is observation as it happens in the mode of here-elsewhere; it is what
Foucault calls thought.
Even while Hata might still remain a prejudiced, largely racist and sexist subject by the
end of the narrative – which remains a debatable topic though – moments of realization that
Hata’s narrative presents with us are valuable. This is because such moments are the only
instants where sameness between I-Other realizes itself. The relative spatio-temporality of hereelsewhere articulates the reality of such sameness. Thus, while transvaluation persists, or while I
am becoming the Other, units of reality emerge out of the solidarity thus formed. As I will
present it, A Gesture Life is replete with the moments when the real gets born in this mode, while
sameness emerges along the relative span between the perspective that recounts a life, and the
perspectives that become the same with the recounting perspective in the course of the narrative.
Also, in this process, we also discover that there are instants when this young Hata were
occupying the perspectives of his own Others in various points of his life. That is, we get to
experience moments when the younger Hata was in love with his own Others, in the sense that
he was occupying his own here-elsewhere’s in his relationship with people such as K. Regarding
these moments, then, we should be able to say that Hata loved K in a genuine sense – a point that
is often denied Hata by many critics. I have to immediately add that, because of the way Hata as
a personality had long been formed – in alignment with the norms of his societies – his love for
K, or for Sunny, only ended up leading him to harm them. If I was in a context where ethical
responsibilities as individuals and citizens should be debated, I would certainly say that Hata is
culpable for harming others and that Hata’s “love” for the others were largely a conceit that
barely hid its violence. The “unit” of action, or that of historical change, that I am concerned
with for articulating the political significance of the novel here, however, does not concern
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“individuals”; I am interested in the events that happen in and through the narrative, in the units
of here-elsewhere. I am interested in articulating why such events happen, and what are achieved
thereby.
Focusing on here-elsewhere, we can discuss the motivation of the narrative. As has been
noted, Hata has been living a life where almost all his energies had been spent on assimilating by
the beginning of the novel. Why, at this very late stage of his life, would he want to spend his
energy on something else all of a sudden – precisely at a timing when he can finally enjoy the
fruits of having entirely committed his life to becoming a successful citizen? Some critics
suggest that Hata must have found it inevitable to look back upon his life then, since he senses
that there is something wrong with the relationships that he had formed. As has been noted,
however, A Gesture Life begins with the proud proclamation on his part that he is “known here,”
or that he is known to everyone in his neighborhood, for which he cannot but feel proud and
grateful. Thus, we cannot explain why something that he had been managing to avoid all his life
– to look straight into the heart of his mind and feel what he really should have been feeling all
this while – has suddenly become inevitable. As Liv Crawford has it, the only thing that remains
for Hata to do, after selling his fancy house, is to move into some “prime zero-care condo with a
180° view of the ocean” that she will surely find for him, and to do whatever he would like to do
for the rest of his life.406 Why would he have to go into his soul searching now of all time?
Presently, I will interpret the narrative to show that Hata’s monologues reveal to him to
be a “vectorial” existence in a consistent sense, whereby he moves from the state of being
someone who does not have any sense of where to advance in the next phase of his life around
the beginning of his narrative, to being someone who comfortably discusses his future dwellings
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in the language of potentiality. By this ending, he has an understanding of the rhythm that makes
one’s life an endless attempt at approximating to his center, even while such movements do not
give one any guarantee of arriving at a utopia. By so doing I will try to confer coherence, or
rationale, to the narrative as a whole. I will continue to analyze Hata as relating the significance
of his own existence to the meaning of his larger reality; Hata has always wanted to “matter” in
his worlds. Such a perspective will aid me in explaining Hata’s motivation to explore alternative
vectors of life even a late stage of life in terms of his incapacity to see himself as having
mattered in any satisfying sense in the world that he has been struggling to live in.

ii. Narratological Emergence of Vectorial Life
The novel begins with Hata saying, “People know me here.” We find Hata seeing himself
as having perfectly adjusted to the world of Bedley Run, a situation which was not always a
given, but which naturally developed over the course of one’s implantation in a certain area.
“Living thirty-odd years in the same place begins to show on a man,” Hata says:
. . . without even realizing it, one takes on the characteristics of the locality, the color and
stamp of the prevailing dress and gait and even speech – those gentle bells of the
sidewalk passerby, their How are yous and Good days and Hellos. And in kind there is a
gradual and accruing recognition of one’s face, of being, as far as anyone can recall, from
around here. There’s no longer a lingering or vacant stare, and you can taste the small but
unequaled pleasure that comes with being a familiar sight to the eyes. In my case,
everyone here knows perfectly who I am. It’s simple determination. Whenever I step into
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a shop in the main part of the village, invariably someone will say, “Hey, it’s good Doc
Hata.”407
Hata’s complacent, placid voice conveys that his adjustment has been happening “naturally,”
with the kind of mutual harmony that exist between an organism and its environment; he says
that his idea is that “people in a particular area are given to a common set of conditions and
influences, like the growth in a part of a forest.”408 Getting instantly recognized, acknowledged
to be “from around here,” has been giving him pleasure. One gets to wonder about the kind of
pleasure that one can derive simply from getting recognized as known, and how far such a
pleasure can take him so he asserts, “everyone here knows perfectly how I am.”409
The pleasure has been mutual. The people who Hata refers to as “everyone here” has
been regarding Hata as the “walking case of [their own] certitude,” which makes him almost
“transparent,” so that “to spy me on my way down Church Street is merely noting the expression
of a natural law.”410 Hata notes that he alone gets rewarded with the special recognition from the
newsstand owner and the employee at the deli, who greet him with “the blustery greeting,”
always making sure to address him as “Docter Hata,” or the simple “Doc.”411 Consistent with
Hata not recognizing the offence of the racist undertone of his neighbors, Hata does not get
disconcerted by the fact that in referring to him as a “Doc,” people could be ironically
downgrading him, putting him in his place; he is not a doctor but the owner of the town’s
medical supply store. By calling him “Doc,” they are also openly demonstrating that they
actually do not know him in the sense that they understand him as a person, getting his own
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permission for their ignorance. In this sense Bedley Run and Hata are perfectly complicit, almost
to an extreme.
Hata and his Bedley Run can be seen as almost an allegory of the Classical episteme, a
reality that reproduces itself thanks to nihilism. Born out of the conception of reality that nullifies
the vector of here-elsewhere, Classical episteme prospers thanks to the emergence and
accumulation of feelings of pleasure, the pleasure that relies on the fraudulent conviction that
one can matter, and continue to do so, as representation. Thus, it can be said that it is this kind of
conviction, or knowledge, that had motivated Hata to live his life as a mere countable member of
his society in Bedley Run. However, modern thought again “realizes” instances of reality that
had been lived along the Classical episteme as part of the “network” of here-elsewhere’s; the
network shows contours of power, by indicating the loci where there is more traffic or
concentration of here-elsewhere’s than others. This shows that there is a certain momentum or
tendency in the way reality had been formed in the Classical episteme. That is, it is more likely
for one to have been living under the assumptions of the Classical episteme to continue to live
his life in that way, compared to the case where one had not been following such a life path as
hard as someone like Hata. This is because each vectorial instance becomes concretized and
supported by its preceding and following occasions of power; as is all here-elsewhere’s, power is
formed relativistically, when a perspective has responded to a hypothetical perspective of an
Other, who entices this perspective to realize himself in the way pleasure emerges, the pleasure
that delights in the realization of “knowledge.”
Hata has acquired a near transparency by ignoring, instant after instant, an implicit,
potential sense of discomfort that the relationship that has become established between himself
and “everyone” who recognizes him as Doc Hata might not be making him feel at home where

302

he lives. In fact, he had not even been aware that he was feeling uncomfortable. He says that he
has preferred the way he had been “belonging” there, hating the very idea of ever contemplating
leaving it:
What used to concern me greatly about leaving was the awkward impression you can
sometimes have, say when you find yourself on an everyday street, or in a store, or in
what would otherwise be a shimmering, verdant part, and you think not about the
surroundings but about yourself, and how people will stop and think (most times,
unnoticeably) about who you may be, how you fit into the picture, what this may be, and
so on and so forth. I’ve never really liked this kind of thinking, either theirs or mine, and
have always wished to be in a situation like the one I have steadily fashioned for myself
in this town, where, if I don’t have many intimates or close friends, I’m at least a quantity
known, somebody long ago counted.412
He is very explicit about having “never” liked the “awkward” feeling that people have once they
begin to contemplate how he “fit[s] into the picture.” He has been avoiding this difficult
emotion, which is why he has never been able to consider the idea of leaving Bedley Run. He is
aware that the status quo depends on both his and his neighbors’ recognition of him as an already
counted “quantity.” He simply wishes to remain “countable,” so the recognition of him
reproduces the Classical episteme, an order that arises on the condition that things simply remain
a member of a larger system. He is aware that such a thinking, once having surfaced, will lead to
further questions about himself and his world, or “what this may be . . . and so on and so forth.”
Thus it is a surprise to see that, still in an early point of the narrative, we see Hata
positively acknowledging that he feels this discomfort. There is the vague prehension that
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something unfamiliar is up in the air. Recalling the business golf trips that he used to go on with
his partners, some of whom were Japanese Americans, he wonders if his rapport with them had
been okay for him. Hata recounts his misgivings that should have been there, which he also
relates to the discomfort that he has been recently feeling about own house:
. . . there is a discomfiting aspect to all this rapport. I don’t know how or when it
happened, or if it is truly happening now, but I’m sure something is afoot, for I keep
stepping outside my house, walking its grounds, peering at the highly angled shape of its
roofs, the way warm color and time-textured façade, looking at it as though I were doing
so for the very first time, when I wondered if I would ever in my life call such a house
my home.413
Here, Hata still can barely notice his own feelings: “I don’t know when it happened, or if it is
truly happening now.” However, he is “sure” that “something is afoot.” This because he has
begun to have doubts about whether his house is his real “home.” Hata is precisely aware that the
issue at hand is “belonging,” which has to do with his “rapport” with his colleagues and
neighbors as well as how he feels about his property and his neighborhood. All of these are
involved: “This happy blend of familiarity and homeyness and what must be belonging, is
strangely beginning to disturb me.”
I suggest that this situation has to do with that, when he is finally perched on the peak of
his social success, Hata, to his inconvenience, discovers a different notion of being at home,
which is to occupy the vectorial here-elsewhere of his present moment. Let us focus on a passage
where Hata describes how he came to see his belonging critically. This is also early on in the
book, where he is musing on his general situation while crouched in front of his fireplace in the
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living room. In a language that reminds one of Pamuk’s explanation of the oscillating movement
between the inner psychology of the protagonist and the “long view” that builds up to form a
novelist landscape, Hata narrates to the reader how he came to think of the way he should appear
to a certain distant perspective while he is swimming in his pool. In this picture, he says, he
should look quite different from the way he used to be:
Sitting before the fire, I wonder, too, whether someone watching me swim each morning
in the peerless quiet of the pool, steadily pulling my way back and forth, would think I
was entering a significant period in my life, a time in which all I would do was swim
every day in my backyard, a lovely place of my own making. And while this may seem
romantic, even triumphant picture of near-end, what we might well hope to achieve at the
start of our adult lives, it strikes me that it could be a scene of some sadness as well, of a
beauty empty and cold. It is an unnerving thing, but when I was underneath the water,
gliding in that black chill, my mind’s eye suddenly seemed to carry to a perspective high
above, from where I could see the exacting, telling shapes of all: the spartan surfaces of
the pool deck, the tight clipped manicures of the garden, the venerable house and trees,
the fetching, narrow street. And what caught me, too, was that I knew there was also a
man in that water, amidst of it all, a secret swimmer who, if he could choose, might
always go silent and unseen.414
Here, Hata can somehow see himself engaged in his everyday activities against the backdrop of
his own house. As in Pamuk’s articulation of landscape, Hata sees the world he lives in as seeped
in sadness, reflecting the mood of the protagonist of that world. Emotional as it is, it is an exact
observation, faithful to reality, detecting the precise details that constitute the scene’s every
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corner. The take-in of the surroundings happens from a definite perspective that watches him
from a distance, the perspective of Other, and it is not someone else’s rather than Hata’s own;
Hata has begun to experience here-elsewhere.
In this alternative outlook, Hata’s life is not a “romantic, triumphant picture of near-end,”
but a picture of beauty “empty and cold.” Instead of a winner of the race, we see “a secret
swimmer who, if he could choose, might always go silent and unseen.”415 This other side
contrasts to his earlier averment that he is the one person who is absolutely known by everyone.
The unacknowledged and silent existence that we see here can be explained in terms of my
theoretical discussion; he used to hardly exist in the modern episteme, having almost never
formed himself along here-elsewhere. Yet this newly developed perspective sustains itself
throughout Hata’s memoir; the ensuing narrative can be read as his resolute journey to find
“himself,” or what he came to see as his more genuine existence. I cite the part, among others,
where he revisits the circumstances of his failed love with K in the later narrative:
If someone had asked me then what I felt, I would have been unable to answer. But if I
can speak for that young man now, if I can tell some part of the truth for him, I would say
that he felt himself drawn to her, drawn to her very presence, which must finally leave
even such a thing as beauty aside. He did not yet know it, but he hoped that if he could
simply be near her, near to her voice and to her body – if never even touching her – near,
he thought, to her sleeping mind, he might somehow be found.416
Here, Hata is giving an account of the way his younger self should have been experiencing his
own life, while recollecting that time. Hata is regarding this other self as a third person,
constantly referring to him as he. This he is someone, as the present Hata acknowledges it, who
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is unable to give an articulation of how he should have been feeling – towards K – at that time.
The present Hata, who is a different person from this demure young man, willing to give an
account of his life to the readers, however assumes that he can speak for this man despite their
difference; it is possible, thus, for Hata to “tell some part of truth for him.” Hata understands the
life of the younger Hata in a vectorial sense; he understands that this young man was hoping that
he could be nearer to the bodily presence of K – “near to her voice and to her body.” That is,
what the young Hata wanted is not to possess K for the sake of her appearance; the way he
wanted her could ultimately “leave even such a thing as beauty aside.” Rather, he felt that the
path that led to K would let him find himself – to approach her, to approach in that direction,
would ironically reveal himself to himself.
Again, it remains a question why he suddenly begins to engage in his self-reflections
when he had been managing to avoid it all his life. This is where I situate my argument about the
relevance of vector and here-elsewhere in analyzing the narrative. It could be argued that he
decides to recall his past out of idleness; he has everything now and he has nothing else to do.
And yet such an interpretation does not address the depth of dejection or confoundedness that
Hata feels by the time he finally makes himself a model citizen. His puzzlement as to what his
life should be like from this point on reaches the bottom of his being. While he says he can
entertain Liv’s suggestions about the condo, Hata benignly muses: “while I might have a decent
place to live, I’d have to figure out for myself how to live there, and why.” Hata has encountered
the question of why he has to continue living his life, when there is no reason to do so anymore,
having reached exactly what he had been believing, all his life, to be the destination. That is, he
has arrived at a point at which it is no longer possible for him to evade the question of the
meaning, or purpose, of his life.
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Soon after the above passage, where Hata says how his life could be actually empty and
cold, he starts an accidental fire in his house while trying to answer Liv Crawford’s phone call.
Having been saved by Liv, he recuperates at the hospital and then at home, his lung having been
severely affected. The whole series of episodes portray him as gradually learning to rely on and
befriend a substantial number of his neighbors. Yet the fire does more than to give him an
opportunity to open up to others. Later on, articulating the experience of serving as a medical
officer in Burma, Hata mentions his friend Fujimori, who died after a bomb exploded on him.
Fujumori was prone to detect “odd” aspects of reality, Hata recounts; should he be able to meet
Fujumori then, Hata would try to make the most distanced and polite of the conversations, since
Fujimori could likely make their encounter awkward for him:
I have to consider how he might cast his eye on me now, after having spoken to Mrs.
Hickey and once again excused myself from spending time with her dying son. How
might he describe me as I step limpidly across this wide parking lot, holding a fading
bouquet of my own? What would he say if I told him I had never married, and that the
girl I adopted had decided to run away rather than live with me in comfort? And would
he devilishly ask why I had been so careless with the fireplace in my most precious
home, as if I’d wanted to bring everything down in a self-made conflagration?417
Fujimori’s comments were to be “devilish” for Hata, because Hata is uninclined to contemplate
the uncomfortable aspect of his life. Yet it is not hard to see that it is Hata himself who,
personifying Fujumori, acknowledges the aspect of reality that he himself cannot consciously
face in this passage; Hata is innately aware that he actually tried to burn down everything – the
way he existed in, and belonged to, his house and Bedley Run.
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This can be explained in terms of Nietzsche and how he explains the “sacrifice of the
subject of knowledge” as the possible end point towards which the subject of knowledge drives
himself to. In Chapter Three, I quoted a passage from Nietzsche where he discusses how the
more the subject gets caught up with the process of “knowing” the world, the more he gets
enslaved to the process, to the point it begins to make sense for him to sacrifice himself and even
others for the sake of the realization of knowledge. I also discussed how the politics of
sovereignty that gets “grafted” onto biopolitics only functions as the trigger of violence; names
such as race, species, or certain ethnicities are but excuses for biopower to align nihilistic lives so
that some can kill others for the sole triumph of knowledge. Given this, it is not strange for Hata
to try to kill himself and bring down the whole of his world, considering the degree to which he
has developed himself as almost the perfect epitome of a subject of knowledge – there is an
almost seamless correspondence between how he sees himself and what his society knows him to
be. Hata does not open fire at random blaming his neighbors for the pain that he suffers. If ever
such a situation would have occurred, it would have reminded us of Oksala’s discussion of the
“petty sovereigns” in our midst.
Hata’s understanding of his own life gradually builds up as the narrative progresses, and
we can see how he evaluates this earlier phase of his life in the later points. Right after having
recollected the most central of his traumas – that of ending up finding the torn, bloody bodily
remains of K after she had been gang-raped and were slayed to pieces by his fellow soldiers –
Hata begins a new phase of his articulation, communicating a fresh sense of confusion about who
he should be. In this passage, which marks the onset of his reborn self, Hata recounts how he
took a bath in his house one day. He recalls how the tinge of the hot water felt good; he also tells
how he, at that moment, felt like staying in the water, like an unborn fetus, retracing and undoing
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the steps that he has taken in his life thus far. Yet he soon admits to himself that such a wish
“smacks of innocence, wanting not to know what I know, which is a fraudulent and dangerous
wish.”418 He also acknowledges that the only way for him to live from now on is to “crave every
last bit and tatter of his memory” and to “consider the character of all his times whether
pleasurable or tragic or sad.”419 This despite that he is not used to savoring his memories because
of his established habits:
But all I seem to think of doing is to stop, or turn around, or else dig in for a sprint,
perambling, old-man leap of the precipitate. And if I could just clear the first jutting
ledges and simply free-fall, enjoy the briefest flying, I should be very thankful indeed.420
At this stage of the story, Hata can see himself and assess his own immediate instincts to run
away from his burdensome emotions. He knows that, when he reaches a point that seems like a
precipitate, or the simple ending of the path, he feels an urge to “stop,” which is to freeze time,
“turn around,” which is to retrace the lived path of life, or take a free-fall, which is to end his life
there. If jumping off the cliff might end his life, he says, he would at least briefly enjoy the
feeling of being alive before the fatal thump. Given the context, Hata could well be suggesting
that the brief moment of setting fire on everything that surrounds him would have given him at
least a single momentary freedom.
By the end of the narrative, we see Hata having set himself up comfortably on an
alternative, vectorial path of life; he has become accustomed to his own movement to return
home:

418

Ibid., 290.
Ibid.
420
Ibid., 291.
419

310

Perhaps I’ll travel to where Sunny wouldn’t go, to the south and west and maybe farther
still, across the oceans, to land on former shores. But I think it won’t be any kind of
pilgrimage. I won’t be seeking out my destiny or fate. I won’t attempt to find comfort in
the visage of a creator or the forgiving dead.
Let me simply bear my flesh, and blood, and bones. I will fly a flag. Tomorrow,
when this house is alive and full, I will be outside looking in. I will be already on a walk
someplace, in this town or the next or one five thousand miles away. I will circle round
and arrive again. Come almost home.421
We do not learn where Hata will be in nominal terms. And yet at least, he will be engaged in the
incessant cycle that will keep returning him to where he used to be and yet not quite land him
there. He could try to visit his “former shores” but would still not make it a pilgrimage; he will
be hovering around his house again, trying to look in, yet will not remain there, being “already
on a walk someplace else,” headed to “this town or the next or one five thousand miles away,” an
indefinite elsewhere. Yet we will soon see him having already come back again; “I will circle
round and arrive again.” The last sentence, which is not quite a sentence but a passage,
summarizes this whole movement again; it returns one to where he feels home again and again,
yet not freezing it into a destination.
The repeated returning movement above manifests Hata’s embodiment of hereelsewhere. That is, the suggestion of the rhythm and the vector of here-elsewhere in the above
passage cannot be dismissed as dissolving the significance of either his narrative that has been
progressing, or his future life. Many critics have remarked that the ending is a mere continuation
of the overall postmodern ambiguity of the narrative, which manifests the haphazard and
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disorderly nature of traumatized psyche in its non-linearity.422 Some have remarked that the
vagueness of the ending mirrors the uneasy, incomplete nature of Hata’s reeducation narrative,
via which nothing substantial has changed in the lives of the victims.423 And yet, by the
beginning of the narrative, we clearly see Hata not knowing what it feels to have somewhere to
return to, a clear contrast from the way he projects his own future movements in the ending. As I
have mentioned above, at an early part of the narrative, his neighbors suggest Hata to go back to
Japan after retirement, portraying it in the mode of their Orientalist fantasy. Musing on such a
suggestion, Hata remarks that, while he “appreciated their interest, and what [he] took as their
friendly concern,” even seriously considering “the notion . . . for some days,” he can still
remember thinking of having to return somewhere in his early days in Bedley Run yet not
knowing where he could return to:
Sometimes I still think of Japan, though much less in recent times than in my first years
in Bedley Run, when it seemed it was every day I wondered how long I would last, and
which morning I’d rise and know I’d have to return, though of course to what I couldn’t
know.424
In the hard days of his settlement, Hata had already felt that he had to return somewhere, but
ended up remaining in Bedley Run since he could not think of how to return anywhere. This
explains why he felt he was standing at the cliff of his life and had to burn his house down –
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there was nowhere else he could go other than Bedley Run, while he already had arrived at the
end of his path.
There is another passage, shortly after the above one, where Hata again ponders about the
same subject. This happens right after Hata describes how he suddenly came to observe himself
swimming in his own pool. This also shows his incapacity to go on living, to continue to return,
at the beginning part of the story:
Sitting crouched before it, arranging the kindling, I can’t help but remember a story I
once read in an old book of Sunny’s, one she must have used in a high-school class. I
found it among others on the shelves in the family room, and it had all sorts of interesting
marking and notes in the margins. The story, which she had dog-eared, is about a man
who decides one day to swim in other people’s pools, one after another in his
neighborhood and town, which, as described, seems very much like Bedley Run. The
man, the story goes, has resolved to “swim across the country,” and after some travail of
walking in on his neighbors and scaling property walls and crossing busy parkways, he
finally makes it back to his own home, which, to his desperate confusion, he finds locked
up and deserted.425
This story reads like an allegory of Hata’s desire for most his life, which is to be like anybody
who could be swimming in the pool of an average household in a town that is, like Bedley Run,
an affluent suburb. Yet, after having been such an anybody, he finds himself ironically locked
out of the town, having deprived of a home there; he only returns to a nowhere.
Given that Hata is already situated at the limit of his former life at the beginning of the
narrative, the whole of the narrative can be understood as building up to Hata’s embodiment of a
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new mode of life. Hata finds it literally inevitable to pursue that other path, which offers the
logic for the narrative to progress. The movement of here-elsewhere that he goes through
throughout the narrative creates and recreates his home, or his origin, as he revisits one episode
after another of his life, building up to his embodiment of the rhythmic returning movement by
the end. Hata recalls many of his life episodes throughout the narrative, which are filled with
various emotions such as regrets, uneasiness, horrors, sadness, and love. One is reminded of
Pamuk’s thesis here; sustaining the oscillating movement between the hypothetical center of a
novel and the contour of its landscape, a novel, by the time it ends, achieves the level of
approximation of a center that satisfies its occupier.

iii. Confession as Transvaluation
I have mentioned that many critics find the value of Hata’s narrative in its honest
acknowledgements; it is seen as a merit to acknowledge that we, living our political reality, are
an inextricable part of the wrongs that are committed by the community and by the multifarious
capitalist processes that we partake in. Hata braves the feeling of discomfort that comes from the
insight that his society, which has been the cast of his being, might be something that jeopardizes
his and others’ genuine existence. In this last section of the chapter, I will be reading the “past”
of Hata’s life the way I can relate to, in the sense that I can see and understand Hata because I am
also Hata. This way, my reading will overlap with those of other critics who value Hata’s selfreflections; yet, my emphasis is in that it is not possible for us to disengage ourselves from Hata
in the end, separating him from us in the name of critique. I want to say that, according to the
way I have been discussing political transformation, the best thing we can do in reading this
novel is to acknowledge our sameness with Hata – such an act will in itself lead to
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transvaluation. This despite the fact that the assumptions involved in such practices make us
acknowledge the limits in the degree of political transformation that can be achieved in a given
time. If change happens in terms of singular instances of here-elsewhere rather than the initiation
of a totalistic will, most of us would have to acknowledge that a world where every one of us is
happy, rather than one in which there are numerous other who remain dejected while I am
managing to be okay, is not likely to arrive soon. This is what, as Chuh would have it, would
give us “discomfort.” At least today, people continue to suffer, while I am being happy, thanks to
the very conditions that make them suffer. Novels like A Gesture Life present us with moments
of silence, where it becomes hard for us to express any tangible opinion about what should be
done about the present – the present that we comprise even while acknowledging it as
biopolitical. Yet through the experience of such acknowledgement the world advances, at least
from where I stand; I am approaching a center through my here-elsewhere, through the very
instance of reality having been acknowledge by me just now.
As has been briefly noted, there is a clear continuity between the society of the Japanese
imperial army that Hata was serving as a medical officer, and the society of the affluent suburban
Bedley Run, the epitome of the utopia of the post-world war American society. This is why both
of the societies can be seen as Classical episteme; Kim effectively suggests this point by pointing
out that both of the societies are biopolitical. She suggests that Bedley Run embodies the U.S.
“way of life” that the Truman doctrine began to promote as “superior” to any other ideologies in
the world, with the assumption that the U.S’s liberal democracy has acquired a universal valence
since the end of the Cold War.426 The young Hata echoes this phrase when reprimanding a
soldier that he deemed to be losing his morale in the waning days of the war: “It is our way of
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life that we’re struggling for, and so it behooves each one of us to carry himself with dignity, in
whatever one he does.”427 With this phrase, Lee makes the parallel between the two societies
explicit.
Such a way of life demands that everyone stays in his place, realizing himself as the thing
that the society orders him to be. For example, if you are a medical officer, you become the
epitome of a medical officer. Captain Ono, who is known to be the most accomplished,
knowledgeable, skilled, and experienced surgeon in the army, thus becomes a kind of a role
model for the young Hata, whose aspirations are to save lives so that his comrades can better
serve their “Nation and the Emperor” in the war. Ono is so good at this that he almost seems
inhuman; accomplished as he is in his skills and professionalism, he does not seem to have any
private feelings of his own, so perfectly aligned his private emotions with the feelings that are
necessary for one to devote oneself to the societal purpose:
He was a person most centrally focused, someone who – in his own mind – could almost
will his thoughts and desires to bear upon the wider truth. Of course it is often in the
military, where one has fixed standing, that this can be seen, but in the case of the doctor
I was sure he was as impeachable in civilian life as he was here, in this, his surgeon’s
room.428
Ono’s “thoughts and desires” so perfectly cohere with the “wider truth” of his society that there
is no longer any distinction between how he thinks and feels when he is alone to himself and
how he acts in the capacity of a soldier. This disturbing picture of a subject perfectly tailored to
the mission of the imperial nation state anticipates how Hata turns out to be in his old age, who
have made himself into a totally impeachable member of his society.
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Ono is “a person of singular resolve and even hardness,” who can make himself not feel
anything in the face of “what must always be for him the patent, terrible frailty of his patients
and others under his care.”429 Yet what could have been a professional virtue turns out to be an
essential hinge of the biopolitical society; the order of his nation is inherently flawed in that way.
It does not serve every member equally; the order whereby each of its member gets assigned an
immobile position, is actually a hierarchy. This becomes manifest in Hata’s articulation of the
different “levels” of treatment that each rank in the army gets entitled to. It is an ironic comment,
since Hata does not seem to be particularly struck by what he himself is saying. He is referring to
how to treat patients in the army, a principle that he understands as a medical officer:
. . . in wartime it was never a question of salubrity, really not for anyone. Rather, as the
doctor had already pointed out to me, it was a matter of standards, in this case to apply
the level of treatment that was most appropriate for the situation, and for whom. In this
schema the commander had his level, the officers theirs, the enlisted men and others yet
another, and so on and so forth, until it came to the girls, who had their own. All this was
inviolable, like any set of natural laws.430
The order that he had just received regarding the treatment of the girls makes sense to him, at
least in a sense; that he should only apply the level of treatment minimally necessary for the girls
to return to the comfort house and continue to serve their “duties” does not particularly breach
the principle that he knows, since, as he has it, it is “never a question of salubrity” for anyone in
the first place in the wartime. Yet the command continues to bother Hata, who has begun to feel
differently about the girls from the way the other soldiers normally think of them. As a doctor,
Hata has a very matter-of-fact, scientific knowledge of what would happen to the girls’ bodies
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should they continue to receive the soldiers in the number and frequency as have been assigned.
Reading the description of such symptoms make the reader, who cannot not regard the girls as
humans, horrified, all the more because of the “scientific,” commonsensical nature of the
account.
It becomes hard for Hata to regard the “natural law” of his society’s organization
naturally; it is not possible for the reader to see the horror of biopolitics that gets practiced by
such a perfect subject as Ono. Without the least disconcertedness, Ono experiments on the stillliving body of a dying man, a tanner from one of Japan’s colonies, cutting the body open so he
can experiment whether he can revamp only the heart after the man’s life has expired.
Apparently, Ono feels himself entitled to execute such an experiment; he is supposed to perfect
his skills as a doctor, and according to the scheme of his society, the life of the tanner is worth
very little. This makes us see how, for the realization of what Hata proudly and benignly calls an
“Asian way of life” following the mandate of the Emperor, human lives are reduced to bare life,
geared to serve a purpose that has nothing to do with the human as an agent. Those who are
forced to “volunteer” by offering their sex to the soldiers are driven into living-dead situation,
since K’s and the other sex slaves are kept alive solely for their bodies to be served up for the
soldiers’ carnal pleasure. That the girls are already effectively dead – on the level of their life
along the vector of here-elsewhere’s – even while they are biologically alive, is conveyed in the
way how the “comfort houses,” a makeshift structure built for the girls to serve the soldiers in,
feel like for Hata as he recalls them. They are like coffins:
The comfort house, which is how it was known, was a narrow structure with five notquite-square doorways, each with a rod across the top for a sheet for privacy. The whole
thing was perhaps as long as a large transport truck, ten or so meters. There were five
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compartments, of course, one for each of the girls; these were tiny windowless rooms, no
more than the space of one and a half tatami mats, not even wide enough for a tall man to
lie across without bending his knees. In the middle of each space was a wide plank of
wood, fashioned like a bench seat but meant for lying down on, with one’s feet as
anchors on either side. At the other end, where the shoulders would be, the plank was
widest, and then it narrowed again for the head, so that its shape was like the lid of a
coffin. This is how they would receive the men.431
The sheer description of the “comfort house” strikingly reveals the irony of the knowledge that
every subject of the imperial Japanese nation shares; in the name of procuring a way of life, live
human beings are being effectively killed while they are biologically kept alive, under the
assumption that their bodies matter only as the object to be “enjoyed” for the cause of war. Since
everyone is supposed to do his or her share of “duty” to realize themselves in their society, no
one questions the idea that the soldiers are entitled to the “comfort” that the young bodies can
offer. No one questions the rationality that regards the bodies of the girls as the army’s
“provision”; when corporal Endo, who was suffering psychologically, kills one of the girls, he is
charged “not with murder,” but is “considered guilty as any saboteur who had stolen or despoiled
the camp’s armament of rations.”432
Actually, the way the young girls are valued only for the youngness of their body makes
me think of the way human beings regard other living organisms on the earth as their “food.” It
is known that some domestic animals, such as chickens, are hatched and raised through
industrialized procedures only aimed to maximize profit. Each animal is given room barely
enough for it to budge in; some become so stressed that they develop abnormal, including
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suicidal, behaviors. To quicken the cycle of hatching, artificial environments are set up, which
deteriorate the wellbeing of the animals. This deliberation makes me question our, that is, human
beings,’ positionality within the larger domain of life. For I think what enabled the soldiers to be
so insensitive to what should certainly have been inordinate fear and devastating pain of the girls,
were their lack of question as to who the girls are, as beings that deserve to exist. There is a
description in the novel where Hata, confused by his own inability to regard the girls in the same
terms as others do after getting to know K personally, asks the soldier who has just used “base
anatomical slur” to refer to the girls why he called the girls so. The soldier seems very much
disoriented by this: “he was so bewildered by my question he could hardly speak. ‘I don’t know
what to say, Lieutenant,’ he said sheepishly after a pause, ‘but isn’t that what they are?’” The
sheer possibility that the girls might not be what the anatomical terms indicate, had never arisen
for him. Hata notes, “From his perspective, I suppose, he was telling only what he knew.”433 The
knowledge this soldier has, which is that the girls are there for his own pleasure, having
“volunteered” to offer the very thing that they were ordered to offer for the benefit of the larger
society, explains how the inordinate violence upon the girls became possible. The extent to
which such knowledge gets taken for granted is the conditions on which the nation state stands.
As I have briefly mentioned at the beginning of the previous chapter, for many of us, certain
living organisms are already regarded as “food” even when they are still alive; they are nothing
but the object of our consumption and survival, we here being the human race. As far as this is
the case, we are part of the biopolitical process that reduces the value of the lives of animals to
the “freshness” of our food. Would I be stretching my argument too far if I suggested that, the
logic that justified the soldier’s taking of pleasure using the girls, might not be that entirely
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different from that which encourages people to indulge themselves with whatever pleasure that
the glittering marketing images allure them to, since they have worked hard and so now deserve
to forget about it all and indulge?
Jamaica Kincaid, in A Small Place, says that she had not known that one of the British
princesses, someone everyone was making a big fuss over because she was visiting Antigua, was
coming simply because her life in Britain was not working out; the princess had been in love
with a married man, which led to frustrating consequences. 434 Yet, in anticipation for her visit,
buildings were being repaired, the beaches were re-decked, and dignitaries were gathering. The
positionality of the colonized is one that forces the colonized to believe or pretend that he is there
for the colonizer’s pleasure, since in the given order of capitalism, where there is a devastating
difference in the degree of “development” between the advanced and the developing countries,
there is not much the colonized can do to survive other than becoming the colonizer’s tourist
attraction. The colonized are “happy” to participate in the course of capitalism, even as the one
who hopped on the train last minute; he puts up a face of a “volunteer.” Yet Kincaid knew that,
despite all her anger about the situation, the colonizers were actually being miserable; tourists
need a way out to Antigua because he cannot take the loneliness that engulfs him when he is in
the midst his life as a good employee, a good family member, and a good whatever that his
society would like him to be. He is tired; he needs a vacation.
The “order” of capitalism consists of a hierarchy where those with higher number of
possessions take higher positions, compared to those who have fewer of them. Thus, efforts at
acquiring more possessions to gain higher standing in the given order do not change the order
itself. At the same time, while it is certainly the case that those who have more power than others
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is less prone to acknowledge their evident advantage in the status quo, to point out how inhuman
the more empowered people are being towards those who are being treated inhumanly in the
capitalistic process, do not disturb the way the capitalistic order as a whole steadily grinds on
based on the assumption of being able to secure safety through possession, a logical error that
began with Descartes’ rationale. The fear that one would disappear from reality for lack of an
identity, or for lack of possessions that correspond to such an identity, does not disappear how
many material or immaterial possessions one manages to pile up. As was the case for one of the
characters in Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small Things, the sight of the dispossessed and
dislocated people only propels the fear of those who have many things, and this ever-reignited
fear all the more forcefully drives the pursuit of possession.435 The violence that derives from the
psychology of those who perpetually feel threatened for their existence can only increase if the
order that organizes the whole course of capitalism does not get questioned.
This is why I argue that transvaluation can be valuable in our politics, even while critics
continue to see danger and even hypocrisy in Hata’s seeming identification with, and
sympathizing with, those who are less empowered than himself. Yes, one could ask: if the
women’s victimizations – whether they are those of the comfort women or that of Sunny, his
adopted daughter – are intricately interrelated to Hata’s own privilege, how could he pretend to
“love” them, or to “understand” them, even in retrospect? Is it not a crime and an outrage for the
colonizer to colonize the subaltern, and then claim to love her? Passages like below, which I
have already cited once before, makes people outraged because he seems to be simply saying
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that he and the subaltern were all forced into the system anyway, where he did not do anything
particularly more wrong than others, including the very subaltern that he victimized:
In an odd way, I think now that K wanted the same thing that I would yearn for all my
days, which was her own place in the accepted order of things. She would be a young
woman of character, as significant to her father as was his son. She would have the
independence that comes from learning and grace. She would choose her kind of
devotion; she would bear children and do her necessary work, a true vocation, and she
would grow old as I have grown old, though she would look backward with a different
cast than mine, a different afterlight. All I wished for was to be part (if but a millionth) of
the massing, and that I pass through with something more than a life of gesture. And yet I
see now, I was in fact a critical part of events, as were K and other girls, and the soldiers
and the rest. Indeed the horror of it was how central we were, how ingenuously and not
we comprised the larger processes, feeding ourselves and one another to the allconsuming engine of the war.436
Hata is identifying himself and K as people who “yearned” for “the same thing,” which is to
realize themselves in a way that is beneficial to and harmonious with the already existing order. I
think this is consistent with my theoretical argument, which is that people advance in the
direction of elsewhere-than-here because of something that they have already felt here. Any new
desire emerges out of something that has been felt as already existing. The tragedy, however, for
Hata and for K was that their society was so strictly aligned with the order of Classical episteme
that there was hardly any avenue for them to follow to become anything vastly different than
what their society assigned them to be. K was born into a Korean family that was solidly
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patriarchal; yet, the traditional “woman’s way” that could have been possible for her if the
country was not colonized by Japan was no longer possible. Since the family was poor, they
could not bribe the soldiers, and K and her sister had to be conscripted, deceived into believing
that they would be working in an overseas factory. Upon finding out that she has been
transported to the army base as a comfort woman, K has two sole options in life: either to
continue to serve as sex slave or to end her life. This is why K insists that Hata help her to end
her life; Hata fails to do so, running away from facing the reality that K faces as hers.
The realization that he and everyone else were constituting themselves as the thing of the
Classical order is the precondition for Hata to realize why he failed to love K in a way that could
have mattered for her. That is, understanding his world, and the way it is ordered, is the
precondition for Hata to understand that, precisely as K has it, the genuine way for him to love K
was to help her die. I think that the problem of the young Hata in his dealings with K, as the
older Hata looks back into it, was not that he indulged in a mere self-delusion in believing that he
was in love with K, unlike the critics who refuse to call Hata’s emotion toward K love. I think
his problem was in not being able to see just what shape of reality he, K, and all the others were
in, to the extent that he allowed himself to believe that he could save K, so that the two of them
could survive the war and live a long life as a married couple. Hata and K build a special
relationship, which K later on refers to as a friendship, during the time when Ono puts K away
from the other girls, secretly keeping her in the infirmary under the care of Hata, ordering him to
prevent her from any possible illness or infection. This is because of strictly eugenic purposes;
deciding that her demeanor and appearance mark her as someone who has extraordinary
“breeding,” Ono plans to use her body as a “vessel” to secure the excellence of his own species.
While K instinctively perceives the deathliness of Ono’s intention and decides to kill herself
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rather than having to go through whatever the doctor aims to execute on her, Hata, having
experienced his very first “budding” of “sexual love” regarding K, indulges in fantasies about the
two of them. This maddens and frustrates K, since she perceives that Hata is a “decent man,” the
only person who was being kind to her in the army, taking her to the gravesite of her sister who
had been slain by one of the soldiers, secretly bringing extra food to her, and conversing with her
on their mutual interests, such as book and places where they would like to travel to.
On one occasion when they are bonding, they discuss the novels that Hata has read,
which interests K, since she “always wanted to live a completely different life, even if it might
be a hard one,” since she was certain that she was not supposed to belong to hers:
“ . . . Maybe you can describe the stories to me, and we could pretend we were in their
lives, those European people in the novels, involved with their own particular problems,
which I am sure must be very compelling.”437
Recalling, in response, the “figure of a woman in a small French provincial town that was her
world, and prison,” Hata goes on to muse on how such situations often lead to tragedy. Hata and
K agree that if they do not end in tragedy, such stories would not be much of a story. K seems to
be certainly aware that this inevitable tragic ending is the foreordained foreclosure of her brief
enjoyment of the company of Hata, especially when, as Hata later realizes it, she deliberately
tries to imagine Hata and herself embedded in a completely different life from the one they had:
After returning from the gravesite, we sat under the cool cast of the moonlight in the
small yard behind the infirmary. There was a dense ring of wide-leafed vegetation
enclosing the space, and no one could see us. She was not so obviously upset at having
seen her sister’s grave . . . Now in fact there was a lightness to her voice, as if she were
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almost being playful with me, though I knew it wasn’t that either. It was something
different, a strange kind of release or relief. For the first time she seemed truly vulnerable
to me, not just her physical body, which as always endangered, but her spirit. . . .
Earlier she had wanted to speak in the darkness, and now, too, she asked if we
could sit close to the building, beneath the low eave, every part of us in the shadows. I
could finally understand what she was wishing for. I believe it was so she couldn’t see
my uniform of the shine of my boots or even my face; I realized that she was trying to
pretend we were other people, somewhere else, with the most ordinary reasons for
keeping such furtive company; just our whispering voices apparent to the night air.438
Hata notes that, having finally visited her sister’s grave, K seemed lighthearted than before, since
she came to believe that getting instantly killed was the best that could have happened to her
sister. Thus we can say that, by this point, she had concluded that to die was the best possible
course of life for her, even though we do see her feeling dejected about her situation, crying
fitfully. In the scene above at least, however, she decides to engage in an imagination that makes
her briefly enjoy being alive, pretending to be dating someone, sitting side by side in the dark,
“with the most ordinary reasons for keeping such furtive company.” This should have to do with
her having seen that Hata being so surprisingly earnest and naïve towards her; earlier, responding
to her questions about the kinds of books he had read, he notices that K “nodded in half-smile,”
which makes him realize “how enthusiastic I probably sounded, as though we were on an initial
date, like two university students.”439
Such an occasion, however, means something completely different for Hata. It is not, as it
is for K, a brief allowing of oneself to engage in what feels like living a life; it is a possibility to

438
439

Ibid., 251-2.
Ibid., 248.

326

continue to live an ordinary life, according to the only way he knows, which is by himself
becoming K’s husband, someone who, according to his society’s norm, protects and saves the
female, thereby becoming her hero. Hata’s actual suggestion that they persevere until the war
ends so that they get married afterwards enrages K; his suggestion does not, for her, change the
immutable fact that the doctor plans to visit her that very night, a fate that she is willing to give
up her life to escape from. Hata’s suggestion not only denies her agency, the only agency that
she was going to exercise as she was standing at the brink of her life; it also perpetuates Hata’s
participation in the outlook that reduces K to an object, returning Hata squarely back into the
order that endangered K’s life in the first place. Hata notes that what ultimately enabled him to
stand up to Ono, striking him even, derived from his “feelings for K,” or the sudden sense of her
“nearness” to him. He says that, even though referring to such nearness as special might sound
“specious,” because he was obviously a “young man in the blush of his first sexual love,” the
“affinity of being” that he came to believe existed between himself and K was more about “what
she had suggested about our pretending to be other people, like figures in a Western novel,
imagining how we could somehow exist outside of this pale and time and circumstance.”440
Thus, we could say that, in rebelling against and hitting Ono, Hata was acting from the desire to
be one with an Other, the foundation for us to build our reality. It is indeed something that is
different from the romantic feeling that Hata was also experiencing. Yet that foundational feeling
does not grow into something that could let him see his reality from the perspective of his
beloved; the embarrassment of the anticlimax is already there when Hata finally finds Ono,
having resolved to avenge him. Before he meets Ono, Hata thinks that he would kill him the
moment he sees him, and has intense fantasies about it. However, at the point when the narrative
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was supposed to give an account of their encounter finally, the reader simply reads: “But my
hand was at my head in salute, and [Ono] said, with no little irritation, ‘What must it be now,
Lieutenant?’”441
Hata’s “hand” had moved automatically; his body had already followed his embedded
sense of duty. This mode of action would henceforth continue to mold Hata’s course of life, and
especially mark all his relationship with the women who he wanted to be his significant relations,
such as Sunny and Mary Burns. He can only treat them with his sense of “duty,” since he cannot
follow his inner mind in dealing with them, his tragic relationship with K having ended in a
trauma that froze up his ability to be true to his feelings with women ever again. Later on, after
the salute, Hata’s errant and unpremeditated rebellion towards Ono results in a terrible slaughter
of K by a hoard of the soldiers who became furious with her after she deliberately provoked one
of the soldiers to avoid being used as comfort woman; the passage describing how Hata
eventually found the fetus that the soldiers presumably torn away from K’s womb, along with
K’s torn bodily remains, ends with Hata recalling to himself that he did not feel anything by the
end of that scene.
Later on, recalling the memory of visiting the scene where Hata finds the body parts of K
finally liberates Hata, releasing him from the ghost of K who had been perennially haunting him.
The reader only gets to know that the ghost had been with him all the while, reading about Hata
casually having his daily conversation with her; her presence is something that he says he wants,
and yet there is the dread that derives from the fact that she would never let him go, and that he
would remain a slave to her forever bound by his purported obligations for her:
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I keep winning her over with hardly an argument, though each time an ill feeling comes
over me, the soiling, resident sickness you develop when you have never in your life been
caught at something wrong, when you have never once been discovered.442
He had not been freed from her presence because he had, ever since her death, never been able to
be honest with himself about how he feels about her. Being with her, and renewing his allegiance
to her again and again, has been giving him only the sense that he had been managing not to be
caught on anything; trying to be faithful to the illusive ideal of having to, or being able to, save
her, he had been betraying his real self. His reflections make him see only now that, in his
immaturity, he had not been able to admit the truth of his reality when he was the young officer
who fell in love with K, that it was impossible for him to save her and survive the war together
with her, and if he ever had the courage to die on her behalf nonetheless, he would have taken an
entirely different course of action from the one he actually took.
Finally admitting his actual feelings about having had to encounter K’s ghost over and
over, releases him from K’s ghost. We find Hata losing sight of K’s ghost momentarily in the
midst of their conversation, trying to search for her here and there in his house, and yet finding
himself solely left with the bare, skeleton-like contours of it, which feels eerily emptied even as
it gives a sense of finally relieving him of a burden. Suddenly his whole house, the physical
presence of it, strikes him as the ruins of a life:
When I looked back across the precious, stately landscape of my property, it seemed I
had travelled far miles to the place I was standing, as if I had gone round and round the
earth in an endless junket, the broad lawn a continent, the pool a whole ocean, the house
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the darkened museum of a one-man civilization, whose latent history, if I could so will it,
would be left always unspoken, unsung.443
The admission that his continued commitment to K’s ghost was making him feel sick, places him
outside the context of the life in which he had been a captive his whole life. This is the central
moment that prepares Hata’s final free venture into yet unnamable elsewhere’s that we see by the
end of the novel.
Discussing how an author sometimes embeds his own true voice in the novel, letting him
personify his characters in a literal sense, Pamuk says that a lot of what he writes in his novel
feels like his confessions to the readers. It is even possible, he says, for a reader to recognize him
in the voice of his protagonists:
“Mr. Pamuk, I have read all your books,” a woman once said to me in Istanbul. She was
approximately the age of my aunt, and had the air of an aunt about her. “I know you so
well, you’d be surprised.” Our eyes met. A feeling of guilt and embarrassment came over
me, and I thought I understood what she meant. The remark of the worldly-wise lady who
was almost a generation older than me, the embarrassment I felt at that moment, and the
implications of her gaze stayed in my mind as the days passed, and I tried to understand
what had confused me.
When this lady who reminded me of my aunt said, “I know you,” she wasn’t
claiming that she knew my life story, my family, where I lived, the schools I’d attended,
the novels I’d written, and the political difficulties I’d suffered. Nor did she know my
private life, my personal habits, or my essential nature and worldview, which I had tried
to convey by linking them to my native city in my book Istanbul. The elderly lady was
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not confusing my story with the stories of my fictional characters. She seemed to be
talking about a deeper, more intimate, more secret thing, and I felt I understood her. What
allowed the insightful aunt to know me so well were my own sensory experiences, which
I had unconsciously put into all my books, all my characters.444
Usually, Pamuk would dismiss the questions when readers ask if the protagonists of his novels
were actually him; he would often and freely complain about the readers’ naivety to his critic and
professor friends. Yet, “when an intelligent reader told me she had sensed the real-life experience
in the novel’s details,” he “felt embarrassed, like someone who has confessed intimate things
about his soul, like someone whose written confessions have been read by another.”445
This makes me recall my argument on the politics of Foucault’s biopolitical discourse,
which is in the reader’s admission that he had been part of the we that Foucault suggests to have
produced biopolitical reality. In confessing how it has been for him to live his life, a subject
recreates himself into part of a multitude – we – that emerges in the moment of his confessing
act. Pamuk says that, trying to write down moments of his own sensory experiences of the world,
he imagines being part of the whole of the mankind who share the same experience with him:
“the similarities [in our sensations in life] allow us to imagine the whole of mankind through
literature, and also enable us to conceive of a world literature – a world novel.”446 This gives us
compelling reason to keep searching for instances in the literature where the protagonists’ reality
is literally conveyed, even while recognizing that such instances could make us complicit in
going against the norms of our society. This, I assume, should be why I felt I was “daring” to say
that we are living in a society not very much unlike Hata’s wartime corp in terms of the way
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think of the animals and the plants that we consume. The politics of confessing the literal
constitution of our reality, I think, always involves the precariousness of not yet knowing if
anyone would acknowledge such confessions as his also.
This politics of literature, however, is simply indispensable, since what A Gesture Life
suggests is that it leads us closer to a possible reality where we feel natural to ourselves. The
simple irresistibility of feeling like yourself or being in the presence of those who make you feel
ordinary, is the most seductive power of what Hata shows us to be the politics of confession.
Despite his lifelong obsession about being an “ordinary” citizen, or following the “natural”
course of life, Hata had never known what it is like to be himself. Finally admitting to his
erstwhile feelings about Mary Burns, Hata lets us know he had been powerfully drawn to her
presence because of the feelings that he had when he was with her; he was feeling like an
ordinary person:
. . . with Mary Burns I seemed to forget the place where I was. In the shade of the eaves
amid the fresh blooms of the lilies, a cool, tropical lilt seemed to unfold in the air. It was
an almost memorial sweetness, rising beneath me like a lifting wave as if it were intent
on transporting me, sending me to a place across oceans. And for that moment I would
have gladly gone there or anywhere, for there was nothing but an immaculate calm in my
heart. I wish to say this now, that it truly was a sensation of calm, and not the other thing,
some pulsing, breakneck thump, a coursing furious and wild. I think it was because she
seemed so perfectly at ease with me, as if our meeting was the most ordinary thing. And I
the most ordinary man. She didn’t seem to speak more slowly or loudly than she might
otherwise, she didn’t gaze at me too attentively, but paid as much attention as she
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appropriately should, all of which, at least for me, was the most unlikely kind of
flattery.447
Here, we hear the voice of someone who has lived all his life as the marker of difference,
shouldering the burden of keeping the normalcy of his society. Having lived all his life believing
that occupying a precarious positionality of otherness was the sole means of being at home
anywhere, Hata is here finally recognizing the true, and new, emotion that he had harbored in the
presence of a woman who is no longer. It is an emotion that taught him what it feels like being
natural; the feeling arises with an openness to travelling to any potential destinations as long as
he could be with the beloved. In her presence, a “tropical” wave seemed to arise, and he would
have been carried away anywhere: “I would have gladly gone there or anywhere, for there was
nothing but an immaculate calm in my heart.” Feeling this potential vector along with Hata, we
feel the possibility of a reality where a minority subject does not have to prove his belonging by
wearing his otherness like a marker.
Through his reflections, Hata regains a sense “naturally” residing in his reality. This
includes him remembering the face of the one of the girls – K’s sister – who had just been killed
by one of the soldiers, an incident that the girl curiously seemed to welcome. Getting dragged by
the soldier who was soon going to kill her, she seemed not to be “fighting him”; her “gait seemed
to lighten, as if he were an old acquaintance and she was pleased to see him.”448 The killing
happens with no drama, without anyone having any forebodings thereof; the soldier approaches
the girl in a slow, limping gait, with some others jeering at him obscenely, having misunderstood
his intension. Hata arrives at the spot only when the killing has just been done:
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I recall myself, now, as having remained there after Endo had been escorted away. I
ordered some others to fetch a stretcher for the girls’ body, and after a few moments, I
was left alone with her. In the sudden quiet of the glade I felt I should kneel down. Her
eyes were open, coal-dark but still bright and glassy. She did not look fearful or sad. She
was no longer in mourning. And for the first time I appreciated what she truly looked
like, the simple cast of her young girl’s face.449
To Hata recalling this moment years later, the remembered face is nothing more than simply a
girl’s, in a “true” sense, which he “appreciates.” To the extent that Hata reconstitutes such a
quality, the girl’s face is alive in his memory, with eyes that are “still bright and glassy.” Only in
his recollections, thus, Hata realizes that the girl only wanted to follow the path that allowed her
to continue to be true to herself.

vi. Political Triumph in Our Lives
I began this chapter with a critique of Karatani’s reading of Doppo, arguing that defining
critical activity as the deconstruction of “landscape” in an exclusive sense leads us away from
recognizing instances of transvaluation in literature. Instead, we can re-think deconstruction in
terms of transvaluation; one way of doing so is to think of how literature places us at the center
of landscape. Landscape enables us to regard the novel as the accumulation of instances of
transvaluation, which, in Hata’s narrative as Lee presents it, succeeds to disentangle him from
the deathly context of his erstwhile life. Félix Guattari argues that we need to procure our
“existential refrains,” or the repeated cycle of instances of becoming, in our practical context of
life; we need tangible allegiances and strategic belongings in a world where we no longer believe
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in getting assigned an identity or other essentialistic markers in order to get political and
practical bearings.450 I suggest A Gesture Life supports this line of thinking, where we want to
ground our life, which is in itself political, on recognizable constellation of instances of
transvaluation. In our daily life, we do not want to have to constantly shift our vector of life, as in
the Deleuzian mode of schizophrenia.451 Usually, we test our ground, feel that a certain direction
of life fits me, and then hold onto that path for some time. This will be the story of the final part
of my analysis of A Gesture Life, which is based on Hata’s final realizations about his dreams of
becoming a doctor. Contrasting the sense in which Hata wants to, and does, realize himself as a
doctor from the way Ono is a doctor himself, I reflect on how politics of transvaluation can be
articulated in relation to our professionalism.
Hata writes how he was awed and somewhat scared by Captain Ono when Hata was a
novice medic, which has to do with Hata also wanting to become a professional doctor after the
war is over. While Hata ends up killing Ono, one can say that, in influencing Hata to ultimately
become the “primary citizen” of Bedley Run, Ono continued to win over Hata, even in death.
This parallels how K’s ghost continued haunting Hata, fastening him to the order of Bedley Run
with his guilt. Yet, in the course of Hata’s reflection, we can see signs that Hata’s aspirations in
wanting to become a doctor seem different from those of Ono’s. For Ono, everything comes
down to maintaining the paradigm of the Japanese “way of life” that he, as someone who comes
from an “elite caste” in Japanese society, hypocritically claim to be beneficial for the whole of
Asia. The totality of Ono’s devotion and self-deception makes it possible for him to treat the
subjects of his society as mere means to achieve the nation’s imperial aim. Again, the reason
Hata wants to become a doctor, as the older Hata remembers it, is different. When K and Hata
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build a tentative friendship, K asks him what he wants to do with his life after he gets discharged.
Even though he answers that he is not certain, the older Hata recalls that, by that time, he had
nevertheless been feeling that he wanted to “specialize in something like cardiopulmonary
surgery,” having “always been fascinated by the workings of the heart and lungs, the immortal
constancy and vitality of their operation.”452 When he was a child, he happened to see that the
heart of a pig that a butcher had slashed cut were still “alive,” which made him conjecture that
the heart could actually be the center of the animals’ life. And yet, the heart for Hata is not a
biological organ that can be decontextualized from the rest of the body of the animal or the
human being to which it belongs to. Thinking of the importance of heart, Hata thinks of how it
seemed to be the marker of the presence of someone who became dear to him for the first time in
his life – the presence of K:
. . . I have had the thought from time to time that indeed these were the vessels of the
animal’s spirit, and that perhaps our souls, too, reside not in our minds but in the very
flesh of us, the frank, gray tissue which seems most remarkably possessed of the will to
go on, to persist. Sometimes when one is a physician or a medic or a nurse, the physical
body can take on an almost mystical presence, and whether living or not becomes a
certain marker of the world, a sign of the wider circumstance. And though she was before
me I thought of her again reclining in her sleep before I unlocked the door, this person in
a tiny closet-room, this solitary girl in a box.453
Like Ono, Hata’s interest is in the biological mechanism of the heart; he witnessed the bare
functioning of it, as any medical students would in an anatomy class. Yet the reason Hata is
fascinated with the heart is because it seems “possessed of the will to go on, to persist,” telling us
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to advance forward. This perception, which seems to be centered on the one who heeds to his
own heart’s address, gets immediately linked to the way one projects the locus of an Other’s
heart as the marker of her presence. Because it accommodates the heart, the corporal body
becomes the marker of the “wider circumstances” that surround us and couch our own lives. This
coheres with the way thought is conceptualized in terms of Sartre’s “imagination,” where to
imagine someone is to imagine the way that person is physically ensconced in his world. Hata
pictures K “reclining in her sleep,” lying in the “tiny closet room” into which Ono has secretly
confined her. K’s body becomes the “center,” in Pamuk’s terms, around which the imaginary
landscape of K becomes real to Hata. Hata’s perception of K is directly correlated to Hata’s own
felt senses:
I couldn’t help but picture her in the closet, barely two meters square, lightless save for
the sunlight pushing through cracks in the wall, the heat blooming and redoubling in the
tight space. But it was not her so much that made me uneasy. I felt as if my lungs and
heart were detaching, moving outward to the skin, and that this was all too obvious to
everyone I dealt with. . . . I was almost certain that the soldiers were sensing my
impatience and discomfort.454
In the reconstituted story of Hata’s love for K, human heart and lungs, and their “frank, grey
tissue,” take on a new significance. The experiences that Hata feel in his heart, or in his lungs,
make him embark on a new path of life, a life that he imagines would involve both himself and K
in their “affinity of being,” though it ends up getting shattered due to his illusory hopes. For
Hata, the heart cannot be separated from the here of experience.
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As we approach the later part of the narrative, we find Hata gradually beginning to form
significant relationships in his life. The present-tense story, given in an interspersed way amidst
his recollections, gradually shows us how Hata has, almost unwittingly, become friends with Liv
and Renee Banerjee, who had been in his life because of their work – Liv being the real estate
agent, and Renee being a worker at the hospital – yet had not been presented as Hata’s
significant acquaintances at the beginning of the novel. Very similar to the way we build
friendships and relations in life, they become people whose well-being and happiness Hata takes
concerns at, in response to their kindness and help. Also, we learn that Sunny comes back to his
life, even tentatively. Hearing the news of his accident, she sends a card unanimously, which
provokes him to search for her, find her and catches up with her at the mall where she works as
the manager of a women’s clothing store. Hata learns that he is now a grandfather, Sunny having
given birth to a son a few years before. Hata realizes that the reason Sunny had sent a card to him
was for the sake of her son, which he does not mind. As Hata came to befriend Thomas, the
grandson, Hata gets to know the blissful feeling of enjoying the company of his offspring.
One day, while leisurely enjoying the company of Thomas swimming in a public pool in
Bedley Run, Hata gets briefly preoccupied with congratulating the engagement of Liv and
Renee. Suddenly, Hata realizes that Thomas is not in sight, that he could be possibly drowning.
Trying to save the children who seem to be missing, Renee wades into the water, too, and
undergoes a heart attack and almost drowns. The whole situation is explained minutely, yet we
learn these things explicitly thanks to the way Hata takes in the whole of the situation, in a
concentrated focusing, the way one’s mind perceives and processes things in hyper clarity when
very critical things are unfolding. Hata, that is, does not think twice as he perceives that Thomas
might be drowning, with Renee probably undergoing a heart attack as well; he dives to the
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deeper water, without trying to seek help from the life guards, his instinct telling himself that that
should be where Thomas should be, and he does not have time to seek help from others. Hata
finds Thomas’s little body curled up underwater, hands Thomas to the lifeguards, directly
proceeding then to take Renee out of the water:
Everything is happening instantly and simultaneously; his hand seems to be a sign not
only from Renny but Thomas, too, and the long knives of panic pierce my chest and
belly. I want to have faith in the lifeguards but they’re so young, and not turning back to
check Renny, I swim as fast as I can out to the line of red-and-white floats. It’s deep out
there and I realize that this is where Thomas would be, this is where he would put
himself, and when I dive I am absolutely sure I’ll see him. And I do: a stocky little figure,
crouched as if sitting, his shape hardly discernable. I kick and swoop under him and then
lift us upward. When we surface, two lifeguards take him and swim him quickly to shore.
I let them because I think I wish to have faith, because there is really nothing but that for
someone like me, and because of Renny, because I can’t stand yet another abandonment
in my life, even if it’s for a brief moment.455
Here, Hata makes it certain that he does not “abandon” anyone in his life anymore. In the context
of the larger narrative, such a determination derives from Hata having squarely faced the past
tragedies of his life, where, because of the illusory idea of duty, honor, or paying the debt one
owes to the benevolence of his larger society, he abandoned K, Sunny, and then Mary Burns. It
is critical that Hata’s refusal to abandon his loved ones manifests as a direct act of saving their
lives in this passage, considering Hata’s realization that his hopes for “saving” K only led to her
detrimental, horrific end. Here, affection or love directly translates into trying to save the loved
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ones’ life – that is, the biological here is no longer attached to the biopolitical. Hata, that is, has
succeeded in transvaluation – the setting free of the significance of life from its confinement in
nihilism.
Once, Ono told Hata that Hata would never make himself into a good surgeon, since Hata
lacks the resolve and concentration that Ono thinks of as essential in anyone’s being a surgeon.
Ono attributes what he sees as Hata’s certain failure to the his “germ of infirmity”:
“You are not an incapable young officer, Lieutenant Kurohata,” he said, exhaling the
spice-edged smoke. “But you are gravely misguided, most all of the time. I fear I shall
believe this about you to my death. You probably don’t care. But I know you believe I
take you to task because of your parentage. I’ve always known of this, yes. But that never
matted to me, It’s for the weak and lame-minded to focus on such things. Blood is only
so useful, or hindering. The rest of strong thought and strong action. This is why,
Lieutenant, I find myself unable to cease critiquing you. There is the germ of infirmity in
you, which infects everything you touch or attempt. Besides all else, how do you think
you will ever become a surgeon? A surgeon determines his course and acts. He goes to
the point he has determined without any other faith, and commits to an execution. You,
Lieutenant, too much depend upon generous fate and gesture. There is no internal
possession, no embodiment. Thus you fail in some measure always. You perennially
disappoint someone like me.456
Ono goes on to point to Hata that, while Hata is trying to sound “resolute” about his intentions
about K, there is “nothing in [Hata’s] face or posture that will convince [Ono] of his desires,”
that the only “solid” thing in Hata for then were “sentimental feeling and hope.”457 For Ono, the
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457

Ibid., 266.
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fact that Hata cannot be firm and strong have to do with having sentimental feelings for K,
someone who is not a legitimate “female” subject of the nation.
Yet Hata’s later concentration and focus in saving the lives of those he cares – who he
saves, as we cannot but clearly note, in the precise order of his grandson followed by his friend –
attests to the innate build-up, the “embodiment,” of a purpose that he came to possess. As Ono
would have it, Hata “determined his course and acted”; having set his purposes, Hata “went to
the point without any other faith, and committed to an execution.” Yet, by succeeding to save
lives, Hata has not become another Ono. Having gone through the series of reflections about his
former life that have led him back to the pit of his most painful, traumatizing landscapes, Hata
has indeed realized a transvaluation in his life. When he was striving to become a model
“subject” of his series of nations and societies, Hata used to be a mere near-success, someone
who seemed to be “not incapable” but “perennially turning out to be a failure” for the likes of
Ono. Having transported himself into the imagined landscapes that have reconstructed the sense
of living vectorial realities, Hata has become able to commit to a goal and execute it, completely
letting go of himself in the process for the sake of saving lives in the sense he knows. He no
longer commits himself to the preservation of the morality of his society, the morality that
Nietzsche critiques as slavish and Christian. He has saved lives because our physical bodies are
the markers of our centers and landscapes, and without the heart that tells us to “go on,” to
“persist” in our vectors, there is no life for us either.
In the recounted narrative, Hata recalls how, when he was a young soldier, he used to be
embarrassed about his name. It connotes his demure, common background; etymologically
derived from the ancient family of apothecaries, hata means “flag,” the flag of warning that a
whole village was contaminated with disease. Ono makes fun of the name, encouraging Hata to
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use a black flag as a sign for the two of them to communicate about the state of the confined K;
yet the black flag, even then, could have meant a portent sign that something about the society
that Ono represented could be contaminated, or in danger of getting corrupted, with the kind of
“infirmity” that Hata harbored as only a germ of by then. When Ono finally hangs up a black
piece of cloth to signal to Hata that the time for him to execute his plans on her is near, Hata
mistakes the flag “at first sight” to be “a blank spot in my vision, a colorless void”; the way the
flag hangs on the pole makes it look like a “shiny, burnt parchment.” This image of a void, or a
hole, appearing in the midst of what used to seem like normal vision of reality, connects to the
later incident in Hata’s life when he ends up nearly burning down his house, as an unconscious
yet potent protest against the whole of reality represented by the house. Hata, indeed, should be
someone who spreads the disease of “infirmity” to the society that is seemingly invulnerable
with its inhumanity. In that society Hata used to live as someone who nearly embodied its ideal,
yet part of him continued to value what could eventually undo it as a whole. His interest in
psychology, and his care with the increasing mental failure of Corporal Endo, makes him an
object of derision of the whole of the camp, not to mention Captain Ono. Hata feels strongly
indignant to be marked as a “failure” like Endo, who ended up getting executed by eventually
“helping” K’s sister escape her fate through death. Later, when we see K’s ghost having a
conversation with Hata, her naked body is draped in the black silken flag. The enduring presence
of K, thus, is the testament to both Hata’s dishonor in failing to be the perfect embodiment of the
dutiful soldier of the Japanese imperial nation.
Yet, by the ending of this passage, the significance of the black flag shifts to denote
Hata’s ultimate triumph. While Ono was perpetually deriding Hata, Ono was also apparently
afraid that his own reality, wherein he was strong and firm, could dissolve thanks to someone
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like Hata, which is manifest in his calling his weakness a “germ.” By becoming a strong person
who can save his loved ones, Hata belatedly proves that Ono’s strength was only a masked
cowardice; strength can also be grounded on what Ono saw was vulnerability – respecting what
one truly feels in his heart and devoting his life to saving what he loves, without even having
time to be afraid of possible consequences. In announcing that he will continue to live along the
cycle of returns, Hata proclaims that “I will fly a flag.” This announces his full embracement of
his new self; he will not try to belong anywhere the way he was forcing himself to belong to his
societies all his life. He would be perennially content to live as a “void” that emerges in every
seemingly perfect, integral homes. “I will be outside looking in . . . Almost come home.” The
movement of his life will, from now on, comfortably occupy the positionality of a possible void
in his societies, opening them up to new transvaluations. Yet such a life will win.
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